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Abstract 
 
Since the 1990s, democratisation has been upheld by international institutions, donor 
governments and development agencies as a means to achieve stability and 
development in post-conflict contexts. Conceived of as a way in which to make ‘fragile 
states’ less ‘fragile’, through encouraging greater interaction between individual citizens 
and the state structure, democratisation has been integral to post-conflict statebuilding 
programmes. To date, however, little evidence has emerged to indicate whether or not 
these programmes have actually facilitated any change in the relationship between ruler 
and ruled.  
 
Contemporary attempts to conceptualise, measure and practice democratisation 
commonly focus on the nature of the state-citizen relationship, and in doing so tend to 
portray the concepts of ‘the state’ and ‘the citizen’ as constant (or ideally constant) 
across contexts. In conflict-affected fragile states such as Afghanistan, however, 
standard conceptions of what the state should be or what role it should play, in the 
predominant Weberian legal-rational sense, are difficult to apply – primarily because 
these states have not emerged historically as did western European states. Expecting 
fragile states to fit the Weberian model, or produce a liberal brand of the state-citizen 
relationship, thus seems untenable. This thesis explores whether democratisation might 
occur in spaces other than that of this seemingly fundamental relationship. 
Using Charles Tilly’s 2007 framework as a basis for enquiry, the research examines the 
case of Afghanistan through compiling an historical narrative of ruler-ruled 
relationships and through analysing a new data set of local perspectives on the state 
collected from three provinces. The study concludes that alterations to this framework 
are needed if the nuances of change in the ruler-ruled relationship are to be captured 
adequately. Developing an alternative, the Comprehensive Democratisation Indicators 
(CDI) approach, the researcher argues that employing centre-community and state-
citizen constructs in parallel provides a much more holistic picture of political change in 
contexts where the liberal institutions of ‘state’ and ‘citizen’ have not taken hold.  
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PREAMBLE: A THESIS IN BRIEF  
General overview: Identifying the research problem  
Since the 1990s, democratisation has been upheld by international institutions, donor 
governments and development agencies as a means to achieve stability and 
development in post-conflict contexts (Lake, 1994; UNDP, 2002: 1). Conceived of as a 
way in which to make ‘fragile states’ less ‘fragile’, through encouraging greater 
interaction between individual citizens and the state structure, democratisation has been 
integral to post-conflict statebuilding programmes. To date, however, little evidence has 
emerged to indicate whether or not these programmes have actually facilitated any 
change in the relationship between ruler and ruled in fragile contexts. This thesis argues 
that a central reason for this lack of evidence is the mismatch between an inflexible, 
liberal framework for conceptualising democratic change on the one hand, and fragile 
contexts that do not conform to the parameters of this framework, on the other.  
In Afghanistan, since the beginning of the international intervention in 2001 the push to 
democratise has been donor-led – and in spite of considerable differences between 
donors in terms of what internationally-promoted democratisation should comprise or 
what its end-goal should be, several uniform assumptions have characterised their 
approaches. One of these assumptions has been that key tenets of liberal western 
democracy, such as individual voting, property and other citizenship rights, gender 
equality, the development of civil society and freedom of the press, for example, are 
universal values that can and should be promoted in the Afghan context (as 
demonstrated by the way in which these values pervade Afghanistan’s Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Program, the Afghanistan National Development Strategy or 
ANDS). Another assumption, more fundamentally, which not only features in donor 
approaches in contexts like Afghanistan but is also reflected in the democratisation and 
statebuilding literatures in general (for example across works as diverse as those of 
Larry Diamond, Robert Dahl, Jean Grugel, and Sunil Bastian and Robin Luckham) is 
that the promotion and development of a more interactive relationship between 
individual citizens and the state relationship is central to democratisation. Within this, 
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discourses of democratisation tend to portray the concepts of ‘the state’ and ‘the citizen’ 
as constant across contexts. In the specific set of circumstances that characterise 
conflict-affected fragile states in particular, however, these concepts can exist or be 
interpreted in ways that do not always conform to western assumptions.  
Indeed, particularly in conflict-affected fragile states such as Afghanistan, standard 
conceptions of what the state should be or what role it should play, in the predominant 
Weberian legal-rational sense, are difficult to apply – hence the ‘fragile’ label. 
Democratisation in these contexts – and especially following international military 
intervention – is often initiated by international actors according to a liberal agenda in 
spite of the way in which the role and authorities of the state do not comply with a 
western-European model, and regardless of the way in which the relationship between 
citizen and state is often not institutionalised in a uniform fashion across the country. 
These shortcomings are considered ‘fixable’: in many cases a blueprint for liberal 
democratisation is developed and operationalised by international actors on the 
assumption that this relationship can be established and rolled out, cultivated through 
external intervention. Yet, if states have not developed according to similar historical 
trajectories to those in which western European states emerged, it is possible to query 
this dominant notion that they could or should be moulded to fit the Weberian model, or 
expected to produce a liberal brand of the state-citizen relationship. This begs the 
question: is it conceivable that democratisation might occur in spaces other than that of 
this seemingly fundamental relationship? Evidently, the answer to this will depend very 
much on the way in which democratisation is conceptualised and defined in fragile 
contexts.   
The primary aim of this research is to explore and examine the validity of the dominant 
assumption of the centrality of a state-citizen relationship as the basis for 
democratisation in conflict-affected fragile contexts. It does not seek to argue against 
liberal democracy in and of itself, but rather to question the ways in which it is 
interpreted and applied in the special circumstances that fragile states present. Focusing 
on three distinct areas of theory, measurement and practice, it asks:  is the state-citizen 
relationship necessarily central to the theoretical concept, measurement and practice of 
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democratisation? If so, how can the theory, practice and measurement of 
democratisation be applied to fragile states, if at all?   
Theory 
The way in which democracy developed in Western Europe is often explained in the 
literature with reference to the historical, simultaneous development of democratic 
regimes and nation-states. Even at a basic conceptual level, then, democracy and the 
Western nation-state are strongly interconnected. This conceptual connection is further 
emphasised in the study of comparative politics wherein idealized legal-rational states 
provide convenient means of political analysis across differing contexts. As bounded 
entities with internationally recognized borders, they are portrayed as sovereign 
territories within which a governmental body holds both a monopoly of violence and 
the sole responsibility for macroeconomic decision-making and resource distribution.  
While critiques of this conflagration of democracy with the nation-state have 
strengthened and developed in recent years, with the work of democracy theorists such 
as David Held (1999; 2006) questioning the nature of state sovereignty in a globalising 
twenty-first century, the majority of democracy and democratisation theorists still treat 
the Weberian ideal state as a constant. Questions concerning the nature of state 
sovereignty arise frequently in fragile states, which are often venues for intrusive 
international intervention in what might otherwise be considered domestic affairs, and 
yet the literature on statebuilding in these contexts sits uncomfortably with these 
questions.  As Stephen D. Krasner has noted, “[a]dressing [a problematised notion of 
state sovereignty] requires altering basic ontological categories such as the state as the 
key actor in the international system” (Krasner, 2009:21). Krasner goes on to question 
the very utility of established theoretical approaches to the contexts of fragile states, 
asserting that “[i]f a state is not autonomous, conventional analytic approaches, whether 
realist or liberal, are of little value” (Krasner, 2009:21). Furthermore, recent trends in 
the democratisation literature have seen democratisation characterized as movement 
toward a more interactive, accountable and transparent relationship between state and 
individual citizen (Grugel, 2002; Bastian and Luckham, 2003; Tilly, 2007). 
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Statebuilding thus involves the strengthening of state institutions to facilitate this kind 
of relationship. This overlooks, however, the way in which in many fragile contexts, 
collective, community interests often take the place of or overlap with individual ones, 
leaving little space for individual interaction with the state. This highlights the 
inadequacy of existing approaches to conceptualizing democratisation in contexts in 
which the state does not conform to a Weberian model, and points to a considerable gap 
in the democratisation and statebuilding literatures.  
Measurement 
In an attempt to compare levels of democracy across different country contexts, a 
number of theorists have attempted to measure demcratisation according to their own 
sets of criteria. Some, such as the Polity Model (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995), Freedom 
House (2011) and Tatu Vanhanen (2000) offer quantitative comparisons based on 
democracy criteria that are assigned numerical scores. Others, such as Charles Tilly 
(2007), base analysis on qualitative accounts of historical processes. Common to all 
these approaches however, is the centrality of the state-citizen relationship in one form 
or another in determining how democratic a country is or is not. Whether portrayed in 
terms of how often elections are held, how competitive they are, how officials respond 
to citizen demands over time, or how ‘free’ civil society activism in opposition to a 
given government appears to be, for example, this construct is critical to contemporary 
means of measuring democracy. In general, the more interactive the state-citizen 
relationship, and the more established the social contract (and methods of renegotiating 
it) between them, the more democratic a given state.  
Yet, in spite of the apparent simplicity of these approaches, there remains a paucity of 
information documenting if, how and how much democratisation has occurred in 
conflict-affected fragile states. Why is this the case?   In Afghanistan, as the 
international intervention comes to an end, after more than decade, there is no available 
information about how or to what extent, if at all, ‘democratisation’ has occurred in the 
country. This demonstrates, among other things, the inadequacy of current models of 
measuring democratisation to fit the characteristics of fragile states.  
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Practice 
Developed as part of broader statebuilding programs, internationally-promoted 
democratisation in conflict-affected fragile contexts is necessarily state-centric: it is 
designed to increase the capacity of the state to respond to citizen needs and demands. 
Often promoted indirectly as ‘governance’ programmes by development agents such as 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and bi-lateral aid agencies, it 
often features a strong focus on the accountable and transparent delivery of state-
provided services. This comes hand in hand with the expectation that state capacity can 
and will be strengthened over time – that the fragile state can be ‘fixed’ to conform 
more directly with western ideals of what a state is and does. Programmes are designed 
and implemented to achieve greater state capacity, autonomy and boundedness: the goal 
is a more Weberian model of statehood. One only need consider the titles of major 
works in the literature, such as “Fixing Failed States” (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008), to 
determine that assumptions made about what a state should be have significant effect on 
the ways in which programmes are designed. In this respect, working towards the 
increased interaction between individual citizen and state fits well with the international 
statebuilding project – and yet, it is arguable that this target is more valuable to 
international actors than it is to the citizens of the fragile state in question (Barakat and 
Larson, 2013).  At the same time, imposing certain liberal democratic values and 
assumptions as to how a fragile state should democratise can in itself undermine state 
sovereignty.  
This thesis seeks to examine the assumption of the centrality of the state-citizen 
relationship within current democratisation theory, measurement and practice. It 
examines whether alternative conceptualisations of how people interact with central 
authorities in fragile contexts could actual prove more insightful in terms of assessing 
democratic change.  
Theoretical approach 
This research is informed by and situated within three areas of academic scholarship:  
existing theoretical concepts of democratisation and the state; different models of 
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measuring democratisation; and the practice of internationally-promoted 
democratisation in fragile contexts as documented in the statebuilding literature. In 
addition, existing accounts of democratisation in Afghanistan are surveyed.  These four 
bodies of literature – which, combined, present an interdisciplinary approach spanning 
comparative politics, international relations, and post-conflict statebuilding – are 
reviewed selectively in chapters 1 and 2.  
Revealing the inadequacy of many contemporary attempts to conceptualise and measure 
democratisation when applied to fragile states, having compared three of these 
approaches in depth (those of the Polity model, Vanhanen and Tilly) the review 
highlights the importance of historical analysis to understanding how these states 
developed, and how the relationship between ruler and ruled within them has changed 
over time.   An historical focus provides a necessary tool toward understanding why, 
historically and politically, fragile contexts are or have become fragile, rather than 
assuming the democratisation process to have begun simply with the establishment of a 
political settlement in the aftermath of conflict, or with the first roumd of national 
elections, or the introduction of universal suffrage.  Tilly’s approach is shown to be the 
most convincing of the three models compared in this respect. 
As outlined and justified in depth in chapter 3, Tilly contributes a comprehensive model 
for conceptualising and measuring democratisation that is grounded in political and 
historical narrative. It assesses democratisation (and de-democratisation) by analysing 
changes in the state-citizen relationship over time. These changes are divided into four 
distinct but overlapping categories: breadth, equality, protection and mutually-binding 
consultation, which, combined, allow a comprehensive analysis of how changes in the 
relationship between ruler and ruled occur. Through this model, Tilly claims to be able 
to assess “the entire world and a great deal of human history”, implying its applicability 
to any state, regardless of its capacity or democraticness (2007: 7). On testing this 
claim, in attempting to apply an adapted version of Tilly’s model to the Afghan case, 
the researcher finds that in spite of its nuanced understandings of how states and 
citizens interact, Tilly’s fundamental assumptions about what states and citizens are and 
do still prevent its useful application to fragile contexts. The researcher then further 
15 
 
modifies the model to allow for a broader focus on relationships beyond that of the 
state-citizen.  
Central thesis 
This research questions the extent to which a state-citizen relationship is a central 
condition of democratisation. It attempts to unpick basic assumptions about this 
relationship that are dominant within current theory, measurement and practice of 
democratisation, in an attempt to see whether it is possible to reformulate the discourse 
of democratisation in a manner that allows more accurate application to fragile states. In 
doing so it necessarily refutes the notion that fragile states are by default ‘undemocratic’ 
as a result of their fragility, and questions the criteria on which current standards of 
‘democraticness’ are based. This is important because democratisation may be 
taking place in fragile states in ways and spaces that are not captured by 
conventional means to measure it according to a state-citizen model.  
The three central hypotheses of this study are as follows: 
 The state-citizen relationship is only central to theoretical concepts of 
democratisation to the extent that no alternative currently exists. Democracy 
theorists commonly assume a strengthening relationship between the state and 
its individual citizens as a necessary characteristic of movement toward 
democratisation – but this precludes application to fragile contexts. An 
alternative means of conceptualizing democratisation is needed, because there 
may be aspects of democratisation that are taking place in these contexts that 
exist outside the limitations of the state-citizen relationship. 
 It is possible to measure levels of democratisation and how they change within 
fragile contexts. In order to do so, however, an historical and political narrative 
is imperative to understand the nature of the relationship between rulers and 
ruled over time, so as to establish how that relationship has changed, and how 
resource management has been affected as a result. Analyses based only around 
narrow interpretations of liberal democracy, such as the holding of elections, 
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party institutionalisation or civil society activism, will mean little in contexts in 
which these institutions are unfamiliar to much of the population.    
 The state-citizen relationship is only central to the practice of internationally-
promoted democratisation in fragile states to the extent that international actors 
such as the UN are unable to move away from a one-size-fits-all blueprint of 
democratisation that prioritises the building of state capacity.  
 Contribution of the thesis 
At present, democratisation in fragile states is largely considered an elusive and/or non-
existent phenomenon, because, for a number of different reasons, governments in these 
states do not have the capacity or political will to interact with all citizens in a uniform, 
predictable and accountable manner. Frameworks designed to measure democratic 
change rely on there being at least the potential for interaction between the state and 
individual citizens, whether it be in the form of tax collection (and subsequent 
expectations of service provision), recourse for unjust state intervention, elections, or 
the existence of opposition movements, for example – and yet     fragile states, by 
nature, do not always comply with these requirements, and thus are often dismissed as 
undemocratic or ‘not free’, to use Freedom House terminology.  
One of the central contributions of this thesis is the way in which it demonstrates, 
however, that while democratisation must occur as change in the relationship between 
ruler and ruled, this change is not necessarily best captured through a state-citizen lens, 
due to the limiting liberal attributes of this construct. For example, it demonstrates how 
assumptions of the individuality and uniformity of citizenship over space and time, 
alongside assumptions of the state as a unified, coherent entity, simply do not translate 
into the conflict-affected context of Afghanistan. Thus, while the ways in which 
communities interact with central authorities may become more or less democratic in 
the aftermath of conflict, for instance, any shifts in this regard would be missed by 
existing methods of democratisation analysis.  
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In its adaptation of Tilly’s model, the research consolidates this contribution in 
presenting an alternative framework for assessing levels of democratisation in fragile 
states. Instead of relying on a singular, central focus on the state-citizen relationship, 
this framework – the Comprehensive Democratisation Indicators or CDI approach – 
advocates the use of a ‘centre-community’ analysis in parallel to an assessment based 
on the state-citizen construct. The researcher argues that in combining two sets of 
indicators, analysts can assess the extent to which political change occurs in fragile 
states without having to wait for liberal democratic structures and institutions to emerge 
(should they ever do so). At the same time, the CDI approach does not preclude the 
possibility that a more liberal state-citizen relationship may be actively sought and to 
some extent experienced by some individuals and groups in society.  Moreover, this is a 
reflexive approach: as change occurs within a given community or state, different 
combinations of the two sets of indicators can be used, reflecting the dynamic natures of 
fragility and democratisation.  
In terms of the placement of its contribution to the academic literature, this thesis can be 
situated firmly within and between both the existing democratisation and statebuilding 
literatures. In bridging a gap between theory and practice, it combines the two in a way 
that engages with both fields of enquiry. Statebuilding in Afghanistan has been the 
focus of a growing critique within the academic and policy-oriented literature (see for 
example Cramer and Goodhand 2002; Rubin, 2004; Goodhand 2009; Suhrke 2011), as 
has the nature of the state itself and how it has developed historically (Edwards, 1996; 
Rubin, 2002; Barfield, 2010). However, little has been written academically on the 
subject of democratisation in Afghanistan. Although a number of technical reports, 
surveys and journalistic articles have been produced – respectively highlighting the 
successes of some technical intervention (NDI, 2011; Larson, 2011a) the percentage of 
Afghans who think the country is going in the ‘right direction’ (The Asia Foundation, 
2012) or the perceived contradictions between Western and Afghan versions of 
‘democracy’, (Rubin, 2004; Barry and Greene, 2009; Larson 2009b, 2011b) there has 
been little systematic assessment of how democratisation might occur.  
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There are reasons for this gap in the literature – including the paucity of reliable 
statistics in Afghanistan, the difficulty in collecting widespread and trustworthy 
qualitative data, and the growing donor fatigue with democratisation narratives in 
favour of stabilization and political settlement. Drawing on eight years of research 
conducted in Afghanistan, and 154 interviews conducted by the researcher and a team 
of Afghan analysts and researchers at the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 
(AREU), this study makes a significant contribution to the existing literature in drawing 
on a large source of qualitative data otherwise difficult to access in the Afghan context.  
The research is aimed at two different audiences – the first, an academic one, in the 
exploration of potentially new means through which to conceptualise and measure 
democratisation in fragile environments. The second audience is that of policy-makers 
and practitioners working both directly in the field of democracy promotion, and also 
indirectly as development agents working in the field of governance. The latter of these 
may indeed be more receptive to the research findings, given the broader focus and 
definition of governance programmes as compared to the generally narrow list of 
activities to which democracy-promotion actors are normally confined. This is 
represented in Figure 1 below by the larger blue arrows linking CDI with development 
agents working in governance, as opposed to the smaller orange arrows linking CDI 
with democracy promotion agencies/analysis.  Alongside these groups, particular 
emphasis is placed on addressing policy-makers within G7+ governments, a group of 17 
self-described fragile states who propose a “New Deal for [donor] Engagement” in their 
countries (G7+, 2012). Findings from this research speak clearly in support of this new 
deal, specifically in terms of re-defining donor approaches to democratisation and 
correspond with the adoption of greater consideration of context-specific factors. As 
empirically-based research, solidly grounded within the Afghan context but also 
potentially applicable in other fragile environments, the thesis offers valuable lessons 
that could be applied to interventions in other contexts – and indeed to the continuing 
international involvement in Afghanistan. 
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Figure 1: Diagram of audiences addressed by the thesis
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Study structure: How the thesis progresses 
The thesis begins in chapter 1 with an in-depth review of the existing literature on 
democratisation and the state, examining historical and current conceptions of both and 
how they interact. This reflects how the researcher first approached the topic of 
democratisation, wanting to explore in more detail the conceptual links between 
democracy and the state, laying the foundations for an enquiry as to their application to 
fragile contexts. This is followed in chapter 2 with a further review of literature on three 
related topics: the measurement of democratisation; internationally-promoted 
                                                          
1
 Acronyms represent the following agencies and organisations: UNDP (United Nations Development 
Programme); USAID (United States Agency for International Development); NSP (Afghanistan National 
Solidarity Program); DFID (UK Department for International Development); ODI (Overseas 
Development Institute); CSOs (Civil Society Organisations); USIP (United States Institute for Peace); 
NIMD (Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy); IDEA (International Institute for Democracy 
and Electoral Assistance); IFES (International Foundation for Electoral Systems); IRI (International 
Republican Institute); NDI (National Democratic Institute); NED (National Endowment for Democracy).      
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democratisation and statebuilding in fragile/post-war states; and democratisation in 
Afghanistan, the chosen case study for this research. These subjects in turn gradually 
narrow the field of enquiry from the initial, broad starting point of the literature review 
in chapter 1. At the end of chapter 2, considering all four topics surveyed throughout the 
literature review, the researcher reflects on gaps in existing scholarship that have 
emerged.  In particular, the review reveals the way in which contemporary concepts of, 
means to measure and current international practice of democratisation rest on the 
dominant assumption of the centrality of the liberal state-citizen relationship. It notes 
how this relationship appears to function differently in fragile, conflict-affected contexts 
and yet how there remains no way of conceptualising democratisation in these 
circumstances without reliance on the state-citizen construct.  
In spite of this observation, however, the review identifies one framework for 
measuring democratisation – Charles Tilly’s (2007) – that emphasizes nuance and 
change in this relationship over and above the technicalities of elections and elite 
bargains, for example. While it remains wedded to the liberal notions of ‘state’ and 
‘citizen’ it demonstrates a central concern for historical narrative and treats 
democratisation as a comprehensive set of political processes very much affected by the 
context in which they are situated.  
For these reasons, in chapter 3, the researcher justifies her decision to use Tilly’s 
framework as a basis for exploring the state-citizen relationship in a fragile context – 
Afghanistan. Based on the information gathered throughout the literature review, and 
the gaps identified, the researcher develops the theoretical outline of the thesis, 
formulates the central line of argument and presents three hypotheses related to Tilly’s 
model. The chapter describes how the researcher then intends to apply Tilly’s 
framework to the Afghan case.  Chapter 4 presents the field methods used to collect 
primary data for the study, first outlining themes within the existing literature on 
conducting fieldwork in fragile contexts before expanding on how the researcher 
conducted data collection in Afghanistan. A sampling design is given and justified, 
followed by an explanation of the limitations faced and reflections on what could have 
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been done differently given greater flexibility in the process. The end of chapter 4 
signifies the end of the thesis’ opening material. 
Chapter 5 presents the start of the researcher’s application of Tilly’s model to the 
Afghan case. Following Tilly’s emphasis on historical events and processes and the way 
in which they affect the relationship between ruler and ruled in a given context, the 
chapter develops an historical narrative for Afghanistan, tracking the ways in which this 
relationship has changed over time. Then, having established the historical/political 
paths in Afghanistan that have contributed to the way in which Afghans currently relate 
to central government authorities, in chapter 6 the researcher begins to examine the 
primary data. In doing so she asks whether it would be possible to apply Tilly’s 
conceptualisation of how democratisation occurs to the Afghan case, starting with his 
criteria of breadth and equality. Chapter 7 then continues this examination of primary 
data, moving on to the criteria of protection and mutually-binding consultation. It 
concludes with a summary of the problems that arose as a result of this attempted 
application, and points to the need for an amended model that might better suit the 
complexities of fragile contexts. 
Chapter 8 takes this idea further and explores potential amendments to Tilly’s model, 
asking whether there is a way to avoid central reliance on the state-citizen relationship, 
perhaps combining it with a parallel focus on ‘centre-community’ interaction. Based on 
the findings from the primary data analysis, the centre-community construct would 
appear a more appropriate construct for analysis in some (primarily but not exclusively 
rural) areas of Afghanistan, while looking at the changing relationship between 
individuals and state structures remains useful in some urban contexts. The researcher 
develops the Comprehensive Democratisation Indicators (CDI) approach, a flexible 
framework for analysing democratisation in fragile states that provides two sets of 
indicators than can be combined to assess how the relationship between ruler and ruled 
might be changing over time. The chapter assesses the benefits that the CDI approach 
could bring to current theory, measurement and practice of democratisation.  Finally, 
chapter 9 summarises the findings of the research, broadening the scope from a specific 
Afghanistan focus to fragile states more generally. It concludes that there needs to be a 
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better way to conceptualise, measure and practice democratisation in fragile states, 
because current means to do so remain inadequate, and presents the CDI approach as a 
plausible alternative. Addressing donors and practitioners of democracy promotion in 
particular, it offers 10 principles for the further enhancement of democratisation in 
fragile states, and suggests areas for future research.  
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CHAPTER 1: DEMOCRATISATION, THE STATE AND THE CITIZEN:  
TRANSITION, SOVEREIGNTY, FRAGILITY 
The literature review for this study surveys existing scholarship relating to post-conflict 
democratisation in conflict-affected fragile states. This literature is divided into four 
categories: first, the literature on the theory of democratisation, the state and the citizen 
in general; second, the literature on measuring democracy and democratisation; third, 
the available literature on the international practice of post-conflict democratisation; and 
fourth, existing studies of democratisation in Afghanistan. These four categories are 
split across two chapters (1 and 2). This chapter comprises the first category – 
theoretical concepts of democratisation, the state and the citizen, assigning more weight 
to this particular review of literature given its relative importance to the thesis.
2
 
1.1 Theoretical concepts of democracy and democratisation 
1.1.1 Democracy and liberal democracy  
The body of literature on democracy as a theoretical and political concept is vast, and 
thus in order to focus discussion helpfully, the researcher has chosen to review literature 
that focuses primarily on democratisation – how democracy emerges and consolidates – 
particularly in post-conflict and conflict-affected contexts. It is necessary to begin 
however with a brief discussion of how democracy itself is defined in this body of 
work. 
According to Larry Diamond, during the 1990s democracy became “a global 
phenomenon, the predominant form of government, and the only broadly legitimate 
form of government in the world” (Diamond, 2003, emphasis in original). Such a claim 
is ostensibly substantiated by the estimation that 117 of the world’s 195 states are now 
electoral democracies (Freedom House, 2012a).  
This assertion is nevertheless problematic: first, due to the contested definition of 
democracy itself. As observed by many scholars, democracy is not only practiced but 
                                                          
2
 Brief background reviews of three further related topics – institutions, rational choice institutionalism, 
historical institutionalism and  interpretivist views of social explanation are given in Appendix 1.  
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also defined in a variety of different ways (Esposito and Voll, 1996; Zakaria, 1997; 
Leftwich et al., 2002). Advocates for a minimalist definition of the term argue that a 
political system determined by free and fair elections, along with universal suffrage, 
constitutes the meaning of democracy (Schumpeter, 1942; Huntington, 1991/1992; 
Przeworski, 1999; Zakaria, 1997). Many further distinctions have been made, however, 
for example between ‘formal (or electoral) democracy’, ‘participatory democracy’ and 
‘social democracy’ – a transition from the former to one or both of the latter two 
considered desirable in the consolidation and achievement of democratic outcomes 
(Huber et al., 1997). Formal democracy is a term used by Huber et al. to acknowledge 
the existence of democratic institutions (such as elections) but also to imply that few 
democratic outcomes (such as universal political and social rights) have materialized as 
a result. Luckham et al. (2003:18) contribute to this debate in their distinguishing the 
establishment of democratic institutions from the consolidation of democratic politics. 
Perhaps the most commonly used definition of democracy is in fact ‘liberal democracy’, 
combining as it does the tenets of the election of government by the people (democracy 
in its most basic form) with aspects of liberal governance such as rule of law, free 
speech, freedom of religion, the separation of powers and property rights (Zakaria, 
1997:1; Plattner, 1999). For Diamond, ‘liberal’ refers most specifically to the protection 
of citizens from arbitrary state action, or “a political system in which individual and 
group liberties are well protected and in which there exist autonomous spheres of civil 
society and private life, insulated from state control” (1999: 3). This perspective, 
specifically of individual liberty, stems originally from the liberal principles attributed 
to the works of John Locke (1960 [1689]) and John Stuart Mill (1963), which outlined 
arguments for the innate freedoms of individuals and the need for any restrictions on 
these freedoms (for example in the form of the actions of authoritative governments) to 
be justified. Many centuries earlier, Plato’s Republic had discussed the nature of a 
political system in which individual men and (city-)states acted justly towards one 
another. In the 17
th
 century, philosophers including  Thomas Hobbes (1948 [1651]), 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1973 [1762]) and Immanuel Kant (1999 [1797]) would take 
this idea further in the development of thought around the social contract – or the way 
political systems should operate in a manner whereby governments interact with 
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individual citizens, but in which citizen interests and fundamental liberties are 
protected.   
Liberalism as a school of thought has burgeoned from these origins into a vast and 
multi-faceted field, which lies beyond the scope of this thesis, but the central tenets of 
early liberal thought have persisted and maintain a direct influence on the work of 
current liberal democracy proponents, including Diamond, Robert Dahl, Marc F. 
Plattner, Kenneth A. Bollen among many others.
3
 Translated into the characteristics of 
modern liberal democratic systems, these central values now correspond with regular, 
competitive elections, the separation and limitation of powers through constitutional 
provisions, and, perhaps most fundamentally, the protected rights of individual citizens.         
As Zakaria (1997) and Plattner (1999) observe, however, while the characteristics of 
liberal democracy outlined above and in Diamond’s liberal definition of a democratic 
political system have come to constitute a widely accepted definition of democracy in a 
given country, they represent an assumed merging of democracy with constitutional 
liberalism (Zakaria, 1997). Indeed, while democracy per se (as a means of electing 
government) may be widespread, it is not always accompanied by the aspects of 
constitutional liberalism that feature in a liberal democracy (Zakaria, 1997: 1).
4
  
In spite of the debate concerning how democracy should be defined, however, and to 
what extent it does or should include aspects of constitutional liberalism, it has been 
noted by some scholars that the term is still used by academics and policy makers as a 
single, unambiguous concept, and one which should be promoted globally as the most 
equitable form of government (Esposito and Voll, 1996). Indeed, as Esposito and Voll 
contend, “[i]n the current global context, most who advocate democratisation still do 
not recognize it as an essentially contested concept” (1996:14).  This is problematic for 
a number of reasons, not least that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model of democratic governance 
is often prescribed irrespective of different contexts, and that values specific to liberal 
constitutionalism are presumed universal goods. Further, because certain assumptions 
                                                          
3
 For more on the connections and distinctions between liberalism and liberal democracy, see Plattner 
(1999).  
4
 For further discussion on Zakaria’s arguments, see Larson 2009: 3-4 and Larson 2011:4. 
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are made about the widespread beneficial outcomes of democracy taking hold purely on 
the basis of elections taking place (Lindberg, 2009: 9). 
Another distinction which remains unclear is the point at which a given state becomes a 
fully-fledged ‘democracy’. As discussed above, the mere holding of elections does not 
guarantee the establishment of democratic politics, less still the constitutional liberalism 
central to liberal democracy. Furthermore, the advent of democracy in a given state 
brings with it a number of expectations, based on the way in which it is strongly 
associated with the enforced rule of law, social freedoms and economic successes often 
perceived as characteristic of western political systems. The comparison between these 
countries and those in which democracy is a recent phenomenon, however, is an 
inaccurate one, given the long and often conflict-ridden historical processes which have 
led to the consolidation of liberal democracy in the West (Garrard, 2004). Moreover, the 
practice of internationally-promoted democratisation often occurs within a short 
timeframe, with a limited budget, often in the aftermath of conflict, as will be discussed 
below – and as such can be based on a narrow interpretation of liberal democracy that 
rarely extends beyond the holding of elections and the drafting of a new constitution, 
for example.  
Clearly, the word ‘democracy’ has come to signify both more and less than the political 
system it fundamentally describes. In one sense, it is not just a political system – being 
now widely associated with liberal constitutionalism and individual rights. In another, 
however, it is an empty word, devoid, in itself, of meaning: because of its common 
usage and application to a wide variety of social and political phenomena, it often 
requires qualification with one of a wide range of adjectives – electoral, liberal, 
monitory, deliberative, social – to name just a few. Indeed, Collier and Levitsky have 
identified 550 subtypes of democracy across 130 different studies (Collier and Levitsky, 
1997; Diamond, 1999: 6). The definitions of democracy that arise from these 
qualifications are diverse. 
In spite of these differences, however, there is a degree of common meaning assignable 
to the term democracy if the word is taken in its most basic form. Perhaps the most 
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famous rendition of a basic definition of democracy is that coined by Schumpeter, 
where it is simply ‘a system in which rulers are selected by competitive elections’ 
(Schumpeter, 1942, cited in Przeworski, 1999: 23). This minimalist definition allows a 
certain analytic clarity, because it removes many of the value-laden associations with 
which democracy is often qualified. Also, according to Adam Przeworski, even this 
most basic definition contains enough in terms of implication for the avoidance of 
conflict and public participation that it is worth defending purely in this form (1999). In 
order to include more general principles, such as participation in a broad sense, on 
which democratic governance might be based (rather than limiting public choice to the 
formal institution of elections, for example) and in order to specify further the primary 
role of publically-chosen leaders within a democratic system, the researcher contends 
that democracy is: a political system in which individuals or groups of individuals 
within a given state, institution or political community have the right and ability to 
determine the ways in which they and their collective resources are governed and to 
whom decision-making power is assigned. This definition, influenced strongly by the 
minimalist approach, but broadened to encompass a wider array of political processes 
than elections alone, will serve to inform this thesis and will allow a useful analytic 
separation of political system from liberal democratic values. 
A simple definition such as that put forward by Schumpeter does not in itself account 
for the quality of a given democracy or the likelihood of its sustainability, however 
(Przeworski, 1999: 54).  Laurence Whitehead contends that Schumpeter’s definition is 
at once insufficient and too demanding, in that it does not encapsulate the teleological 
process of democracy, but at the same time puts forward minimal conditions that are 
ideal and not practically attainable in real democracies (2002: 10; Dahl, 1971). A 
further, related shortcoming is that it does not capture the means or processes through 
which democracy comes into being, changes over time or is affected by other social and 
political phenomena. If, for example, democracy is simply a way to ensure public 
limitation over executive decision-making, then democratisation primarily refers to the 
establishment of mechanisms to facilitate this limitation. It does not detail anything of 
the potential power struggles or processes which might occur in order to establish a 
democratic political order. In essence, it does not capture the changing nature of the 
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relationships between rulers and ruled in the move toward democracy. In this sense, 
then, the broadened definition given above allows greater application to the processes 
that surround democratic decision making – if people have the right and ability to 
determine the ways in which they and their collective resources are governed and to 
whom decision making power is assigned, there is an implication of public involvement 
in processes of governance that reach beyond the mere holding of competitive elections 
for leadership roles.   
‘Democracy’ is a noun, and an ostensible end-state: a state, polity or institution is or is 
not ‘a Democracy’; ‘the people want democracy’, ‘in our village there is no 
democracy’. This implies that there is a categorical distinction between democracy and 
non-democracy that can be established, and that, once a state or political entity has 
become a democracy, there is no further progression toward the consolidation of a 
democratic politics. This does not accurately describe the experience of most countries, 
however, which, as Charles Tilly notes, over time experience periods of more or less 
democratic rule (Tilly, 2007: 34). Tilly argues that, rather than countries being or not 
being democratic, they move along a continuum toward or away from end-points of 
democracy and non-democracy, with no assurance or certainty of ever reaching either 
pole (2007:24). This concept of a continuum is more conducive to the explanation of 
change in political systems over time than the static notions of democracy and non-
democracy, and is also particularly relevant to fragile states, where political transitions 
after war for example are complex and often do not take place according to a linear 
trajectory.  
In summary, definitions of democracy are varied and contested across different schools 
of political thought, between theorists and practitioners of democracy promotion, and 
across different country contexts. The definition of democracy chosen for the purposes 
of this study – a political system in which individuals or groups of individuals within a 
given state, institution or political community have the right and ability to determine the 
ways in which they and their collective resources are governed and to whom decision-
making power is assigned – has been selected to follow broadly the minimalist school, 
following Schumpeter and Przeworksi, allowing for greater analytical clarity. As Larry 
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Diamond asserts, this minimalist approach – focusing primarily on the political nature 
of the term – allows the greater analysis and separation of the political system itself 
from the social and economic effects it might engender (Diamond, 1999: 8). The 
specific definition here also implies, however, the following tenets: a broader focus than 
that of the state alone; a substantive notion of actual agency of individuals or groups in 
determining the way and by whom they are governed, rather than a focus only on their 
nominal right to do so; the inclusion of political processes that extend beyond the mere 
holding of elections; and the avoidance of reference to the principles of constitutional 
liberalism which could shift focus away from the key issue of governance. Further, it 
does not deviate from the simple fundamental principle that democracy is concerned 
with the relationship between ruler and ruled. These aspects of the chosen definition of 
democracy will now guide a more substantial discussion of the democratisation 
literature, and will be important to the later study and application of democratisation as 
it occurs in fragile states.   
1.1.2 Democratisation and the recent focus on the state-citizen relationship 
Alongside the broader study of democracy, the sub-field of democratisation has 
developed into a body of scholarly literature in its own right. In a succinct article 
summarising a number of key theoretical positions on democratisation, Matthjis 
Bogaards divides existing definitions of the term itself into two groups (Bogaards, 
2010: 476). On the one hand, he argues, there exists a broad, all-encompassing 
interpretation, which uses the term to describe any kind of movement towards ‘more 
democracy’: 
Democratisation in the broadest sense can thus refer to a minimal improvement 
in an authoritarian regime, what others might refer to as “liberalization”...but 
also to the further democratisation of an existing democracy... (Bogaards, 2010: 
476). 
On the other hand, this can be compared with a more limited definition of the term 
which refers more specifically to the transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes 
(Bogaards, 2010: 476). Christian Welzel adds a third category – that of defining 
democratisation in terms of the endurance and/or survival or democracy (Welzel, 2009: 
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74-75). Of these three kinds of definitions, the second (transitions from autocracy to 
democracy) is most commonly found in the literature, probably as a result of the way in 
which much of the recent work on democratisation stems from the transitions literature 
of the mid-1980s (and most particularly O’Donnell et al., 1986). For this reason, the 
transitions approach will be discussed first. The review will then discuss 
democratisation as a broad movement toward ‘more democracy’ in any context, before 
assessing definitions of democratisation as the sustainability and endurance of 
democratic politics. Throughout this discussion, the centrality of the state-citizen 
relationship to recent scholarship on democratisation becomes clear.  
Writing in 1986, Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead 
edited a four-volume study on processes of transition from authoritarian to democratic 
regimes, and the causes of reversion back to authoritarianism (O’ Donnell et al., 1986). 
Focusing in particular on Latin American and Southern European transitions, as indeed 
much of the contemporary literature did (see for example Collier, 1975; Collier, 1979; 
Karl, 1986; Mainwaring, 1989) – the work provides a critical early contribution to the 
transitions literature, comprised of the essays of 22 contributing authors alongside the 
editors. The editors’ treatment of democratisation remains limited, however, as a purely 
political transition between one regime type and another, with neither regime type 
defined substantively. Democratisation is considered a procedural enterprise, 
comprising the installation of open elections and oppositional rights only – and this kind 
of ‘political democracy’ preferable over socio-economic processes of transition, which 
are considered secondary (MacEwan, 1988: 118). Very little attention is paid 
throughout the work to external and international effects on democratisation processes, 
with the majority of analytical focus resting on the actions and interests of military 
elites internal to each country studied.   This kind of focus on process or procedure in 
the transition from non-democracy to democracy was common at the time, when, as 
Jean Grugel states, “the meaning of democratisation was self-evident: it meant simply a 
transformation of the political system from non-democracy towards accountable and 
representative government.” (Grugel, 2002: 3).  
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In his seminal work, ‘The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century’, 
Samuel Huntington also refers primarily to democratisation as a movement to 
democracy from autocracy, describing the process of this transition as occurring across 
different groups of countries in waves (and reverse waves) (Huntington, 1991). In this 
work Huntington makes the implicit assumption that the line between democracy and 
autocracy is relatively clear.   Following Huntington, Diamond also implies a similar 
demarcation, distinguishing between electoral democracies (where formal democratic 
institutions are in place but lack the substance of a democratic politics) and liberal 
democracies (where democratic institutions ensure and protect liberal freedoms) – but 
nevertheless establishing a threshold between these and various forms of non-
democracy or ‘pseudo-democracy’ (Diamond, 1999: 18).While others following in this 
trend (see for example Jaggers and Gurr, 1995; Dahl, 1998 (Chapter 5); Freedom 
House, 2011) establish different thresholds and definitions of one or the other regime 
type, there is nevertheless a common assumption that a distinguishable (and empirical) 
line exists between one and the other. 
Some studies have sought to add more nuance to this perspective. While still firmly 
within the transitions approach, Barbara Geddes problematises the nature of transitions 
by questioning the homogenous treatment of autocracies across different contexts by 
earlier scholars in the field (Geddes, 1999). In identifying a typology of autocratic 
regimes, comprised of military rule, personalised rule and single-party rule, she 
examines in detail the differential nature of these regime types’ approaches toward 
power and staying in power, concluding that a number of existing theories about 
transitions remain too simplistic or are simply not substantiated by the available 
evidence. She argues that most of the transitions literature is based on two fundamental 
assumptions about the behaviour of political elites: 1) that politicians want to be elected 
to office and stay there, and 2) that they consider the best way to do this as to meet the 
needs of constituents (1999: 125). However, these basic assumptions are based on 
rational elite behaviour in democratic societies, and do not necessarily apply to 
authoritarian regimes. As Geddes explains, 
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Although even very coercive regimes cannot survive without some support, in 
the absence of routine ways for citizens to remove authoritarian leaders from 
office, questions of who exactly their constituents are, how satisfied they have to 
be, and what factors besides satisfaction with regime performance affect their 
level of acquiescence require empirical investigation and cannot be answered in 
the abstract (1999: 125). 
This analysis would seem also to have wider relevance than to the application of 
authoritarian regimes, also – any kind of non-democratic state undergoing transition, 
and particularly one emerging from war, is unlikely to provide a scenario in which these 
two assumptions are applicable. This implies that fundamental flaws exist in the 
transitions approach to analyzing regime change in general, but most particularly in 
fragile or conflict-affected states. While Geddes’ approach marks a significant 
improvement from the simplistic version of transitions put forward by earlier scholars, 
however, it remains limited to the analysis of three kinds of autocratic regime and their 
differential movements toward regime change. In fragile states, regimes often do not 
comply with these types, comprising a mixture of two or more of these types, or simply 
a complex scenario in which numerous actors compete for control of state resources and 
none holds claim to a monopoly of force. The institutional structures implicit within 
Geddes’ three types – military, single-party and personalized rule – often simply do not 
exist in fragile contexts and thus cannot be used as analytical frameworks.      
In part as a means to explore the meaning of a transition from autocracy to democracy, 
clarifications were made in the mid-1990s – in particular by Linz and Stepan (1996) – 
to distinguish the transition to democracy from democracy’s consolidation. This led to 
the use of the word democratisation broadening in its application by scholars, in order 
that it could be used not only to describe the transitions from authoritarian to democratic 
regimes, but also the deepening and further institutionalisation of democratic politics in 
existing electoral (and even well-established liberal) democracies. Larry Diamond 
(1999) focuses particularly on this consolidation in newly-formed electoral 
democracies. For Diamond, consolidation is “the process of achieving broad and deep 
legitimation, such that all significant political actors, at both the elite and mass levels, 
believe that the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, 
better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine” (1999: 65). Although 
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Diamond makes reference to the behaviour and norms of masses, however, following 
Robert Dahl (1971) it is the behaviour of elites that he considers the most critical to the 
consolidation of democracy, given their disproportionate influence over the way in 
which a given society is governed (1999: 66). 
Contrary to this elite focus, more recent approaches, for example from the fields of 
deliberative democracy, civil society, feminism and cosmopolitanism have sought to 
highlight the state-citizen relationship, the social contract and the nature of citizenship 
as more important to the understanding of democratisation than elite bargains and 
behaviour. Indeed, much of the democratisation literature that opts for a broader, more 
complex view of democratisation than that put forward and developed by transitology 
has focused on this relationship (Dryzek and Holmes, 2002; Leftwich et al., 2002; 
Luckham et al., 2003; Diamond, 2003; Paris, 2004; Tilly, 2007; Keane, 2009). This has 
emphasised different aspects of state-citizen interactions, including the nature of 
democratic participation, accountability, inclusivity and transparency, both in terms of 
establishing the necessary institutions to promote greater interaction between citizen 
and state (Dryzek and Holmes, 2002; Paris, 2004; Keane, 2009) and facilitating the 
establishment of a substantive democratic politics or ‘culture’ (Luckham et al., 2003; 
Tilly, 2007). These concerns have been reflected more broadly in development policy 
through the use of the ‘good governance’ discourse (see for example UNDP, 2002; 
Gaventa, 2004). They incorporate a renewed focus on the meaning of citizenship, one 
the one hand defined in with an active sense of duty, in which citizens regularly come 
into contact with state (and global) institutions (Held, 1999; Dryzek and Holmes, 2002; 
Fung and Wright, 2003; Keane, 2009) and are able to hold the state to account through 
transparent processes (Goetz and Jenkins, 2004). This involves the guarantee of access 
to these institutions and processes to all citizens – ensuring that ‘spaces for change’ and 
representation of interests are available and inclusive (Goetz and Jenkins, 2004; 
Cornwall and Schatten Coelho, 2007).   On the other hand, corresponding with the 
concepts of individual liberties discussed in section 1.1.1 above, they focus on the rights 
of individual citizens, and the need for these to be uniform across all segments of 
society (Evans, 2001; Grugel, 2002; Tilly, 2007; Freedom House, 2011).       
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This stance is taken by Tilly in his most recent work on democracy (2007), where he 
adopts a broad definition of democratisation and focuses on state-citizen interactions. 
Tilly extends his analysis to all regimes within states as they change over time, either 
toward or away from democratisation (or de-democratisation), and regardless of when 
they supposedly made the transition from autocracy to democracy. These are at either 
end of Tilly’s continuum, although he does not require states to reach either pole at any 
point in time.  Thus, democratisation for Tilly is: 
net movement toward broader, more equal, more protected and more binding 
consultation [between the state and its citizens].  
And by contrast: 
De-democratisation…then means net movement toward narrower, more 
unequal, less protected and less binding consultation. (Tilly, 2007: 14) 
In this definition, then, democratisation is not merely ‘consolidation’ in term of the 
habituation of democratic norms and values among elites (Diamond, 1999: 65; Rustow, 
1970) but rather any movement towards the greater coordination of state and citizen 
priorities.     
Very much related to the idea of consolidation of democracy is that of its sustainability 
and endurance. Indeed, it could be argued that democratisation is not democratisation 
unless transition from non-democracy to a democratic politics lasts, and does not revert 
back to authoritarian rule (or whatever kind of regime existed previously) at a future 
point in time. One of the most cited contributions to the sustainability literature is an 
empirical study by Przeworski et al., who argue that various factors including: existing 
democracy in the previous year, levels of affluence, rapid economic growth combined 
with moderate inflation, gradually declining income inequality, a favourable 
international climate in which there are more democracies in both the world as a whole 
and the region, and a parliamentary system all have positive effects on the likelihood of 
democracy enduring (Przeworski et al., 1996). In this work, the authors were able to 
counter persuasively previously held assumptions concerning the ability of dictatorships 
to foster economic growth before transitioning to democracy, which had been used by 
western politicians during the Cold War to justify support or tolerance for dictatorial 
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regimes.  Further, these authors argue, while predicting the likely emergence of 
democracy is notoriously difficult, assessing its potential to survive is an easier 
empirical task. 
Although this approach offers clear criteria for the measurement of how long 
democracies last across different regime contexts, however, it does not account for the 
quality of democratisation as it is experienced by citizens, and whether this changes 
over time. In spite of their consideration of political, economic and institutional factors, 
and their inclusion of the influence of international and regional climates, Przeworski et 
al. remain focused on what Grugel terms “the formal and observable structures of 
government” (2002: 22), or the institutions considered necessary to create incentives for 
elite compromise. According to Grugel, however, the process of establishing democracy 
“means not only the elimination of authoritarian institutions and the establishment of 
formal institutions for the election of leaders and the creation of political parties but, 
just as important, legitimizing on-going struggles to eliminate authoritarian social 
practices” (2002: 31). This can be linked also to Diamond’s focus on democratic norms 
and behaviours becoming ‘habituated’ (Diamond, 1999; following Rustow, 1970), as 
referred to above, but less exclusively at the hands of a political elite. Grugel’s ‘on-
going struggles’ very much take place within the citizenry at large and correspond both 
with Tilly’s process-oriented approach and his focus on the state-citizen relationship.  
A fourth and final consideration concerning the definition of democratisation regards 
the way in which the term, as an intransitive verb, requires the presence of an object: to 
democratise someone or something. While not discussed widely in the literature, this 
has allowed the blurring of terms between the process of democratisation, which might 
generally occur, and democratisation, which is the action of trying to democratise a 
given state or entity. A further blurring has then occurred between the would-be 
democratisers of own-states or their home countries, and those from western countries 
tasked with the support of democratisation in so-called developing nations – democracy 
promotion. In this sense, as Grugel points out, democratisation can become a 
patrimonial exercise, or a “highly prescriptive process in which the South is supposed to 
learn from the developed countries – it becomes the reproduction of the procedures of 
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government which have been developed in western Europe and the US” (2002: 21). 
This statement could perhaps be further clarified by adding the word ‘attempted’ before 
“reproduction of the procedures of government” – primarily because levels of ‘success’ 
in promoting democratisation from the outside have eluded measurement to this point, 
and cannot be directly ascribed to the agency of international actors. Nevertheless, 
democracy promotion has become an increasingly established component of US (and 
other nations’) foreign policy since the Reagan administration, and has involved the 
establishment of numerous NGOs and quasi-government organisations whose role is to 
promote various aspects of democratic government – and in particular the 
encouragement of increased state-citizen interactions – overseas (Munck, 2009: 2-4).  
Definitions of democratisation, then, are indeed just as complex and debated as those of 
democracy (Grugel, 2002: 4), and there is no real consensus in the literature as to 
whether it should be defined purely in terms of regime transition, in terms of 
consolidation or in terms of sustainability. It is argued above that the transitions 
approach, based largely out of the empirical school of democratic theory and focusing 
primarily on institutional processes and procedures at the elite level, is too simplistic for 
application to fragile states, whose existing regimes before democratisation often defy 
categorisation and whose levels of socio-economic inequality often require a broader 
conceptualisation of democratisation, situated in historical context, than those based on 
institutions and elite behaviour alone.  This being the case, a broader, consolidation 
approach is considered here as a more appropriate definition to the contexts being 
studied, as this allows for incremental changes in either direction along a 
democratisation continuum to be noted, and for historical and social processes to be 
taken into account. If democracy concerns the relationship between ruler and ruled, then 
democratisation (and, following Tilly, de-democratisation) concerns changes within this 
relationship. This definition allows a broader conceptualisation of lasting change than 
that proposed by Przeworksi et al. (1996). It also facilitates the distinguishing of 
internationally-promoted democratisation as the foreign-assisted instalment of 
institutions and processes, such as the holding of elections and the drafting of 
constitutions, from the more substantive bottom-up democratisation that denotes the 
continual “elimination of authoritarian social practices” (Grugel, 2002: 31) by those 
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who had previously lived under them.  While the existing democratisation literature that 
adopts a broad, consolidation approach tends to consider this consolidation in terms of 
state-citizen interaction, focusing instead for the time being on ruler-ruled relationship 
allows analytical separation from what are value-laden, liberal concepts.  
1.1.3 Theories of how democratisation occurs and the conditions it requires  
Numerous theorists have posited suggestions as to how and when democratisation 
occurs in different contexts. Evidently, their accounts depend on the ways in which they 
define the term, and as Grugel (2002: 4) notes, tend to be split between the early 
democracy theorists (such as Dahl, 1956; Lijphart, 1969; O’Donnell and Schmitter, 
1986; Karl, 1990; Burton et al., 1992) focusing most particularly on the actions of elites 
and necessary institutional structures and later scholars who broadened the scope to 
include different socio-economic, institutional, cultural and political conditions (such as 
Leftwich et al., 2002; Grugel, 2003; Bastian and Luckham, 2003; Tilly, 2007). There 
are some exceptions to this rule, however, as will be discussed below.  
In the transitions literature, some authors place emphasis on the frailty of an 
authoritarian regime necessary for democratisation to take place (O’Donnell and 
Schmitter, 1986) – indeed, this was a widely held assumption when these authors were 
writing (Geddes, 1999: 120). Others highlighted the need for the formation of elite pacts 
in the bringing about of a move to democracy (Karl, 1990; Burton et al., 1992).  These 
pacts involve agreements and compromises among elites concerning the nature of the 
new regime, power rotations and decisions concerning the inclusion and exclusion of 
certain groups. However, as Geddes notes, this analysis has largely focused on Latin 
American transitions and does not appear to apply in other contexts (Geddes, 1999: 
120). Broadly conceived first in terms of consociational democracy by Abend Ljiphart 
(1969), the model of compromise among elites concerned the agreement among those 
leaders representing different interest groups in fragmented societies to cooperate in 
order to avoid the greater costs of further fragmentation and likely warfare. Unlike in 
later transitions literature, however, that offered an alternative to structural and 
historical conditions for democratisation, successful consociational agreements, also 
required particular conditions within society concerning different sets of relations 
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between the different subcultures represented, and between the elites and their own 
interest groups (1969: 216). At this early stage, then, the inclusion of certain conditions 
for democratisation was being posited alongside considerations of institutional process 
and agency.  
For Dahl, the emergence of polyarchic societies – states governed democratically – is 
based largely on the presence of political arrangements or institutions that form 
minimum criteria for democratic government (1956; 1998: 83-84).  In 1988, Przeworski 
referred specifically to the institutional framework needed to ensure that elite interests 
are met in a sustainable manner. Indeed, according to this author, “[d]emocracy is 
possible when the relevant political forces can find institutions that would provide a 
reasonable guarantee that their interests would not be affected in a highly adverse 
manner in the course of democratic competition” (1988: 64). Przeworksi sets this 
scenario in direct contrast to the development of elite agreements over issues, such as 
taxation – which cannot convince elites of their longevity because of the nature of 
democratic politics – when new leaders are elected, they may change their stance on 
issues agreed upon previously. This being the case, a sound institutional framework is a 
fundamental condition to the agreement of elites to a democratic transition. This is 
particularly the case in the aftermath of conflict, to which Przeworski specifically refers 
in this work. 
Since the early 1990s, there has been even greater consideration by scholars of the 
economic, social, political and institutional conditions necessary for democratisation to 
take place. Samuel Huntington emphasised the social and economic conditions within 
countries necessary to the uptake of democracy even in spite of ‘waves’ of 
democratisation taking place internationally or a snowballing effect in the region (1991: 
7). Further, as other scholars would later concur, a mid-level of affluence and/or growth 
was also necessary to provide a ‘political transition zone’ within a given country (1991: 
22). Huntington also highlights the need for leaders conducive to democratic change, 
joining the elite school of thought and decisively asserting that “[e]conomic 
development makes democracy possible; political leadership makes it real” (1991:24). 
This line of thought is also followed closely by Diamond, who claims that ‘political 
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culture’ is of paramount importance: that the democratic norms and values must be held 
by elites and masses (but particularly elites) in order for democratisation to take place 
(1999:66).  
In a more recent study, Staffan Lindberg posits that the holding of elections, in and of 
itself, can bring about democratisation. According to Lindberg, “[e]lections are not only 
indicators but also a mode of transition themselves, whereby electoral processes and 
incentives under certain conditions play causal roles in furthering democratisation” 
(2009: xxi). This stems in part from the recent phenomenon of internationally-promoted 
elections in various countries in transition, and responds to the prevalent argument that 
the holding of elections and the installation of formal democratic institutions cannot in 
themselves bring about a substantive democratic politics (Karl, 1990; Carothers, 1997).  
Lindberg’s central thesis runs as follows: “De jure competitive elections provide a set of 
institutions, rights and processes stacking up incentives and costs in ways that tend to 
further democratisation” (2009: 9). Conceding earlier, however, that elections can occur 
in ‘undemocratic’ countries and also that there are ‘obvious facade elections meant for 
international display only’ (2009:6), it is clear that not all elections comply with 
Lindberg’s model and that there are a considerable number of exceptions to the rule. 
Furthermore, his lack of expansion on the meaning of ‘competitive’ begs further 
questions: what does it take to class an election as competitive, and according to whom 
is it considered so? In a number of fragile states elections take place, often at the 
encouragement (and funding) of international actors, and often with significant 
candidate: seat ratios. This does not mean however that the playing field is considered 
level by the candidates competing or the constituents whose votes they hope to win.    
Alongside the existing literature on causes and conditions for democracy’s emergence is 
an equally vast canon on democracy’s demise. Considering this in terms of ‘reverse 
waves of democratisation’, Huntington considers a number of factors important to the 
reversion back to authoritarian rule, perhaps most importantly concluding that these 
reverses do not generally take place as a result of popular dissatisfaction with 
democracy, but instead through the machinations of elite control or military coups 
(1991: 9-10). Indeed, as Diamond also asserts, “publics have shown no appetite for a 
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return to authoritarian rule of any kind” (1999: 62) – implying that reversions that have 
occurred have done so for other reasons that need to be addressed by ‘consolidation 
from within’ (1999: 64). Following Lipset (1959), Przeworksi et al. (2000) argue that 
low per capita income levels are likely to accompany the fall of democratic regimes, 
with the corollary that democracy is more likely to survive, if not emerge, in already-
developed countries.  
This review demonstrates that a number of theorists consider conditions of some kind 
necessary for the onset of democratisation. This is problematic, however, when studying 
democratisation in conflict-affected fragile states, because in these countries very few if 
any of the conditions mentioned above exist. GDP per capita is normally very low, 
growth minimal, and inflation rates high. Further, the states in question often do not 
comply with the typologies outlined by transition theorists, without the capacity to be 
classified as any kind of authoritarian regime. These theorists also appear to present an 
ahistorical approach to democratic development, also – in which the onset of democracy 
in western Europe, for example, is not always considered in comparison to 
contemporary examples. Presumably the conditions of mid-range income levels and 
universal suffrage, for example, were not pre-requisites for the early stages of 
democratic development in Europe in the 19th century. For this and other reasons, Tilly 
differs from the above theorists by advocating a ‘set of crucial variables’ rather than a 
‘yes/no checklist’ for what should come to define democratisation (2007:10) and its 
trajectory in different states. The basic acknowledgement in this approach that factors 
conducive (and unconducive) to the development of democracy change over time and 
are not static conditions that can be checked off to predict whether one country or 
another is likely to experience democratic (or de-democratic) transition – i.e., the 
reference to these factors as variables or processes as opposed to actual conditions or 
pre-requisites – makes for a more flexible approach that could potentially be applied to 
states whose characteristics do not match a particular list of criteria. 
From the literature surveyed above, it is possible to argue that the transitions literature 
and associated agency approach to democratisation does not consider the potential 
structural, historical, economic and political factors in a given context that might hinder 
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or promote democratisation. These factors are critical to the understanding of political 
transitions in fragile states, because they do not conform to ‘standard’ models of 
statehood (as discussed below) and require contextualised analysis. This is not to say 
that the making of generalisations between and across fragile states is not possible, but 
that any cross-contextual comparison must be grounded in local political and historical 
realities. This being the case, then, a substantive definition of democratisation appears 
more appropriate, given its consideration of context and a broad range of contributing 
factors to political transition. However, as Jean Grugel highlights, recent substantive 
approaches (including those of civil society, feminism and cosmopolitanism) have 
brought about a renewed focus on citizenship and, implicitly, the state, as central to 
democratisation (2002: 31). 
1.2 Democratisation and the state 
Recent developments in the democratisation literature that focus primarily on the state-
citizen relationship draw on a significant body of scholarly work on the underlying 
relationship between democratisation and the state.  This subject has received particular 
attention from historicists and structuralists, due to the way in which, in western Europe 
at least, the development of the nation-state and democracy occurred simultaneously 
(Tilly, 1985; 1992; 2004). In reaction to the prominence of the behaviouralist school of 
thought in the 1950s and 1960s, which posited individualism and later pluralism as 
means of interpreting political and social phenomena, statist literature began the task of 
‘bringing the state back in’ (Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol, 1985) to consider in 
more depth the structural and historical factors influencing these phenomena.  
Rather than assess all of this literature, the researcher will focus on three key areas 
relevant to the context of fragile states: democratisation theorists’ definitions and 
perspectives of the state; the state in the international system and the sovereignty 
paradox; and fragile states.  
1.2.1  Democratisation theorists’ definitions and perspectives of the state 
Underlying the majority of democracy theorists’ conceptions of the modern state is Max 
Weber’s definition of a bounded territory in which a monopoly of violence is held by 
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state actors: “the state is the form of human community that (successfully) lays claim to 
the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory” (Weber, 1919 
[2004]: 33). This definition has come to dominate most understandings of the state in 
the international system, combined with the so-called Westphalian notion of 
sovereignty (discussed below).   Thus, for pluralists such as Robert Dahl, for example, 
the state is “a very special type of association that is distinguishable by the extent to 
which it can secure compliance with its rules, among all those over whom it claims 
jurisdiction, by its superior means of coercion” (1998: 41); and for Tilly, whose 
theoretical stance on democratisation is somewhat different from that of Dahl, a state is 
also primarily  “[a]n organization that controls the major concentration of coercion 
within a substantial territory, exercises priority in some regards over all other 
organizations operating within the same territory, and receives acknowledgement of that 
priority from other organizations, including states, outside the territory” (2007:11). In 
spite of their different approaches to democratisation, then, these theorists definitions of 
the state remain similar.  In both accounts,  the Weberian notion of the state is a broad, 
all-encompassing one – as Skocpol writes, “this Weberian view of the State does 
require us to see it as much more than a mere arena in which social groups make 
demands and engage in political struggles or compromises” (Skocpol, 1985: 8).  
Where pluralists and structuralists differ, however, is in their conceptions of the role 
and position of the state vis-à-vis its citizens. For pluralists, this role is a neutral, 
facilitative one, in which multiple centres of power – organisations, associations or 
interest groups, for example – have the opportunity to influence the state system without 
the domination of any one group, and that conflicts can be resolved to the benefit of all 
groups in this manner (Dahl, 1967: 24). Thus, as Stephen D. Krasner describes, “the 
behaviour of the state is seen as the product of societal pressures” (2009: 25). This 
approach is also often connected closely to liberal views of the state (in which the state 
may be seen as one interest-group among many). Having dominated the field of social 
and political science in the 1950s and 1960s in particular (Skocpol, 1985: 4) this view 
nevertheless continues to hold significant influence over the study of political science in 
the United States in particular. For structuralists, however, such as Althusser (1971), 
whose position emanates from the Marxist school, the state is not in itself neutral but 
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serves the agenda of the capitalist ruling classes (for Marxists, to protect the capitalist 
economy), excluding certain other groups or classes from gaining positions of 
influence, for example, but determining its policy based on broader societal needs 
(Skocpol, 1985: 5). A separate perspective in its own right is the statist view, whose 
basic premise is that “[t]he state is autonomous...The state is not one interest group 
among many, or the servant of general societal needs; it is an institution with purposes 
and powers of its own” (Krasner, 2009: 35). Proponents of this approach (such as Tilly, 
1985; Scott, 1998) analyse the state in terms of its ability to impose its own agenda on a 
given group of people (citizens) in order to achieve a specific goal. For Scott, this is 
embodied in the state-making process in which states themselves raze the proverbial 
forest of a territory’s ‘natural’ environment, ordering, cataloguing and recording 
information in order to gain control over its inhabitants and extort taxes (Scott, 1998).  
Thus, in spite of an underlying similarity across these perspectives in terms of what a 
state actually is in the current context, views of its role and purpose differ quite 
significantly. This is important in the study of democratisation because, particularly 
according to the most recent conceptions of democratisation as substantive and 
encompassing more than a single political transition, democratisation processes take 
place not only within the locus of the state, but consider the state as a necessary active 
participant in the development of an inclusive, democratic citizenship. As Jean Grugel 
asserts, “[d]emocratization means, above all, building a democratic state” (2002: 68). 
Questions of what kind of participant it will be, and how much capacity and willingness 
it has to undergo and take part in processes of regime change or democratisation more 
specifically, dominate the literature. For example, referring specifically to autocratic 
regimes in the southern cone of Latin America, Alfred Stepan discusses the relative 
power of states versus civil society, and “the way in which the character of the state 
affects the evolution of opposition politics” (Stepan, 1985: 338). He concludes that the 
nature of cleavages and unions within civil society, on the one hand, and those within 
the state (along with how it defines its own activities), on the other, are central to the 
understanding of the relationship between civil society and the state in any given 
context. This then promotes a contextual analysis but at the same time provides a series 
of questions that can be applied comparatively to assess the differential relationships 
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between states and civil societies in a variety of countries. Clear from Stepan’s 
conclusions however is the way in which states interact differentially with citizens 
depending on the interests they consider to be at stake, which then in turn determine 
their actions and (by extension) the likelihood of regime change.  
For many contemporary scholars of democratisation, particularly in newly-
democratizing states, the issue of ‘state capacity’ is central to determining the likelihood 
of change.  Indeed, from this perspective, while state capacity in itself does not foster 
democratisation, democratisation without state capacity is unlikely to occur 
substantively (Grugel, 2002: 83; Tilly, 2007: 175). This is due to the way in which the 
institutions of state must take on a variety of complex tasks in responding to citizen 
demands.  Determining what is meant by ‘state capacity’ in the literature is not as 
straightforward as these assertions suggest, however. In one of the earliest mentions of 
the term, Skocpol and Finegold talk about capacity in terms of a given regime’s 
administrative ability to implement interventionist policies (1982: 260-261). This 
capacity can vary across different governmental departments, however, and is thus not a 
descriptor of a given government but of the state capacity within certain administrative 
departments. These authors use the concept state capacity to explain why agricultural 
and industrial reform within FDR’s New Deal in the USA in the 1930s succeeded and 
failed respectively.  Geddes (1994) posits that state capacity to respond to public needs 
is linked to state autonomy from elite vested interests – and that the more autonomy a 
state has from these interests, the more likely it is to be able to implement policy in the 
public interest (1994:6). Within the field of economics, Besley and Persson (2007) 
argue that fiscal and legal state capacity, primarily to raise taxes and enforce contracts, 
are critical to a country’s development and cannot be assumed to exist in developing 
states. This reflects Evelyn Huber’s argument which defines state strength and by 
extension, capacity in terms of a state’s extractive capabilities (1995: 166).  
Scholars within the democratisation literature have used the term to refer to the way in 
which newly democratizing states are able (or unable) to reform the institutions of state 
to respond to public needs, or in other words, “to supervise democratic decision-making 
and put its results into practice” (Tilly, 2007:15).  Tilly goes on to define state capacity 
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as: “the extent to which interventions of state agents in existing non-state resources, 
activities and interpersonal connections alter existing distributions of those resources, 
activities and interpersonal connections as well as relations among those distributions” 
(2007: 161).  Thus for Tilly, state capacity is about the extent to which the interventions 
of state agents actually change existing patterns of resource distribution. Evidently, and 
especially according to this definition, states can have high capacity levels (otherwise 
termed ‘strong states’) but remain undemocratic. One of Tilly’s central arguments 
remains however that the strengthening of state capacity is a first step among many in 
the path to democratisation, because “the process of state strengthening starts the 
processes of subjecting the state to public politics and increasing popular control over 
public politics” (2007: 162). Thus, it is easier for a strong state to democratise than a 
weak one. Having said this, however, some theorists have made distinctions between 
state strength, on the one hand, and state capacity, on the other - where states that are 
capable do not centralise decision-making but instead guide other agents within society 
to make decisions on the state’s behalf (Rosenau, 1992: 14; Grugel, 2002: 83-84). This 
stage of devolved power-holding would presumably follow on from the ‘strong state’ 
stage in Tilly’s process. Finally, state capacity appears not to be contained within a 
state, but to be significantly affected by the increasing globalisation of markets. As 
Mkandewire (1999) points out, international trade stipulations, among other global 
agreements and aid packages considerably limit the policy space in which some 
developing states can actively respond to their citizens. This point is expanded by David 
Held and Daniele Archibugi in their call for a cosmopolitan democracy, in which 
international institutions are also held accountable by their members and member states 
(Held and Archibugi, 1995).  
It is clear from this review, then, that the state is almost without exception considered 
by democratisation scholars to be central to democratisation processes, and that few 
(perhaps with the exception of Held and Archibugi) would argue with Grugel’s 
assertion that democratisation essentially equates to the democratisation of the state. As 
discussed in section 1.3 below, this approach essentially deems democratisation 
unlikely or slow to occur in fragile states, also often defined as ‘weak states’. Without 
departing from the statement given above that democratisation principally concerns the 
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relationship between ruler and ruled, however, it may be possible to deviate from a 
focus on states per se and look beyond and between state structures to other spaces 
within a given territory, such as the way in which local communities interact with 
regional and or central authorities that may or may not be connected to the state 
infrastructure. This approach would suggest that fragile states can be defined in other 
ways, above and beyond negative comparisons with ‘established’ or institutionalized 
states in western Europe, for example.   
1.2.2 The state in the international system and the ‘sovereignty paradox’ 
Within the international relations literature there exist different approaches to the role of 
states within the international system. The researcher does not intend to approach her 
own research through an IR lens, instead choosing democratisation and post-conflict 
statebuilding as primary theoretical bases. Nevertheless, there is considerable overlap 
between these fields of study, and IR perspectives remain important to the 
understanding of how states and their behaviour are perceived and conceptualised by 
theorists in different ways. The researcher includes this brief review of the central 
theories in order to see whether IR perspectives can shed further light on political 
transitions in fragile states.    
Three dominant theoretical perspectives can be identified through much of this 
literature – realist, liberal and constructivist stances. Of these, the first two – realism 
and liberalism – represent positivist approaches, in which states are the central units of 
analysis and in which actual political phenomena, including behaviour and its 
consequences, can be measured and observed. Realist conceptions involve the argument 
that interests, defined in terms of power, determine the actions of statesmen and 
politicians: these actors act according to prudence and with the political consequences 
of their actions in mind (Morgenthau, 1948). As Jackson explains, according to the 
realist perspective “states are human agencies which interact not in respect to 
international law or other norms but solely or at least primarily out of regard to their 
national interests – reasons of state” (1996: 8). Further, power relations between states 
are always going to be unequal and therefore outcomes in international politics will 
always reflect the interests of the most powerful states.  By comparison, liberal (and 
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more specifically, liberal institutionalist) perspectives consider states’ domestic 
concerns in particular the need to mitigate market failures as the fundamental 
determinant of state behaviour in the international system (Krasner, 2009: 12). These 
concerns however are very much connected to the way in which states are 
interdependent economically, and not isolated from one another. This has led to a 
situation of ‘complex interdependence’ within international society in which states are 
mutually dependent and interconnected in a web of different levels of interactions 
(Keohane and Nye, 1977).  Further, for liberalists, states are not the only actors whose 
behaviour can influence political outcomes – a variety of non-state and transnational 
agents play increasingly significant roles (Kaarbo and Ray, 2011: 8). Within this 
perspective, the characteristics of states’ behaviour can vary according to the kind of 
government they have, for example – a stance linked to the liberal claim (often called 
the Liberal or Democratic Peace Theory) that democracies never go to war with one 
another.  
Constructivist perspectives offer a critique on realist and liberal schools of thought, 
questioning the ontological foundations on which they are based, and suggestions that 
rather than existing in the real world, international society is constructed on the basis of 
shared norms and values. For constructivists, these norms and values, alongside ideas 
and perceptions, constitute what Alexander Wendt terms “the social construction of 
power politics” and determine the behaviour of both states and non-state actors. (Wendt, 
1992).  
Closely relating to the position and role of states within the international system is the 
issue of state sovereignty. A considerable literature within the IR field exists on this 
subject, debating the nature of sovereignty within the current international system (see 
for example Lyons and Mastanduno, 1995; Jackson, 1996; Hansen and Stepputat, 2005; 
Krasner, 2009). Often linked to the Peace of Westphalia, compiled in 1648 to end the 
Thirty Years War, but more accurately assigned to Emmerich de Vattel and his writings 
in 1758 (Krasner, 2009: 16) the concept of national sovereignty involves at its most 
basic interpretation the principle of non-intervention, and the idea that states should not 
interfere in the domestic affairs of others – thus creating autonomous state entities. 
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While the notion of state sovereignty in this form has been assumed in much of the IR 
literature, students of which have “assumed that the object of their study is sovereign 
states” (Krasner, 2009:14), sovereignty remains highly contested both as a theoretical 
concept and in the practice of international relations. 
First, problematising sovereignty as a concept, Krasner distinguishes between three core 
types of sovereignty: international legal sovereignty, in which states recognize one 
another as theoretically equal entities within the international system; second, 
Westphalian/Vatellian sovereignty, in which states have complete jurisdiction over their 
territories and populations, are not subject to any higher authority and thus are free to 
rule without external intervention; and domestic sovereignty, which refers to a state’s 
capacity “to actually control activities both within and across its borders” (Krasner, 
2009: 15). While the rules associated with these three types of sovereignty are 
frequently violated, the notion of sovereignty remains, in what Krasner calls the 
‘organization of hypocrisy’. Sovereignty persists because there is no better alternative to 
organizing the state system (2009: 17). Lyons and Mastanduno point out one of the 
central early contradictions with the sovereignty devised in Europe – it applied 
primarily to European states’ dealings with one another, but was not expanded beyond 
this. As these authors describe, 
[o]riginally the concept of sovereignty was recognized as a guideline to be used 
by the European states in their relations with each other   but not necessarily in 
their contacts with non-European states as they expanded their political and 
economic influence to other parts of the world. In Africa and Asia, the European 
states reserved the ‘right’ to intervene, as the United States did in Latin America 
(Lyons and Mastanduno, 1995: 6).  
While this was to change, gradually, as a result of the World Wars, the building of the 
League of Nations and the end of colonialism, it is evident that there is still a 
contradiction between the language of sovereign statehood and the practice of 
intervention by the global powers and ‘international community’ in weaker states.   
Robert H. Jackson refers to this discrepancy as the difference between positive and 
negative sovereignty, where the former developed in western Europe alongside the 
nation-state, and the latter is an “international normative framework that upholds 
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sovereign statehood in the Third World” (1996:1). To this effect, negative sovereignty 
both helps to maintain the existence of so-called Third World states (for example 
through their entitlement to international aid), some of which Jackson later refers to as 
‘quasi-states’, but also facilitates intervention by outside powers into their socio-
economic development and treatment of citizens (1996:1).  Taking the critique of an 
assumption of unquestioned state sovereignty even further, Hansen and Stepputat 
contend that sovereignty has been redefined in recent years, with the global war on 
terror embodying a significant shift in international approaches toward employing 
violence across national boundaries (2005: 1). Yet in the existing literature, they argue, 
“sovereignty cannot be imagined independently of the state” (2005: 2). Further, they 
critique the way in which the IR literature has homogenized statehood across states, by 
assuming “states to be both normal, that is, with de facto legitimate control of their 
population and territory, and identical, that is, with similar interests, strategies, and 
expected patterns of action” (2005: 3). This is critically important to the study of 
political transitions in fragile states, whose sovereignty comes into question through 
these authors’ analysis. Applying conventional IR approaches to the sovereignty (and 
indeed statehood more generally) of these states evidently fails to capture the complex 
nature of the ways in which sovereignty is constructed and performed within them and 
by the international donors that support them.   
Issues of sovereignty are critical to the study of political transition, particularly when 
that transition occurs in the form of internationally-promoted democratisation. Indeed, 
one of the most fundamental problems with democratisation being encouraged (or 
imposed) ‘from outside’ in this manner is its violation of recipient state sovereignty, 
particularly where calls for a democratic politics have not been made explicitly by 
citizen populations (such as in the Afghan case, as opposed to the Egyptian one, for 
example). In these scenarios, a new form of legitimacy is imposed (in theory) where the 
right to rule is determined by popular vote. Although this may be considered ‘global 
best practice’ or seen by international actors as the best form of government, as 
demonstrated by the way in which it has become an established component of many 
western countries’ foreign policy (Munck, 2009: 2-4), in terms of its ability to 
potentially create networks of trust, stable institutions and a form of toppling unpopular 
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elites – it is nevertheless promoted through intervention that categorically contradicts 
principles of Westphalian sovereignty.  Furthermore, it is often promoted in scenarios in 
which the recipient state is a great deal less powerful than its would-be democratisers, 
who consider political instability as a source of weakness and fragility.    The lack of 
Westphalian (or positive) sovereignty in fragile states, alongside the potential for 
negative sovereignty to exist, contributes to the way in which democratisation is 
unlikely to occur in these states according to existing analyses that focus on state 
capacity. Again, however, this emphasises the need to consider other spaces in which 
political change might occur, outside of liberal conceptualisations of the state.   
1.3  Fragile states 
Having discussed in some depth contemporary theories of democratisation and the state, 
the researcher attempts now to apply some of these theories to the context of conflict-
affected fragile states. She has chosen to focus specifically on these states due to the 
special circumstances they share, and due to the conviction that existing means to 
conceptualise statehood, citizenship and democratisation are not adequate to assess 
changes in the relationships between ruler and ruled as they might occur in these 
contexts. The common practice of defining a state in the Weberian sense, by its 
monopoly of violence and political power within a given geographical area and over a 
defined population living within it, is particularly problematic when applied to countries 
experiencing or having recently experienced civil conflict. This is due to the way in 
which, as a result of these circumstances, the state is often not the sole arbiter of violent 
force, nor does it have juridical control over actions of its populace. Tilly’s contention 
that states “receive acknowledgement…from other organizations, including states, 
outside the territory” (2007: 11) implicitly implies not only a formal recognition of state 
sovereignty by external actors but also a substantive one. While lip service is certainly 
paid by external states and international bodies, for example, to the sovereignty of 
conflict-affected and post-conflict states in which international interventions have taken 
place, this is often not substantiated by the ways in which interventions are conducted. 
Decisions can be made (for example about troop placement and withdrawal in military 
interventions) without consultation with or permission of the head of the recipient state, 
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which again brings into question the earlier notion of monopolies of violence. 
Furthermore, the sheer reliance of many conflict-affected states such as Afghanistan on 
international aid funds as primary sources of revenue can render them rentier states, in 
effect (Rubin, 2002: 81; Barfield, 2010: 311-312; Barakat and Larson, 2013) – and very 
much at the mercy of bilateral donors and international financial institutions.  
These discrepancies between theories of state sovereignty and equality, on the one hand, 
and the realities of intervention on the other, have seen the proliferation of alternative 
terms for states in conflict or post-conflict situations. ‘Quasi-states’, as put forward by 
Jackson, (1987; 1996) is one such example, alongside ‘non-states’, ‘weak states’ ‘failed 
states’, and ‘fragile states’. These have all been used as ways in which to describe the 
incapacities of countries whose states do not fit the traditional Weberian model. As will 
be argued below, however, the acknowledgement of non-compliance in this case has not 
led to the development of a new framework through which to view and assess political 
transitions in these countries.  
1.3.1 Defining state fragility 
State fragility is a relatively new term that has evolved as a more nuanced version of 
earlier concepts of state failure and collapse discussed by scholars, politicians and 
practitioners in the early 1990s. Zartman (1995) defines states failure as when “the basic 
functions of the state are no longer performed” (cited in Francois and Sud, 2006: 142). 
This definition highlights clearly the ways in which notions of what the basic functions 
of the state should be are applied to all states equally, in spite of the vastly different 
characteristics of so-called failed states and ‘functioning’ ones.  
Since this time, the term ‘fragile state’ has become more commonly used in current 
literature in the international development and security fields, but has also evaded 
concrete definition (Barakat and Larson, 2013). According to one paper produced by the 
UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), state fragility is primarily 
about ineffectiveness, most usefully determined as a state’s inability to provide for its’ 
citizens’ developmental and poverty-reduction needs (Torres and Anderson, 2004). For 
other international agencies, state fragility reflects more the inability of a given regime 
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to provide security for its citizens (USAID, 2005: 1; Stewart and Brown, 2009: 2) As 
Stewart and Brown. point out, however, there is often a gap between the way in which 
the term is described in theory and the way it is employed by aid agencies, which have 
different definitions among themselves for the term also (2009: 2; Barakat and Larson, 
2013). Building on extensive research conducted at the CRISE centre at Oxford 
University, Stewart and Brown take a broad approach in defining fragile states, classing 
them as “states that are failing, or at risk of failing, with respect to authority, 
comprehensive service entitlements or legitimacy” (2009: 3). Thus, fragility and failure 
are part of the same continuum but are multi-faceted, incorporating all three elements of 
authority, service provision and state legitimacy (Barakat and Larson, 2013). Like 
definitions of failed or collapsed states, however, this conception of state fragility – 
while perhaps the most comprehensive of existing definitions – allocates and assumes 
certain basic standards (a certain degree of authority, service provision and legitimacy 
of rule) to the underlying notion of ‘stateness’ which is applied to all states in the 
international system.   
This approach to fragile states – treating them as underperforming ‘real’ states – could 
be linked to the approach to international development critiqued by underdevelopment 
and dependency theorists, who criticize the way in which less developed countries are 
kept on the periphery of developed nations in a perpetual state of dependency, 
particularly in terms of their lack of ability to make autonomous technological advances 
and in terms of the unequal exchange between center and periphery within the same 
economic system (Frank, 1967; Emmanuel, 1972).   
While much has changed in the discourse of international development since these 
theorists were most influential (in the 1960s and 1970s), and while the majority of the 
literature stems from the study of Latin American nations, notions of global class 
divisions between different groups of states appear to be present in the fragile states 
discourse also, under a different name and with less emphasis on the economic/wealth 
gap between them and their ‘real’ state counterparts. This is emphasised by the way in 
which the concept of fragile states appears to serve donor purposes above and beyond 
those of the recipient states in question, in that it is a useful means through which 
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donors can simplify and categorise otherwise complex political environments, and 
develop bureaucratic responses that coincide with their existing aid and development 
delivery infrastructure (Barakat and Larson, 2013). Recently, reflecting this issue, the 
distinction between fragile states and the OECD countries that deliver aid assistance to 
them has been emphasised by the formation of the G7+ group, a collaboration among 
17 self-defined fragile states who have developed and promoted a ‘New Deal for 
Engagement’ that critiques the way in which donor assistance has been administered to 
them. This New Deal is very much about setting the terms of engagement from the 
perspective of fragile states themselves, rather than according to the agendas of donor 
states that tend to prioritise short-term goals over and above sustainability, as the 
following quotation indicates:   
International partners can often bypass national interests and actors, providing 
aid in overly technocratic ways that underestimate the importance of 
harmonizing with the national and local context, and support short-term results 
at the expense of medium- to long-term sustainable results brought about by 
building capacity and systems (G7+, 2011: 1).  
This highlights the way in which the timescales for expected ‘results’ of development 
assistance (including statebuilding and democratisation) in fragile states can differ 
significantly between donors and recipient states, and how representatives of these 
states are now increasingly pushing to be able to define the terms and timeframes of 
change. Furthermore, the emphasis placed by the G7+ members on the importance of 
national and local context implies that fragile states can be defined in ways above and 
beyond negative comparisons with ‘established’ or institutionalized states. 
1.3.2 Fragility and conflict 
Narrowing the focus of this research from the potential study cases of all fragile states, 
to those that are ‘conflict-affected’ – i.e. have recently experienced or are currently 
experiencing violent conflict within and across state borders – the review now considers 
the relationship between fragility and war. There is a critical relationship between 
fragility and violent conflict that has been acknowledged by several OECD countries 
(see for example USAID, 2006: 3). This is linked once again to the idea that fragile 
states have limited capacity to control a monopoly of violent force within their own 
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territories, with non-state actors (or in Tilly’s terms, ‘autonomous power centres’) 
proving a potential source of instability.  As one World Bank report claims, “[t]hese 
countries…create negative spillovers such as conflict, instability, and refugee flows for 
their neighbors” and further “span IDA post-conflict situations, countries emerging 
from weak governance and internal strife, and situations of sharply deteriorating 
governance” (World Bank, 2007:3). While fragility and conflict are not synonymous, 
with conflict possible in strong as well as weak states, and fragility caused and/or 
exacerbated by other factors such as famine, weak institutions of governance, and 
poverty or poor resource management, fragility can perpetuate conflict through the 
incapacity of the state to contain violence and through the grievances that arise as a 
result of the state’s inability to provide services for citizens, or lack of perceived public 
legitimacy. In spite of there being no agreed or fixed definition of fragile states, there is 
general consensus among donors, encouraged by an ongoing dialogue supported by the 
OECD DAC, that they share the common characteristics of weak governance and a 
vulnerability to conflict, but can experience four kinds of differentiated scenarios: “(i) 
prolonged crisis or impasse, (ii) post-conflict or political transition, (iii) gradual 
improvement, and (iv) deteriorating governance” (IDA, 2007: 2).  Thus, while the 
relationship between conflict and fragility is not straightforward, there is nevertheless 
an overlap between the two.  
The researcher has chosen to focus discussion specifically on conflict-affected fragile 
states, due to an interest in the way in which conflict affects the state-citizen 
relationship, and to the high incidence in these states of internationally-promoted 
statebuilding and democratisation programmes. These could include those highlighted 
in yellow in the list of ‘failed states’ represented in Table 1. 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Those states highlighted in bold comprise 10 of the 17 G7+ member states. The remaining seven states 
fall lower within the table, and are categorised in the ‘warning’ section of the continuum,   
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Table 1: Failed States Index (Foreign Policy and Fund For Peace, 2013) 
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Somalia 113.9 9.5 10.0 9.3 8.9 8.4 9.4 9.5 9.8 10.0 9.7 10.0 9.4 
Congo (D. R.) 111.9 10.0 10.0 9.4 7.1 8.8 8.5 9.6 9.5 9.8 10.0 9.5 9.7 
Sudan 111.0 8.8 10.0 10.0 8.4 8.5 7.8 9.6 8.8 9.3 9.8 10.0 10.0 
South Sudan 110.6 8.9 10.0 10.0 6.5 8.9 8.6 9.1 9.8 9.3 9.6 9.8 10.0 
Chad 109.0 9.5 9.7 8.8 8.0 8.9 8.0 9.7 9.9 9.8 9.4 9.5 7.9 
Yemen 107.0 9.3 9.2 9.0 7.4 8.1 9.2 9.3 8.7 8.7 9.8 9.5 8.7 
Afghanistan 106.7 9.3 9.2 9.2 7.2 7.8 8.2 9.4 8.8 8.4 9.9 9.4 10.0 
Haiti 105.8 9.6 8.6 7.0 9.1 9.1 9.7 8.8 9.6 7.6 7.9 9.0 9.9 
C. African 
Rep. 105.3 8.6 9.8 8.5 6.1 9.2 7.7 9.0 9.5 8.6 9.7 9.1 9.4 
Zimbabwe 105.2 9.2 8.7 8.4 8.6 8.6 8.6 9.2 9.1 8.9 8.4 9.7 7.8 
Iraq 103.9 8.3 8.8 10.0 8.3 8.4 7.3 8.6 7.6 8.6 10.0 9.6 8.5 
Cote d'Ivoire 103.5 7.8 9.3 9.0 7.3 7.8 7.7 9.3 8.5 8.6 9.1 9.4 9.7 
Pakistan 102.9 8.9 9.1 9.7 6.9 7.9 7.5 8.4 7.3 8.7 9.8 9.2 9.6 
Guinea 101.3 8.4 8.2 7.6 7.7 8.2 9.2 9.8 8.9 8.4 9.1 8.9 7.0 
Guinea Bissau 101.1 8.4 7.8 5.7 8.0 8.1 8.7 9.7 8.8 7.6 9.5 9.7 9.0 
Nigeria 100.7 8.5 6.6 9.8 7.3 9.2 7.5 8.8 9.3 8.6 9.5 9.4 6.3 
Kenya 99.6 9.1 8.7 9.0 7.8 8.3 7.6 8.3 8.1 7.1 8.1 9.0 8.5 
Niger 99.0 9.8 7.9 7.8 6.3 7.9 8.4 8.1 9.5 7.6 8.3 8.9 8.5 
Ethiopia 98.9 9.7 8.7 8.6 6.7 7.6 7.7 7.3 8.7 8.7 8.4 8.7 8.1 
Burundi 97.6 8.9 8.8 8.1 6.2 7.6 9.1 8.4 8.3 7.9 7.7 7.9 8.7 
Syria 97.4 5.6 9.5 9.3 6.2 7.2 6.4 9.6 7.0 9.5 9.8 9.2 8.1 
Uganda 96.6 9.1 8.4 8.0 6.7 7.8 7.4 8.1 8.3 7.9 8.2 8.6 8.2 
North Korea 95.1 8.0 5.0 6.6 4.4 8.3 9.3 9.8 9.5 9.7 8.4 7.7 8.4 
Liberia 95.1 8.8 9.2 6.5 7.0 8.0 8.3 6.6 9.1 6.4 7.1 8.3 9.8 
Eritrea 95.0 8.7 7.4 6.1 7.3 6.9 8.3 8.7 8.4 9.1 7.5 8.1 8.6 
Myanmar 94.6 7.6 8.5 9.0 5.4 8.4 7.3 9.0 8.1 8.3 7.8 8.6 6.6 
Cameroon 93.5 8.3 7.3 7.8 7.2 7.8 6.1 8.5 8.4 8.1 8.0 9.2 6.8 
Sri Lanka 92.9 6.8 8.4 9.5 7.3 7.8 5.9 8.2 5.5 9.0 8.5 9.3 6.8 
Bangladesh 92.5 8.1 7.3 8.6 7.5 7.8 7.3 8.3 8.0 7.3 7.7 8.9 5.8 
Nepal 91.8 7.6 7.7 9.0 5.9 8.1 7.3 8.1 7.3 7.9 7.6 8.2 7.1 
Mauritania 91.7 8.5 8.3 7.2 5.7 6.5 8.0 7.7 8.4 7.4 7.8 8.2 7.9 
Timor-Leste 91.5 8.7 7.4 6.8 6.4 6.7 7.9 8.0 8.5 6.0 8.3 8.3 8.5 
Sierra Leone 91.2 9.0 8.1 5.9 8.0 8.5 8.6 7.3 9.0 6.1 5.4 7.9 7.4 
Egypt 90.6 7.2 6.5 8.5 5.4 7.1 8.2 8.9 5.6 9.6 7.3 8.7 7.7 
Burkina Faso 90.2 9.4 7.4 5.3 6.3 8.4 7.7 7.7 8.7 6.8 7.2 7.3 8.0 
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Table 1 represents the states listed in the ‘Alert’ category on the Failed States Index 
continuum that runs from ‘Alert’ (indicating failed or highly volatile states) through 
‘Warning’ to ‘Stable’ and ‘Sustainable’ (Foreign Policy and Fund For Peace, 2013). 
Determining whether or not a fragile state is ‘conflict-affected’ is not as straightforward 
as it might seem in this table, however. In general, the states highlighted in yellow (by 
the researcher) all have scores of 9.5 or above for ‘security apparatus’, for example, 
have consistently high scores for ‘human flight’, ‘refugees and IDPs’ and ‘group 
grievance’ – all of which are common characteristics of conflict-affected fragile states. 
They also constitute all the states for which the score of 10 is allocated for any variable. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that other states in the list are not ‘conflict-affected’ 
simply because in 2013 the FSI indicators suggested their scores for these 
characteristics were lower than they might previously have been. Fragility is a dynamic 
phenomenon that changes over time and does not have a static connection to levels of 
conflict or other forms of upheaval.  Still, the FSI data provides a basic framework for 
the rough distinguishing of fragile states in which conflict is a current and direct 
contributor to fragility, from those in which it may have more of an indirect effect.    
Having attempted to separate conflict-affected fragile states from other fragile states, 
however it remains true that in any discussion of fragile states, all of which are 
vulnerable to conflict, it is important to understand the potential effects that conflict 
might have on the relationship between state and citizen, or between ruler and ruled – 
and by extension, the effect that it might have on democratisation, beyond an inherent 
connection between violence and state-making (Tilly, 1985). These effects are likely to 
be defined to some extent by the nature of the conflict in question. Skocpol argues, for 
example, that social revolutions present an entirely unique kind of conflict in terms of 
the results they can have on the structure of society. As she explains, 
Social revolutions are set apart from other sorts of conflicts and transformative 
processes above all by the combination of two coincidences: the coincidence of 
societal structural change with class upheaval; and the coincidence of political 
with social transformation. In contrast, rebellions, even when successful, may 
involve the revolt of the subordinate classes-but they do not eventuate in 
structural change. Political revolutions transform state structures but not social 
structures, and they are not necessarily accomplished through class 
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conflict...What is unique to social revolution is that basic changes in social 
structure and in political structure occur together in a mutually reinforcing 
fashion (1979: 4). 
For Skocpol, then, the transformative effects of social revolutions on the way in which 
the state-society relationship is defined are particular to the simultaneous combinations 
of class conflict and the structure of society, of political and social change. Whereas, for 
example, recent conflict in Egypt might be defined as a political revolution, involving 
change at the highest levels, events prompting the start of the ‘Arab Spring’ in Tunisia 
(and particularly the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi) might be classed as the 
beginnings of social revolution, redefining the relationship between ruler and ruled. In 
contrast to this, Olivier Roy talks about the way in which in guerrilla warfare, political 
objectives are paramount. According to Roy, “[t]he goal is to determine where the seat 
of power lies, which, when taken, will ensure victory” (1994: 148). This seat of power 
cannot be assumed to be the state, however – particularly in fragile states where other 
competing sources of authority exist. Roy goes on to argue that the role of violence in 
Afghan society differs again from classic guerilla warfare where political objectives are 
central. Violence in Afghanistan has traditionally occurred as a means to re-instate a 
balance of negotiated power between the state and different communities, and “is not an 
attempt to break off relations or destroy the adversary; rather, it aims to establish a 
complex system of priority” (1994: 148). In this way, he claims, violence follows 
“anthropological” norms rather than political ones, in which ethnicity, family ties, 
honour and loyalty define the rules of the game. 
Guerilla warfare is different again from the concept of New Wars, as put forward by 
Mary Kaldor (1999). New Wars are distinct from ‘traditional’ warfare in that they, like 
guerrilla conflicts, tend to avoid battles and expansive military action, but at the same 
time are distinct from guerilla conflict in that they promote destabilization and 
alienation in an increasingly globalized context. As Kaldor writes,  
[t]he aim is to control the population by getting rid of everyone of a different 
identity…the strategic goal of these wars is population expulsion through 
various means such as mass killing, forcible resettlement, as well as a range of 
political, psychological and economic techniques of intimidation. This is why, in 
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all these wars, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of refugees and 
displaced persons, and why most violence is directed at civilians (1999: 8)   
One of the principal characteristics of these wars is the way in which they blur the 
boundaries between the traditional distinctions of public and private, soldier and 
criminal, combatant and civilian (1999: 5). In a similar manner, they encapsulate the 
way in which ‘legitimate’ violence is no longer solely associated with the state and its 
representatives, but can extend to other groups also – and at the same time, the state can 
lose its claim to the use of legitimate violence. David Keen talks at length about the 
‘sobels’ (solider-rebels) of Sierra Leone where the distinction between the two was 
blurred, and the objectives of both ‘sides’ in fact coincided rather than opposed one 
another (Keen, 2005: 107). As Keen explains, this was not coincidental but caused by 
very specific socio-political dynamics: “soldiers and rebels increasingly came from the 
same social base; and both the insurgency and the counterinsurgency were shaped by a 
weak, unrepresentative and corrupt state and an underdeveloped economy that starved 
its youth of opportunity” (2005: 107). This demonstrates how the state-citizen 
relationship can affect and exacerbate conflict, but at the same time how conflict can 
have a profound effect on the state-citizen relationship and the way in which the state is 
perceived by citizens. It can also affect the cohesiveness of the state structure as the 
fragmentation of groups within society impacts the way in which politics is played out 
at the national level, and the way in which the administration functions. 
It is partly for this reason that a number of scholars within the field of post-conflict 
peace-building and reconstruction advocate the prioritization of the establishment of 
institutions that can re-establish an impartial, service-provider and/or administrative role 
for the state (Bastian and Luckham, 2003; Paris, 2004). Undermining the establishment 
of state processes and procedures that are knowable and accessible to all citizens, the 
fragmentation ensuing from new wars (alongside the much more limited capacity and 
reach of the state) can hinder basic service delivery and lead to humanitarian crises that 
linger for many years. Somalia provides a case in point.     
As well as affecting the cohesiveness and capacity of the state, and the likelihood of 
citizens to trust the impartiality of its administrative processes, conflict (and especially 
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conflict as a component of the new wars) can cause disproportionate levels of 
community displacement, both internal to a conflict-affected state and across borders 
with neighbouring countries (Lischer, 2007). This can have a significant effect on the 
way in which these communities relate to the state as they no longer occupy fixed 
geographical positions and are often unaccounted for, particularly given the state’s 
limited capacity as a result of civil conflict. Displacement and/or greater instability 
more generally can also exacerbate the fragmentation according to different kinds of 
identity groups that Kaldor discusses – as networks of trust contract to include 
progressively smaller groups of people, diversity within these groups dissipates. This 
can serve to strengthen community cohesion in the face of adversity, in some cases, or 
can have the opposite effect where family units become entities unto themselves and 
function as independent of previously tight-knit communities. The fragmentation of 
society caused by conflict has been documented at length by Nordstrom (1994).     
The reason for assessing these effects of conflict in fragile states is that they are likely 
to have a significant impact on the way in which democratisation occurs or does not 
occur in a fragile context. Returning to a key statement made in section 1.1.1 above, 
democratisation primarily concerns changes in the relationship between ruler and ruled, 
and as has been shown here, different kinds of conflict also have very particular effects 
on this relationship. Apart from the basic assumption that conflict decreases the chance 
of democratisation occurring, however, as a result of its varied (negative) effects on the 
state-citizen relationship  through either weakening state capacity or strengthening it to 
the extreme,  there has been little systematic enquiry into whether and why the 
particular circumstances shared by some fragile states hinder the democratisation 
process and affect the nature of citizenship.  Collier provides a cursory glance into the 
behaviour of political elites in war-torn environments in which elections in particular 
take place (2009), but does not expand discussion to the way in which society changes 
as a result of conflict, or indeed the way in which conflict becomes normalized into 
everyday life (Fetherston, 2000: 195), thus affecting daily decisions and lifestyle 
choices. At the same time, while conflict becomes embedded in people’s day-to-day 
existence, it is not static: levels and experiences of fragility and conflict change over 
time, forcing new forms of adaptability, compromise and a necessarily short-term 
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perspective among inhabitants of conflict-affected areas. One of the aims of this study 
therefore is to assess the way in which the shifting characteristics of fragile 
environments can affect the state-citizen relationship and what this then means for 
democratisation processes within them.  
1.4  Summary and conclusions 
This section has reviewed a range of different bodies of literature on democratisation 
and the state, covering theoretical definitions and conceptions of democratisation and 
the state-citizen relationship. It has also reviewed theories of the state in the 
international system, state sovereignty, and the notion of fragile states – a concept that 
emerged in the early 2000s as a way to classify dysfunctional states and analyse reasons 
for that dysfunction.  
From this review, it is possible to make several statements about the state of the theory 
on democratisation and the state. First, that the transitology approach to transitions from 
autocracy to democracy (and vice-versa) is insufficient to explain the complexities of 
political transition and also the nature of democratisation. While this approach allows a 
wider application of the theory of transition that expands beyond structural and 
historical factors linked to a specific context, they are unable to capture the dynamics of 
social change at the local level. This being the case, broader conceptions of both 
transition and democratisation are needed. Second, however, that the current source of 
these broader, more complex definitions – substantive approaches to democratisation – 
focus increasingly on state-citizen relationships, that in themselves are confined to 
limited definitions of what the state and the citizen are or should be in a given context. 
Third, that state sovereignty is a highly contested concept that is at once assumed and 
contradicted, with negative sovereignty a powerful concept to explain these 
contradictions in weak or fragile states – a factor likely influencing the ability of these 
states to develop or maintain state-citizen relationships. Finally, that the term ‘fragile 
states’ is a means for donor countries to categorise otherwise ‘unruly’ states which do 
not fit the standard model of what a state should be. Conflict-affected fragile states do 
present a certain set of special circumstances in which political processes take place, but 
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there is significant differentiation among them and fragility in any one is not a static 
phenomenon. Different types of conflict in particular have differential effects on society 
and its relationship to ruling powers, which in turn is likely to affect democratisation 
processes.    
From the literature surveyed, a key problem emerges: democratisation and transition in 
general need to be described in substantive terms, but when applied to fragile states, 
they cannot rely on an analysis of state-citizen relationships because of the way that the 
circumstances presented by these states do not comply with the conventional model of 
statehood or citizenship. How does conflict impact the way in which people relate to 
ruling powers in fragile contexts?  Is it possible to develop a means of conceptualising 
democratisation that avoids the assumption of this seemingly fundamental relationship? 
These questions do not appear to have been addressed to date in the available literature. 
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CHAPTER 2: DEMOCRATISATION: MEASUREMENT, PRACTICE AND THE 
AFGHAN CASE 
This chapter surveys the second, third and fourth categories of the literature identified 
as relevant to the thesis: existing models to measure democratisation; the practice of 
internationally-promoted democratisation and statebuilding in fragile contexts; and 
democratisation in Afghanistan, the chosen case for this research. It then identifies gaps 
across all four categories of literature reviewed, and formulates the key research 
questions that will guide the choice of methodology. 
2.1 Existing models to measure democratisation  
The second component of this literature review looks at existing frameworks to measure 
levels of democratisation and the effects of democracy promotion. Building on the 
theories of democratisation assessed in chapter 1, this section will focus specifically on 
the way in which existing models for democracy measurement are tied to definitions of 
the state and the state-citizen relationship that are not necessarily applicable to conflict-
affected or fragile contexts.  
Considering democratisation as a phenomenon that can be measured and compared 
across contexts suggests a positivist ontological perspective, in which phenomena exist 
in the world to be observed by political scientists. Thus, a political party in Canada, for 
example, is the same fundamental entity as a political party in the Ukraine. An 
interpretivist approach, however, would see parties as institutions that derive meaning 
from their human constituents, who assign this meaning based on contextual and social 
influences (Winch, 1958; Taylor, 1985; Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: 18). From this 
perspective, while institutions like parties can be compared across contexts, they are 
likely to be vastly different from one another given the varying meanings assigned to 
them by those that participate within them, as a result of contextual difference.  
The researcher finds the interpretivist position convincing, in that institutions, for 
example, are socially constructed entities, and that social phenomena such as 
democratisation will take place according to the specificities of historical and political 
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context. She also assumes, however, that to some degree, these pheonomena can be 
compared across small groups of contexts that share certain characteristics – for 
example, in the case of conflict-affected fragile states. To this extent, then, she 
considers the Historical Institutionalist (HI) position – key proponents of which include 
Theda Skocpol (1979; 1985); Kathleen Thelen, (1999; 2010) Charles Tilly (1975; 1978; 
2003) and Sven Steinmo (2008; Steinmo and Ide, 2009) – which is grounded in the 
study of the structural change of society over time, to be the most appropriate for this 
research in its grounding of comparative analysis in historical and political context.
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Scholars from the HI school often compare small groups of contexts, rather than making 
universalistic generalizations (Thelen, 1999: 373), and this approach would suit well the 
study of so-called fragile states. In essence, the researcher proposes to look at 
empirically grounded cases rather than search for overarching theories of 
democratisation.   
This part of the literature review surveys the various attempts of democracy theorists to 
address an empirical question: assuming institutions and processes can be compared 
across different contexts, provided that history and power are taken into account – 
through what means is it possible to make this comparison? More specifically – if 
democratisation levels can be measured and compared from one country to another, 
what should be the indicators or proxies used to facilitate plausible comparisons? This 
question has been asked by many scholars who have applied varying criteria in 
assessing levels of democratisation, a detailed comparison of some of the more recent 
attempts at which is made by Bogaards (2010). As Bollen describes, however, the study 
of measuring democracy has been a concern (albeit wavering in prominence) of social 
and political scientists since the late 1950s, when the decline of colonialism led to the 
creation of numerous new independent states (Bollen, 1991: 3). In order to limit 
constructively the discussion for the purposes of this thesis, three have been selected for 
comparison: those of the Polity model (Gurr, 1974; Jaggers and Gurr, 1995), Tatu 
Vanhanen (1984; 1990; 2000) and Charles Tilly (2007).  These are explored 
individually and compared in this section.   
                                                          
6
 For more on the HI school and Interpretivist approaches to social explanation, see Appendix 1. 
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Over the last century, a number of political scientists have put forward schematics 
through which to assess levels of democracy or democratisation in and across given 
contexts. These have included those based on quantitative indicators of procedural and 
constitutional factors (for example the Polity Model expounded by Jaggers and Gurr, 
1995; Vanhanen, 1984, 1990, 2000); those passed on judgements of political and civil 
rights (Freedom House, 2011), those based on ideological and/or socio-cultural 
distinctions (Huntington, 1991, 1993; Diamond, 1999), and those focusing on process-
oriented criteria or variables (Dahl, 1998; Tilly, 2007). These inevitably vary depending 
on the author’s definition of democracy, but most (with the exception of Tilly) include 
requirements for democratic procedures (such as elections), a level of freedom of 
expression (although exactly what level is rarely specified) and the facility for peaceful 
secession of power as determined by the will of the people. As one theorist has stated, 
“it has been easier for researchers to agree on the general characteristics of democracy 
than on how to measure it” (Vanhanen, 2000: 252). This section explores the validity of 
three alternative methods for measuring levels of democratisation that could potentially 
be applied to fragile states.  
2.1.1 The Polity model/Freedom House 
Since its inception as Polity I in the 1970s, the Polity model (Gurr, 1974) has been 
widely used and amended as a means to assess both regime stability and levels of 
democracy and autocracy in a wide range of countries over time. Gurr’s 1974 usage of 
the Polity data was an attempt to build on existing theories about the nature of regime 
durability and stability, comparing data sets in three regions (Europe [including North 
America and Australia], Latin America and ‘Afro-Asia’) in both the 19th and 20th 
centuries. In this work, he states a critical objective that speaks to the ontological 
question discussed above: “my central concern is whether any of the prevailing 
scholarly and popular beliefs about the viability of particular kinds of national political 
arrangements have historical or cross-cultural validity” (1974: 1483). Through this and 
a variety of subsequent studies, Gurr attempts to show that this validity does in fact 
exist. An amended version of the data – Polity II – was later released with modifications 
allowing the annual categorization of 132 different polities over time (Lichbach, 1984; 
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Jaggers and Gurr, 1995: 470). Polity II became one of the most widely used data sets for 
the measurement of the democraticness of a broad spectrum of political systems. 
Amended again by Jaggers and Gurr in 1995 to become Polity III, which includes 
further democracy indicators, additional data (taking the number of countries studied to 
161 – all independent countries between 1946 and 1994 with populations of over 
500,000 at the end of the 20
th
 century) and a re-coding of previous data to allow ease of 
comparison with other models (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995: 470), Polity remains influential 
as a seminal means through which to quantify regime type and regime change over 
time.   
In its third and most recent format, this model is used to convert qualitative analysis into 
a quantitative scoring system, in which polities (used by these scholars as an alternative 
term for regimes) are assigned numerical values indicating their position along a 
continuum between autocracy and democracy.  As the authors describe,   “democratic 
and autocratic systems are assumed to occupy two ends of a single political continuum.  
In between these two 'ideal types', political systems can be defined by their degree of 
democraticness” (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995: 469). Based on an 11-point scale, polities are 
judged according to five sets of criteria: 1) competitiveness of political participation; 2) 
regulation of political participation; 3) competitiveness of executive recruitment; 4) 
openness of executive recruitment; and 5) constraints on the chief executive. These 
follow a definition of democracy that is purposefully institutional in focus. While the 
authors state that alongside “the presence of institutions and procedures through which 
citizens can express  effective  preferences about alternative political policies and 
leaders” and “the existence of institutionalized  constraints  on  the  exercise  of 
executive power”, a third indicator of the democraticness of states from a western 
liberal perspective is comprised of civil liberties – this is deemed too difficult to 
quantify given the general lack of contemporary or historical data on the subject and so 
institutional factors are prioritised (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995: 471). Justifying what might 
otherwise be seen as a narrow focus, the authors describe the way in which they see 
other facets of democracy as contained within their framework: 
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[O]ur operational indicator of democracy is derived from subjective codings of 
the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness 
of executive recruitment, and the level of constraints on the chief executive. 
Other aspects of plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of checks 
and balances, freedom of the press, and the like, are treated as means to, or 
manifestations of, these institutional structures (1995: 471).   
In this way, the polity model maintains a certain simplicity which renders possible the 
comparison of polities across centuries, but which is limited in its inability to consider 
some of these ‘aspects of plural democracy’ in isolation. This links then to minimalist 
definitions of democracy (as opposed to the more recent substantive alternatives) 
discussed in chapter 1. 
Whereas in Polity II, separate scales for autocracy and democracy were used, these are 
combined in Polity III to form a continuum of one to the other.  A combined score is 
allocated to polities, in which a figure for levels of autocracy is subtracted from a score 
for democracy. The total figure calculated for each country is then entered into a 
typology in which distinctions are made between coherent autocracies, incoherent 
polities (‘anocracies’) and coherent democracies (Bogaards, 2010: 476-477; Jaggers and 
Gurr, 1995).  A score of +7 to +10 indicates a coherent democracy, and 
correspondingly, a score of -7 to -10 indicates a coherent autocracy. The range in 
between these two extremes (+6 to -6) represent ‘incoherent’ polities: 
By definition, incoherent polities are unconsolidated polities. Incoherent polities 
denote those political systems which are neither fully autocratic nor democratic 
in institutional structure. Incoherent democracies denote those political systems 
with primarily democratic elements that also place substantial limits on 
participation, competition, and/or civil liberties. By contrast, incoherent 
autocracies denote those political systems with primarily autocratic structures 
that also allow some opportunity for political participation and competition 
and/or provide for the protection of civil rights (1995: 478). 
Incoherency also poses more of a threat to regime stability, as Gurr earlier demonstrates 
(Gurr, 1974: 1502). According to his analysis, the more solidly autocratic or democratic 
a given polity, the more likely it is to have persisted over time. This presents a possible 
point of relevance to this thesis, as – as explored in chapter 1 (section 1.3), one of the 
key determinants of any fragile state is its propensity to be politically unstable. All 
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potential case study cases, then, to which the model developed in this thesis could be 
applied, would by definition be governed by ‘incoherent polities’, although they would 
occupy different positions along the continuum from incoherent autocracies to 
incoherent democracies.  
Some point of distinction needs to be made, however, between Jaggers and Gurr’s focus 
on ‘polities’, and the concept of the state.  For Gurr, the ‘polity’ is simply a political 
system – or “the basic political arrangements by which national political communities 
govern their affairs.” (1974: 1483). This is distinct from the (nation-) state in which a 
given polity is situated. Perhaps a less neutral term for this would be a ‘regime’. As 
such, comparisons can be made over time between successive polities in a state, and 
studies conducted on the subject of polity change. In Polity I, for example, 336 different 
polities are studied across 91 ‘nominally different’ states across the 19th and 20th 
centuries (Gurr, 1974: 1483). This presents another potential point of relevance to this 
thesis as one of its central concerns is the persistent reliance in attempts to measure 
democracy on the variable of ‘the state’. Avoiding its usage by favouring a notion of 
‘polity’ instead might present a more appropriate mechanism for the measurement of 
democracy in fragile states.    
In its categorization of regime type as a result of quantitative scores, the Polity model is 
not dissimilar to the approach taken in the Freedom House schematic (Bogaards, 2010: 
475). While Freedom House focuses on political rights and civil liberties instead of 
institutional concerns, in a sense it mirrors the Polity model in that for Freedom House, 
institutional factors are product of or are intimately connected to the institutions in place 
to protect them. The distinction and relationship between political rights and civil 
liberties in measuring democracy is not new, but draws on distinctions made by scholars 
in the late 1980s, who noted that both were important components of democracy: 
“political structures are important in their own right, but without significant opportunity 
to exercise…civil liberties there can be no effective exercise of the political rights 
generally placed at the core of any definition of democracy” (Inkeles, 1991: ix). As 
discussed in chapter 1, Zakaria expands on this point in his contention that regimes 
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where these political structures exist without civil rights or liberties (in his terms, 
constitutional liberalism) can be classed as ‘illiberal democracies’ (Zakaria, 1997).    
Collating data from 1972 until 2010 on an annual basis – also similar to the Polity 
model – Freedom House categorises regimes as ‘free’, ‘partly free’ or ‘not free’ 
according to the scores generated for each country based on subjective, qualitative 
criteria (Freedom House, 2012a). A checklist of variables is applied to each country 
(Freedom House, 2011) and a final score allocated based on the judgment of researchers 
as to whether the country meets the standards outlined in the list. Countries are rated on 
a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is the most free, and 7 the least. Categorisations are made 
through the combination of average score for political rights and civil liberties, with a 
total score of 1 to 2.5 equating a ‘free’ country; 3 to 5 constituting a ‘partly free’ 
country; and a score of 5.5 to 7 denoting a state that is ‘not free’.  
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Table 2: Freedom House Country Status ratings (Freedom House, 2011) 
Combined Average of the PR and CL 
Ratings 
Country Status 
1.0 to 2.5 Free 
3.0 to 5.0 Partly Free 
5.5 to 7.0 Not Free 
  
The simplicity and consistency of the Freedom House approach is a strength allowing 
comparisons both between countries and within the same country over time. As such, it 
is possible to collate data for Afghanistan, for example, from 1972 – 2010 very simply 
by compiling annual scores: 
Figure 2: Afghanistan combined PR and CL Freedom House score, 1972-2012 
(compiled from data available at Freedom House, 2012b) 
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Table 3: Annual Scores for Afghanistan, post-intervention (Freedom House 2012b) 
 
Year Political 
Rights 
Civil 
Liberties 
Status 
2001 7 7 Not Free 
2002 6 6 Not Free 
2003 6 6 Not Free 
2004 5 6 Not Free 
2005 5 5 Partly Free 
2006 5 5 Partly Free 
2007 5 5 Partly Free 
2008 5 6 Not Free 
2009 6 6 Not Free 
2010 6 6 Not Free 
 
Figure 2 clearly demonstrates the way in which Afghanistan has not been ranked as 
‘free’ according to the Freedom House criteria over the last 40 years, and indeed has 
spent most of this time ranked as ‘not free’ during successive quasi-authoritarian 
regimes which have tended to quash opposition movements and dictate policy (an 
historical analysis of Afghanistan’s democratic history will be given in chapter 5). The 
period from 2005-2007 (highlighted in blue in Table 3) marks an interesting progression 
and a category change, roughly around the time of the first post-intervention 
parliamentary elections in Afghanistan, which were declared by independent observer 
missions as ‘free and fair’ and in which participation levels were relatively high. The 
reversion back to the category of ‘not free’ marks a number of different events and 
trends, notably the increasing consolidation of executive power over legislative affairs, 
and fraudulent elections in 2009 and 2010.  
At a glance, then, Freedom House assessments of Afghanistan’s relationship with 
political rights and civil liberties over time seem to coincide with historical evidence, as 
will be detailed further in later chapters. Nevertheless, there remain problems with both 
this and the Polity models, most specifically in the ways in which judgments are 
simplified to events or situations in a given year rather than painting a picture of the 
larger historical and regional narratives at play. While trends emerge, demonstrating 
shifting levels of political rights and civil liberties, or democractiness versus 
autocraticness, over time, there is no indication of why this might be the case without an 
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accompanying narrative. Jaggers and Gurr also concede that    “[u]nfortunately, the 
annualization format of the Polity  II  (and  Polity  III)  data has  made  it difficult to 
precisely match regime  type with event-based social  behavior, such as international 
conflict” (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995: 470). As such, it is not possible to make 
generalisations about macro-level international policy decisions that different kinds of 
polities (autocracies, democracies or anocracies) make.   
As demonstrated above, both Polity and Freedom House rely on a continuum along 
which countries or polities can move over time with relative fluidity in the sense that 
they can become more or less democratic/autocratic, or can assign more or less political 
rights and civil liberties to citizens. Indeed, the principal contributor to the Polity I and 
Polity II indices claims that “[n]o attempt is made to label a polity as a ‘democracy’ or 
an ‘autocracy’. Rather, the indices make it possible to distinguish degrees of autocracy, 
democracy, and anocracy in any system” (Gurr, 1974: 1487). In Polity III, however, 
clear defining categories are outlined based on the numerical scores of polities, labelling 
quite clearly their status as democracies, autocracies or anocracies. This is even more 
pronounced in the Freedom House allocations of ‘free, partly free and not free’ to 
countries based on their combined scores for political rights and civil liberties. In 
applying these labels, both models risk functioning as somewhat subjective judges in 
the awarding of ‘badges of honour’ (Zakaria, 1997: 25) to polities or countries and 
collating these with ‘democracy’ or ‘democraticness’.  This proves to be a problem 
when scores for different aspects of democraticness are weighted equally and a 
combined average score derived, as occurs in both models – a country can attain ‘free’ 
status based on its proficiency in one category of civil liberties even though its 
performance in another area is significantly lower than would be expected in a free 
state. In 1993, for example, Italy was given a civil liberties score of 3 (below the 2.5 
threshold for the ‘free’ category) and yet the average score was still enough to earn the 
country its ‘free’ status (Freedom House, 2012b). In other years Italy has consistently 
shown lower scores for civil liberties than for political rights, and yet since 1973 has 
managed to maintain its free status. Given the currency and weight now placed on 
Freedom House ratings, the political ramifications of Italy being awarded only a ‘partly 
free’ status would be considerable. Evidently, according to Freedom House measures 
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civil liberties in Italy are ‘better’ than they are in, say, Uganda – but again, their 
betterness depends in part on what are essentially subjective judgements.   
This is not to say that ‘subjective’ is necessarily wrong – most if not all assessments of 
democracy and democraticness rely to varying degrees on some form of subjectively 
analysed data, which presents more of a problem for some scholars than for others. 
Jaggers and Gurr acknowledge the subjectivity present in their own data analysis but 
suggest that comparison with other models provides a means to test for and limit the 
effects of this:   
[T]he measures of institutional democracy and autocracy found in the Polity III 
dataset are based on the subjective interpretation of historical monographs and 
other source materials by the authors and their associates. Aware of the 
problems of' interpretation bias' associated with judgmental measures of 
democracy, we test the validity of our measures against those of other 
researchers (1995: 473). 
As such, the stronger the correlation with others’ findings, the less subjective the 
analysis – or the more it appears all researchers have the same bias in their approaches 
(1995: 476). This argument is supported by the compilation of studies represented in 
Alex Inkeles’ edited volume, the product of a conference on measuring democracy in 
which the work of numerous scholars (including Gurr) using different indicators for 
measurement roughly correlated with each other in terms of results (Inkeles, 1991: x).  
However, relying on a methodology that prioritises cross-comparison with other studies 
would present a problem for the analysis of democracy in fragile states, about which 
there is very little information available and on which very few studies have been 
conducted. While Freedom House statistics exist for the country from 1972 onwards, 
Polity uses interregnum codes for Afghanistan in the 1990s (a score of -77) 
demonstrating the difficulty in assessing conflict-affected areas (Jaggers and Gurr, 
1995: 481).    
As such, while both Polity and Freedom House present valuable contributions to the 
ways in which the measurement of democracy might be approached, neither presents a 
method that would facilitate this measurement when applied to fragile or conflict states.  
While some aspects of these models, such as a focus on polities instead of states, may 
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yet prove useful in the model developed in this thesis – on the whole Polity and 
Freedom House remain insufficient. This is largely due to their tendency to award labels 
to polities or states, and the subjectivity of the judgements made.  One model attempting 
to avoid this kind of subjectivity by focus purely on ‘objective’ brute data – electoral 
statistics – is that put forward by Vanhanen.  
2.1.2 Vanhanen 
Vanhanen’s model (1984; 1990; 2000) measures democratisation using elections as its 
primary unit of analysis. In order to so this, it uses two key variables: the degree of 
electoral competition and the degree of electoral participation, and then multiplies 
scores from these variables to create an Index of Democratisation (ID) (2000: 251). The 
use of only two variables makes for a very simple model, which can be used easily by 
other researchers given its lack of reliance on subjective judgment, and can be easily 
adapted to other research projects with different parameters also. It is also a model 
which, according to Vanhanen has no need for a further indicator of civil rights and 
political liberties, because the assumption is that countries with competitive elections 
and high levels of participation must by default have a certain degree of these other 
characteristics. Thus, they are indirectly measured through participation and 
competition (2000: 256), according to a minimalist conception of democracy.  
The Vanhanen model is an events-focused or procedural (Tilly, 2007:8) approach that 
assigns considerable weight to certain political structures such as political parties and 
their success or failure in elections. Electoral competition is measured through the 
subtraction of the percentage votes gained by the largest party in a given country from 
100, with the remainder comprising the share of votes gained by the smaller parties 
(Vanhanen, 2000: 254). In cases where parties do not formally take part in elections, but 
are not prohibited from doing so, it is assumed that no party or government body 
controls more than 30 per cent of the vote, and thus this number is subtracted from the 
total 100. In cases where parties are not allowed to compete in elections, a score of zero 
is allocated.  
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Electoral participation is measured simply by comparing the number of voters in a 
given election with population figures, making use of two sets of data that are normally 
readily available for a given country. This allows the comparison of a broad range of 
countries over a significant time period (187 independent or former independent states 
over the period 1810-1998).  Using entire population figures, due to their relative 
availability, rather than the percentage of adults eligible to vote, however, is also a 
shortcoming: as Vanhanen himself admits, this widens the discrepancy between 
developed and developing countries, the latter of which have very young populations 
and a much smaller proportion of adults (2000:255).  
In spite of this kind of problem, relating to the reliance of this model on two, solely 
quantitative variables, Vanhanen contends that this approach is nevertheless more 
reliable than qualitative alternatives:    
it is better to use simple quantitative variables with certain weaknesses than turn 
to more complicated indicators loaded with weights and estimates based on 
subjective judgments  (2000: 256).   
This facilitates the production of empirically grounded results based on electoral 
statistics that are not as determined by ‘subjective judgments’ as are the models of 
Polity and Freedom House (2000: 262). However, there are evidently problems with 
this method. Applying this model to a conflict-affected context in which any statistics 
are both difficult to determine and usually politically contested, is problematic. 
Oftentimes election observers are few and far between, and the accuracy of electoral 
data can be called into question. Treating quantitative data such as electoral turnout and 
the percentage of votes gained by parties as empirical fact cannot only be an inaccurate 
reflection of results but also can serve to solidify the so-called ‘gains’ made by 
dominant parties that could otherwise be questioned. These data are not a-political: it is 
not possible to remove them objectively from the context from which they came.  
Further, it could be argued that the common frailty and/or informality of political parties 
in conflict-affected settings renders the assessment of their share of the electoral vote an 
inaccurate measure of competition. This dilemma reflects an epistemological debate 
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concerning the fundamental transferability of institutions and organizations across 
different contexts, without allowing for historical and political variables.  
Moreover, as Vanhanen also admits, while fundamentally quantitative, his own model is 
not free of subjective judgments. Once an ID has been established for a given regime, 
Vanhanen then determines arbitrary thresholds to distinguish between autocracies and 
democracies (2000: 257). These are set at 30 per cent competition and 10 per cent 
participation – a regime must score above both of these levels, and reach an ID of +5, in 
order to be considered a democracy. Again, then, this is a model in which a clear 
dividing line is established between one regime type and another, implying that the 
difference between the two rests purely on the extent of voter participation and the 
number of parties who share the votes. 
Comparing his results to those of the Polity dataset and Freedom House, Vanhanen 
finds rough correlation throughout and particularly close correlation since the end of the 
First World War, with some significant exceptions. For example, in 2000, Iran is 
classified by the ID model as a democracy, while according to Freedom House, it was 
considered ‘not free’ (Vanhanen, 2000: 261). This is because, according to Vanhanen, 
“one can interpret the nature of Iran's political institutions in various ways” (2000: 261). 
This being the case, however, the question remains: if Iran’s political institutions can be 
interpreted in ‘various ways’, then surely this principle could apply to other regimes 
also? Earlier, Vanhanen clarifies his definition of democracy, which is: ‘a political 
system in which ideologically and socially different groups are legally entitled to 
compete for political power, and in which institutional power-holders are elected by the 
people and responsible to the people’. Although its institutional focus is clear, this does 
not differ significantly from a number of other mainstream definitions, including those 
of Dahl, and Diamond, for example. Vanhanen continues, however, to state that “[w]e 
should apply the same criteria for democracy to all countries because it is reasonable to 
assume that human nature basically is similar everywhere” (2000: 252, emphasis 
added).  This would seem to contradict his perspective on Iran, whose institutions are 
considered open to interpretation. By extension, it is possible to argue that political 
institutions in fragile conflict-affected states may also fall outside the standard 
76 
 
conception or interpretation of an institution, and thus evade accurate classification by 
this model. Essentially, the characteristics of political institutions require a more 
detailed analysis grounded in political and historical realities. 
2.1.3 Tilly 
Tilly’s contribution to the social sciences is vast and difficult to categorise according to 
a specific discipline. In a broad sense, he is a political historian – having spent many 
years analysing the development of the nation state in Western Europe, (1975); the 
nature of revolutions (1978), state formation and violence (1985) collective violence 
(2003, 2006); regimes (2006) and, latterly, on democracy (2004, 2007).  His work 
coincides most closely with the HI school, in that he focuses on macro-level structures 
and historical processes, and their contribution to the explanation of social phenomena. 
An influential scholar in the statist literature, he is in part responsible for the re-
emergence of scholarly literature on the role of the state in the late 1970s and 1980s 
following a 20-year period of academic focus on behaviourism and the role of the 
individual. Less concerned with class than some of his contemporaries in this field, 
however, Tilly is not as driven by Marxist ideology as by a more general concern for 
the centrality of historical analysis. Tilly’s perspective allows for cross-cultural 
comparisons as situated within highly specific historical processes. These characteristics 
of Tilly’s work in general feature strongly in the model he presents for the measurement 
of democracy (2007), which is to a much greater extent than Polity, Freedom house or 
Vanhanen situated within historical narrative. While Polity and Freedom House draw on 
historical accounts in order to assess countries according to their respective criteria, 
Tilly grounds his entire model on historical narrative, placing very little emphasis on 
quantitative variables.  
Tilly presents democratisation as a continuum on which states move to become more or 
less democratic – but do not reach an end-point or category in either direction. This 
allows the possibility for states to move toward or away from a more consolidated 
democratic politics over time. He plots the trajectories of many different states or 
regimes on an x axis of democracy against a y axis of state capacity, with values from 0 
to 1 assigned for each variable at different points in a regime’s history (2007: 71).  
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Diagrams thus assume a complex, overlapping trajectory moving backwards and 
forwards at different points in time, countering persuasively any developmental or 
modernisation-theory assumptions of democratisation as a uni-directional, teleological 
process (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3: “Trajectory of French National Regimes, 1600-2006” (Tilly, 2007: 35). 
 
The model also presents a process-oriented approach to democracy within which a 
consultative relationship between citizen and state is central. For Tilly, “a regime is 
democratic to the degree that political relations between the state and its citizens feature 
broad, equal, protected and mutually binding consultation” (2007:14). The extent to 
which these four elements define a state-citizen relationship determine its 
democraticness at a given point in time. Thus, democratisation is “an average 
movement upward on the four dimensions”, with “de-democratisation as an average 
movement downward on the four dimensions” (2007:15). Historical accounts are 
judged – subjectively – according to these four aspects of democracy for a given state 
and the ensuing graphs complemented with a corresponding historical narrative of 
events. Critical also to this approach is the way in which it rejects conventional notions 
of the importance of elite behaviour to regime change. Whereas for Diamond, for 
example, “elites matter most for the stability and consolidation of democracy” (1999: 
66), Tilly centres his discussion firmly within the state-citizen struggle and focuses on 
the “citizenry at large” (2007: 12). This is particularly important to the kind of data that 
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are considered useful in Tilly’s compilation of historical narratives that chart the 
relationships between ruler and ruled over time.   
Tilly’s model differs significantly from those put forward by Polity, Freedom House or 
Vanhanen. First, it does not seek to categorise regime types. While similar to 
Polity/Freedom House in their initial measuring of democracy along a continuum,  for 
Tilly the democraticness of a state is measured according to the four key determinants 
of breadth, equality, protection and mutually binding consultation (2007:14-15) – and 
placed on a bi-directional continuum between democracy and non-democracy, in which 
states can move toward or away from either pole. The model does not then attempt to 
label states according to seemingly arbitrary distinctions. A certain contradiction 
appears, it seems, between Tilly’s claim to dismiss these distinctions, on the one hand, 
and his acknowledgment nonetheless that poles at each end of the spectrum exist (2007: 
41). Throughout his argument, he also labels some states as democracies uncritically. 
Nevertheless, Tilly de-emphasises the need to categorise states into groups in preference 
of a more nuanced approach to analysis that allows for much greater fluidity of 
movement along the continuum and a central hypothesis that brings to the fore the 
potential for frequent change in state-citizen relationships. This is a fundamentally 
different kind of assessment of democratisation to those of Polity and Freedom House, 
which attempt first and foremost to distinguish regime types from one another. As 
Bogaards explains: 
Scholars who conceive of democracy as a matter of degree treat democracy and 
its absence as endpoints of a continuum, on which any thresholds or boundaries 
are arbitrary. Such “degreeism” (Sartori 1991) not only does away with the 
notion of a democratic transition, but it also negates the concept of regime and 
regime type (Bogaards, 2010: 476) 
Whereas this has been seen as a negative characteristic in the pursuit of quantitative 
measurement by scholars such as Sartori (1970: 1036) – it is argued here that in fact this 
is a key strength of Tilly’s approach. It avoids the need for arbitrary distinctions made 
between different kinds of regimes, as determined by west-centric theorists, and in 
doing so concentrates on what is considered here as a much more important factor – the 
extent to which citizens are able to participate in political processes without hindrance 
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from the state, and the extent to which the state responds to their demands. The move 
away from talk of ‘transition’ – from the progression between ‘anocracy and 
democracy’ or ‘not free’ to ‘partly free’ allows for a much more accurate conception of 
the ways in which countries democratise over centuries and with movements toward de-
democratisation at various intervals. ‘Transition’ implicitly invokes a short period of 
time, particularly in the rhetoric of post-conflict statebuilding. The researcher considers 
any move away from this terminology as far as democratisation is concerned to be more 
analytically sound. Furthermore, this framework  allows for the possibility of 
improvement or deterioration of a democratic politics in what might be considered 
‘established’ or ‘liberal’ democracies – as Larry Diamond asserts, “liberal democracies, 
too, can either improve or decline in their levels of political accountability, 
accessibility, competitiveness, and responsiveness” (Diamond, 1999: 19). Again, this 
serves as a stark reminder – particularly when referring to the historical processes 
through which western ‘established democracies’ democratised – that conflict and 
contestation within states were often integral to the eventual stabilisation of democratic 
political systems (Tilly, 1985).  
Moreover, Tilly’s model is not events- (or procedures-) oriented but focuses on 
processes. According to Tilly, process-oriented approaches (unlike constitutional, 
substantive or procedural categorisations) “identify some minimum set of processes that 
must be continuously in motion for a situation to qualify as democratic” (Tilly, 2007: 
9).  This moves away from Vanhanen’s (procedural) focus on electoral competition and 
participation, and Polity’s emphasis on institutions, thus broadening the scope for the 
application of this model to contexts in which electoral statistics are disputed and 
misleading. As Tilly clearly demonstrates, a focus on elections alone does not allow for 
accurate historical analysis of the development of democratic systems in western states:  
Suppose…that we were examining all western regimes on which we could 
collect evidence between 1750 and 1800. In France, the Dutch Republic, Great 
Britain, the nascent United States, and elsewhere, comparisons based on national 
elections would get us nowhere….[A]ny scale treating characteristics of 
elections as the basic criteria for democratisation and de-democratisation would 
entirely distort the range, and therefore the comparisons, over the period from 
1750 to 1800. We would have no choice but to fix on other sorts of rights, other 
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forms of political participation, and other varieties of protection from arbitrary 
state action (2007:62). 
When focusing specifically on the question of how states democratise, and in the 
attempt to measure the ways in which they have done so historically, it is thus critical 
that a broader approach to the definition of key criteria is adopted and processes, as 
opposed to the incidences of electoral events alone, considered critical determinants.  A 
process-oriented approach  also allows greater contextual flexibility when considering 
the roles and activities of organizations, such as political parties, which in Afghanistan 
are not ideologically distinct, are not institutionalized internally as organizations and do 
not formally compete in elections under the current Single Non Transferable Vote 
system, for example (Ruttig, 2006; Larson, 2009a).  
There are problems, however, with Tilly’s model. One of its key limitations, common to 
all three approaches outlined above, is its focus on bounded, internationally recognized 
and sovereign states, countries, regimes or polities as their focus of enquiry. This is 
necessary across all models due first and foremost to the empirical requirement of 
consistency in the comparisons made.  While these are all conceptually different from 
one another, they all nevertheless limit analysis to a fixed, bounded entity – and one 
which has a relationship of some sort or other with individual citizens.    
The central hypothesis in this study speaks to the problem of applying these models to 
contexts, such as fragile states, in which the role of the state does not comply with 
notions of Westphalian statehood. Tilly states clearly that his argument brings “the 
entire world and a great deal of human history into its scope” (2007: 7) and in doing so 
implies that any state, regardless of its capacity or strength, can be analysed 
through his model. This contention is emphasised through his analysis of the historical 
paths of European states from early points in their development as states (see for 
example the case of France in Figure 3 above), and through his application of the model 
to a wide range of ‘democratising’ and ‘de-democratising’ states in the contemporary 
context. Strong, undemocratic states (such as Russia, 2007: 136) and weak, 
undemocratic states (such as Somalia and Congo-Kinshasa, 2007: 18) are all considered 
game for analysis, though they present examples ‘alternative paths’ along the 
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continuum (2007: 162-185). The claim Tilly makes here is that in any given state, the 
dynamics of the state-(individual)citizen relationship are central to democratisation and 
de-democratisation on a national scale. Whether or not this is in fact the case is the 
central concern of this thesis.  
Another limitation of Tilly’s model and its potential application to fragile states 
concerns his emphasis on the need for ‘autonomous power centers’ to be consumed 
within central state authority, if democratisation is to occur.   While he presents the four 
processes of breadth, equality, protection and mutually binding consultation as the key 
determinants of democratisation, these derive from a focus on three more fundamental 
indicators – as he explains, “for democratisation to develop in any regime, changes 
must occur in three areas: trust networks, categorical inequality, and autonomous power 
centers” (2007: 74). These are explained in some detail, but in sum they dictate that 
democratisation comprise the integration of trust networks (such as differing social 
groups) into and within the state; the reduction of categorical or formally 
institutionalised inequalities between different social groups; and the reduction of the 
power or existence of autonomous power centres whose authority could compete with 
that of the central state. Of these, the first two indicators are relatively straightforward 
in application to fragile states such as Afghanistan, and could potentially be tracked 
through proxies such as investment trends, public-private partnerships, attitudes toward 
the police for levels of integration of trust networks; acquisition of key governmental 
seats and civil service positions for minority groups, and regional resource allocation 
for institutionalised inequality.  
The third factor, however – the existence of autonomous power centres – poses a 
problem, as a result of its implicit distinction between state and non-state actors.  In 
fragile, conflict-affected or post-conflict states, centres of authority are often multiple 
and shifting. Given chronic instability, and particularly in the case of the imposition of 
new state structures following conflict, there is often an uncertainty among political 
actors concerning the locus of ‘real’ power. It is not clear whether the state will be able 
to wield a monopoly over the distribution of patronage and resources, or whether these 
will remain in the hands of regional strongmen or opposition groups. As a result of this 
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uncertainty, actors may choose to maintain connections both with state institutions and 
with other sources of authority to spread the chances of losing resources and lower 
opportunity costs.  Critically, the division between state and non-state actors is blurred: 
an individual can at once be a Member of Parliament and a significant player in the 
informal economy. Before his assassination in July 2011, Ahmad Wali Karzai, the 
brother of the Afghan President, was both the head of the Provincial Council in 
Kandahar and a well-known trader in the opium economy. In this way, alternative 
sources of power to the state exist and continue to maintain connections with the state 
but also cling to and demonstrate their autonomy whenever it is politically expedient to 
do so. This being the case, a prioritisation of different relationships and political 
identities occurs and is reshuffled on a regular basis, and a stark distinction between 
state and non-state actors does not necessarily apply (Barakat and Larson, 2013; Coburn 
and Larson, forthcoming 2013). 
Tilly’s conception of autonomous power centres is clear, in that if they remain separate 
from the political activities of state, they hinder democratisation: “To the extent that 
power centers, especially those controlling autonomous coercive means, remain 
detached from public politics, democratisation remains difficult or impossible” (2007: 
76). What is not captured by this analysis, however, is the way in which these actors 
(whether regional strongmen, warlords or commanders) can benefit from an ambiguous 
or continually negotiated relationship with the central state. Olivier Roy describes the 
way in which the ideal scenario for Afghan warlords is the simultaneous autonomy 
from and connection to the state: 
All [warlords] want to be integrated into the central political game while 
retaining as much autonomy as they can afford at the local level. Almost none of 
them... has a direct and consistent source of revenue; warlords may benefit from 
the smuggling of drugs and other goods, but they are not the primary actors in 
the drug traffic. They need the central state for legitimacy, for protection against 
possible changes of fortune and for the institutionalisation of their power. 
Consequently there is a basis for negotiations between warlords and the central 
state, provided the warlords do not have access to alternative sources of direct 
support by bypassing the central state (Roy, 2003: 10).   
84 
 
In essence, Roy’s analysis coincides with Tilly’s framework, in that potentially 
autonomous political actors need to be connected both politically and economically 
with the state at least at some fundamental level in order that democratisation (Tilly) or 
the semblance of a ‘modern state’ (Roy) can emerge. Tilly, however, does not expand 
on the grey areas in between connectedness and non-connectedness to the state, which 
is problematic. If political actors maintain some degree of autonomous bargaining 
power, and do not comply fully with state or institutional methods for dispute 
resolution, for example, negotiations between these actors and the state are protracted 
and based on personal relationships as opposed to structured, institutional practices. 
This in turn reduces the likelihood for transparency and public accountability due to the 
ways in which deals are bi-laterally made behind closed doors. Negotiations are not 
process-oriented, and there is no mechanism for treating all negotiations in the same 
way because they are all highly personalised. In Tilly’s somewhat straightforward 
portrayal of the relationships between ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ actors, the nuances of 
relationships that thrive on both accounts are lost.  
2.1.4 Section summary 
The comparative review above has demonstrated the extent to which three current 
models for measuring democratisation all focus strongly on indicators assessing the 
quality of the state-citizen relationship in some way – whether in terms of the presence 
of institutional democratic procedures (Polity), party performance and voter turnout in 
elections (Vanhanen), or the historical analysis of how states and citizens interact 
(Tilly).  It is arguable that Tilly’s model surpasses those put forward by Polity, Freedom 
House and Vanhanen in its prioritisation of historical and political narrative, and in its 
process-oriented approach. Having said this, however, the model would require 
reconsideration and amendment if applied to the contexts of fragile states, in light of the 
contextual challenges they pose in regard to conventional concepts of the state and state 
capacity. It remains to be seen whether or not it would be possible to adapt the model to 
the sphere of analysis of fragile states, and to overcome the limitation of its state-centric 
foundations.  
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2.2 The practice of internationally-promoted democratisation and statebuilding in 
fragile contexts 
Following on from the reviews of existing theoretical concepts of and means to measure 
democratisation in scholarly work given above, this section reviews the available 
literature on the practice of democratisation and statebuilding in fragile contexts. This 
review reveals the fundamental assumption of the validity of a liberal state-citizen 
relationship underlying the donor-driven processes of democratisation in fragile states. 
2.2.1 Why is democratisation in fragile states actively encouraged by external actors? 
Enshrined in the so-called Liberal (or Democratic) Peace thesis is the notion that 
liberalisation (and by extension, liberal democracy) promotes peace and stability. 
Building on Kant’s 1795 [1917] ‘Perpetual Peace’ argument, Michael W. Doyle has 
contended that a ‘liberal peace’ ensues when the three components of Republican 
representation, a commitment to international human rights and transnational 
interdependence occur simultaneously (Doyle, 1983; 2005: 463).
7
    While this idea is 
not new, in the late 1980s and 1990s, it become the subject of both a renewed scholarly 
interest. and, in the aftermath of the Cold War, of political rhetoric (Paris, 2004: 37). US 
President Bill Clinton and his then National Security Advisor Anthony Lake made very 
clear their support for this idea, championing the promotion of democracy abroad as a 
key part of America’s foreign policy (Lake, 1994).  Endorsed by United Nations 
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his ‘Agenda for Democratisation’, the 
argument was made that democratisation itself would promote peace (Boutros-Ghali, 
1996; Paris, 2004: 36). This was then further used to justify the inclusion of democratic 
statebuilding in post-conflict reconstruction programmes throughout the 1990s and 
beyond, in the Balkans, East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan to name but a few examples.   
This is not to say that the theoretical premise of the Liberal Peace thesis has not been 
questioned. Some scholars have queried the liberal explanation of democracy 
correlating with long-lasting peace in and between democratic countries, and have 
suggested instead that alternative factors, including shared values among NATO 
                                                          
7
 For further comprehensive expositions of the concept, see Paris, 2004: 36-37; Mac Ginty, 2011: 19-46. 
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countries (Spiro, 1994), geopolitics and regional primacy (Thompson, 1996) could be 
more responsible for subsequent peace in certain regions:  
most of the states that became (and remained) democratic in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries had created or found themselves in relatively 
cooperative niches that insulated them from extremely competitive, regional 
international politics. The various ways in which these niches were established 
had important and positive implications for the likelihood of domestic 
democratisation processes (Thompson, 1996:142).     
Reasonable as these challenges to the liberal peace assumptions sound, however, they 
did little to affect the popularity of the idea among policy makers and politicians in the 
West in the 1990s.  To this end, democratisation became global best practice in terms of 
post-conflict intervention in the post-Cold War era (UNDP, 2002:1), and would gain 
further traction as a means to promote international security in the aftermath of 9/11. 
It is important to consider further what democratisation of this kind, promoted primarily 
by international actors, came to constitute. For the most part, initial concerns were with 
the installation of democratic institutions – elections, to be held as soon as possible after 
the ‘end’ of a given conflict, followed by the creation of the institutions of state 
(Carothers, 1997; Paris, 2004). The Dayton Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
signed in November 1995, provides a clear example of one of the first attempts of the 
Clinton Administration to put the Liberal Peace Thesis into practice. This Agreement, 
alongside creating provisions for the division of territory, military force and a new 
Constitution, forced all parties of the conflict to agree to the creation of a unified state, 
multi-ethnic state of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Malik, 2000: 304). It set into place a new 
governmental structure that would provide the administrative framework for the new 
state. Given the ethnic nature of the conflict in the region, that had caused casualty rates 
of 230,000 and had displaced well over 2 million people so recently (Cox, 2003: 256), 
priority was placed by international actors on the creation of a state administration that 
was highly decentralised, assigning very little power to the central state institutions – 
and one which protected and isolated the three main ethnic groups from one another, 
rather than forming the basis of what might later assist greater unification. Malik argues 
that divisions became more, and not less, entrenched, as a result of this framework 
87 
 
(2000: 304). As Cox writes, while the Agreement was clearly designed to protect these 
three groups, it was “weak on creating the political and institutional ties to bind them 
together” (Cox, 2003: 263).  
The way in which elections featured in the Dayton Agreement is also notable given the 
short time in which they were scheduled after the conflict. The Agreement itself 
specified that elections should be held ‘as soon as possible’, with the actual timing of 
the polls strongly influenced by the way in which the presence of American troops had 
only been committed for a period of one year following the conflict. Thus, elections, 
facilitated by the OSCE, took place only 9 months after the end of the war. These, and 
other early elections such as the municipal polls that were to follow, simply did not 
serve to alter the existing political environment: indeed, they “tended to replicate 
existing power structures” (Cox: 2003: 269), partly due to the failure of the international 
community to implement Annex 7, a critical clause ensuring freedom of movement 
(Malik, 2000: 306). To this point, then, the introduction of ‘democracy’ from outside 
had failed to set in place a new form of political system that would empower the people, 
as opposed to the nationalist leaders who had led the war effort. This calls into question 
Staffan I. Lindberg’s contention, discussed above, that elections in themselves can 
promote democratisation (Lindberg, 2009). In the case of Bosnia and Herzogovina, the 
opposite appears to have been true. 
As is evident from this example, the scenarios in which external would-be 
democratisers find themselves in post-conflict and conflict-affected contexts are highly 
complex, politically charged environments, with democratisation forming only a small 
component of a much larger international intervention. As a small part of broader 
statebuilding approaches, democracy promotion can be somewhat limited in scope also, 
comprising a finite list of activities that encompass preparations for elections, political 
party assistance, civic education, and support to new legislative bodies, for example. 
Wider in scope and mandate is the related focus on ‘governance’ that is adopted by a 
range of development actors, including bi-lateral aid agencies, United Nations 
organisations, and civil society groups. Interpreted in many different ways, ‘governance 
programmes’ can incorporate activities as diverse as the establishment of participatory 
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decision-making bodies, anti-corruption initiatives, and supporting women’s political 
participation (Larson, 2011a: 3). This broad definition of ‘governance’ can be both 
useful and detrimental, however, since the meaning of the term has been clouded by 
donors attempting to avoid using the more politically-charged language of 
democratisation.      
Ultimately, the often conflicting agendas held by different international actors, 
particularly concerning any troop commitments to the maintenance of post-conflict 
security, are critical determinants of the outcome of intervention agreements. As the 
interests of politicians in donor countries shift, so do plans for intervention, which are 
rarely long-term in nature or consistently articulated (Suhrke, 2011). This can be 
particularly problematic when stabilisation efforts (which, as in the case of Afghanistan 
and Iraq, can entail large scale counterinsurgency strategies) through an international 
military presence are ongoing and simultaneous with democratisation efforts. 
Stabilisation is often prioritised over and above these efforts, as has been the case in 
Afghanistan to the extent that political settlements between insurgent groups and the 
government have the potential to undermine democratic principles (Mac Ginty, 2011: 
113). Through examining some of the pitfalls of cases in which liberal democratisation 
has been promoted, the researcher’s intention is not to argue against liberal 
demoratisation per se, but to question the ways in which it is often interpreted and 
applied. 
2.2.2 The practice of democracy promotion: differing approaches    
Partly as a result of the obvious problems with externally-led democratisation in post-
conflict states, a growing critical literature has developed, offering suggestions for the 
amelioration of democratic interventions. Within this literature, some scholars of what 
could be called the ‘security first’ school propose the postponement of democratisation 
efforts completely until a basic level of security has been achieved (Mansfield and 
Snyder, 1995; 2002; 2005; Etzioni, 2007). Others, focusing on an institutionalist 
perspective, argue that the problem lies with the simultaneous promotion of 
democratisation and liberalization, contending that institutions of democratic 
government should be prioritised (Paris, 2004); and yet others criticise the limited 
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nature of international democratisation efforts, calling for more attention to the 
substantive components of democracy building as opposed to the installation of formal 
democratic institutions alone (Bastian and Luckham,  2003; Ghani and Lockhart; 2008). 
These three approaches will be discussed in turn.    
‘Security first’ is a relatively recent position developed largely in response to the 
failings of democratic statebuilding in the 1990s and early 21
st
 century. Rather than see 
this failing as a result of the poor quality of international assistance, scholars of this 
persuasion consider the very attempt to democratise unstable or post-conflict regimes an 
exercise in futility. As Amitai Etzioni explains, 
We must face the fact that no matter how much money the United States and its 
allies expend, they cannot make...nations into liberal democracies. As we have 
seen time and time again, the West can easily topple Saddam or the Taliban, but 
it cannot easily found a liberal democratic regime in their place. Hence, there is 
little to be lost and much to be gained by providing security guarantees and other 
rewards in exchange for vigorous and verified deproliferation, and an end to 
harbouring, financing and equipping terrorists (Etzioni, 2007:14). 
Rather than attach democratic conditionality to assistance, then, as was the norm during 
the early 2000s, both directly from donor government and indirectly through aid 
provisions from the IMF and World Bank tied to ‘good governance’ targets, outlined in 
countries’ Poverty Reduction Strategy Plans (PRSPs) – this argument would instead 
allow regimes to remain sovereign in the Westphalian/Vattelian sense, without risk of 
intervention from outside, in return for cooperation in the elimination of terrorist 
activity within their borders.  Left alone, the theory goes, these countries would be 
likely to liberalise eventually anyway, due to the inevitable realisation that a market 
economy works well to promote growth – and due to the declining influence of 
traditional leaders who were seen as unable to respond to the demands of a new 
generation. This libertarian perspective also fits with the idea that democratisation can 
only occur from the ground upwards, and cannot be imposed by external forces. To 
some extent, recent uprisings across the Arab World appear to support this claim.  
Related to this is the earlier contention, put forward controversially in the mid-1990s by 
Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, that democratisation can in fact contribute to the 
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continuance and escalation of conflict, rather than serve as a panacea for it (Mansfield 
and Snyder, 1995).  This argument centres on the nature of political transition, 
conceding that, while established, stable democracies may not go to war with one 
another, regime change is always likely to be fraught with difficulties and may 
exacerbate tension rather than relieve it. According to these authors, “[i]n this 
transitional phase of democratisation, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, 
not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states” (1995: 5). Evidence supporting 
this argument since it was first made seems to be prevalent, with continued violence 
occurring in a number of states where democratic transitions have been promoted by 
international actors (East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan, for example). Other proponents 
of this argument include Frances Stewart and Meghan O’Sullivan who also argue that, 
while democratic nations may not fight each other as frequently as non-democratic 
ones, there is still no guarantee that they will not experience internal conflict (Stewart 
and O’Sullivan, 1998: 2). In comparing the cases of Uganda, Kenya and Sri Lanka, 
these authors find that existing ethnic divides can be emphasized to varying degrees by 
democratic institutions and apparatuses, such as political parties and particular electoral 
systems.  Furthermore, that if economic trends follow ethnic fault lines, conflict 
between opposing groups can be emphasized in spite of (and even as a result of) the 
existence of these democratic institutions, as Malik suggests in relation to the Bosnian 
case discussed above (Malik, 2000).
8
 They argue that “[w]here there are strong 
economic differences which are combined with ethnic ones, political parties may 
represent and use these differences in a way that can provoke violence…In such 
societies, widely shared economic and social development may be a necessary 
precondition for a democratic and peaceful society rather than the other way round” 
(Stewart and O’Sullivan, 1998: 17, emphasis in original).  Clear from these arguments 
is the way in which democratisation in and of itself is unlikely to engender peace in a 
context of existing and continuing conflict. This approach implies that citizens’ trust in 
the sustainability of peace – and the greater control of the state over a monopoly of 
violent force – must be developed before democratic institutions can contribute to the 
further entrenchment of that peace.   
                                                          
8
 For more on the relationship between ethnicity and conflict, see Collier (1998).  
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*** 
Related to this, for other scholars and democratisation practitioners of what might be 
termed the ‘institutions first’ school, of primary concern is the building of institutions 
that might facilitate a transition to a stable political system in the longer term. A key 
proponent of this approach is Roland Paris, who proposes ‘Institutionalization before 
Liberalization’, which is based on similar arguments to those reviewed above, in that 
“democratization and marketization are inherently tumultuous transformations that have 
the potential to undermine a fragile peace” (Paris, 2004: 7). To this end, Paris contends 
that democratisation should be delayed by international actors until political and 
economic institutions have been built to cope with political transition.  This is linked 
also to the work of civil society proponents, who argue that the key to building 
democracy is the generation of ‘social capital’ through the existence and activities of 
sub-state interest groups and social networks, who create social ties and a certain 
behaviour that facilitates democratisation (Putnam, 1993). Thus, before democracy can 
be truly established, these social networks are needed in the creation of a democratic 
culture. Erring on the side of caution, however, Philip Nord warns that while “[c]ivic 
activism may well be the bedrock of democratic life...not all civil societies, however 
dense and vibrant, give birth to democratic politics” (Nord, 2000: xvi). In practice, 
international actors have tended to see the promotion of civil society as a key 
component of democratisation, to be promoted at the same time as formal democratic 
institutions. In some cases, however, this has involved the injection of huge amounts of 
donor funds into local civil society organisations (CSOs) that did not exist prior to the 
international intervention. This has the adverse effect of creating a superficial layer of 
donor-reliant CSOs whose agendas are determined entirely by the interests of donors, 
and who have very little influence over the actual coordination and organisation of 
issues-based, grass-roots movements (Larson, 2011a: 12).   
*** 
Finally, it is the kind of superficiality of donor-promoted democratisation highlighted 
above that has led to the call by some scholars and practitioners for more 
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democratisation, not less: for more substantive democratisation to be promoted, as 
directly opposed to the minimal approach proposed by the ‘security first’ school. This 
approach would have a greater connection made between democratic institutions, on the 
one hand, and democratic politics, on the other – the latter representing a much more 
substantive, sustainable system than the introduction of institutions alone. As Bastian 
and Luckham argue, the relationship between democratic institutions and politics is 
interdeterminate: “democratic institutions only flourish if they are supported by active 
and broadly based democratic politics. But conversely the design and structure of 
democratic institutions also make a difference, by creating spaces for democratic 
politics and shaping how elected governments deal with substantive issues of 
participation, socio-economic justice and conflict” (2003: 5). Thus, both are influenced 
by one another, and can be mutually reinforcing. Having said this, these authors also 
recognise the highly political nature of democratic institution building, which is as often 
based on realpolitik and expediency of actors with vested interests as it is on their 
rhetoric of democratic transition (2003: 307). This may not necessarily be a negative 
phenomenon, but it is often overlooked in what is considered by international actors as 
a primarily technical process. Clearly, every transition is different and must be 
considered within its own historical and political context. 
2.2.3 Assumptions underlying the practice, and critiques of the practice, of democracy 
promotion 
How, then, does the literature on the practice of democracy promotion surveyed above 
relate to the central question of this thesis – the question of whether the assumption of 
the centrality of a state-citizen relationship to democratisation is applicable in fragile 
states? Simply, in the way in which both current practice and critiques of current 
practice appear to make this assumption. These two categories are now addressed in 
turn. 
Within current practice, democracy promotion is a multi-faceted phenomenon that takes 
a number of forms and is conducted by a wide range of actors, including donor 
countries’ aid agencies, such as USAID and DFID; international NGOs, such as the 
Institute for Electoral Systems (IFES) or the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty 
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Democracy (NIMD); party-affiliated organizations, such as the US National Democratic 
Institute (NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI), German Fredrich Engbert 
Stiftung (FES) and Heinrich Boll Stiftung (HBF); and multilateral donors, such as the 
UNDP, or United Nations Fund for Women.  It can include a broad spectrum of 
activities that encompasses political party development and assistance, parliamentary 
development assistance, programmes to encourage the development of civil society, 
elections observation missions, programmes to support the establishment of sub-
national governance structures and anti-corruption initiatives.  
Across the board, however – while differences exist in terms of the kind of democracy 
these organizations envisage helping to establish, there is a common assumption that a 
relatively narrow interpretation of liberal democratic practices are desirable and 
appropriate for immediate application to and establishment within fragile or post-
conflict states.   
This assumption is evident, for example, in the way in which elections are often 
prioritised on the basis of the prejudgement that popular sentiment supports an 
interactive relationship with central government and sees this as a desirable outcome. 
Elections are hurriedly organized in the aftermath of war, for example in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, on the assumption that people will choose to rid the country of its 
tyrannical wartime leaders simply because of their violent past. They are promoted as 
technical, one-off events (JEMB, 2005: 3) rather than part of a broader political 
landscape that have local as well as national ramifications (Coburn and Larson, 
forthcoming, 2013). Contentions about the establishment of democratic systems are 
made by international actors on the basis of elections having taken place, such as this 
statement from a UNDP report on Afghanistan in 2009: “The foundation for a viable, 
sustainable new democracy has been laid and a new constitution adopted. Presidential, 
parliamentary and provincial elections were successfully held in 2004-2005 and the 
next round of presidential and provincial elections will be held in August 2009” 
(UNDP, 2009: 2). Moreover, elections can comprise part of an ideological crusade to 
promote the liberal democratic freedom of individual citizens – to cast their own votes 
according to secret ballots, for instance. One elections observation report from the 
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Afghan presidential and provincial council polls in 2009 demonstrates how elections 
conducted did not match up to international standards in this regard, stating that 
“[p]ower politics and brokering set the stage for vigorous campaigning but also paved 
the way for Election Day vote maneuvering, which undermined one-person-one-vote 
principles based on individual voting preferences” (IRI, 2009: 10). This kind of value 
judgment does not take into account, however, the ways in which, as in Afghanistan, 
individual interests can be seen as secondary to the needs of a given community or 
group, and that secret ballots can generate more distrust and enmity that can the open 
show of hands in a village meeting where all preferences are clearly displayed.   
Elections aside, there is also the assumption in more general programming that all 
citizens within and across fragile states can have, and want, a relationship with their 
own state’s central apparatus that is uniform across time and place. To this end, a 
‘cookie cutter approach’ is often rolled out, where similar programs across different 
countries or different parts of the same country are implemented regardless of 
demographic and or political differences. This was the case with the National Solidarity 
Programme (NSP) in Afghanistan, for example – a programme creating elected village 
councils that could apply for state funding for development projects in their area. 
According to the NSP’s website, the programme, now in its third phase,  “has led the 
new nation’s ‘reach’ to rural communities and laid the foundations for inclusive and 
progressive local governance in almost 367 districts and every province of Afghanistan” 
(NSP, 2013). Indeed, the programme has served as an innovative and inclusive means 
of connecting otherwise disparate villages to local and national government. However, 
the programme has also inevitably worked better in some areas than others, precisely 
because of the differential nature of political connections to the central government 
from one areas to the next, differing uses of the official complaints procedure (Barakat 
et al., 2006: 10), varying political environments and local institutions with different 
structures of authority (Kakar, 2005: 1) and the availability of other (sometimes illicit) 
sources of income in some communities. As security has worsened in Afghanistan over 
the decade of international intervention, counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies have 
attempted to promote the legitimacy and authority of the government, to ‘win hearts and 
minds’ through aid distributed by international military forces. This has often had the 
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opposite effect to that intended, however, demonstrating the weakness and complicity 
of the state with civilian casualties, for example, and connection with corrupt, predatory 
state representatives, rather than promoting it as a service provider.  
Another aspect of international programming that belies assumptions about the nature 
of the state and what it should be is the way in which assistance is often channeled 
disproportionately to the executive branch of government. This has been the case in 
Afghanistan, where a considerable emphasis has been placed on the capacity building of 
line ministries, for example, to the detriment of other, local forms of governance such as 
the provincial councils.  This is related to the way in which the executive branch is 
currently seen by international actors as the central means through which to distribute 
goods and services, and thus create an image of legitimacy and a two-way relationship 
with citizens on this basis, and yet in Afghanistan in spite of the considerable funds that 
have been allocated to strengthening these central state institutions, the gains they have 
made in providing services have not served to promote the image of the state in the eyes 
of the population. As Suhrke describes, “[t]he liberal democratic vision initially 
promoted by international and Afghan reformers and supported through numerous 
governance projects was overshadowed by the daily realities of violence, inequality and 
corruption” (Suhrke, 2011: 153).    
Finally, in their emphasis on the importance of ‘civil society’ to promoting 
democratisation, international actors often employ a narrow definition of the term that 
appears to signify ‘apolitical’ institutions that could interact with and monitor state 
activities.
9
 In Afghanistan, again, donors have avoided the assistance of political parties 
in preference of agencies set up to combat corruption or promote women’s rights, for 
example – overlooking the fact that both are highly political stances in the country, and 
that few if any organizations exist without ties to prominent ethnic groups or influential 
individuals. This has also led to the burgeoning of ‘suitcase NGOs’ – those set up only 
as a means to access international funds - and the creation of a superficial ‘civil society’ 
                                                          
9
 This preoccupation has been noted by the researcher on several occasions during conversations with 
international donor representatives in Kabul, in which they have discussed the difficulties in finding civil 
society organizations to work with who have no apparent ethnic or political affiliation.  
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that is Kabul-based, donor-driven and disconnected from what might be considered 
‘society’ at large (Larson, 2011a).  
International programming in democracy promotion thus furthers the cause of a set of 
limited, liberal democratic values based on fundamental assumptions of what a state is 
and does vis-à-vis its citizens. This incorporates normative projections as to how 
democracy programming should take place and what its priorities should be. Very little 
evidence exists, however, to show that this approach does actually promote 
democratisation. It is the contention of this thesis that one of the key reasons for the 
lack of ‘success’ in international democracy promotion in fragile states is the underlying 
assumption that a state-citizen relationship should be central to the democratisation 
process in the immediate aftermath of conflict.  
*** 
Critiques of the practice of democracy promotion as it is currently attempted by 
international actors in fragile or post-conflict states are useful in pointing out the pitfalls 
of contemporary approaches, but their analysis also assumes that efforts to encourage 
the strengthening of the state-individual citizen relationship are central to 
democratisation occurring, The ‘security first’ approach, for example, implies that 
international priorities for intervention should be on building the capacity of central 
state institutions to control violent opposition within their own borders – or in Tilly’s 
terms, to eliminate ‘autonomous power centres’. Etzioni recommends the providing of 
incentives for fragile state governments to do this, over and above the (largely futile) 
attempt to install democratic regimes (2007:14). But this viewpoint assumes that greater 
state control over the means of violent force (Tilly’s ‘strong state path’) will eventually 
result in democratisation from the ground upwards, when repression and persecution at 
the hands of the state prove too much for ‘ordinary’ citizens to bear. It assumes that 
state repression reaches a level so extreme that the opportunity cost of going to war 
against the state is less than that of enduring repression to prioritise security, 
livelihoods, communal unity. But is this necessarily the case? This seems to an 
argument too simple to be true in all circumstances. While uprisings have occurred in 
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Arab countries in recent years as a result of state oppression, these countries have also 
had long histories of state-citizen interaction and sufficiently urbanized populations that 
consider regular, individual interactions with state institutions to be desirable and free 
of corrupt activity, for example. Similar popular uprisings have not occurred against 
state authorities in Somalia or Afghanistan, where, in the latter, even when a strong 
state structure was in place in the late 19
th
 century, only small groups rose up to resist its 
influence on the day-to-day lives of citizens (see chapter 5 for a more detailed 
discussion of this).          
When arguing that the building of institutions should be prioritized over and above the 
international drive to encourage market liberalisation and democratisation, Paris 
demonstrates the assumption that institutions themselves can be neutral, facilitative 
entities that inspire popular trust. Even (or perhaps especially) when these institutions 
have been established for some time, however, this is not always the case, as Stewart 
and O’Sullivan argue in their exposition of the potential for party politics to exacerbate 
ethnic tensions (1998: 17). This approach assumes that state regulations, for example on 
the registration of political parties, or on the establishment of independent electoral 
commissions, or a national bank, can be seen by citizens and groups of citizens as 
separate to the interests of officials in central government, and represent a coherent state 
entity – again, that there is a relationship of some (even if not much) trust between ruler 
and ruled. Further, it assumes that a set of institutions that have been established with 
the help of international funds and expertise will also generate popular confidence, 
when again, the nature of outside assistance can be a source of public suspicion and 
conspiracy theory.         
Finally, the ‘more, not less, democracy promotion’ school calls primarily for 
international actors to promote a more comprehensive relationship between citizen and 
state that incorporates the establishment of institutions, accountability mechanisms and 
checks and balances to limit state control over resources. Even more than the other two 
approaches discussed, this assumes once again the desirability of a closer, more 
interactive relationship between state and individual citizen and people’s need to hold 
the state to account on a regular basis over matters of administration and resource 
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distribution. When the state has not traditionally taken on these roles, however, as is 
often the case in fragile states, the establishment of these mechanisms to connect more 
strongly people with state officials may be futile at best, and at worst, exacerbate violent 
conflict.    
2.2.4 Section summary 
The practice of internationally-promoted democratisation has become a standard 
component of statebuilding in post-conflict and fragile states. Justified initially in terms 
of the liberal peace thesis and through the contention that promoting democratisation 
would also engender peaceful political settlements, it became a central feature of 
political rhetoric and western countries’ foreign policy in the early 1990s. Experiences 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan since this time have 
demonstrated the complexity of ‘democratisation from outside’, however, and have 
become the subject of critique from a number of different perspectives. Some scholars 
and practitioners call for less democratisation and more security-related conditions in 
dealing with fragile or post-conflict states; others call for  a focus on 
‘institutionalization before liberalization’; and a further group of academics suggest that 
more, and not less democratisation, in the form of tying democratic institutions to 
democratic politics, would be a better solution. In all cases, however, internationally-
promoted democratisation as presented in the statebuilding literature is invariably tied 
to a state-centric perspective in which states themselves, along with the civil society 
institutions that exist within them, are considered the key targets for democratisation 
efforts.  
2.3 Summary of literature on democratisation in Afghanistan10 
The emerging need to look more closely at the way in which democratisation occurs in 
fragile contexts lends itself to the selection of a single case study for close analysis, 
followed by the potential application of findings to a broader group of conflict-affected 
fragile contexts. Afghanistan provides a key example of a ‘fragile state’ as labelled by 
international donors, given its weak capacity to maintain a monopoly of violence over a 
                                                          
10
 A full review is given throughout the historical narrative developed in chapter 5.  
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growing insurgency, and to provide services for its citizens. It has also played host to an 
international intervention, which has included efforts toward statebuilding, over the last 
ten years. As such, the closer analysis of democratisation in Afghanistan and how (or 
indeed whether) it has taken place over time could provide valuable insights into 
democratisation in fragile states more generally. A full justification of this choice of 
case study is given in chapter 3. Here, it is first necessary to review existing literature 
on democratisation processes in the country. 
A wealth of literature is currently available on Afghanistan, within the policy arena and, 
to a lesser extent, in academia. Within both, however, very few studies focus on 
democratisation per se, (with the exception of Larson, 2009b; 2011b; and Barry and 
Greene, 2009) but rather more analyse a variety of different aspects of state- or nation-
building – whether historically at the hands of internal rulers (Edwards, 1996; Ewans, 
2001; Barfield, 2010); as anthropological accounts of events and elite personalities, 
their methods of ruling and responses to citizens and foreign powers (Elphinstone, 
1839; Dupree, 1980; Edwards, 1996); as commentary on internal mobilization during 
times of war (Roy, 1994; Barakat et al., 2008; Giustozzi, 2009); as an account of the 
existence and development of political parties, groupings and tribes (Roy, 2003; Ruttig, 
2006; Larson, 2009a), or as a critique of international statebuilding efforts within 
Afghanistan, whether during the Soviet era or post-2001 (Rubin, 2002; Cramer and 
Goodhand, 2002; Goodhand, 2004; Goodhand, 2009; Suhrke, 2011; Fishstein and 
Wilder, 2012; Coburn and Larson, forthcoming, 2013).   From these sources, it is 
possible to build a brief synopsis of democratisation in Afghanistan during the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries, which will be expanded considerably (in both timeframe and 
content) as the historical narrative developed in chapter 5. 
Afghanistan’s experience of democratic government prior to the 2001 intervention was 
minimal, with a ‘decade of democracy’ initiated by then king Zahir Shah occurring 
between 1963-1973 but better described as an experiment in modern politics than an 
internal attempt to democratise. Although a parliament was elected by popular vote in 
1965 and again in 1969, universal suffrage was not enforced and political parties denied 
the ability to register as formal organisations as a result of the King’s refusal to sign a 
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political parties law (Ruttig, 2006: 6). Political activity was highly contained and 
monitored with an elite, monarchist oversight that left little room for opposition to the 
ruling classes (Rubin, 2002: 81). This curtailment of opposition (and particularly of 
Islamist groups) would be further enforced by Daoud Khan after the coup d’etat in 1973 
(Rubin, 2002: 102; Ruttig, 2006: 9).  
Perhaps even more significant, however, is the way in which over the course of the 
twentieth century Afghanistan did not develop along a consistent trajectory into a 
modern state, and by the early 1990s could be labeled a failed state, in terms of the way 
in which central authorities were unable to maintain a monopoly of violence within the 
country’s borders or provide a centralized system of taxation, rule of law or service 
provision for citizens. Drawing on Krasner (2009), although at an earlier point, the 
Afghan state had had its international legal sovereignty confirmed in 1934 when it 
became a member of the League of Nations (Ewans, 2001: 143), its Westphalian 
sovereignty was questionable even at this point. As Thomas Barfield argues, while a 
sense of nationhood has emerged within, across and between the different people 
groups that define themselves as Afghan, to the point at which none of these groups has 
attempted to pursue an ethnically-based independence agenda, there has throughout 
Afghan history been a distinct lack of a centralised structure of government (Barfield, 
2010: 278). Edwards refers to this as “the fundamental artificiality of the Afghan 
nation-state”, a situation resulting from the way in which the state has never been able 
to imprint itself on the public imaginary (1996: 4). At certain points during the 
twentieth century state control of national resources and provision of services were 
apparent, perhaps most during Zahir Shah’s reign (1933-1973) and then again under the 
Soviet occupation (1979-1989), but especially in the latter period, state presence and 
control in general was largely restricted to urban and semi-urban areas, with little 
influence across much of the countryside (Rubin, 2002: 145). Even during these times, 
the majority of state revenue was not collected through taxation of income but rather as 
aid from (competing) international sources. As Rubin describes, with the United States 
and the Soviet Union attempting to win the allegiance of the Afghan state through aid, 
“From [1956] until 1973, foreign grants and loans accounted for 80 percent of Afghan 
investment and development expenditure” (2002: 65). This reflected the way in which 
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the Government of Afghanistan had courted both Germany and the Allies for aid during 
the Second World War as a result of the country’s ‘neutral’ foreign policy (Barfield, 
2010: 311-312). This legacy of a rentier economy throughout the 20
th
 century  not only 
had the effect of keeping the majority of citizens from interacting with the state but also 
of precluding the possibility of state-citizen accountability.  
Indeed, it would take widespread participation in the Mujahideen resistance movement, 
that would oppose the PDPA and eventually help to overthrow the (already struggling) 
Soviet occupation, to generate a greater sense of entitlement to participate in the 
political process – a process previously restricted to an elite ruling class in Kabul 
(Barfield, 2010: 242).  
When the international military intervention began in 2001, few international actors at 
the time suspected that it would last a decade, and would involve not only a military 
campaign but one of statebuilding and later, stabilization. Indeed, the Bush 
administration made clear at the time that nation-building was not part of their agenda 
(Rumsfeld, 2003). In spite of this, however, plans were put in place for post-conflict 
elections to take place within two years, following the holding of Emergency and 
Constitutional Loya Jirgas or Grand Councils, in 2002 and 2003 respectively. Elections 
took place for the Presidency (2004) and parliament (2005), marking the end of the 
Bonn Process and the formation of new institutions of state, tasked with the re-building 
of a shattered nation.     
A considerable critique of the nature of the international statebuilding agenda in 
Afghanistan as a whole has been made across the academic and policy literature (see for 
example Cramer and Goodhand, 2002; Kandiyoti, 2005 and 2007; Barfield, 2010; 
Suhrke, 2011; Mac Ginty, 2011; ICG, 2011; Fishstein and Wilder, 2012). First, a 
number of observers saw the elections in 2004 and 2005 as a rushed process, with the 
wrong electoral system, beset with problems for future implementation (Reynolds and 
Wilder, 2004; ICG, 2004; Rubin 2005). Others point to the nature of the system 
established through the Bonn Process – a strong presidential system, allocating 
significant powers to one individual at the top (Barfield, 2010: 302-304), resulting in 
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weak de facto powers of parliament to counter presidential decrees (Suhrke, 2011: 175). 
While great gains were made in the promotion of women’s space in the political arena, 
through an internationally-promoted reserved seats system for parliament and provincial 
councils, the mere presence of women was not to result in a legislative bloc able to 
promote substantive policy gains for women across Afghanistan, due in part to the 
ethnic and linguistic between women legislators (Wordsworth, 2007; Larson, 2011c; 
Larson, 2012). As security levels began to decline, with the rise of insurgent activity in 
the south, statebuilding initiatives that had been in place began to take on a political 
dimension and were combined with military stabilisation agendas in an attempt to ‘win 
hearts and minds’ through counterinsurgency. (Fishstein and Wilder, 2012; Barakat and 
Larson, 2013). As Fishstein and Wilder note, this was essentially counterproductive in 
that it served to further distance Afghans from a government increasingly perceived as 
corrupt and illegitimate (Fishstein and Wilder, 2012),  
Astri Suhrke has written at length on the internal contradictions and complexities of the 
‘international project’ in Afghanistan, which she considers principal reasons for its 
failures (Suhrke, 2007; 2011).  Within this, it is possible to determine that there has 
been no combined agenda shared by donor governments as to what democratisation is 
or should look like in the Afghanistan context, with several communiqués from 
international (pledging) conferences describing democracy in obscure terms with what 
Barry and Greene call a “laundry list of expectations” (2009: 8). This is combined with 
differential priorities among donors, most of whom have re-oriented their programmes 
in recent years toward security-driven and/or stabilisation goals and a ‘whole-of-
government’ approach (Gordon, 2010; Barakat and Larson, 2013) but few of whom 
share a common idea of democratisation in Afghanistan. 
The lack of coherence over democratisation agendas is not limited to international 
actors. Indeed, members of Afghan civil society organisations are also unaligned or in 
disagreement over the necessary components of democratisation in Afghanistan.
11
 In 
                                                          
11
 This is nowhere more evident than in disagreements over women’s role in democratisation processes 
and how, if at all at the present time, this should be promoted. Women’s claim to space in the public 
sphere in Afghanistan has generated conservative backlash at several points in the country’s recent 
history (Kandiyoti, 2005: 31) and many civil society actors cite this fact as a means of cautioning 
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previous work on Afghan perceptions of democracy and democratisation in 
Afghanistan, the researcher has also noted that there is little consensus among Afghans 
themselves as to what the term ‘democracy’ means.  In recent years, ‘democracy’ has 
acquired negative connotations in Afghanistan due to its association with the liberal, 
secular values of western societies (Larson, 2009b; 2011b). This association of 
democracy with secularism is not new in the post-2001 era, as it formed a component 
part of Mujahideen campaigns against the secular, socialist rule of the People’s 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in the 1980s. It has re-emerged, however, 
partly as a result of the increasing Islam-versus-West discourse that is commonly 
utilised by political and religious public figures in Afghanistan (Larson, 2012: 148-
149). While at first the international intervention and (re-) introduction of formal 
democratic structures was welcomed by many Afghans, as indicated through high voter-
turnout rates in early elections, disillusionment with the results of intervention 
accompanied by increasing insecurity have contributed to a growing willingness to 
associate ‘democracy’ with international troop presence, ‘foreign occupation’ and an 
alien value-set unwelcome in Afghanistan (Larson, 2009b; 2011b). This general 
sensitivity surrounding the term renders the work of those promoting democratisation 
programmes difficult in many cases: Afghans who would generally espouse a liberal-
values-oriented agenda have been less likely to declare this openly for fear of 
conservative (and potentially violent) reactions. In field notes over the last three years 
the researcher has observed a general and increasing tendency for MPs to avoid 
speaking in public on what are considered ‘sensitive’ or ‘western’ issues (Larson, 
2011c: 125; Larson, 2012: 149).  
Of all the available literature, Barry and Greene’s analysis of what democratisation 
might look like in Afghanistan is closest in subject matter to the questions posed in this 
thesis. They apply several contemporary definitions of democracy to the Afghan case, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
international would-be activists not to push this issue in a provocative manner that might result in recent 
gains for women being lost. While most representatives of civil society in Kabul – a small educated elite 
which has formed under the name ‘civil society’ only since 2001, largely in response to donor funding – 
share the view that women have a role to play in democratisation, they are starkly divided over the 
question of whether this role is central to the process or whether it is an issue that can be promoted at a 
later stage. 
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including that put forward by Freedom House, Polity IV and, in part, by Charles Tilly 
(focusing primarily on his concern with state capacity) (2009, 5-7). These frameworks 
are discussed briefly and uncritically, however, with the authors assuming that they are 
all adequate means of assessment for the Afghan case. Conclusions are made, somewhat 
ahistorically, to the effect that Afghanistan is currently not measuring up to even 
‘minimal democracy’ standards, must model a democratic system on non-western 
examples such as Nicaragua and Mozambique, and needs a more decentralised 
democratic system with greater checks and balances over the powers of central 
authorities (2009: vii-x).  
This thesis attempts to go beyond the analyses of democracy in Afghanistan that current 
exist, by questioning the very framework that all accounts of the international practice 
of democracy-promotiion in the country appear to be based upon.  While much has been 
written on the nature of the Afghan state, statebuilding and state-society relations within 
Afghanistan both over time (Elphinstone, 1839; Edwards, 1996; Rubin 2002; Barfield, 
2010) and in the contemporary context (Cramer and Goodhand, 2004; Kandiyoti, 2005; 
Suhrke, 2011; Giustozzi, 2009), none of these accounts have systematically addressed 
the problem of assessing and measuring democratisation in a state that does not comply 
with western norms. In applying the Afghan case to an existing framework for 
measuring democracy, the researcher proposes to demonstrate the inadequacy of such 
frameworks for application to fragile states. Her own previous accounts of Afghan 
perceptions of democracy (Larson 2009b; 2011b), based on an in-depth qualitative 
study, go some way toward unpacking local perceptions of democracy, but do not 
address broader issues of state-society relations or how democratisation in Afghanistan 
might be conceptualised, measured or practiced.   
2.4 A gap in the literature: problems to be addressed 
In chapters 1 and 2 the literature review has surveyed the existing literature on the 
theory, measurement and practice of democratisation in fragile states, along with the 
available literature on democratisation in Afghanistan.   
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As can be gauged from this review, while much of the existing literature on 
democratisation looks for social explanations for the way in which states democratise, 
and the causes of or contributors to democratisation, these are all fundamentally based 
on the assumption of a Weberian and/or Westphalian state either existing, or being an 
ideal ‘state’ to which fragile, weak or failed states should aspire. This is a critical 
characteristic dominant across current analysis: existing concepts of democracy and 
democratisation treat the state as an unproblematic unit of analysis and put a great deal 
of weight on the state-citizen relationship. This does not present an obstacle in the 
assessment of democracy in established or ‘stable’ states, which have developed 
according to the western European or Weberian model, but can be called into question 
when applied to fragile or conflict contexts in which statehood and state sovereignty are 
not as easily assumed.  
It is clear that this basis for analysis is grounded in the western European experience: a 
unique historical path dissimilar to that of the development of newer states in other 
regional contexts. Currently missing is a model of analysis that would allow an 
assessment of democratisation in states that do not comply with the Weberian form and 
do not currently demonstrate or aspire towards a liberal, uniform connection between 
state and citizen. For many democracy theorists, evidently – and particularly those of 
the more recent school of substantive democratisation – this would in itself present a 
contradiction in terms, with the state-citizen relationship being inseparable from the 
democratisation process. Indeed, these theorists may well be right: it could be that 
democratisation is simply not occurring in these contexts. At present, however, there is 
no exploration of this question in the existing literature.  
In terms of measuring democratisation, a similar problem arises. All existing models not 
only define democracy in terms of its presence or absence in a given state, but also 
measure the degree to which it exists with variables that assume the existence of a 
Weberian state in the regime studied. Of the three models discussed, Tilly’s qualitative 
measures of democratisation are more convincing that those of Polity, Freedom House 
and Vanhanen because they include the recognition of historical and political context, 
which affects how and why states democratise in different ways. Nevertheless, Tilly’s 
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model is still firmly based on central variables that reflect the state-citizen relationship, 
which are arguably not applicable to fragile states in spite of his claims to the contrary. 
Thus, alongside a gap in the theoretical literature on what democratisation is and how it 
occurs in fragile states, there is also a distinct lack of an available tool to measure it 
appropriately in these contexts.   
Very little attention is paid within this literature to the ways in which democratisation 
processes are affected by and indeed form part of broader international interventions in 
conflict-affected states. This is covered to some degree within the statebuilding 
literature, which, however, does not cover the more general explanations about how and 
why and when states democratise.   Thus, there is a distinct need for a theoretical 
framework that combines both of these important approaches in a manner that facilitates 
a specific focus on the practice of democracy promotion in conflict-affected fragile 
states.  
2.5 Research questions  
Following the literature review and identification of certain gaps in the existing 
scholarship on democratisation in fragile states, it is now possible to identify key 
questions that could guide this research in its attempt to fill these spaces.  
Democratisation and the state: 
1. Is the state-citizen relationship necessarily central to the theoretical concept, 
measurement and practice of democratisation?  
2. If so, how can the theory, measurement and practice of democratisation be 
applied to fragile states, if at all?   
3. If not, what could function as an alternative means of analysis in these cases? 
Can levels of democratisation in conflict-affected fragile states be effectively 
modeled without a central focus on the state-citizen relationship?  
Measuring democratisation: 
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1. Can democratisation be measured in conflict-affected fragile states? If so, would 
it be possible to use Tilly’s framework for measurement, or does this approach 
rely too heavily on the state-citizen relationship? 
2. What are the factors contributing either to a greater consolidation of a 
democratic politics in fragile states or toward de-democratisation? Are these 
comparable across fragile states, or are they specific to a given country context?  
Practicing democratisation: 
1. How do international efforts to promote democratisation in conflict-affected 
fragile states coincide with or contradict theories about the onset and 
consolidation of democracy? 
2. Is there a role for international actors in promoting democratisation in the 
aftermath of conflict? If so, what should this involve? If not, what are the 
alternatives? 
In attempting to answer these questions, this research seeks to question basic 
assumptions about the state-citizen relationship that are dominant across the theory, 
current attempts to measure and the practice of democratisation, in an attempt to see 
whether it is possible to reformulate the discourse of democratisation in a manner that 
facilitates application to fragile states. In doing so it necessarily refutes the notion that 
fragile states are by default ‘undemocratic’ as a result of their fragility, and would 
question the criteria on which current standards of ‘democraticness’ are based.  
2.6 Summary and conclusions  
This chapter has presented reviews of the literature for three further topics relevant to 
this research – for existing models to measure democratisation, for the practice of 
democratisation, and for democratisation in Afghanistan. In the comparative review of 
measurement models, Tilly’s approach most suits the application to fragile states given 
its historical, qualitative focus. The researcher suspects that considerable amendment 
would be needed, however, in testing this application, due to Tilly’s uncritical 
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definitions of states and citizens. In the review of literature on the practice of 
internationally promoted democratisation, the complexity of attempting 
‘democratisation from the outside’ in conflict-affected states has been brought to light, 
and three approaches to the role of international actors in these circumstances (‘security 
first’, ‘institutions first’ and ‘more, not less, democratisation’) have been identified. 
Across all three, a state-centric perspective prevails. Finally, in terms of literature 
surveyed on democratisation in Afghanistan, the researcher has ascertained that existing 
academic and policy-oriented studies of political change in the country are few and far 
between, and do not address in any systematic way the problem of how democratisation 
in Afghanistan might be conceptualised, measured or practiced.  As such, across all 
three areas of literature surveyed in this chapter there remain significant gaps that will 
be addressed by this thesis, through an enquiry based on the research questions 
presented at the end of the chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: FRAMING THE THESIS 
3.1 Theoretical methodology: A justification of the research design 
In order to answer the central research questions outlined at the end of chapter 2, this 
thesis will need to analyse democratisation in one or more fragile states, in which the 
impetus to democratise has been donor-led. Before embarking on this analysis, 
however, it is necessary to determine the kind of approach that will be taken.  
3.1.1 Summary of findings on available models of democratisation discussed in the 
literature review 
As discussed in the literature review in chapters 1 and 2, the study of democratisation is 
well-established within the field of political science, and numerous models exist for its 
measurement and comparison across different contexts. For the most part, these models, 
such as Polity (Gurr, 1974; Jaggers and Gurr, 1995). are quantitative and rely on fixed 
criteria against which countries or regimes at a given time are scored.  
Part of the problem with this approach, however, as explored in chapter 2, is the way in 
which average scores for each indicator (all weighted equally) are combined to produce 
a label of ‘autocratic’, ‘democratic’ or ‘anocratic’. This kind of labeling carries with it a 
series of value judgments that can be seen as a badge of honour (Zakaria, 1997), which 
can be highly political in nature (see for example the weight given to Freedom House’s 
use of a similar technique, labeling states ‘free’, ‘not Free’ or partly free’ based on 
scores for civil rights and political liberties) (Freedom House, 2011). The divisions 
between these categories appear arbitrary, also. While the authors justify their approach 
by comparing their own data to that of other models, this method of triangulation falls 
short for conflict-affected states, where very little information is available.  
Tatu Vanhanen’s model (1984, 1990, 2000) focuses on elections as its primary unit of 
analysis, using the variables of degree of electoral competition, degree of electoral 
participation and a combined index of democratisation (2000: 251). This is an events-
focused or procedural (Tilly, 2007:8) approach that assigns considerable weight to 
certain political structures (such as political parties) and their success or failure in 
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elections, in an attempt to avoid subjective judgment. Applying this model to a fragile 
state context in which any statistics are both difficult to determine and usually 
politically contested, presents a problem, however – as does the characteristic frailty 
and informality of political parties in post-conflict states. This dilemma reflects key 
ontological and epistemological discussions concerning the existence and fundamental 
transferability of institutions and organisations across different contexts, without 
considering historical and political variables.  
Given these problems with quantitative approaches to analysing and measuring 
democratisation in fragile states, the researcher argues that a qualitative research design 
is more appropriate when considering these contexts. While less common in the theory, 
due to the way in which generalisability is more difficult when using qualitative 
approaches, an holistic approach that can capture historical and political dynamics 
through the narratives of individual respondents and through historical sources could 
potentially provide a more accurate means of assessing democratisation in fragile states. 
This is partly due to the way in which qualitative approaches can be more flexible in 
terms of research design, with concepts, indicators and/or criteria developed from 
respondent interviews, for example, rather than prescribed beforehand in order to 
develop a uniform comparison across numerous contexts (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 
734-8; Bryman 2008: 373).  Qualitative approaches reflect the researcher’s own broadly 
interpretivist position, and follow that participants themselves ascribe meaning to social 
action, which can be interpreted, but which evades universal comparison (Bryman, 
2008: 366).
12
  The researcher focuses analysis on one chosen case study, before 
assessing whether it is possible to apply the criteria developed in this case to other 
fragile states – but does not look for universal generalisations across any context.   
To this end, the work of the Historical Institutionalist (HI) school of political analysis 
fills some of the gaps outlined in the models above.  The central premise of historical 
institutionalism holds institutions as important tools in the theory and practice of social 
explanation, but insists that they are not constructed or experienced within a vacuum: 
                                                          
12
 See Appendix 1 for more on interpretivist approaches.  
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they are the product of given historical structures and processes.
13
  This allows a clear 
theoretical divergence from the prospect of universal generalisations, and instead 
facilitates the comparison of small groups of cases, for example in a regional context or 
across states in which a particular political or social phenomenon has occurred (Thelen, 
1999: 373). This then provides an appropriate approach for the consideration of 
democratisation in fragile states.  
One problem with this approach, however, when applied to the central research 
question, is its focus on structural or state-centric explanations for gradual change over 
time. This research intends to find out whether it is possible to measure democratisation 
without such a central focus on the state, given the fluid and shifting nature of statehood 
in fragile states. As such, it will use the principles of HI approaches as a means to map 
change over time in terms of democratisation, emphasising the importance of historical 
narrative and political context, and yet will question the state-centricity common to the 
HI school. To this end, the research will attempt to develop its own approach as an 
alternative to the quantitative measures developed in Polity/Freedom House/Vanhanen, 
on the one hand, but also to the state-centric approaches of Historical Institutionalists, 
on the other. 
3.1.2 Discussion of chosen methodological framework: Charles Tilly 
Having established that HI provides the most appropriate of all approaches to follow, at 
least initially, in this exploration of democratisation in fragile states, it is necessary to 
identify a model within this approach that provides a methodological framework for 
analysis. One of the most recent models to come from this school is that put forward by 
Charles Tilly (2007), as discussed in chapter 2.  
In this section, I seek to justify why an application of Charles Tilly’s framework to a 
fragile state setting is important. It is the contention of this thesis that democratisation in 
fragile states is understudied and misunderstood because attempts to conceptualise, 
measure and practice it are based on a liberal conceptualisation of the state-citizen 
relationship. This is critically important because democratisation may be occurring in 
                                                          
13
 See Appendix 1 for an in-depth exploration of HI approaches. 
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fragile contexts but in ways that are not captured by this concept. The researcher’s 
rationale in choosing Tilly to help expose this misunderstanding is threefold: 1) A 
process-oriented approach to measuring democratisation, along a continuum without 
labeled categories, is theoretically sound; 2) Tilly’s emphasis on the historical 
relationship between ruler and ruled is unique and sheds more light on democratisation 
processes than analysis of elite behaviour or elections; 3) Tilly’s claim that his 
framework can be applied to all states should be problematised in fragile contexts where 
state-citizen relationships do not fit a liberal model. In sum, Tilly’s model presents the 
best possible means to measure democratisation processes generally because 
process, relationships and history matter just as much if not more in fragile states 
than in other contexts. States and citizens, however, are liberal concepts that need 
to be examined if they are to be applied to fragile environments.     
Following on from the outline of Tilly’s approach to democratisation given previously, 
this section now discusses the way in which Tilly focuses on the need to explain how 
and why democracies form (2007: 6). His model is based on the premise that states 
consistently move toward or away from democratisation on a continuum, which has no 
necessary fixed end-point at either extreme. Following states’ historical trajectories, he 
maps their movement back and forth along this continuum according to four key 
processes reflecting the nature of state-citizen relationships: breadth, equality, 
protection (from arbitrary state action) and mutually-binding consultation. For Tilly, “a 
regime is democratic to the degree that political relations between the state and its 
citizens feature broad, equal, protected and mutually binding consultation” (Tilly, 
2007:14). This perspective thus facilitates a critical analysis of ‘established 
democracies’ – which, far from being ‘wholly democratic’ still experience considerable 
struggles within the state-citizen relationship. Tilly’s central reliance on the state-citizen 
relationship is problematic as far as this thesis is concerned, but it does encapsulate the 
important notions of power struggles and negotiation between political actors at the 
centre and the public.  
Tilly avoids referring to the need for preconditions for democratisation in preference for 
a ‘process-oriented approach’ (Tilly, 2007: 9). Although the distinction is subtle, it is 
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nonetheless critical in post-war (and or continuing-conflict) contexts, because it 
captures an element of movement toward or away from democratisation rather than 
assuming there are key milestones to be achieved before democratisation can begin, or 
that there is an end-state toward which countries must aspire. While others, such as 
Robert Dahl (1998), have also taken up this process-oriented model, as Tilly notes – the 
approach presented by Tilly is more sophisticated in its focus on ‘crucial variables’ 
instead of a ‘yes/no checklist’ (Tilly, 2007:10) for measuring the democraticness of a 
state at a given time – essentially measuring democratisation by degree instead of 
considering democracy as an end-state to be achieved. Indeed, according to Tilly, “[i]f 
we want insights into causes and effects of democratization or de-democratization, we 
have no choice but to recognize them as continuous processes rather than simple steps 
across a threshold in one direction or the other” (2007:10). 
In spite of this emphasis on a continuum of democraticness, along which regimes move 
according to the nature of their state-citizen relationships, Tilly’s perspective could be 
classed as positivist, in that for him, democracies are essentially different from other 
types of regimes (2007: 6), behaving in certain ways that differentiate them from 
authoritarian systems of government, for example. Thus, democracies exist as ‘things’ 
that can be observed and compared in the real world, across different contexts.   This 
seems to contradict slightly his avoidance of a threshold, beyond which states are or are 
not democratic: he does not define where democratisation stops and ‘democracy’ 
begins, and yet still holds to the claim that there are such things as actual democracies 
that behave differently to non-democracies. There are end-points, theoretically speaking 
at least, at either end of his continuum. Tilly himself writes of this problem, allocating 
more emphasis and explanatory power to the continuum approach as opposed to the 
need to categorise regimes as democratic or otherwise. He contends that “[a]lthough 
from time to time I will flatly call a regime democratic or undemocratic, that device will 
not serve this book’s explanatory purposes well” (2007:41). In de-emphasising this 
internal contradiction, Tilly draws more attention to the need to examine changes along 
the democracy continuum over time, which he considers more important that classifying 
regime types. This being the case, it could be argued that the contradiction does not 
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detract from the usefulness of his approach to democracy by degree, but it does call into 
question the possibility of holding a positivist stance simultaneously.  
Tilly begins his discussion of democratisation with an exploration of the relationship 
between state capacity and democracy, where state capacity is: “[t]he extent to which 
interventions of state agents in existing non-state resources, activities and interpersonal 
connections alter existing distributions of those resources, activities and interpersonal 
connections as well as relations among those distributions” (2007: 16). Using a simple 
schematic, he posits that there are four general ways in which to describe states in terms 
of their capacity and democraticness: High-capacity undemocratic; low-capacity 
undemocratic; high-capacity democratic; and high-capacity undemocratic. Putting aside 
for the time being the issues with assumptions made about the state, which will be 
revisited below, one could roughly situate the chosen case study for this research – 
Afghanistan – in 2013 within the second category (low-capacity undemocratic). 
According to Tilly, this roughly equates to “warlords, ethnic blocs, and religious 
mobilization; frequent violent struggle including civil wars; multiple political actors 
including criminals deploying lethal force” (2007: 20).  
Figure 4: Regime placement of Afghanistan in 2012 (following Tilly, 2007: 19-21) 
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States can move positions both within and between quadrants over time and thus their 
positioning is more fluid than fixed. Other regional examples for 2013 might include 
Iran and Pakistan as high-capacity undemocratic, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan as low 
capacity undemocratic (although positioned higher than Afghanistan within the 
quadrant); and China at the top of the high-capacity undemocratic quadrant. 
Further to the introduction of this somewhat simplistic model, Tilly focuses on the 
relationship between state capacity and democracy, specifically considering the nature 
of the state-citizen relationship in a given regime. He contends that the primary locus of 
that relationship, to the extent that it is observable and measurable, is public politics 
(2007: 12). For Tilly, this includes elections, voter registration, legislative activity, 
patenting, tax collection, military conscription, and collective contention/public action, 
amongst other examples – but purposefully excludes personal interactions between 
individuals and state officials (2007:12).  Part of the task of attempting to apply Tilly’s 
model to fragile contexts will therefore involve identifying and assessing the spaces in 
which public publics of these or other kinds takes place, and seeing whether it is 
possible to analyse the nature of the state-citizen relationship as a result.   
Having identified public politics as his central focus of investigation, Tilly organizes 
explanations around three ‘clusters of change’: 
1. levels of integration between ‘interpersonal networks of trust’ and public politics 
2. levels of insulation of public politics from categorical inequalities 
3. levels of autonomy of major power centres with respect to public politics 
(2007:23) 
Within these, examples of ‘interpersonal networks of trust’ include kinship, religious 
membership and relationships within trades; categorical inequalities include widespread 
social exclusions based on gender, race, religion etc; and major power centres are 
defined as warlords, patron-client networks, armies and religious institutions (2007: 23). 
Changes in these three areas reflect for Tilly the principal means through which 
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democratisation and de-democratisation can be observed and measured.   Again, how if 
at all these three clusters of change can be observed and measured in fragile contexts, 
and in Afghanistan specifically, will be a central focus of this enquiry. 
3.1.3 Application of Tilly 
In applying his own framework to case study examples (Kazakhstan and Jamaica, in 
chapter 1), Tilly asks critical questions concerning the movement or democratisation 
paths of the countries in question, with the aim “to build a general account of change 
and variation in regimes on the way to describing paths that lead toward and away from 
democracy” (2007: 22). Summarized versions of these questions are as follows, adapted 
to the Afghan case: 
1. Considering Afghanistan’s historical trajectory over the 19th and 20th centuries, 
in which no centralized state existed before Abdurrahman Khan’s brutal attempt 
to forge tribal and regional warlord allegiance to his rule, even after which 
center-periphery relations have been strained and consistently re-negotiated – by 
what path and how did the current highly centralized system come into being 
and why has it not resulted in higher state capacity? 
2. Under what conditions and how could Afghanistan 1) drop further in the low-
capacity undemocratic quadrant; 2) move upwards into the high-capacity 
undemocratic quadrant, following neighbouring countries; or 3) move into the 
democratic quadrants? 
In seeking to answer similar questions about his own case study countries, Tilly does 
not attempt to establish general laws or conditions for democratisation, but instead tries 
to locate ‘causal mechanisms’ which ‘produce the same immediate effects over a wide 
range of circumstances’ (2007: 22) – indicating his position within the historical 
institutionalist school. These coincide with the three ‘clusters of changes’ he identifies 
(trust networks, categorical inequalities and autonomous power centres). Maintaining 
initially a close following of Tilly’s method, this thesis will first attempt to answer these 
questions using secondary data to build an historical narrative detailing Afghanistan’s 
path to its current state (question 1) and then assessing whether it is possible to address 
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the second question above with an emphasis on local perspectives of the state-citizen 
relationship through the analysis of primary data collected by the researcher in 
Afghanistan.   
However, it may not be possible to address Tilly’s two key questions accurately in 
regard to so-called fragile states such as Afghanistan simply because the conception of 
the state that Tilly uses makes too many assumptions about its nature and capabilities in 
such a context. Once Tilly’s framework has been applied to the Afghan case, and 
answers to the above questions either found or left unaddressed, possible amendments 
to the model will be considered to render analysis more accurate to the Afghan context 
and to the fragile states sphere of analysis more generally.  These amendments in their 
most radical form would include a divergence away from Tilly’s reliance on the state-
citizen relationship. 
3.1.4 Choosing a single case study and justification of Afghanistan as the case 
The choice of one single theoretical-type case study for this research allows an 
exploratory approach, facilitating the testing of an idea (Hancké, 2009: 60-68; Gerring, 
2004: 341) – the potential measurement of democratisation without central focus on the 
state-citizen relationship – in one case, before possibly being able to apply it to others 
within the conflict-affected fragile state category. While the outcome of this kind of 
analysis has the potential to be overly deterministic, every effort will be made to guard 
against this in the sense that the specific context of the chosen case will be emphasized 
and great care taken when making suggestions for the application of any amended 
model of Tilly’s framework to other cases. Advantages of this approach include the way 
in which it is able to grasp the complexity of factors affecting democratisation in one 
context. Further, the focus on process facilitated by a case study approach works well 
with the researcher’s chosen framework – Tilly’s process-oriented conceptualisation of 
democratisation.  
The choice of case study for this research might seem ill-informed on the basis that, at a 
glance, the odds of democratisation occurring or taking root in Afghanistan seem 
unlikely. Factors such as increasing insecurity, ethnic and sub-ethnic diversity in the 
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country, a largely illiterate rural population and general lack of educational resources as 
a result of many years of conflict, poor infrastructure and weak economy all contribute 
to the challenges facing would-be democratisers. Indeed, it could be argued that 
conditions in the context are and have been such that a transition to democracy was pre-
determined to be perilous if not impossible within a short-time frame. The aim of this 
study, however, is not to assess whether or not Afghanistan has become democratic, 
which would evidently present a foregone conclusion – but to use the case as a basis for 
the critique of standard conceptions, measures and practice of democratisation that are 
primarily state-centric in their approach. Afghanistan presents a typical example of the 
‘fragile state’, as defined by different donor governments and aid agencies, in which the 
authority, willingness and capacity of the state do not comply with a standard 
Westphalian model. This then implies that current means of measuring democratisation, 
which rely heavily on this model, are inappropriate, and call for amendment.    
Academically, Afghanistan has been the subject of a growing body of scholarly material 
within the development, statebuilding and anthropological disciplines, as outlined in 
chapter 2, but has not featured regularly within the field of political science. 
Afghanistan is not featured as a case for Tilly’s model on democratisation, for example 
(Tilly, 2007); neither has it featured prominently in the democratisation literature more 
broadly. This is primarily because at present there is a distinct lack of an academic 
framework through which to analyse fragile states within political science (Krasner, 
2009: 21). This provides an opportunity not only to contribute to the literature available 
on Afghanistan within political science but also to build a multi-disciplinary approach.  
Aside from assessing academic concepts of democratisation and frameworks with 
which to measure it, this thesis also focuses on the practical exercise of democratisation 
as part of statebuilding in fragile contexts. To this end, Afghanistan provides a good 
example of an externally-driven effort to promote democracy following an international 
military intervention, which in itself was to some extent justified by a human rights and 
democracy discourse. Since the initial invasion in 2001, Afghanistan has been the 
recipient of one of the longest statebuilding and stabilisation interventions since the end 
of the Cold War and thus lends itself to analysis for this reason. In November 2011, the 
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‘Bonn 2’ international conference took place in Bonn, Germany, mirroring the first 
Bonn Conference on Afghanistan in 2001 and reflecting a desire among international 
actors to measure progress following a 10-year intervention. An attempt to assess the 
means of assessing democratisation in Afghanistan is thus both timely and relevant to 
current debates in the policy-making arena.   
Afghanistan has been the recipient of democracy assistance and the focus of 
statebuilding initiatives as a sub-narrative to that of stabilization within the fight against 
a growing insurgency. This lends a further aspect of interest to the country as a case for 
the study of democratisation: the potential assessment of the contribution of conflict, 
instability and a war economy to the development toward or away from a democratic 
politics. The relationship between democratisation and stability is complex and 
multidirectional, in that while the argument has often been made that democratic 
institutions contribute toward the development of stability, in that they potentially 
facilitate the resolution of disputes and competition for resources in a peaceful manner 
(Dobbins et al., 2007: xxxiv) – their formation and establishment can take many years 
and can involve an arduous, complex and essentially violent process (Mansfield and 
Snyder, 1995; 2002; 2005). Recent contestation over election results in Egypt clearly 
demonstrates the way in which democratic institutions such as elections can be 
subverted and manipulated to the benefit of the ruling party, creating resistance and 
civil unrest. While democracies may rarely go to war with one another (Diamond, 1999: 
5), there is considerable evidence to suggest that the process of democratisation can 
contribute to greater, rather than less, instability – particularly if one or more actors or 
groups consider themselves to be excluded from the process (Stewart and O’Sullivan, 
1998: Mansfield and Snyder, 2002; 2005).  
Alongside the study of the relationship between democratisation and stability, 
Afghanistan also provides an interesting case in which to consider democratisation in an 
Islamic context. In a recent study of Afghan perceptions of democracy, many 
respondents called for an Islamic democracy as opposed to a western democracy, 
making a sharp distinction between the two, but basing that distinction in reaction to a 
concern about the influx of western cultural values rather than on the basis of a strong 
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conception of what exactly an Islamic democracy might look like in Afghanistan 
(Larson, 2009b: 11). While this thesis touches on this issue, an area it highlights for 
further research is the way in which the state-citizen relationship relates to Islamic 
social and political discourses.  
A final reason for selecting Afghanistan as a case study relates to the researcher’s 
familiarity with the context. Having worked in the country over eight years as a 
researcher in governance and democratisation issues for the Afghanistan Research and 
Evaluation Unit (AREU) and other organisations, she has developed a basic 
understanding of the Afghan political context on which to build a more substantive 
comprehension through further academic research. The researcher’s own networks of a 
broad range of contacts within the Afghan government, civil society and international 
agencies were useful in establishing access to information and in facilitating fieldwork.   
One apparent contradiction of the choice of Afghanistan for this research is that the 
chosen case study is itself a state, in that it is internationally recognised as such, and yet 
the centrality of the state is criticised throughout. However, this research does not argue 
that the concept of the state in itself is redundant or unhelpful in fragile contexts, but 
rather that the problem lies in the way in which democratisation theorists and 
practitioners assume a liberal conception of the state-citizen relationship to be central to 
democratisation. Also problematic is the way in which the state-citizen relationship is 
currently used as the only locus for measurement. It is the intention of this thesis to 
further problematise current conceptions of the state in fragile contexts, while 
acknowledging its persistent centrality as a unit for comparative politics.  
3.2 Formulation of argument and hypotheses 
Based on the literature review and careful consideration of Tilly’s framework, the first 
aspect of the central argument of this thesis concerns the way in which existing 
academic concepts of democratisation do not facilitate application to fragile states. As 
explored in chapter 1, a vast body of literature on democratisation exists, in which 
scholars have defined the terms in different ways and with varying emphases. In spite of 
the size of this field of scholarship, however, most if not all theoretical conceptions of 
121 
 
democratisation – the move toward a more substantive democratic politics – rest on the 
assumption of an existing and increasingly interactive relationship between citizens and 
the state. Generally speaking, the more interaction, the more movement toward 
democratisation.   
This relationship can take different forms – it can be seen to take place between 
individuals and the state directly (as the proponents of deliberative or direct democracy 
would advocate); between and within civil society and the state, building on notions of 
social capital (from a liberal perspective), primarily between elected representatives and 
the state (representative democracy), through different processes within the realm of 
public politics (Tilly), principally through the media (as proposed through concepts of 
‘monitory’ democracy, for example, by scholars such as John Keane, 2009), or a 
combination of one or more of the above. These approaches all suggest that citizens 
should have a stake in national-level decision making. Some theorists, such as David 
Held and Danielle Archibugi (1995), look above and beyond the state in their arguments 
for a more substantive democratic order in the form of cosmopolitan democracy. 
Whereas this approach questions the authority and autonomy of the state in an ever-
globalising context, and calls for a limitation on national sovereignty where new 
cosmopolitan institutions would override this, it nevertheless considers citizens’ 
relationship with the state or ‘democracy inside nations’ to be the first of a series of 
necessary accountability mechanisms available to them (Archibugi, 1998: 209).  
For some theorists, such as Gurr (1974), analysis should focus on a ‘polity’ or ‘regime’ 
rather than a state, which helps to overcome at least semantically the assumption of a 
bounded state entity. For Gurr, the ‘polity’ is simply a political system – or “the basic 
political arrangements by which national political communities govern their affairs” 
(1974: 1483). This is distinct from the (nation-) state in which a given polity is situated. 
For Gurr, this allows comparisons to be made over time between successive polities in a 
state, and studies conducted on the subject of polity change. In Polity I, for example, 
336 different polities are studied across 91 ‘nominally different’ states across the 19th 
and 20
th
 centuries (Gurr, 1974: 1483). This potentially has the benefit of removing some 
of the issues tied to liberal notions of the state, but nevertheless Gurr’s analysis places 
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considerable emphasis on the institutions that connect central governing authorities with 
individual citizens, and thus is still problematic in application to fragile contexts.  As 
discussed in chapter 1, more recent, substantive or process-oriented theories and 
measurements of democratisation focus on the nature of the state-citizen relationship 
within a given polity or regime over time.  
The recent prevalence of this centring of democratic theory on the state-citizen 
relationship implies that the assumption of this relationship is a reasonable basis for a 
definition of democracy. Few theorists tend to question the necessity of this connection. 
This is partly as a result of the simultaneous development of the nation-state and 
democratic government in western Europe (Tilly, 1985; 1992; 2004) and the way in 
which the state has become the default entity in control of the government of resources 
in the international system. Connecting citizens with the primary resource-allocating 
agent
14
 in a bounded territorial entity makes sense, as it allows (in theory) the formation 
of accountability chains that ensure those in office controlling resource distribution are 
expendable, their positions subject to the will of the people. This functions as a check 
and balance against the potential for one individual or a group to consolidate control, 
but carries with it an underlying assumption as to what the state is and does. Again 
although diversity exists in abundance in academic writing on this subject, on the one 
hand approaches in the democratisation literature do not capture the complexities of 
what a state is not and what it does not do in conflict-affected fragile contexts. On the 
other hand, the statebuilding literature does not focus on what fragile states are or do 
except in contrast to what established, institutionalized states are and do. 
These contexts are notoriously problematic subjects for analysis. First, they are not 
always territorially bounded, in that disputes over the placement of borders can be 
longstanding and unresolved at the time of a post-conflict international intervention, for 
example. Second, the state is not always recognised by citizens as being the only 
legitimate distributor of resources. This is particularly the case if a new state, 
government or head of state has been recently installed in the aftermath of conflict. 
                                                          
14
 According to Hay and Lister, some modern welfare states are the responsible entities for over 50 per 
cent of GDP and 15 per cent of the workforce (2006:6) 
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Indeed, in this case, various parties to the conflict may not recognise or trust the new 
state and its infrastructure at all, fearing retribution for war crimes or systematic 
discrimination, perhaps. Third, due to poor infrastructure and limited capital, the reach 
of the state to provide services, should it be willing to do so, is generally poor.   Finally, 
the state itself can be an entity with blurred boundaries – government officials working 
in the private sector to top up the meagre state salaries they receive, for example – or 
prominent warlords being elected to office while maintaining militias for the eventuality 
in which they should need them. It is difficult for citizens to determine whom the state 
is represented by, let alone what in fact it actually is, or its relevance to the lives of 
those its services rarely reach.  
These and numerous other characteristics render the case of fragile states difficult to fit 
into the mould of statehood assumed by most theories of democratisation. Indeed, some 
might classify these polities as ‘non-states’, ‘proto-states’ or ‘quasi-states’, perhaps, 
going further than the ‘fragile state’ term by implying incompleteness or under-
development – but even if so, there is no question that, once recognised in the 
international system, they are treated and analysed as states regardless, because one 
aspect of their sovereignty – their international legal sovereignty (Krasner, 2009: 15) – 
remains theoretically unquestioned.  
They are also perhaps unlikely subjects for the study of democratisation – it would be 
easy to argue, for example, that these countries are necessarily undemocratic because 
the state has a limited relationship with its citizens, whether due to a lack of capacity or 
a lack of will (DFID, 2005). In a vicious cycle, they are then also fragile precisely 
because they are not democratic enough. This thesis will attempt to argue, however, that 
this cause-and-effect reasoning is too simplistic – that democratic practices, such as 
participatory decision making – may be found within these states at the local level, for 
example, or that the relationship between governing authorities at the centre and 
communities at the local level may change as levels of fragility shift. These nuances in 
the relationship between ruler and ruled are overlooked by current conceptualisations of 
democratisation.  
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The second aspect of the argument in the thesis concerns the measurement of 
democratisation in fragile states.  Partly as a result of the way in which theoretical 
concepts have not yet been developed to apply to fragile states, as claimed in the first 
contention of the argument – assessing levels of democratisation in fragile states 
remains an elusive task, about which little has been systematically written and even less 
demonstrably concluded. In Afghanistan, this remains the case in spite of considerable 
international intervention, including statebuilding and democratisation initiatives, since 
the beginning of the Bonn Process in 2001. There is little evidence to indicate whether 
this investment has in fact had any bearing on democratisation. This is both a result of a 
paucity of information specific to democracy promotion in Afghanistan, but also a 
consequence of the lack of any mechanism to measure democratisation in conflict-
affected contexts. This thesis will explore whether or not it is possible to apply a 
contemporary framework for measuring democratisation to a fragile state. 
Political scientists have attempted in numerous ways to quantify or measure 
democratisation through a variety of different indicators. According to Tilly, approaches 
can be broadly categorised into constitutional, substantive, procedural and process-
oriented types (Tilly, 2007: 7). These vary according to a greater or lesser focus on 
institutions, opportunities for public engagement in the affairs of state, or on attitudes of 
leadership, for example, but all hold the state-citizen relationship in some form or 
another to be a critical indicator of democratisation. 
Another factor common to most of these categories of measuring democracy and 
democratisation is their emphasis on the importance of an elected head of state and, to a 
lesser degree, an elected legislature – in spite of attempts by substantive and process-
oriented approaches to move away from these indicators. Although it is widely 
recognised that ‘electoral democracies’ or ‘formal democracies’ are lacking in 
substance, they are nevertheless categorised as democracies according to many formal 
systems of measurement. The weight of emphasis placed on elections is thus a critical 
shortcoming of these systems – if elections are held in these contexts, they are often 
highly flawed with results contested, and yet the very occurrence of elections raises the 
international standards on which these states are subsequently judged. One of the main 
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reasons for choosing Tilly’s framework as model for this study is that he moves away 
from this focus on elections to measure democratisation in alternative ways.       
What also becomes clear through the study of Tilly’s approach is the way in which 
historical and political context are critical to the understanding of democratisation and 
how it occurs in a given state. While fragile states may be branded ‘fragile’ in 2013, 
according to donor assessments, for example – the trajectories that have led to the state 
becoming weak are rarely included in measures of democratisation. Tilly’s model again 
marks a break from the norm in this regard, and while his emphasis on the state-citizen 
relationship may not be applicable to fragile contexts as they currently exist, the nature 
of the relationship between ruler and ruled, and the ways in which national resources 
have been managed and distributed historically, can provide critical insights into how 
democratisation and de-democratisation have occurred.     
The third component of the argument concerns the nature of democratisation in practice 
in fragile states, which generally occurs as part of statebuilding initiatives by external 
actors. These initiatives are intended to strengthen state-citizen relationships, in order 
that a greater degree of both state control and accountability (for example in terms of 
service provision) might be developed.  In theory, the more visible the services 
available to citizens, the more they are likely to be satisfied with the activities of their 
government and generally support government activities. This reasoning has been 
underlying the way in which, in Afghanistan, as discussed in chapter 2, a great deal of 
emphasis has been placed by donors on supporting the development of the state at the 
central level – particularly in terms of support to the executive branch and line 
ministries. Furthermore, it has been central to the ‘winning hearts and minds’ strategy 
of the counterinsurgency (COIN) effort, whereby coalition forces have presented 
themselves as ‘on the government side’ and have contributed to development efforts 
(building schools, dams, hospitals etc) to promote local support for the state. This 
approach makes the assumption however that citizens are likely to attribute services 
gained to the activities of a central state, or indeed that their conception of citizenship 
involves allegiance to that state. Any connection that is made by local people between 
service provision (by military or other means) and the state also carries with it a 
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corollary, however: mistakes made by implementing agents can be attributed to state 
actors also.  
Democratisation led by external actors in contexts recently emerging from conflict has 
also followed a particular model or blueprint usually involving the development of a 
new constitution, in which the rights of all citizens as individuals are detailed (and are 
remarkably similar across different country contexts), followed quickly by the holding 
of elections in order to confirm the legitimacy of a new government (Dobbins et al., 
2007). Models followed are also similar to one another, often based on a European or 
American version of a bi-cameral legislature with certain powers to oversee the 
activities of the executive.  An advisory role for a country-specific body of the United 
Nations is also often established as a means of providing political and technical support.  
These similarities have facilitated a relatively rapid statebuilding response to post-
conflict scenarios. (Dobbins et al., 2007). In doing so they have created a 
‘democratisation industry’ and a cadre of development professionals whose role has 
been to facilitate democratisation through similar programmatic initiatives in different 
countries, moving from one to the next once donor funding is reduced. What remains 
unclear, however, is the extent to which this model of democratisation is in fact 
‘effective’: whether it does in fact contribute to the building of a democratic politics or 
whether in some senses, it may contribute to the opposite occurring as a result of its 
assigning of responsibility for the promotion of democratic processes to international 
actors as opposed to the citizenry of a given country. Either way, it is clear that there 
remains little space within the democratisation blueprint for the idiosyncracies and 
differential characteristics of different country contexts.  This being the case, the third 
part of the argument questions the assumptions about state-citizen relationships 
underlying current approaches to post-conflict development and democratisation. The 
way in which democratisation comprises part and parcel of statebuilding efforts in itself 
is a case in point.  
The researcher also contends that a central reason explaining the lack of a viable 
mechanism to measure democratisation in these contexts to date is the way in which 
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existing frameworks for democracy measurement rely on an assumed state-citizen 
relationship. Choosing one – Charles Tilly’s model (2007) – the researcher attempts to 
make adaptations to explore whether it could be applied more effectively to the Afghan 
case, and to conflict-affected fragile states more generally. The thesis argues that an 
effort to find an alternative means of measuring democratisation is as yet unexplored, in 
theoretical or practical terms, and critical to the greater understanding of political 
relationships in fragile contexts. 
*** 
As developed in the formulation of the three components of the argument above, and 
based on the detailed study of Tilly’s framework and its potential application to the 
problem of fragile states, the researcher intends to investigate the following central 
claim: 
There are alternative means to conceptualise, measure and practice democratisation 
without central focus on the state-citizen relationship that could be applied theoretically 
with greater explanatory power, and in practice with better results for practitioners, 
than are currently realized in conflict-affected fragile contexts. 
This contention can be split into three distinct but related hypotheses: 
 The state-citizen relationship is only central to theoretical concepts of 
democratisation to the extent that no alternative currently exists. Democracy 
theorists commonly assume a strengthening relationship between the state and 
its individual citizens as a necessary characteristic of movement toward 
democratisation – but this precludes application to fragile contexts. An 
alternative means of conceptualizing democratisation is needed, because there 
may be aspects of democratisation that are taking place in these contexts that 
remain outside the limitations of the state-citizen relationship. 
 It is possible to measure levels of democratisation and how they change within 
fragile contexts. In order to do so, however, an historical and political narrative 
is imperative to understand the nature of the relationship between rulers and 
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ruled over time, so as to establish how that relationship has changed, and how 
resource management has been affected as a result. Analyses based only around 
narrow interpretations of liberal democracy, such as the holding of elections, 
party institutionalisation or civil society activism, will mean little in contexts in 
which these institutions are unfamiliar to much of the population.    
 The state-citizen relationship is only central to the practice of internationally-
promoted democratisation in fragile states to the extent that international actors 
such as the UN are unable to move away from a one-size-fits all blueprint of 
democratisation that prioritises the building of state capacity.  
3.3 Summary and conclusions  
This chapter has outlined and justified the way in which the thesis will be framed 
theoretically. Explaining how Tilly’s framework will be applied to the Afghan case, and 
providing reasons for the choice of this single case study, the chapter has consolidated 
the approach that will be taken as the researcher seeks to answer the questions set out at 
the end of chapter 2. The researcher has argued in this chapter that Tilly’s model for 
measuring democratisation will provide a useful and enlightening test of the validity of 
the state-citizen relationship in conceptualizing and measuring democratisation in 
Afghanistan.  Further to this, the chapter has formulated an argument based on the 
chosen theoretical framework that is threefold, corresponding to the themes of theory, 
measurement and practice of democratisation in fragile states. Finally, three hypotheses 
have been developed, also relating to the theoretical framework and to these three 
themes.   
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CHAPTER 4: FIELD METHODS: DESIGNING RESEARCH IN AFGHANISTAN 
4.1 Introduction 
Following the justification and outlining of the theoretical methodology in chapter 3 as 
a means of framing the thesis, this chapter presents the way in which field methods for 
the research were chosen and undertaken.  It begins with a brief discussion on 
conducting fieldwork in conflict-affected areas, before detailing how the researcher 
designed the field methodology with the specific context of Afghanistan in mind, and 
conducted data collection. Justifying choices made at all junctures, including over the 
kinds of data collection techniques employed, the provinces and districts in which to 
conduct interviews, and the sampling design used, the chapter provides a detailed 
account of the field methods employed before considering the limitations of the 
approach chosen, and reflections on how the researcher might have conducted data 
collection differently given greater levels of flexibility during the research period.   
4.2 Conducting fieldwork in conflict-affected areas 
A growing literature exists on the practice of conducting fieldwork in conflict zones, 
speaking to the numerous methodological and ethical challenges faced by researchers 
attempting to do so in the specific circumstances that conflict-affected areas present 
(Lee-Treweek and Linkogle, 2000; Wood, 2006; Hobbs, 2006; Pottier, Hammond and 
Cramer, 2011).  First, obvious difficulties in accessing respondents arise when 
conducting research in insecure areas, both in terms of physically travelling safely to the 
chosen research site and maintaining a basic level of security once there (McCosker, 
Barnard and Gerber, 2001), and in terms of gaining the opportunity to speak with a 
representative sample of selected community members, for example, access to whom 
may be controlled by gatekeepers (Kawulich, 2011) with vested interests in (or security-
based reasons for) limiting community exposure to outside interference. This can be 
affected by perceptions of the researcher and what they are seen by the gatekeeper to 
represent: in some cases, a foreigner can appear less of a threat than can local 
researchers, due to assumptions of neutrality and naïveté. In other cases, the opposite is 
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true. Developing and managing relationships of trust can be more challenging in 
conflict environments when it is logistically more difficult to remain in the field for 
sustained periods of time.    
Perhaps more critical than practical methodological concerns, however, are the ethics of 
working in conflict environments, where the ethical issues that would be considered in 
non-violent settings are heightened and exacerbated (Wood, 2006; Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 2007). This applies to the nature of consent and how this is gained, emotional 
responses to the (often harrowing) information collected and the circumstances in which 
it is given, the anonymity and security of respondents and research staff, the presence of 
armed combatants, the nature of neutrality and what it means to be ‘neutral’ as a 
researcher, and the related need to ‘do no harm’. Indeed, the dilemmas presented by 
some of these issues have led some scholars to argue that research should not be 
conducted in certain conflict settings, and that the ability of research procedures to 
address ethical concerns such as these is highly dependent on the nature of the conflict 
context in question (Wood, 2006: 374).     
The serious concerns arising from this discussion suggest a number of key principles 
that should ground all research undertaken in conflict zones. First, that before research 
begins, questions should be asked about the ethical appropriateness of conducting 
fieldwork in the specific conflict scenario being considered. Second, that if it is deemed 
appropriate to go ahead, great care should be taken in selecting locations for data 
collection, to ensure as far as possibly the safety of all involved. Third, that the 
methodology designed remains flexible and amenable to sudden change should 
problems arise; and finally, that the ‘do no harm’ principle is upheld across every aspect 
of the research – from the preservation of participant anonymity to the consideration of 
the consequences of remunerating respondents, for example. As the researcher 
developed the field methodology for this research, these principles were revisited on a 
regular basis.      
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4.3 Designing the field methodology 
4.3.1 Identifying the primary data needed 
In order to ascertain the kinds of primary data needed for this thesis, it is necessary to 
return briefly to the adapted versions of Tilly’s central questions that the researcher will 
attempt to apply to the Afghan context through the use of his analytical framework: 
1. Considering Afghanistan’s historical trajectory over the 19th and 20th centuries, 
in which no centralized state existed before Abdurrahman Khan’s brutal attempt 
to forge tribal and regional warlord allegiance to his rule, even after which 
center-periphery relations have been strained and consistently re-negotiated – by 
what path and how did the current highly centralized system come into being 
and why has it not resulted in higher state capacity? 
2. Under what conditions and how could Afghanistan 1) drop further in the low-
capacity undemocratic quadrant (of state-capacity versus democracy); 2) move 
upwards into the high-capacity undemocratic quadrant, following neighbouring 
countries; or 3) move into the democratic quadrants? 
The first question here is the least problematic of the two, in that it requires the 
development of an in-depth historical narrative that details the nature of the state-citizen 
relationship in Afghanistan over time. It will track how and why certain developments 
within this relationship led to others. Although the very existence of a state-citizen 
relationship in Afghanistan will be called into question, the application of this means of 
analysis to the Afghan case over time is nevertheless possible and traceable, particularly 
if alternative terms such as ‘ruler and ruled’ are used. The data needed to accomplish 
this will be secondary – comprised of historical accounts and sources such as 
Mountstuart Elphinstone (1839), Oliver Roy (1994), Martin Ewans (2001), Barnett R. 
Rubin (2002), Thomas Barfield (2010), and in particular the field reports of American 
anthropologist Louis Dupree (1959-1980; 1980).  The historical narrative will be 
developed in chapter 5 and will form the basis of analysis in this thesis. 
132 
 
Answering the second question (or set of questions) in relation to Afghanistan and 
potentially to fragile states more generally will form the remainder of the thesis, and 
will require a more detailed examination of Tilly’s contentions concerning the nature of 
the relationship between the state and individual citizens, through the analysis of new, 
primary data. The researcher will need to establish the character and nature of these 
relationships in Afghanistan. In order to follow Tilly’s emphasis on democratisation 
from ‘below’ (as opposed to the focus on elite pact-making), the researcher will attempt 
to do so from a local standpoint, and will thus require the viewpoints and perspectives 
of Afghans themselves as to their relationship with the state. Tilly does not take this 
approach in his own methodology, largely relying on his own considerable knowledge 
of each of the contexts studied in detail, and due to his concern with comparisons over 
vastly different contexts – but the researcher considers this local dimension to the 
methodology critical to her own further understanding of democratisation both in 
Afghanistan and to conflict-affected countries in which similar dynamics between state 
and citizen might be visible. Further, Tilly’s focus on actually-existing indicators – such 
as numbers of prisoners kept by the state without trial, for example (2007:66) – again 
render difficult the application of the framework to fragile states because this kind of 
information is rarely available or reliable. ‘Hard data’ such as this often remains 
undocumented or, if collated,  unverifiable. For this reason also the researcher has 
chosen to focus on perspectives, and an interpretivist standpoint, instead of claiming to 
collate ‘facts’ that may be questionable. While the indicators used may be different, 
however, they do not deviate from Tilly’s four fundamental variables or his three 
principles of change.     
The researcher thus draws on a comprehensive sample of Afghan viewpoints, which are 
utilised in conjunction with secondary sources to answer a preliminary question: Is it in 
fact possible to position Afghanistan on the matrix between state capacity and 
democracy, both currently and in the past?  The researcher uses qualitative analysis in 
examining interview transcripts to assess the meaning assigned to the state-citizenship 
relationship by respondents, and to compare this with the meaning of this relationship as 
assumed by Tilly.  
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Further to answering this preliminary question, the researcher will explore any problems 
that arise in the application of Tilly’s framework, assessing what might be lacking from 
this approach when applied to a fragile context. If problems do arise, she will attempt to 
construct an alternative model for measuring democratisation in this kind of 
environment that might be more appropriately and practically applied. 
The researcher will then proceed to answer the second set of questions outlined above: 
essentially, under what circumstances and how could changes in democratisation be 
measured in Afghanistan? In order to answer this, she will consider Tilly’s four 
processes of breadth, equality, protection and mutually binding consultation, alongside 
his three ‘clusters of change’ (in trust networks, categorical inequalities and 
autonomous power centres) and suggest alternative indicators that better match the 
context in question. 
4.3.2 Data collection methods 
After considering a variety of qualitative data collection methods, the researcher 
selected semi-structured individual interviews as the best means of gathering narrative-
style responses from interviewees. These allow the respondent to determine their own 
priorities when answering broad, open-ended questions, and to talk at length if desired 
on subjects they deem important (Robson, 2002: 278). Guided only by a simple, flexible 
framework of questions, the respondent is generally free to express their own concerns 
and is not limited by a rigid interview questionnaire as would be the case with 
structured interviews, for example. The in-depth conversations that result facilitate the 
provision of contextual detail and the ability to situate the conversation within a specific 
political and locational environment. This being the case, the researcher developed an 
interview guide that only outlined broad categories (which were: Introductions and local 
context; Authority and decision making; Quality of life; Government representatives 
and elections; and international actors) to guide the interviewer, with some sample 
questions given under each heading.
15
  
                                                          
15
 See Appendix 2 for the interview guide developed for data collection.  
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As Clough and Nutbrown contend, the value of this kind of interview depends heavily 
on the skills of the interviewer in being able to facilitate in-depth conversations in a 
personable manner to the extent that the respondent feels comfortable sharing 
information, and in being able to guide conversation around certain general themes, 
probing where appropriate, and without asking leading or closed questions (Clough and 
Nutbrown, 2007: 134; Richie and Lewis, 2003: 141). When designing this research 
methodology, the researcher knew that the team of Afghan researchers who would be 
conducting interviews (or taking notes while she facilitated them), based at AREU and 
at one of its partner agencies, the Organisation for Social Research and Development 
(OSDR), had a strong background in qualitative interviewing, having worked with them 
for over three years on other research projects for the AREU. Training specific to this 
research was however also given over a period of one week before data collection 
began, and feedback on transcripts provided throughout the data collection process.      
The questions asked in the guide were intended to be broad and open-ended, in order 
that respondents might determine the content of their answers themselves, to a greater 
or lesser degree (Robson, 2002: 278). This then allowed the researcher to develop 
analytical indicators from the responses, rather than formulate indicators before data 
collection began in a prescriptive manner that might reflect more of the researcher’s 
own assumptions about the state-citizen relationship than the perspectives of Afghans 
interviewed. Interviews were ideally designed to last at least an hour and a half, or as 
long as possible, to maximize the amount of data collected.   
The researcher considered at length whether to conduct interviews only with 
individuals, or with a mixture of individuals and groups. As Gaskell notes, in the 
literature, there appears to be no consensus as to which is necessarily the most 
appropriate form of interviewing in a given context (Gaskell, 2000: 47). On the one 
hand, speaking with individuals rather than groups allows for respondents to feel more 
at liberty to discuss what might otherwise be sensitive issues, but does not dislocate an 
individual respondent from the community of which they are a part. On the other hand, 
speaking with groups of people seems to reflect a tendency within Afghan society to 
discuss issues at length with other community members, and the researcher team found 
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that oftentimes an individual interview would become a group interview simply by 
default; other interested parties would join and contribute. The researcher considers the 
combination of both individual and group interviews an asset to the quality of data 
rather than a hindrance, especially given that the topics being discussed in interviews 
were not generally of a sensitive nature (for which individual conversations would 
probably have been more appropriate).    
Detailed field notes were taken and attached to each interview transcript to ensure that a 
clear picture of the respondent’s position within a community was developed (see notes 
in italic script at the beginning of sample interviews in Appendix 3).   Afghan 
researchers were also asked to provide notes throughout the interview transcript in italic 
script where they wanted to explain something happening during the conversation (for 
example a neighbour joining in the interview, or the respondent becoming more 
guarded after a particular question was asked). This allowed the author to get a clear 
sense of any interview in which she was not able to be present herself (usually due to 
security risks to the Afghan team).  
These qualitative methodological considerations facilitated to a greater extent the ability 
of the research to see the state-citizen relationship as it is perceived by Afghans – a key 
aspect of this study and a critical component of a qualitative approach (Bryman, 2008: 
385). As Gaskell writes, 
[u]sing qualitative interviewing to map and understand the respondents’ life 
world is the entry point for the social scientist, who then introduces interpretive 
frameworks to understand the actors’ accounts in more conceptual or abstract 
terms… The objective is a fine-textured understanding of beliefs, attitudes, 
values and motivations in relation to the behaviours of people in particular social 
contexts (Gaskell, 2000: 39). 
 This also added an ethnographic element to the research, given that emphasis was 
placed particularly on the Afghan context and on meaning ascribed to events and 
structures in that context by Afghans themselves. This in turn will also make 
generalizations to other fragile states more difficult, but it may still be possible to 
separate concerns that affect the Afghan context only – for example, specific references 
to multiple delays in the electoral process – from those which may be applicable to 
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conflict-affected fragile states more generally, such as the relationship between state-
citizen interactions and security.   
Primary data were collected in 2010 through 154 semi-structured interviews with 
respondents in Nangarhar, Ghazni, Balkh and Kabul provinces. Nangarhar, Ghazni and 
Balkh were selected as provinces for detailed study, with interviews in Kabul city 
conducted primarily as a means to compare provincial data with perspectives in Kabul 
(see section 4.5 below for further discussion and justification of this). These provinces 
reflected a mix of ethnic compositions and were selected partly for this reason. In 
Nangarhar and Ghazni, Pashtun respondents were largely prioritized due to their being 
the majority ethnic group in these provinces.
16
 In Balkh and Kabul respondents were 
from mixed ethnic backgrounds but primarily non-Pashtun.   Respondents were selected 
according to a sampling design (Table 4) that included local decision-makers, 
community members, Provincial Council members, taxi drivers and labourers (see 
Table 4 for a full list) in all three provinces. The sample included a broad range of 
different age-group representatives, and both men and women. Such a broad sample 
was important in order to gather a range of perspectives: while this research cannot be 
representative of the views of an entire community, it nevertheless allows insight into 
the opinions of a diverse cross-section of each community visited to allow for variation 
in perspective.   
Individuals fitting the descriptions above were identified by the research team in each of 
the communities studied, and asked whether they would be willing to participate.  The 
researcher conducted a number of interviews (particularly in urban areas) herself, 
speaking Dari in some cases and English in others depending on the preference of the 
respondent, with the assistance of a team of qualified Afghan researchers as referred to 
above who were able to help with analysis and translation. In some (particularly more 
rural areas, and in Ghazni province) a foreign woman travelling with the team would 
have put other members at risk. In these cases, the team of trained Afghan researchers 
                                                          
16
 Ghazni province is roughly split between Pashtun and Hazara residents, but it was felt that the focus in 
this province should be on Pashtun respondents given the way in which they were the residents of rural 
and insecure areas (as compared to the numerous Hazara communities more secure areas includingthe 
district centre), which were under-represented in the other provinces.  
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conducted interviews themselves, providing the researcher with written transcripts. She 
was able to give feedback on all interviews conducted and suggest areas for clarification 
or improvement in interviewing techniques.  
Table 4: Sampling design per province 
S.No Respondents Number of 
Interviews  
Urban centre 
Number of 
interviews 
Suburbs/Rural 
1 Teachers 2 2 
2 Students (high school 
and university) 
3 3 
3 Shura members 3 3 
4 Shopkeepers/traders 3 2 
5 (other) Illiterate 
people eg labourers, 
housewives 
4 5 
6 Taxi drivers 2 0 
7 NSP Community 
Development Council 
(CDC)  members 
0 2 
7 Candidates for the 
parliamentary  
election 
1 2 
8 Provincial Council 
members/District 
governors 
2 1 (if any) 
(approximate) total:  20 20 
Of which women: 10 No less than 5 
 
This sampling design was developed as a guide and was relatively flexible, given, for 
example, the difficulty in finding Provincial Council members in some rural areas. 
Nevertheless, it provided an ideal to word towards that allowed for a cross-section of 
social perspectives to be gained through the data collection. Each occupational 
description was selected for a reason. Teachers were a useful source of local 
information, and, not gender-specific. Indeed, particularly as women teachers were 
public figures with community roles, they were often willing, and able, in the relatively 
‘neutral’ environment of an empty school classroom, to speak at length in interviews, as 
compared to women in the home who were less so. Students provided a youth 
perspective, and Shura members were able to comment at length on community 
decision-making processes. Shopkeepers and traders had an insight into the local 
economy – and more of these perspectives were sought in urban areas as they were 
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more representative of the occupations of the general public, many of whom had their 
own small businesses. Likewise, in rural areas, a slightly greater number of illiterate 
perspectives were sought, again to better represent rural literacy levels. Literacy was an 
important factor in the study as one assumption of the researcher at the beginning was 
that increased levels of literacy would increase levels of connectedness (or desired 
connectedness) to state structures.  Taxi drivers are known in Afghanistan (as 
elsewhere) for their propensity to talk openly and their extensive local knowledge, 
although few worked in rural areas, hence the difference between ‘urban centre’ and 
‘suburb/rural’ columns above. NSP CDC shura members were included in rural areas 
(where they primarily exist) as a means to compare perspectives with those of members 
of non-elected shuras pre-dating the World Bank’s NSP programme. It was felt that 
candidates for the parliamentary election (due to be held approximately 4-6 months 
after data collection) would provide an interesting insight into perceptions of elections 
and their significance in different areas, and that Provincial Council members and/or 
district governors could provide a view from the perspective of elected or appointed 
authority respectively. Finally, as indicated at the bottom of the table, efforts were taken 
to ensure that numbers of women respondents equaled men in urban areas, and, in the 
more challenging rural settings, comprised at least a quarter of interviews conducted.   
During the data collection period, the researcher and the team of Afghan analysts and 
researchers were working for the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). 
Together, they were conducting a study for AREU on Afghan perceptions of democracy 
(see Larson 2009b and 2011b for final reports from this work), at the same time as 
collecting data for this thesis. However, the researcher and team were careful to ensure 
that data for the AREU study and the PhD thesis conformed to the same high academic 
standards, and remained separate, with themes (and corresponding interview questions) 
divided between the two projects. The researcher had written permission from both 
AREU and the University of York to conduct data collection in this way. While the two 
subjects of study were related, the AREU paper focused only on what Afghans currently 
perceive democracy and democratisation to mean, whereas this thesis looks in much 
more depth at relationships between citizen and state in the country.      
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Taking on board the concerns regarding conducting research in conflict-affected areas 
as discussed in section 4.2 above, ethical practices were adopted at all times, especially 
to ensure the safety and anonymity of respondents. All interviews began with an 
explanation of how the data would be used, with the respondent always given the option 
to withhold their name if preferred (see Appendix 3 for an example interview guide 
including this explanation). No real names are used throughout the research and all 
names that were collected were carefully removed from transcripts. Every effort was 
made to make sure that respondents were not put into any danger in participating in 
interviews – in practice this meant that as a British woman, the researcher did not 
always attend interviews in more insecure areas (in case respondents might feel 
endangered by the presence of a foreigner) but instead remained at a central location 
and provided feedback on the Afghan team’s interviews. Interviews were transcribed 
and not taped, in order to ensure to as great an extent possible that the respondent felt 
comfortable talking in interviews. While this meant that detailed notes were being taken 
during interviews, these were generally considered by respondents as a reasonable 
practice of recording what was said (providing adequate explanation had been given at 
the start as to how the data would be used) as opposed to tape recorders, which tended 
to be regarded with suspicion (as found by the researcher during previous research 
conducted in Afghanistan).   
When analysing the data, acknowledgment of the researcher’s own subjectivity in 
interpreting interview transcripts was made throughout. Evidently, it was not possible to 
escape the western mindset with which she approached the data, and thus while the 
research was ethnographic, it was nevertheless conceptualised through a western 
European lens. Certain measures have been taken to mitigate this, however – including 
the way in which codes and indicators for analysis were derived from the data itself, 
rather than predetermined. Furthermore, the researcher is familiar with the Afghan 
context and with one of the country’s official languages, Dari – and during data 
collection emphasis was placed on using Dari words where these surpassed their 
English translation. In many cases, Dari terms (such as qawm or shura) or their literal 
translations were preferred over and above their English meanings.  
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4.3.3 Provincial descriptions 
In choosing provinces for data collection, it was important to take on board a number of 
criteria that would allow for diversity across the sample of interviews. Ethnic diversity 
was particularly critical, given the number of ethnic groups represented in Afghanistan 
and their varying relationships to the central government. The provinces selected are 
home to different ethnic groups, but also to different kinds of ethnic composition also. 
Nangarhar is predominantly Pashtun, Ghazni is roughly divided between Pashtun and 
Hazara inhabitants, and Balkh has a majority of Tajik inhabitants but also is home to 
various other ethnic groups that tend to settle in broadly homogeneous areas.  Perhaps 
more fundamental, however, was the need to ensure that urban and rural perspectives 
were adequately represented. To this end, the researcher chose provinces that included 
those both close to and further away from the centre, Kabul – and also those that had 
large urban centres of their own (Nangarhar and Balkh) as compared to those that did 
not (Ghazni).   
 
Figure 5: Provinces chosen for data collection 
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Nangarhar
17
 
Nangarhar province is located in the far east of Afghanistan, bordering Pakistan on its 
eastern and southern edges, and sharing a provincial border with Kabul to the west, at 
Surobi. The province is known primarily for its favourable, warm climate and related 
agricultural productivity (Barfield, 2010: 52), with crops as diverse as maize, cotton, 
olives and mangos grown on a large scale. Jalalabad city is the provincial centre, home 
to approximately 205,000 people of an estimated provincial total of around 1.3 million 
inhabitants (Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development, (MRRD), cited in 
World Food Programme (WFP), 2013a). Services available in the province are better 
than most other provinces, with nine hospitals, two universities and a number of key 
transport links connecting Jalabad to Kabul and to the Torkham border with Pakistan 
(Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, 2011: 1). Irrigation systems are generally 
well-maintained, allowing subsistence as well as commercial agriculture, although land 
is scarce in relation to the size of the population and land disputes are increasingly 
common.
18
 The majority of the population are Pashtun, with Shinwar, Momand, 
Khogiani and Ghilzai forming the main tribal groups. Other ethnicities represented 
include Tajik, Pashai and Arab (Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, 2011: 1).   
Historically, Nangarhar and other neighbouring eastern provinces have been the home 
of tribes close to the central administration – looking forward to the narrative in chapter 
5, it was these groups, such as the Ghilzais, who enjoyed limited taxation under Ahmad 
Shah Durrani’s rule, in return for compliance, and indeed for many generations to 
follow provided that the king could source revenue elsewhere (Barfield, 2010: 113). 
Indeed, even when these tribes did form rebellions against the monarchs in Kabul, once 
hostilities had ceased, relations between the Ghilzais and central rule returned to the 
negotiated compromise of before the uprisings – as Elphinstone remarks, following a 
rebellion in 1802, “[t]he severities of the government ceased with the campaign; and 
after tranquility was restored, the Ghiljies experienced exactly the same treatment as 
                                                          
17
 See Appendix 5 for provincial and district maps. 
18
 This was noted by members of the research team in a debrief session at the end of data collection, 
based on what they had heard from respondents.  
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before their rebellion” (Elphinstone, 1839: 331).  Fifty years later, when Dost 
Mohammed attempted to enforce taxation and conscription in these areas, however, he 
was faced with sustained revolt – as were other rulers who tried to do the same 
(Barfield, 2010:113-114), until Abdur Rahman Khan subdued the Ghilzai resistance in 
1885.   Thus, the ‘state-citizen’ relationship in the Nangarhar area has a colourful 
history, and one which is important to the way in which contemporary Nangarharis 
interact with the central government today. 
Nangarhar province has been governed by Gul Agha Sherzai since 2004, a leader who 
has generally been close to the President
19
 and who is perceived to have reaped a 
number of rewards for his support to the premier, perhaps including his control of the 
customs revenue at the Torkham border which is not regulated by the state (field notes 
from interviews, Nangarhar). Sherzai is also married to a close female relative of the 
President, a strategic alliance which emphasises his connections to the centre (Program 
for Culture and Conflict Studies, 2011: 2).   
Originally from Kandahar, however, and widely perceived to be corrupt with a 
monopoly on customs, land, construction and trade, Sherzai is not popular with many 
Nangahari residents (field notes from interviews, Nangarhar; Program for Culture and 
Conflict Studies, 2011: 2; Foschini, 2013). He maintains a cadre of elite businessmen 
close to him, through which many of his own business deals are conducted, and a 
number of key ex-military commanders as allies – strategically linking their own 
prospects for enrichment with the longevity of his rule (Foschini, 2011). Within the 
provincial council of Nangarhar province, in which there are 19 members in total, there 
are two groups – one supporting and supported by Sherzai, and one opposing him (field 
notes from interviews, Nangarhar). Nangarhar also has 14 elected representatives to the 
Wolesi Jirga. The province is split administratively into 22 districts.       
 Ghazni
20
 
                                                          
19
 Perhaps with the exception of an initial candidacy for the presidential elections in 2009, challenging 
Karzai’s re-election – until he was persuaded to step down by Karzai after a personal visit.  
20
 See Appendix 5 for provincial and district maps. 
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Ghazni province is located in southern Afghanistan, and in spite of being over three 
times the size of Nangarhar province in terms of geographical area, its population is 
estimated to be quite similar, at 1 million inhabitants (MRRD, cited in WFP, 2013b). 
Ghazni is much more rural in terms of its population distribution, also, with 89 per cent 
of the population living in rural areas, and the provincial centre Ghazni city being home 
to only 150,000 people (MRRD, cited in WFP, 2013b). Agriculture is the principal 
source of income across the province but recent droughts have affected this severely, 
causing many residents to seek work in neighbouring countries and even as far away as 
the United Arab Emirates (field notes from interviews, Ghazni). Services are much 
more limited than in Nangarhar, with only five hospitals, no institutions of higher 
education and one major road (the Kabul to Kandahar highway) (Program for Culture 
and Conflict Studies, 2010a: 1). Electricity is scarce, and generally only available in the 
city. Ethnically, the province is divided almost equally between Pashtun and Hazara 
residents, with the Pashtuns divided into Ghilzai
21
 and Kuchi tribes (MRRD, cited in 
WFP, 2013b). The province has a history of conflict between these groups – particularly 
over land, between the nomdic Kuchis and resident Hazara communities. In recent 
years, the province has grown increasingly insecure with considerable insurgent activity 
taking place.  
As in Nangarhar, the Ghilzai tribe in particular in Ghazni has a history of revolt against 
the central government if and when its autonomy has come into question through state 
or foreign intervention. It was the Ghilzais who mounted opposition to the British in the 
first and second Anglo-Afghan wars (Barfield, 2010: 121-122), and this group has 
maintained a unique, almost aloof status in terms of its relationship to other Pashtun 
tribes (being the largest group among them) and to the state. Ghilzai Hotaki clan 
members also formed the core of the Taliban movement in its early incarnation 
(Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, 2010a: 6).  Again, this is one of the reasons 
for selecting Ghazni as a province for data collection, as the history of its inhabitants’ 
relationship to the centre is directly relevant to the nature of that relationship in the 
twenty-first century. 
                                                          
21
 Of which sub divisions include Andar, Suleman Khail, Taraki, Kharoti, Niazi, Sulemanzi, Alikhail, 
Daptani, Durani, Miya Khail, Jalalzai, Khogiani, Musa Khail, Hotak and Wardak. 
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A number of key powerholders have particular influence over the political economy of 
the province. These include commanders Ismail
22
 and Malang, neither of whom have 
any formal role in government but who are considered highly influential in terms of 
their ability to determine levels of security in the province (field notes from interviews, 
Ghazni). Both are considered by local people to have allegiances to both Taliban and 
government forces, generating their influence from this double alliance and directly 
contributing to security/insecurity as a result. One former governor of the province, 
Assadullah Khalid (2001-2005) – now head of the National Directorate of Security, but 
recently injured in a bomb blast at his home in Kabul (BBC, 2012) - has also been 
considered by local residents to wield significant influence in recent years. Currently 
the provincial governor is General Mohammed Musa Khan Ahamdzai, who was 
appointed in 2010 following the departure of his predecessor Osman Osmani on 
accounts of corrupt activity (Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, 2010a: 2).  
In general, elected provincial councillors (19) and Wolesi Jirga members (11) have 
comparatively little influence over political and security issues in the province. In the 
2010 Wolesi Jirga elections, some controversy occurred over the Ghazni results, in 
which all 11 seats were won by Hazara candidates. This is likely due to the way in 
which most Hazara communities live in the centre of the province and other areas where 
security is generally better and thus had more secure access to polling stations. 
However, in general power distribution in the province is highly localised and related to 
shuras at the local and district level, rather than at the centre.  
Balkh
23
  
Balkh province is one of Afghanistan’s northernmost provinces, bordering Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan. In a sense more like Nangarhar than Ghazni, Balkh has a provincial 
centre that is an established urban city – Mazar-i Sharif, whose population of 375,000 
makes up over one third of the total provincial inhabitants (approximately 1.1 million) 
(MRRD, cited in WFP, 2013c) and plays a key role as a dominant city in the north 
(Barfield, 2010: 51).  The provincial economy is largely reliant on trade, construction 
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 Commander Ismail was reported to have been killed in Pakistan in 2012 (Shinwari, 2012), 
23
 See Appendix 5 for provincial and district maps. 
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and agriculture, although with an extremely warm climate in summer crop production is 
heavily reliant on irrigation systems stemming from the Amu Darya. Services are 
mostly concentrated in Mazar city, which hosts one university and eight hospitals 
(Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, 2010b: 2). A good road network links the 
city to the southern provinces via the Salang Pass over the Hindu Kush mountains, and 
also to the northern border with Uzbekistan at Turmez. Electricity is readily available in 
the city but more scarce elsewhere in the province. Security is generally considered to 
be good in this area, although recently the number of insurgent-related incidents has 
risen in the north-east of the province in particular. Local feuds over irrigation are also 
common. Ethnically, the province is mixed, although with the exception of the city, 
most districts are defined roughly by a single ethnic population and remain for the most 
part segregated. Still, the provincial population includes ethnic Tajiks (in the majority), 
Uzbeks, Pashtuns, Hazaras, Turkmen and Arabs (MRRD, cited in WFP, 2013c).   
Lying to the south of the Amu Darya, the area has been formally and consistently 
considered part of Afghanistan since Amir Dost Mohammed’s reign, partly as a result 
of the natural border provided by the great river. Nevertheless, its relationship with the 
centre has been tenuous over the years, not least under Dost Mohammed, with local 
strongmen and/or relations of the king holding quasi-autonomous reigns in which tax 
revenues were rarely contributed to the state coffers (Barfield, 2010: 135).  In recent 
history, the area has been dominated by rivalry between two key commanders – Ustad 
Atta Mohammed Noor, and Abdul Rashid Dostum – both of whom have laid claim to 
the city of Mazar-i Sharif at different points since the early 1990s. In 2003, however, 
Atta Mohammed was labeled the officially appointed governor of the province, and has 
held the position since – dominating the local economy in much the same way as Gul 
Agha Sherzai in Nangarhar.   
This monopoly of force and influence has led to the fast economic and physical 
development of Mazar city, with its paved roads and high rise buildings rivaling those 
of Kabul (see Figures 6 and 7). This has resulted in a trade-off with political freedom, 
however, with Atta Mohammed’s supporters (one branch of the Jamiyat-i Islami party) 
enjoying a great deal more access to construction deals, good jobs, places in reputable 
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schools and other favours (field notes from interviews, Balkh province). Balkh has a 
total of 19 provincial council seats and 11 Wolesi Jirga seats, representatives of which 
are largely considered to be under the influence of the governor, or of one the key Shia 
political parties in the area, Hezb-e Wahdat Islami-e Mardom (led by former 
commander in Mazar, Mohaqqeq). While these seats are held by a number of different 
ethnic group representatives, most have good relationships with the governor and secure 
patronage and security for their own areas in this manner.    
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Figure 6: Street in Mazar city, 2004 (photo credit: Anna Larson) 
 
 
Figure 7: Street in Mazar city (in the same neighbourhood), 2012 (photo credit: Radio 
Azadi)    
 
 
Kabul  
Kabul is the most populous of all Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, due to the location of the 
country’s capital city at its centre. Most recent population estimates for the Kabul city 
and its suburbs stand at around 3.2 million, with the province as a whole totaling around 
4 million (Central Statistics Organisation, 2012a; 2012b). The provincial economy is 
weighted heavily toward the capital, in which the majority of the province’s inhabitants 
work either in government/civil service jobs, the NGO sector, business or trade. 
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Agriculture then comprises the main source of income in the rural districts surrounding 
the city (MRRD, cited in WFP, 2013d).  Education, healthcare and other services are 
most highly concentrated in the capital, although 24-hour electricity and sanitation are 
not equally distributed across the city and some areas do not have these provisions 
available (field notes from interviews, Kabul). 
Administratively, Kabul province is divided into districts, as are other provinces, with 
the Provincial Governor (currently Ahamdullah Alizai) as the highest governmental 
authority for the province. District governors are appointed as the administrative heads 
of each district within the province. The city is sub-divided into numbered urban 
districts or nahiya (CSO, 2012a), each also with an appointed leader, and a mayor 
oversees the general administration of the city. In terms of elected bodies, Kabul 
province has a provincial council of 29 members, who serve a four-year term, and 33 
elected representatives to the Lower House of parliament, the Wolesi Jirga. The number 
of representatives for both of these bodies is proportional to rough population figures, as 
elsewhere in the country.  
Historically, since the time of Ahmad Shah Durrani Kabul has been the seat of central 
control - whether as the epicentre of a monarchy, republic, civil war or fledgling 
democracy. Its strategic position within the drainage basin of the Kabul river and as a 
city linking critical trade routes over the Hindu Kush and through the Khyber Pass have 
contributed to the value of its location over many centuries (Barfield, 2010: 52). Also, 
since the educational and social reforms of the kings in the early 20
th
 century, has 
received significantly more in terms of central investment than other parts of the 
country (Rubin, 2002: 59). This has led commentators to remark on the vast differences 
that developed during the 20
th
 century between the ruling urban elite of the capital, 
home to the country’s highly centralized administration, and rural communities 
elsewhere (Barfield, 2010: 224). To some extent, this is changing with rapid 
urbanization and migration to Kabul in recent years leading to a rise in urban poverty, 
and also with the increase in wealth and status of some regional governors leading to 
investments in infrastructure in other regional centres (Mazar-i Sharif, in the north, 
Herat in the west and Jalalabad in the east). However, there is still a marked divide 
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between the services available, the mixture of people groups and the wide spectrum of 
political, social and religious viewpoints held by inhabitants of Kabul city compared 
with those in other parts of the country. This is reinforced by the perceptions of non-
Kabul residents of Kabul life – considered by many to be one of westernized cultural 
norms and in some cases, immorality.   
In general, Kabul residents have greater access to central government resources due to 
the increased likelihood of their knowing well or being related to a government 
employee, and thus being connected (in however marginal a fashion) to networks of 
patronage. Proximity to the institutions of state administration and generally higher 
levels of education also allow, to some extent, greater access of residents to government 
officials. For these reasons, Kabul is something of an anomaly. As the focus of this 
research is the nature of the state-citizen relationship in Afghanistan more broadly, 
Kabul is not considered one of the three provinces for data collection for this study 
because it is arguable that this relationship is notably different than in other parts of the 
country. 22 interviews were conducted here, however, as a means of comparison with 
data from other provinces, to see whether a marked difference could be noted between 
the responses of Kabul city and other provincial respondents.   
4.3.4 Choosing districts within provinces 
When deciding where to conduct interviews within the three key provinces, it was 
necessary to begin with a number of central criteria. Already, the provinces selected in 
themselves represented a diverse spread of ethnic group populations, a mixture of urban 
centres and rural areas, different geographical distances from Kabul city and different 
kinds of relationships with the central government. It was also necessary to ensure 
however that interviews within the provinces were conducted in a range of locations, in 
order that the data were not skewed toward reflecting opinions about central 
government, for example, in provincial centres where the connection between citizen 
and state was likely to be strongest.  
This being the case, the most important consideration for the selection of locations for 
data collection was the need to gain both urban and rural perspectives. In each province, 
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ideally, approximately half of the interviews would be conducted in the provincial 
centre and half in rural areas (see Table 4). Two to three districts were selected in each 
province for rural data collection, based the following criteria: relative security and ease 
of access; distance from the provincial centre (ideally the further away, the better); 
likely to be home to a mixture of literate and illiterate people; likely to be home to 
people of different relative income levels; and not the home districts of the research 
team members. Of these criteria, however, security and ease of access became the 
principal concern due to the need to consider the safety of researchers (and their 
respondents) above all other factors. 
In Nangarhar, for example, districts initially selected were Dara-e Noor and Khogiani, 
but security concerns were such that it was more feasible to conduct research in districts 
closer to the provincial centre. As such, Surkh Rod and Behsud districts were chosen 
instead, with the understanding that interviews would be conducted in villages that were 
as far away from the provincial centre as possible. Two villages were selected – one in 
each district.  In Ghazni, similar problems with security were encountered, to an even 
greater extent, with security concerns escalating as the research progressed. This meant 
that for the more rural interviews, conducted only by the male team, notebooks and pens 
could not be taken to interviews for fear of arousing insurgent suspicion. Notes were 
written up and transcribed in the evenings following interviews. Only one district was 
selected – Qarabagh – as a second planned district, Nawur, was considered by the team 
(and NGO security advisors) to be too dangerous for research.  Within Qarabagh 
district, however three villages were chosen in which to conduct interviews, one that 
was close to the main road to Kandahar, and two that were further away from the road. 
Proximity to the road made a significant difference to the kinds of data collected in 
terms of attitudes towards insurgents, NATO forces and trade opportunities.  In Balkh, 
security was not as much of a problem as in Ghazni or rural Nangarhar, and thus all 
three districts selected were accessible for data collection. These were Balkh, Dehdadi 
and Kaldar, selected for their diverse majority ethnic group inhabitants (Pashtun, Tajik, 
and Turkmen respectively), and, in the case of the former and the latter, their distance 
from the provincial centre. In these districts, however, the district centres were all 
established market-villages or trade centres, which meant that they could not easily be 
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categorised as rural. Rural interviews were conducted in villages outside these centres, 
but interviews in the district centres were categorised as ‘suburb/provincial town’.    
4.3.5 Reflections and limitations  
Reflecting on the data collection process, it is possible to identify a number of things 
that could have been done differently, given more time, resources, and most 
importantly, greater levels of security.  First, the three provinces selected for data 
collection in this study are diverse in terms of ethnicity, urban/rural composition and 
proximity to the capital, but they evidently do not represent ‘Afghanistan’ as a whole. 
Decreasing security levels across the country and the culture of ‘research fatigue’ in 
more secure areas, where growing numbers of studies are conducted to the increasing 
chagrin of their respondents, are thus a limitation of the field methods selected. 
Deteriorating security in Ghazni province made it difficult for the women researchers in 
particular to travel to rural areas to interview women. It would have been excellent to 
have had the opportunity to interview more women in these areas, especially given the 
fascinating stories collected in the transcripts from the interviews that the team were 
able to conduct with urban women in Ghazni and rural women in the other two 
provinces. Nevertheless, every effort was taken to ensure that, within the selected 
provinces, a variety of viewpoints were collected.  
Second, as a result of security concerns for the Afghan research team, it was not 
possible for the researcher to accompany the team to two of the chosen provinces for 
data collection (Nangarhar and Ghazni). She was able to compensate for this, however, 
by providing feedback on each of the interview transcripts by email, suggesting second 
interviews where necessary, and through close telephone correspondence with the team 
on a daily basis. 
Finally, the political environment in Afghanistan is changing continually, partly as a 
result of internal instability and unrest but also in response to international uncertainty 
as to the length of military and civilian engagement, and global events more broadly 
(such as the ‘Arab Spring’, for example, and the death of Osama bin Laden). As such, 
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data collected is limited in the extent to which it captures only a small glimpse of 
Afghan perspectives in a very specific timeframe (end- 2009 – summer 2010). 
4.4  Summary and conclusions 
This chapter began by highlighting some of the key challenges and dilemmas that arise 
when conducting research in conflict-affected areas, as discussed in recent literature on 
qualitative research methods.  Further to this, it outlined the chosen field methods for 
the study, detailing the data needed to answer Tilly’s central questions, and the 
researcher’s corresponding research design. This included a justification of the choice 
of semi-structured individual interviews as data to be collected, an explanation of the 
sampling design developed  a description and justification of the provinces chosen for 
data collection, and reflections on the limitations of the methods selected.  While there 
were indeed ways in which the research could have been conducted differently, given 
more favourable circumstances, when accounting for the deteriorating security situation 
the researcher is satisfied that data were gathered in an optimal manner. 
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CHAPTER 5: POLITICAL CHANGE IN AFGHANISTAN: AN HISTORICAL 
NARRATIVE  
 
5.1 Introduction 
As outlined in chapter 3, Tilly’s approach to the overall assessment of democratisation 
in a given state comprises two core components. First, the development of an historical 
narrative of the state in question; and second, the identification of potential causes of 
change toward or away from democratisation according to four key processes (breadth, 
equality, protection against arbitrary state action and mutually-binding consultation), 
that in turn align with the three overarching ‘clusters of change’ of trust and distrust, 
equality and inequality and the existence of autonomous power centres.  
This chapter addresses the first of these tasks in compiling an historical narrative for 
Afghanistan’s political context, focusing in particular on the period from 1839 to the 
present with the primary and secondary data available. Following Tilly’s approach to 
the analysis of democratisation and de-democratisation in Switzerland, the researcher 
finds that a qualitative narrative assessment is well-suited to the Afghan case, and to an 
analysis of fragile states in general. As Tilly states, this is due to the way in which 
“detailed analytical narratives...promise more [than quantitative measures] for general 
explanations of democratisation and de-democratisation...because they allow us to 
match detailed changes in relations among political actors to alterations in their 
presumed causes” (2007: 72).   
Starting from this point, then, this chapter will use Tilly’s approach as a guide, focusing 
for the time being primarily on ruler-ruled relationships, internal political dynamics, and 
in considering a theme critically missing from Tilly’s analysis, regional/international 
relationships and interactions affecting Afghanistan’s political trajectory. 
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5.2 Afghanistan: an historical narrative 
5.2.1  Introduction and justification of 1839 as a critical juncture 
Existing detailed historical accounts of political and social change in Afghanistan from 
1747 to the present are numerous and provide a rich background of secondary material 
from which to base a narrative (including Barfield, 2010; Rubin, 2002; Ewans, 1999; 
Noelle, 1997; Dupree, 1959-1980 and 1980; Munshi, 1900; Lal, 1846; Elphinstone, 
1815). The narrative that the researcher compiles in this chapter presents as broad an 
account as possible, drawing from these various sources – but is also guided by criteria 
that focus on the relationship between ruler and ruled, and Tilly’s organising principles, 
described as follows: 
Start with state-citizen interactions [1]; concentrate on dynamics rather than 
static comparisons [2]; average the changes in breadth, equality, protection, and 
mutually binding consultation [3]; specify the range of cases within which you 
are working [4]; standardize the changes on that range [5]; and let deviations 
from close correlation among changes signal important explanatory problems 
[6].
24
 (2007: 59) 
Tilly presents these principles as ideals to which an analytical narrative following his 
model should attempt to conform, but is quick to admit that his own narratives do not 
reach these levels of measurement (2007: 59). Instead, he opts for an “informed 
narrative...keeping the [above] principles in mind but without setting out numbers or 
even precise comparisons with other regimes” (2007:61). To this end, he draws on 
Freedom House (FH) measures of political rights as a rough proxy for breadth, equality 
and mutually binding consultation, and FH measures of civil liberties to indicate 
protection.  As Tilly himself concedes, “[t]hese measures fall far short of the precision it 
would take to verify – or falsify – this book’s arguments. But they concretize my claims 
about particular regimes and thus open my analyses to confirmation, revision, or 
refutation by specialists” (2007:61). This being the case, the narrative compiled below 
for Afghanistan  will attempt to apply Tilly’s principles, for the time being omitting 
those referring to cross-contextual comparisons (4 and 5 as indicated in the citation 
above) and returning to this in chapter 9, when discussion is broadened to fragile states 
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more generally. While it falls short also of the strict measurements outlined in Tilly’s 
organising principles, it will aim to fulfil these as far as possible with the material 
available. 
The question of where to begin this narrative deserves significant attention and 
justification in its own right. Tilly’s own treatment of starting points in his narratives 
compiled for Democracy is somewhat minimal; he does not draw attention to the 
potentially subjective nature of his choices or spend time justifying them.  This 
complaint reflects one of the criticisms of historical institutionalist approaches more 
generally, as the selection of ‘critical junctures’ can be perceived by critics as arbitrary 
or value-laden according to the intentions of the researcher. She attempts to address this 
critique regarding my own narrative by justifying my choice of starting point here.  
In searching for a point in time at which to begin my historical analysis, the researcher 
has applied several criteria. In order to maintain a tight focus on Tilly’s own organising 
principles, but also take into account the specificities of the Afghan context (such as its 
geopolitical position), the starting date must represent 1) a rupture or stark change in 
ruler-ruled (or to use Tilly’s language, ‘state-citizen’)  relations; 2) an event that can be 
argued to have affected later ruler-ruled relations in a sustained manner; and 3) one in 
which external actors were involved also. The final criterion reflects the contention that, 
largely as a result of its position between competing empires in the nineteenth century, 
Afghan politics has been defined in the modern period by its relationship to foreign 
powers.  This being the case, any critical juncture must reflect not only the start of 
sustained change in ruler-ruled relations internal to Afghanistan but also the role of 
external actors in creating this change. Tilly himself focuses on factors internal to the 
state in question – perhaps one of the principal shortcomings of his model when applied 
to fragile states, which are often subject to the interventions of regional and 
international actors.  
Having laid out the criteria used in searching for a critical juncture, it is possible to 
justify why 1839 fits the specifications well. This date marks the beginning of the first 
Anglo-Afghan War, and the first moment in Afghan history in which ‘ordinary people’ 
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– i-e those other than the Durrani elite or the heads of tribes – were involved in ‘state’ 
politics (Barfield, 2012).
25
  This was the first time that popular revolt played a key role 
in influencing the outcome of political manoeuvres at the national level, and as such, 
represents a critical moment in the forging of new linkages between rulers and ruled.
26
 
As will be discussed below, before this time, politics was uniquely the preserve of an 
elite ruling class (from 1747, comprised of the Durrani tribe alone, and before this time, 
shifting between different Turko-Mongolian conquerors in different territories across 
the region (Barfield, 2010: 67). Furthermore, 1839 also marks a moment in which 
international actors (Britain and Russia) were inextricably involved in the changes that 
took place at the local level, prompting rural revolt and thus forging (albeit 
inadvertently) the beginnings of a new connection between the Durrani elites and the 
people they governed.  
When analysing Afghanistan’s historical trajectory through a ruler-ruled lens, then, it is 
possible to justify the choice of 1839 as a critical juncture, or to cite Thelen, as a 
“crucial founding moment of institutional foundation” (Thelen, 1999: 387). While brief 
reference will be made to pre-1839 events, the narrative will remain for the most part 
focused on the period from this date onwards. To make this time-period more 
manageable analytically, the researcher has divided it into four sections, following a 
brief summary of pre-1839 historical background: 1839-1880, ending with the rise to 
power of Abdur Rahman, the Iron Amir; 1880-1929, ending with the fall of Amanullah 
Khan and the power struggle that ensued; 1929-1978, ending with the ‘Saur Revolution’ 
or ‘Communist Coup’; and 1978-2014, ending with the departure of Allied forces from 
Afghanistan. At the end of each of these periods, significantly, is a succession struggle 
involving, to a greater or lesser degree, the political incorporation of ordinary 
Afghans.
27
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5.2.2 Summary of pre-1839 historical background 
Most accounts of modern Afghanistan begin in 1747, the year in which Ahmad Shah 
Durrani, formerly the head of the former Safavid ruler Nadir Shah’s bodyguard, was 
appointed leader of the Abdali Pashtuns and began a series of military campaigns to 
control of most of what is now modern Afghanistan, and eventually an area almost 
twice the size, stretching from Karachi on the Arabian Sea in the south, beyond Mashad 
in the West, to Balkh in the North and almost as far as Delhi in the East (Ewans, 2002: 
34). He would begin a dynasty of Abdali Pashtun rulers that survived for over two 
centuries. Beginning Afghanistan’s modern history at this point is in itself is a political 
statement, however, as Barfield notes: the select choice of starting point (common 
among narrative accounts within Afghanistan) reinforces the idea that Pashtuns have 
always ruled Afghanistan, a notion playing in to current discourses of power and one 
that is false when considering the long durée perspective (Barfield, 2010: 67). Indeed, 
the area was ruled both in part and in totality at different points in time by Turks, 
Greeks, Persians, Mongols, and a variety of others ending in a sustained period of rule 
by the Moguls (south-east and centre) and Safavids (west) before Ahmad Shah claimed 
the territory as his own (Ewans, 2002: 29). Nevertheless, as a result of his extensive 
expansionist campaigns, he is seen as the first ruler of Afghanistan in its totality. His 
successors would lose control of the territories at the peripheries, but maintain a core 
territory that would come to be distinguished permanently from its neighbours on all 
sides.   
Mountstuart Elphinstone, a British diplomat residing and writing in Kabul in the early 
19
th
 century provides the most comprehensive accounts of Afghanistan under the ‘old 
order’, describing the patterns of monarchic rule that the Durrani shahs had established 
by this point, and the characteristics of the Afghan landscape and its people 
(Elphinstone, 1839). Interestingly, in comparison to other contemporary regimes in the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Musahiban dynasty; and 1978-2001, a period of ‘war and anarchy’ (2010:169-170). My own divisions 
draw on those of Barfield but differ in that Abdur Rahman Khan’s reign is combined with that of his 
successors in the 20
th
 century (1880-1929), in order to end the period on a point of succession struggle in 
which ordinary Afghans were involved, and in the extension of the last period to incorporate the US 
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region, he describes the kingdom’s rulers as relatively peaceable in their attitudes 
towards their subjects:   
In most Asiatic governments there are no limits to the power of the crown but 
those of the endurance of the people; and the King’s will is never opposed 
unless by a general insurrection. Among the Afghans, however, the power of the 
Dooraunee aristocracy and the organisation of the other tribes afford permanent 
means for the control of the royal authority, and for the peaceable maintenance 
of the privileges of the nation (Elphinstone, 1839 : 243). 
Compared to the Persians in particular, the Afghan rulers were described by 
Elphinstone as lenient towards their subjects, as punishments for rebellions were rare, 
and when they were ordered, they were enacted against chiefs and not ordinary people. 
Torture was used sparingly as a means to extort money from the rich (Elphinstone, 
1839: 248).  
This was not to suggest that Ahmad Shah and his descendants were peace-loving and 
non-aggressive in their attitudes to rule – they had fought many a brutal battle for the 
conquest of territory by the point at which Elphinstone was writing. Beginning with the 
approach of Ahmed Shah in wooing his fellow Pashtun tribes with the prospect of loot 
from other conquests, however, and ruling them as ‘the first among equals’, creating an 
Abdali council (albeit lacking in de facto influence) as one of his first activities as 
leader,  this dynasty (now labelled Durrani) had developed a claim to legitimacy that 
centred on compromise, not terror (Ewans, 2002: 33; Barfield, 2010: 105), at the very 
least in its treatment of other Pashtun tribes. In a later example of this trend continuing, 
Elphinstone writes of the Durranis as subjugated by the King (Shah Shuja) but still 
favoured over all other tribes, creating a trade-off for the Durrani tribal leaders that 
often weighed in the monarch’s favour (Elphinstone, 1839: 247).  In a sense, then, an 
unwritten contract between ruler and ruled was formed here, in the compromise deemed 
necessary for sustained rule – although it was a contract established between a king and 
community leaders, and not directly between the king and his subjects.  Indeed, Ewans 
describes the product of Ahmed Shah’s rule as “more a tribal confederacy than anything 
approaching a nation-state” (Ewans, 2002: 36). This was not to alter significantly over 
time. Reflecting on circumstances in Afghanistan in the late 20
th
 century, Edwards 
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makes a similar observation, stating that “although most Afghans hold to some notion 
of shared identity with one another, that identity is articulated horizontally between 
individuals, tribes and regions rather than vertically between the state and its citizens” 
(1996: 4). This will become a central theme throughout the narrative.   
One component of the unwritten contract effectively developed by Ahmad Shah 
concerned what were perceived to be the legitimate sources of state revenue – a critical 
aspect of the relationship between ruler and ruled that remains problematic in twenty-
first century Afghanistan, and will emerge as a consistent theme throughout this 
narrative. The first Abdali king had agreed a minimal settlement for land revenue that 
successive rulers would not be able to increase without causing significant unrest, 
leaving them dependent on fines and other insubstantial sources of income such as tribal 
payments in place of military service (Elphinstone, 1839: 245).  While later rulers 
would re-negotiate the terms of extortion, at times through the use of violent force, the 
resentment this created often led to uprisings and unrest that would persuade their 
successors to avoid the issue and seek substitute revenue sources outside the country 
(Barfield 2012
28; 2010: 112).  Indeed, Elphinstone attributes the king’s maintenance and 
consolidation of internal control primarily to the gaining of resources and prestige from 
outside Afghanistan: “For the consolidation of his power at home [the king] relied, in a 
great measure, on the effects of his foreign wars. If these were successful, his victories 
would raise his reputation, and his conquests would supply him with the means of 
maintaining an army” (Elphinstone, 1839: 283). For the extent of resource extraction 
that could be undertaken in these wars, there appeared to be no internal substitute.    
To this end, then, a notable feature of the early Durrani rulers, all of the Sadozai sub-
tribe, as described by Elphinstone is the extent of the limits on their authority. Not only 
was a certain code of conduct followed in terms of revenue extraction, but also in terms 
of succession, which was hereditary but not fixed to the eldest son, with the dying 
King’s wish only one of several considerations taken into account by a jirga of elite 
sirdars (Elphinstone, 1839: 243-44); with the appointment of provincial governors, in 
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some areas beyond the King’s control (Elphinstone, 1839: 256); and with the King’s 
inability to curb the corruption in court, due to his need to keep the royal elite loyal to 
the crown (Elphinstone, 1839: 250). In a striking example of the scale of this problem, 
when Elphinstone was writing he estimated that a third of the then king Shah Shuja’s 
entire revenue during the time of his reign was spent paying off princes (Elphinstone, 
1839: 258).  Finally, in terms of maintaining law and order at the local level, the King’s 
authority was also limited: while the position of qazi (judge) was assigned by royal 
appointment, the authority that a judge was able to wield was entirely dependent on the 
support of the tribal chief in the area (Elphinstone, 1839: 256-7). Reiterating the way in 
which this had been the case long before Elphinstone was observing Afghan culture and 
customs, Ewans cites an account of a British East India Company employee, George 
Forster, who visited Afghanistan in 1783:  
...the different chieftains usually reside in fortified villages, where they excerise 
an acknowledged, though a moderate, sway over their vassals, and yield a 
careless obedience to the orders of government. Rarely any appeal is made to the 
head of state, except in cases which may involve a common danger; when I have 
seen the authority of the Shah interposed with success (Forster, cited in Ewans, 
2002: 39). 
Thus, the relationship between central rule and community ruled was not in any way 
given, but even at this stage was the product of a negotiated balance of power between 
the Shah and semi-autonomous community leaders.  
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Figure 8: Rulers of Afghanistan, 1747-1880
29
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The struggles for leadership that characterised the first half of the 19
th
 century in 
Afghanistan were aptly named by the Afghans experiencing them as ‘Padshahgardi’ – 
literally, ‘king-moving’ (Ewans, 2002: 39). Until 1800, Ahmed Shah Durrani’s direct 
line had ruled without interruption – his son, Timur Shah, had ruled for over twenty 
years by the time of his death, and was succeeded by one of his sons, Zaman Mirza, 
who held control until the turn of the century. At this point, however, while control 
remained within the Sadozai house and indeed within the direct descendents of Ahmad 
Shah, a contest between Zaman’s brothers was to determine the struggle for power for 
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forty years. While these struggles periodically called on the resources of local tribes, in 
terms of the provision of fighting men, negotiations as to the support of these tribes took 
place exclusively between the tribal chiefs and the ruling elite. At this point, political 
agency rested solely with these two groups of actors: politics at the centre was a game 
only for the elite royal circle who occasionally interacted with community leaders in the 
regions. As far as Tilly’s principles are concerned, then – starting with the first, to begin 
with state-citizen interactions – there is very little to analyse at this stage. 
External intervention would provide the catalyst for change in this regard. During the 
first reign of Dost Mohammed in Kabul (which began in 1826), Russia strengthened its 
control over neighbouring Iran in the 1830s, encouraging the Iranian Shah to invade 
Herat and Kandahar. As a result, British interest in protecting the empire in India from 
Russian advance was heightened. A British threat to invade Iran appeared successful in 
halting any such intervention, but its articulation was a thinly veiled statement of 
territorial ownership over Afghanistan, which provided a buffer-zone protecting India’s 
western borders. This arousal of British interest in intervention would culminate in full 
scale war by the end of the decade.     
5.2.3 1839-1880 
By 1839, Dost Mohammed – the first of the Barakzai line to make claim to the Afghan 
throne – had been the ruling monarch of the kingdom of Kabul for 13 years.30 These 
had not been easy years, however, and had mostly been spent trying to hold on to 
power. His initial claim had been weakened by his lack of Sadozai heritage, inconstant 
support from within the Barakzai clan, the Qizilbash and other tribal groups whose 
backing he needed, and his resulting choice of the title ‘Amir’ instead of ‘Shah’ (Noelle, 
1997: 14-15; Barfield, 2010: 111). This breaking with previous tradition was not only 
reflected in his unconventional lineage, however, but also in his approach to leadership. 
As Noelle describes, using a quotation from letters between British civil servants in the 
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(unpublished) Elphinstone Collection, he undertook a populist mandate, styling himself 
as a king for the common man after his coronation in 1835:
31
  
[Dost Mohammed] protested to his friends, that he would not become a king 
after the manner of the Suddoo Zyes, to be secluded in his Haram and take no 
cognizance of public affairs – that he should take the same concern in the affairs 
of the country as formerly, and that all classes of people should have access to 
him (Masson to Wilson, 4 January 1835, cited in Noelle, 1997: 19)   
This entirely different approach to the relationship between ruler and ruled 
foreshadowed further changes to this relationship that would come about during his 37-
year reign.  
However, this apparently benign approach toward his subjects was not to manifest itself 
in popular support for the monarch, at least initially. Having to tax his subjects heavily 
as a means to raise revenue previously gained from outlying territories that had now 
been lost, the Amir had created animosity among his subjects, particularly among those 
who had previously enjoyed tax exemption as a result of former monarchs sourcing 
revenue in the Indian territories, for example (Barfield, 2010:113-114). This, however, 
could be seen as a form of early ‘public politics’, in Tilly’s terms – although his 
extractive policies generated resistance, they were nevertheless beginning to forge 
relationships between the monarch and previously ungoverned or autonomous areas.     
Having intervened to defend the western province of Herat from Persian invasion two 
years earlier, in 1837, the British interest in Afghanistan had heightened with the 
perceived threat of Russian interference, to the point at which a plan to invade and 
reinstall Shah Shuja, the former monarch, in the place of Dost Mohammed, was devised 
(Hyman, 2002: 303). Equipped only with weak forces, Dost Mohammed was quickly 
defeated militarily in 1839 and voluntarily gave up his claim to the throne, accepting 
exile in India in return for British subsidies. Shah Shuja was reinstated to his former 
position as monarch, although as Barfield describes in some detail, his new reign under 
the auspices of British rule was fundamentally different to his previous years in power: 
due to the widespread administrative reforms introduced by the occupying forces, he 
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was unable to extend patronage to the tribes and regions that had previously enjoyed it 
(Barfield, 2010: 118-119). To some extent, his legitimacy as monarch had decreased as 
a result, in spite of his lineage. While Dost Mohammed had not been popular during his 
early reign, the British (with the exception of Alexander Burnes, London’s agent in 
Kabul) grossly underestimated the extent to which tribes – disgruntled by the phony 
rule they now saw in Kabul, and the disruption that the British forces were bringing 
(Barfield, 2010: 120) – would rally around him and support his re-instatement.  
Barfield describes two key differences to the nature of the uprisings in 1841-42 as 
compared with previous rebellions that Afghan shahs had had to deal with in the past: 
the way in which religion was being used to justify a rebellion against an infidel 
invasion and its puppet leader within Afghanistan, and the way in which the uprisings 
were not elite-inspired but in fact began among ordinary citizens whose anger at the 
behaviour of British troops and economic effects of their presence prompted widespread 
willingness to fight (2010:122).  Indeed, this anger was to have critical consequences 
for the British, who were massacred in huge numbers on their retreat to India in early 
1842 (Hyman, 2002: 303-304).  This series of events, brought about by foreign 
intervention, marked a sea-change in the nature of the relationships between rulers and 
the ruled in Afghanistan: for the first time, ordinary Afghans were participating in 
public politics, reacting to unwanted imposters and bringing about their departure, 
unwittingly promoting a national agenda (Barfield, 2010: 130-131; 2012
32
). 
Once the British had left and Dost Mohammed had been reinstalled as leader, the 
following 20 years of his reign were to solidify, slowly, the Barakzai claim to legitimate 
rule, largely through the expansion of the areas under his control. As Ewans describes, 
he was gradually able to expand his territory and influence (2002: 76-77) – although at 
first, on regaining the throne, the extent of both had been weaker than before the British 
invasion (Noelle, 1997: 56). Allocating provinces to the governorship of his sons, he 
allowed regional autonomy to flourish under their stewardship, (Ewans, 2002: 77), to 
the point at which any revenue collected largely remained in the pockets of the sons in 
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question, and was not transferred to the central coffers (Ewans, 2002: 78; Barfield, 
2010: 135). Extraction continued to be the Dost’s primary source of income, in spite of 
the tension this caused among Afghans little able to afford heavy taxation – and very 
little of the revenue collected was spent on infrastructure or services, but on improving 
the army instead (Noelle, 1997: 252; Ewans, 2002:78). Nevertheless, before his death in 
1863, Dost Mohammed had won the support of the majority of the key tribes, and had 
expanded his territory to include most northern areas, Kandahar, and finally, Herat. 
These tribes and their peoples were still very much subjects, however, and in spite of 
their participation in expelling the British, and in spite of the Amir’s progressive 
statements after his coronation, they played no part in the affairs of state (Barfield, 
2010: 134). 
After the Dost’s death in 1863, as one observer working for the British crown had 
predicted many years earlier, there was a considerable struggle for succession (Lal, 
1846: 229). Padshahgardi was again in play, and would last for the next five years until 
Sher Ali, one of Dost Mohammed’s 27 sons, was able to defeat his brothers in their 
claims to the throne. During his 10-year reign, Sher Ali would build on his father’s 
achievements in strengthening the army but also move beyond the Dost’s meagre 
progress in building the state administration and tax system (Barfield, 2010: 137). 
However, the reach of Sher Ali’s new policies was still limited to urban areas and 
military outposts – beyond this, tribal areas continued to administer themselves 
(2010:138).    
Also during Sher Ali’s reign, Britain and Russia began to re-kindle interests in 
Afghanistan after a long period of seeming disinterest. In 1873, an agreement was 
reached concerning the limits of Russia’s influence, and the northern border of 
Afghanistan – the Amu Darya, the river south of which would mark Afghan territory in 
which British interests were contained (Barfield, 2010: 139). This agreement, however, 
would not prevent intrigues and interventions from both powers at different points 
during the next seven years, partly as a result of Britain’s ‘forward policy’ in promoting 
the expansion of its empire. At Sher Ali’s death in 1879, his son Yacub came to power, 
signing the Treaty of Gandamak that would concede considerable powers to the British 
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in return for annual subsidies. Even this, however, was not to satisfy the colonial power, 
which  - seeming to have forgotten the travesty that had been its former escapades in the 
country forty years earlier – invaded once again in 1880. Local unease at this move in 
the first instance was bolstered by a riot among soldiers over a lack of British subsidies 
owed to them, and once again, it was ordinary Afghans that led the fight to resist 
colonial rule (Barfield, 2010: 141).      
In sum, the period 1839-1880 represented a critical shift in the relationship between 
ruler and ruled. While tribal regions remained for the most part autonomous from state 
interference, and the control of the affairs of state remained firmly within the hands of 
the monarch and his family (until Sher Ali’s changes toward the end of the period), a 
space for public politics had nevertheless been created, if only in the form of a role 
resisting the advances of foreign powers. Still, as Barfield summarises, during the 19
th
 
century “[the Afghan people] became more involved in struggles to defend the nation 
against foreign invaders and yet found themselves more oppressed by their own 
governments in the aftermath” (Barfield, 2010: 110). This trend would continue 
throughout the twenty-year reign of the nation’s most infamous monarch, Abdur 
Rahman Khan. 
5.2.4 1880-1929 
If Dost Mohammed had begun the transformation of the relationship between ruler and 
ruled in Afghanistan, then the rule of Abdur Rahman Khan altered this relationship 
dramatically.  Credited with transforming a disparate group of fiefdoms into a single 
state under a centralized administration, he reduced the autonomy of local centres of 
power but also in many instances took away the middlemen of the tribal chiefs who had 
previously served as interlocutors between central government and community, 
shielding the latter from the former (Barfield, 2010: 159). It was during this regime that 
the state came into direct contact with ordinary people, more often than not to inflict 
stringent taxes and punishments. As Barfield notes, future Afghan rulers would come to 
see central government and military rule as the key to maintaining control, often 
overlooking the price paid by Abdur Rahman to achieve this – over 100,000 Afghans 
were killed during his twenty-year rule in the internal wars he promoted to centralise 
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control (Barfield, 2012
33
; 2010: 147). These, then, were the cumulative effects of Abdur 
Rahman’s reign, but it is critical to look in more depth at the events, actions, approaches 
and decisions that contributed to them. The researcher argues that five key elements of 
Abdur Rahman’s reign are particularly significant as regards Tilly’s criteria: religion; 
the personalization of power; his approach toward previously autonomous loci of 
power; his approach toward foreign powers; and his approach toward internal 
development and statebuilding. 
The first of these, religion, is a theme that surfaces from this point onward as a critical 
component of Afghan politics. Before Abdur Rahman, religion had been used as a tool 
by various leaders to garner tribal support for foreign wars, such as those waged against 
the Sikhs in India in the 18
th
 century (Barfield, 2010: 122). More importantly, however, 
it was primarily a feature of local politics. It had been considered by rulers as the 
preserve of the clergy, whose influence at the community level was considerable. If war 
against an infidel population abroad was imminent, it would be a question of inciting 
the support of mullahs to advocate for the cause and convince their local communities 
of the divine legitimacy of the proposed conflict.  This approach endowed the religious 
elite with a power base from which to negotiate with rulers, and a certain level of 
autonomy from the centre.  
Abdur Rahman would radically alter the status quo in this regard. From the beginning 
of his rule, he would justify his claim to the throne with reference to religion. As Ewans 
describes, “[t]o establish his authority, Abdur Rahman did what no previous Afghan 
Amir had done except marginally: he claimed that his rule was based on divine sanction 
rather than derived from the consensus of the tribal jirga” (Ewans, 2002: 101). At the 
same time as establishing himself as defender of the faith, however, he dramatically 
undermined the power of the religious clergy, enforcing them to take examinations 
(leading to performance-based pay) and publically humiliating popular religious 
leaders.
34
 The waqf (charitable endowments) at local mosques was confiscated (or 
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 Lecture given at SOAS, 7 March 2012. ‘Problems in Establishing Political Legitimacy in Afghanistan: 
1500-2012’. Anthony Hyman Memorial Lecture. 
34
 In one case, he re-named the respected Mullah, popularly known as ‘Mushk-e Alam’ (Perfume of the 
Universe) as ‘Mush-e Alam’ (Mouse of the Universe). Ewans, 2002: 101-2). 
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‘nationalised’) to contribute to state funds (Ewans, 2002: 101-2), in a blatant ploy to 
create for the Amir an image as supreme religious leader as well as head of state. This 
was religion used as a tool to consolidate power, above and beyond a commitment to 
upholding the faith. 
Indeed, Abdur Rahman’s position shifted between the outright undermining of religious 
rules (Barfield, 2010: 146) to the upholding of Islam as a cause for internal war and as a 
means to rally troops. Labelling the Shia Hazara population in the central highlands as 
infidels legitimised the looting of their lands and their being captured as slaves by the 
Pashtun tribes fighting for the king (as a reward for their having been heavily taxed the 
previous year). Conquering Kafiristan in 1896, the only remaining province whose 
inhabitants had not converted to Islam by the late 19
th
 century, Abdur Rahman again 
cited religious fervour as a reason for attack, but forbade looting and the taking of 
slaves, a practice forbidden in Islam in the case of war against fellow Muslims 
(Barfield, 2010: 180). This facilitated a relatively easy conquest and a less volatile 
situation after the war had ended. The region was renamed ‘Nooristan’ (Land of Light) 
and Abdur Rahman given the title ‘Light of the Nation and Religion’ (Ewans, 2002: 
102).  
The effect of Abdur Rahman’s rebranding of himself would not only solidify his hold 
on power and his claim to legitimate rule – it actively forged a closer relationship 
between ruler and ruled. In Tilly’s terms, the relationship between the state and its 
‘citizens’ was forming during this period.  In spite of waging several internal wars, he 
succeeded in persuading the population that the real threat came from infidel outsiders, 
and thus a common enemy could unite Afghans under his rule and protection (Barfield, 
2010: 158).  In nationalizing the waqf, in particular, he had forced a connection between 
people’s duty as Muslims within a local community, and the needs of an expanding 
Islamic state. To all intents and purposes, however, the state created by Abdur Rahman 
was not Islamic at all, based fundamentally in a secular model of administration 
(Barfield, 2010: 159).  As Barfield writes, “Abdur Rahman made himself the arbiter of 
domestic religious and national ideology in a way that championed his primacy while 
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hiding his compromises”. This political balancing act would be the envy of many a 
future leader. 
The second key theme linking Abdur Rahman’s rule to Tilly’s criteria is that of the 
personalization of power that the Amir developed during his reign. Whereas the 
legitimacy of previous rulers since Ahmad Shah Durrani had been based largely on their 
dynastic lineage and tribal identity as Durrani Sadozais, since the reign of Dost 
Mohammed and the rise of power of the Barakzai Mohammedzais, that automatic right 
to rule had been removed and thus prompted subsequent rulers to find different sources 
of legitimacy (Barfield, 2010: 111-127). Alongside his claim to be the defender of the 
faith, Abdur Rahman also persuaded the British that he was the only individual capable 
of controlling the unruly masses (Barfield, 2012), allowing them to withdraw from the 
country in the faith that their interests in India would be safeguarded by a strong ruler 
nevertheless highly dependent on British funds. 
The Amir’s individual stamp on rule was solidified not only by the persona he created 
but also by his direct personal involvement in matters of state. He was well-known for 
inflicting brutal punishments on dissenting citizens himself, and for ordering 
punishments on the basis of insult to his person (and not, by contrast, to the government 
or state). Indeed, again as Barfield notes, “[b]y the end of his reign, he had created a 
powerful police state in which even subversive talk that might offend the amir could 
land a person in jail or worse” (Barfield, 2010: 147).While he was able to create a 
unitary administrative system with considerable reach, however, in order to govern 
most of what is considered Afghanistan today, the depth and substance of the 
administrative structure was lacking. Very few mechanisms existed for the management 
of state coffers, with accounts only providing vague estimates of total income and 
expenditure per annum (Barfield, 2010: 152).   
The third aspect of Abdur Rahman’s reign that further solidified his rule was his 
approach towards autonomous power centres – the tribal regions that former monarchs, 
wary of causing insurrection, had left untaxed and ungoverned. New tactics involved 
moving beyond the nepotistic trend of allocating the governorship of provinces to 
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relatives, instead appointing unrelated administrators who could be replaced whenever 
necessary; playing on the existing divisions between different, uncoordinated groups in 
Afghan society, making these divisions wider and groups more fractured than 
previously; creating smaller provinces to this effect; and directly taxing populations 
themselves, rather than tribal leaders (Barfield, 2010:151).    
Abdur Rahman himself had a clear vision of his task in leading Afghanistan. As Munshi 
cites, he is said to have described his role as:   
...to put in order all the hundreds of petty chiefs, plunderers, robbers and cut-
throats...This necessitated breaking down the feudal and tribal system and 
substituting one grand community under one law and one rule. (Munshi, 1900: 
176-77).  
While initially he began to undertake this project by means of persuasion, this quickly 
reverted to force (Barfield, 2010: 147). Barfield identifies three groups of potential 
rebels that Abdur Rahman brought under his control by force – the easten Pashtun 
tribes, his rival cousins ruling the Turkestan region, and non-sunni ethnic groups (such 
as the Hazara) (2010:147). These autonomous power centres, to use Tilly’s terms, had 
to be brought under central control, and through a series of bloody civil wars. This, 
however, was Abdur Rahman’s state-making in process – clearing (or re-ordering) the 
political forest to make room for absolute authority (Barfield, 2010: 160; Scott, 1998: 
Chapter 1), and beginning a ‘strong state trajectory’ for the first time (Tilly, 2007: 161), 
he was increasing the capacity of the state through violent means. At this point in time, 
from 1879-1900, and from a position of very low values for both state capacity and 
democracy, Afghanistan would have been moving directly upwards in Tilly’s matrix 
(Figure 9)
35
.  
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 The application of the Afghan case to this model will be probematized later in the chapter.  
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Figure 9: Approximate positions on Tilly’s state capacity/democracy matrix for 
Afghanistan 1747-1900 
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One of Abdur Rahman’s most effective policies was that of isolating communities from 
one another and thus preventing coordinated attacks. Removing khans and elders from 
positions of authority, he was able to make impotent these communities and remove 
their potential to mobilise collectively (Barfield, 2010: 160).  This was bolstered by his 
policy of forbidding subjects to move around the country, apart from at times when he 
enforced movement himself (Ewans, 2002: 103). This could be seen to contribute to an 
increasing sense of internal zenophobia that would work to his political advantage also. 
Adding to the breaking down of horizontal linkages between communities, Abdur 
Rahman mastered the art of tokenism, creating what seemed to be an inclusory body of 
advisors in the capital in the form of a loya jirga. This, however, was a council designed 
to rubber-stamp his decisions, having no authority or influence of its own – and 
succeeded in separating regional powerholders from their support bases in the regions 
(Ewans, 2002: 103). Loya jirgas would become a regular feature of the Afghan 
administration over time, retaining their propensity to act as forums for facilitating a 
monarch’s (or President’s) wishes. Their origin, as a mechanism to create distance as 
opposed to representation, is highly significant.      
Abdur Rahman’s approach to foreign powers was also significant in affecting the 
development of the state-citizen relationship. The remnants of decisions made before 
his assent to power were also important in this regard – as Hyman states, “[a]greement 
by Russian and British administrators to preserve a buffer state of Afghanistan between 
their own territories was crucial to the statebuilding process undertaken from the 1880s 
by Emir Abdur Rahman” (2002: 303). After the war in 1880, and Britain’s humiliating 
defeat, British policy appeared to be to buy Abdur Rahman’s assent rather than threaten 
the use of force (Ewans, 2002: 99). Essentially, then, he was able to finance the 
modernisation of the army and all internal wars, while making (and concealing) 
significant compromises in terms of national sovereignty. This was the case with his 
agreement to the British demarcation of the Durrand Line separating off tribal territories 
on the Indian border, which was bought with a promise of easy importation of weapons 
and an increase in his annual stipend from 1.2 million to 1.8 million rupees (Ewans, 
2002: 108).  
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In this way, then, just as his predecessors had done before him, and many successors 
would continue to do afterwards, Abdur Rahman was able to bargain with the foreign 
powers to bolster internal campaigns. His concessions on the Durand Line, however, 
would be a source of great consternation and debate for years to come. Still, the 
campaign against the British in the second Anglo-Afghan war, and Abdur Rahman’s 
ability to convince them that he could provide a strong defense against Russia, provided 
that weapons and funding were liberally supplied, would change the nature of the 
Afghan state almost indefinitely. As Rubin concludes, Abdur Rahman “used these 
coercive resources to establish the basic state structure that endured until the fall of 
Najibullah in 1992: A Pashtun ruler using external resources to reign over an ethnically 
heterogeneous society while manipulating that social segmentation to weaken society’s 
resistance” (2002: 19). 
Finally, worthy of note in Abdur Rahman’s rule was his lack of attention to the needs of 
his subjects. Having taxed them to the point of destitution, he followed the model set by 
Dost Mohammed, in that he focused on the development of the army rather than the 
provision of public services. Afghans gained no entitlements, no infrastructure, and no 
services as recompense for their payment of taxes. Wary of ulterior motives, he even 
rejected the offers of international powers to build transport links between Afghanistan 
and neighbouring states (Barfield, 2010: 152). In neglecting this critical aspect of 
statebuilding, Abdur Rahman contributed to the country’s future decline – as Barfield 
writes, he  “...thus laid the foundation for the country’s long-term economic stagnation 
and poverty, even though in terms of population density and available resources it had a 
stronger potential for growth than many of its neighbours” (2010: 153). British 
subsidies played a key role in enabling Abdur Rahman to ignore the needs of his 
subjects.  
By the time of his death in 1901, Abdur Rahman had established himself as one of the 
great (if ruthless) rulers of Afghanistan. Indeed, “[f]or better or worse, Afghanistan 
became a unitary state under [his] rule, and its inhabitants came to see it as such” (2010: 
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160).  In theory, then, he was following Tilly’s ‘strong state’ trajectory towards 
democratisation (where state capacity increases significantly before any democratisation 
occurs [2007: 161]) – initially increasing state capacity through the domination of 
autonomous power centres and using force to ensure the compliance and obedience of 
subjects. As Tilly goes on to explain, this kind of exertion of force by a ruthless leader 
is necessary to the provocation of citizens into uprising and revolt, and thus the forging 
of new relationships of compromise and negotiation between states and citizens – the 
re-formation of the social contract. This had been the case in France a century earlier, 
and was also taking place in Iran at the same time as Abdur Rahman’s reign in 
Afghanistan. As Gheissari and Nasr describe, the tobacco rebellion at the end of the 19
th
 
century was a response to the Qajar dynasty’s foreign trade policy on tobacco (2006: 
24). Why, then, did revolt against the ruler not occur in Afghanistan? 
Potential reasons include the extent to which Abdur Rahman had isolated communities 
from one another, and that his reign was simply not long enough to allow collective 
mobilisation to occur in spite of this. Further, as Barfield describes, there was no 
national impetus to rise up against the leader, in spite of the way in which a national 
cause had been present when the British had invaded:  “a national identity did not 
bubble up from below. It was the amir’s standardized taxes, laws, currency, 
conscription, and administrative structure that put all Afghans into a single system” 
(2010: 159). Although Abdur Rahman is often attributed with the creation of the nation-
state in Afghanistan, Edwards nonetheless concludes that in spite of his reforms, a 
‘myth of the state’ was never imprinted onto the public imaginary, and any semblance 
of a state remained purely artificial (1996: 4). Abdur Rahman’s extractive rule was 
personalized, not state-based, and ended with his death. 
*** 
Highly significant as a result of Abdur Rahman’s solidification of rule and suppression 
of all opposition was the way in which the legitimacy of his Barakzai line was no longer 
in question. Moreover, non-Pashtun groups had also come to recognise the existence 
and legitimacy of a Pashtun-led state: “[i]n the eyes of most non-Pashtuns, the Afghan 
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government was now viewed as a Pashtun government and not just a Durrani dynasty” 
(Barfield, 2010:157). In contrast to the ends of previous rulers’ reigns, after Abdur 
Rahman, there was no succession struggle: the named heir was Habibullah Khan, Abdur 
Rahman’s eldest son (Ewans, 2002: 110).   
The reigns of leaders that immediately followed Abdur Rahman marked another 
dramatic shift in the way Afghanistan was governed. Rather than pursue the brutally 
extractive policies of their father, Abdur Rahman’s sons and successors chose instead to 
appease the population, and thus, in Tilly’s terms, ended the strong state trajectory that 
their father had begun. The beginning of Habibullah’s reign marked the start of a more 
inclusive politics in Afghanistan, with the re-instatement to the royal court of several 
previously exiled families who brought with them influences and experience from 
across the Ottoman empire (Barfield, 2010: 175-176). Alongside other events both 
within Afghanistan and in the region, this act of bringing back to the political centre 
families that had been previously excluded under Abdur Rahman’s singular, 
authoritarian regime represented a critical creation of political space for those other than 
the King himself.  Furthermore, by this point, as a result of the wars waged by previous 
rulers (Abdur Rahman in particular) and the involvement of colonial Britain, 
Afghanistan could now be identified as a ‘bounded territory’, at least, if not a nation-
state.  
Three distinct but related points can be made concerning the nature of Habibullah’s 
reign (1901-1919). The first of these concerns his approach toward the opening of 
political space to elites in Kabul.  Having invited back families in exile, he proceeded to 
create a court of advisors, some of whom were able to wield significant influence. This 
was particularly evident in reactions to the way in which the British and Russians 
signed a treaty in 1907 on their relations in Afghanistan, excluding Habibullah. This 
prompted the formation of the ‘War Party’, led by Mahmud Tarzi, which channelled 
anti-imperialist thought among the Kabul elites at court (Ewans, 2002: 115) and led to 
the development of ‘palace intrigue’ that would characterize his reign (Dupree, 1980: 
430). Interestingly, the sentiments behind the formation of this group were not 
dissimilar to those prompting the tobacco rebellion in Iran, with the key difference of 
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being contained within a small elite circle rather than escalating into a nationwide 
grievance.  This was about power, not trade – and did not affect ordinary people.  
The second related factor worthy of mention is Habibullah’s approach to foreign policy. 
As the War Party continued to promote an anti-imperialist stance, the Amir was equally 
convinced of the merits of remaining neutral (rather than waging war against the Allies) 
in the First World War, largely to wait and see which side would win (Dupree, 1980: 
434). Although he had convened a Loya Jirga to discuss the issue, and had heard the 
delegates promote an anti-British jihad, he decided to pursue his own agenda (Ewans, 
2002:115). Using the Loya Jirga in much the same way as his father had done, he 
shunned elite opinion at his peril – Habibullah would later be assassinated, while 
waiting for the British to grant full independence to the Afghans, likely by a War Party 
member dissatisfied with his stance on foreign policy (although as Dupree (1980: 435-
7) documents, numerous other possible culprits have been blamed). In the meantime, 
the Amir would continue to balance his assurance to the British of his support for them 
against his need to placate Tarzi’s group (Ewans, 2002: 116).      
Finally, Habibullah began to reverse the policies of his father as far as the provision of 
services was concerned. Managing to maintain peace throughout his reign, he built a 
high school, a military academy, a teacher training college and a hospital in Kabul. 
Having visited India and having been convinced there of the value of these institutions, 
largely under the modernizing influence of Tarzi, he started the long process toward 
modernising Afghanistan (Ewans, 2002114-116; Dupree, 1980: 437). Alongside 
providing much needed services in the capital, these developments “also marked the 
beginning of Afghanistan’s critical social divide, between the traditional Afghan society 
of the tribe and the countryside, and that of an increasingly westernized, urban elite” 
(Ewans, 2002: 116). This divide would be further exacerbated under the rule of his son, 
Amanullah, who was also strongly influenced by Tarzi.  
King Amanullah is best known in Afghanistan for his rejection of conservative social 
norms and his radical reforms, which caused severe reactions from religious and tribal 
leaders, and which Dupree rates at 20 years too soon (1980: 441). Having been a part of 
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the modernist nationalist movement that had contended against his father, and being the 
son-in-law of Mahmud Tarzi, he had the support of this group when claiming the throne 
against his uncle and brothers in 1919 (Barfield, 2010: 181). Declaring a war of 
independence immediately after gaining power, Amanullah began the third Anglo-
Afghan war, which, in spite of military losses for the Afghans, ended with a declaration 
of independence. While this gained him support from the conservative anti-British 
mullahs, however, this support was to be short-lived: in announcing a series of radical 
reforms, a backlash from the conservatives was not long in the coming, in the form of 
the Khost Rebellion (Dupree, 1980: 449; Barfield, 2010: 183).  
Part of the problem concerned Amanullah’s constitution (1923), the first of its kind in 
the country. Able to please neither the conservatives nor the modernists, however, it fell 
short of the radical document it could have been (Ewans, 2002: 128). Further, because 
the British had stopped their subsidies to the Amir on the pronunciation of 
independence, and his general anti-British attitude (Dupree: 1980: 449), he had little 
funds with which to promote his radical reforms thoroughly (Rubin, 2002: 19). For the 
most part, reactions against the reforms could be attributed to the reduction in power of 
mullahs and regional strongmen – again, a challenge to the autonomy of formerly self-
governed areas – and a perceived threat to Islam, largely in the form of changes to 
women’s status and code of conduct. (Ewans, 2002: 129) Evidently, the latter proved a 
convenient tool through which to counter the former, with conservative mullahs calling 
people to arms on the basis of an affront to Islam but at the same time, defending their 
right to authority in rural areas. Without having invested in provisions for the army 
(Ewans, 2002: 135, Barfield, 2010: 187), and without British support, having had to 
raise unpopular taxes astronomically to fund his regime (Barfield, 2010: 190), 
Amanullah was poorly equipped to deal with the opposition he faced in the civil war of 
1929, and was forced to flee and abdicate.   
 The period from 1880 -1929 saw cataclysmic shifts in Afghanistan’s political history, 
in which over a relatively short space of time, the country’s leadership shifted from an 
authoritarian monarchy with no room for public politics, to a monarchy considerably 
weakened in its power vis-à-vis increasingly active and ideologically-motivated elites. 
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While the role of ordinary people in the affairs of state was still minimal, changes to 
this status quo had already begun.  
5.2.5 1929 – 1978 
A succession struggle between contenders was again to ensue following Amanullah’s 
deposition, but the battles it comprised would this time embody a fundamental change 
in the way in which legitimacy of rule was defined. First, an opportunistic Tajik rebel, 
Habibullah Kalakani, laid claim to the throne, in a startlingly display of bravado that 
contradicted the now conventional norm that government was a Pashtun affair. Perhaps 
more surprising was the way in which Kalakani managed to hold on to power for nine 
months, and even managed to garner some support, while Pashtun tribes organised 
themselves into an opposition to depose him (Dupree, 1980: 458). Although for most he 
was not considered a ‘legitimate’ claimant to the throne, his attempt and initial success 
nevertheless questioned the existing rules of the game. Second, instead of inviting the 
return of Amanullah on Kalakani’s death, a loya jirga of elders and local strongmen 
selected Nadir Khan, a distant cousin of Amanullah from a different line of descent, as 
the next monarch. Nadir, who had returned to Afghanistan to assist Amanullah in the 
fight against Kalakani, had himself suggested the calling of a loya jirga as a ‘traditional’ 
means to select the next king. As Barfield notes, however, this was hardly a traditional 
practice when it came to choosing monarchs, which had since Ahmad Shah Durrani 
been an issue of hereditary claims and conquests (2010:195).   Thus, not only was this a 
new means of conferring legitimacy to leader, it was also a means to de-legitimise a 
former dynasty, the descendents of Abdur Rahman. This was to be solidified in late 
1929 through British support to Nadir in the form of funding and weaponry (Barfield, 
2010: 197). A new royal line, the Musahibans, had been established (Barfield, 2010: 
195), and with it, was to come almost 45 years of peace.   
Nadir named himself Shah and began to implement changes. While distancing himself 
from the radical reforms of his predecessor, in order to maintain the support of the 
conservative clerics, he nevertheless continued to implement some of Amanullah’s 
plans. His constitution of 1931 was largely based on the former Amir’s constitution of 
1923, including plans for a bi-cameral parliament as a consolatory body, and a national 
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council, to be composed of 105 members from the parliament (Ewans, 2002: 140).  
While these bodies had little in the way of formal influence over executive decision-
making, they were nevertheless institutions that served to increase the space in which 
some form of public politics could take place. Further to the changes made to the 
political system, Nadir Shah and his successor, son Zahir Shah, would make several 
decisions concerning the economy, foreign relations, autonomous regions and political 
freedoms that would significantly affect, once again, the nature of the ruler-ruled (or 
state-citizen) relationship.  
Figure 10: Rulers in Afghanistan 1880-1978 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First, in terms of the economy, Nadir began to build the extent to which revenue could 
be extracted from imports and exports, preferring this over the levying of further taxes 
over potentially rebellious subjects (Ewans, 2002: 142). After his father’s death in 1933, 
Zahir (under the stewardship of his uncles) continued to adopt the same approach. This 
would be an indicator of an attitude that would last for the next forty years, and would 
see the consistent prioritisation of stability over any other concern (Barfield, 2010: 198-
199). Trade was a fairly weak source of revenue, however, which was only supported 
later with the influx of aid from competing superpowers during the Cold War (Rubin, 
2002: 20). While allowing the development of infrastructure, this significant source of 
additional income would further facilitate the avoidance of taxing citizens, preserving 
stability but at the same time stalling any progress along the strong-state trajectory (with 
heightened, enforced taxes promoting rebellion) that Abdur Rahman had started.  
Indeed, between the start of the Cold War and the end of the 1970s, the USSR had 
1880 – 1901: Abdur Rahman Khan 
 
1901 – 1919: Habibullah Khan (son) 
 
1919 – 1929: Amanullah Khan (son) 
 
1929 - 1929: Habibullah Kalakani (unrelated imposter) 
 
1929 – 1933: Nadir Shah (distant cousin of Amanullah) 
 
1933 – 1973: Zahir Shah (son) 
 
1973 – 1978: Daoud Khan (cousin) 
 
180 
 
furnished Afghanistan with approximately USD 2.5 billion, roughly split between 
economic and military aid, the USA contributing USD 533 million (Rubin, 2002:20).   
Relatedly, Afghanistan’s relationship with the outside world altered considerably during 
Musahiban rule. Joining the League of Nations in 1934 (Ewans, 2002: 143)
36
, the 
country had established itself on the global stage, with its political decisions having 
some (if limited) consequences. ‘Neutrality’, both in World War 2 and afterwards, was 
a strategic position that would characterise Afghan foreign policy throughout the 
Musahiban period, facilitating the bargaining between the USSR and United States that 
would bolster (and indeed comprise the majority of) the Afghan economy through aid 
(Barfield, 2010: 311-312). As Barfield writes, “[t]he Musahiban plan was to warm 
Afghanistan with the heat generated by the great power conflicts without getting drawn 
into them directly” (2010: 206). This reflected Abdur Rahman’s foreign policy 
challenge toward Britain and Russia, which he described as that of a goat between two 
lions, or a grain of wheat between two millstones, trying to exist in between 
superpowers without being consumed or crushed (cited in Arnold, 1985: 2). The answer 
to this was to play them off one another. For the Musahibans, the aid that was to come 
from both powers would facilitate the expansion of the Afghan army, the building of 
infrastructure, and the exponential increase of educational services across the country 
(Barfield, 2010:210).  
Similar to their reasons for avoidance of taxation in semi-autonomous areas, Nadir and 
later Zahir Shah attempted to avoid conflict of any kind by appeasing, rather than 
provoking, religious leaders and tribal elders. As Rubin writes, “[e]ach solidarity 
group...remained isolated, linked to the nation-state only through personal ties to 
individuals in the government; the qaum did not need to form nationwide alliances to 
capture and exercise power” (2002: 20). Without national institutions that could have 
formed bridges between these personal, patron-client connections and the state (Rubin, 
2002: 20-21), there was no question of linkages being created between Tilly’s 
‘networks of trust’ and the state apparatus. Indeed, the advantages of maintaining this 
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autonomy from the state were numerous for the tribes in question. As one British 
representative described, at the beginning of Nadir Shah’s reign,   
Throughout the country the advantages of anarchy seem to have been better 
appreciated than its drawbacks, and the tribes were asking themselves why they 
should resign the freedom which they had enjoyed for the past year [1929] and 
submit again to a central authority which would inevitably demand payment of 
land revenue, customs duties and bribes for its officials, and possibly the 
restoration of the arms looted from government posts and arsenals. (Richard 
Maconachie, cited in Ewans, 2002: 139). 
Thus, in order to avoid the resistance that might materialise if this return to a former 
existence (that had been disrupted by Amanullah’s taxation) was disturbed, Nadir Shah 
opted to turn a blind eye to these areas, rather than enforcing their compliance toward a 
public politics through taxation, for example. His policy of maintaining only personal 
(and not public) links with various semi-autonomous regions developed into what 
Olivier Roy would later term a relationship of ‘externality and compromise’ (Roy, 
1994: 148) between the central government and these regions.  
At the same time as appeasing the tribal elders and mullahs by allowing their hold on 
regional power and religious authority to thrive, Zahir Shah continued throughout his 
reign to make small concessions to modernists through a superficial commitment to 
political reform (Ewans, 2002: 143). Instrumental to the political uprisings of later years 
would be the founding of Kabul University in 1932 (Ewans, 2002: 144).
37
 The 
University would provide in the 1960s a forum for the development of radical 
communist and Islamist ideologies that would both shape the political landscape in the 
country dramatically. A number of new schools were also built in the capital, 
contributing to the rise of the educated class in Kabul (but not outside of the city). 
Before this time, however, in the early days of Zahir Shah’s rule, modernists were 
beginning to hold more of an influence in parliament, pushing for change. Under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Shah Mahmud (1946-1953), brother of the king, several 
reforms were put in place including the release of political prisoners, an increase in the 
freedom of the press, and the inclusion of 50 members parliament whose stance was in 
opposition to the government (Ewans, 2002:145). These reforms would be short-lived, 
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however: as a result of a combination of factors, including the creation of Pakistan and 
increasing animosity over the possession of border areas, an economic decline and lack 
of support from the United States, and the increasing fervour of the opposition – 
measures were taken to rescind the liberal changes that had been made in order to 
preserve stability (Ruttig, 2006: 5). Mahmud resigned and was replaced by Daoud 
Khan, the king’s cousin.      
Daoud had little tolerance for opposition, as would become evident in later years, and it 
was not until the end of his term as prime minister that new political reforms would be 
brought in. The king himself signed a new constitution in 1964, which made provisions 
for an elected bi-cameral parliament (the first of its kind in the country) and an increase 
in political freedoms. A political parties’ law was drafted, and passed by parliament in 
1965, although the king deliberated over this for many years and never formally ratified 
it (Ruttig, 2006: 5). Parliamentary elections were held in 1965 and 1969, for seats that 
represented constituencies throughout Afghanistan. While there was still a fair degree of 
royal influence over candidacy (Dupree, 1971: 1), and parliament itself was an unruly 
and disorganised collection of individuals with no ideological groupings (Weinbaum, 
1972), the last ten years of Zahir Shah’s reign, often labelled ‘the Decade of 
Democracy’ represented a considerable step toward the de jure expansion of public 
politics, and the re-adjustment of the state-citizen relationship. This would be brought to 
an abrupt end however in 1973, when Daoud staged a bloodless coup to oust the King, 
and relabelled Afghanistan a Republic overnight.   
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Figure 11: Approximate positions on Tilly’s state capacity/democracy matrix for 
Afghanistan 1900-2014 
 
 
 
What is clear about this period in Afghan history, however, is the way in which, while 
superficial reforms were being made to the structure of government, and ordinary 
Afghans across the country were beginning to participate in selecting individuals who 
would act as their connections to Kabul – this did not equate to the de facto molding 
and development of the state-citizen relationship into one in which Afghans themselves 
could hold their government to account. Public connections that would have linked all 
citizens to the state structure (such as taxation) remained all but absent – as was clearly 
evidenced by the way in which Daoud’s coup was not challenged by popular uprising. 
As Rubin concludes,  “[r]ather than incorporating the various sectors of the population 
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into a common national political system, the political elite acted as an ethnically 
stratified hierarchy of intermediaries between the foreign powers providing the 
resources and the groups receiving the largesse of patronage” [2002:20]. In spite of its 
beginning the course of a strong state trajectory a century earlier, Afghanistan had by 
this point reverted to a place in which the capacity of the central government, which 
varied but was mainly limited to urban areas, was not really linked to democracy at all. 
Tilly’s model does not capture adequately the nuances of this situation, because while 
state capacity existed in some sense, in some parts of the country and over some people 
groups, it was not felt on a country-wide scale. This could then be considered as limited 
state capacity, but again this does not fit the way in which Daoud was a fairly tyrannical 
(and effective) leader at certain points during his reign and again, in certain areas. This 
makes constructing a diagram on Tilly’s state capacity/democracy schematic very 
difficult – in fact, most of the positions of the dots placed in Figure 11 could be called 
into question. The period of Soviet occupation, for example, is marked as a distinct 
decline in state capacity but also a step backwards in democracy due to the atrocities 
committed by the occupying forces in villages across the country, and the conflict that 
ensued in the countryside over the decade. At the same time, however, reforms were 
being implemented in urban areas that gave women the freedom to attend school, 
remove the veil and claim equal inheritance to their brothers. This then already points to 
flaws in the model when applied to the Afghan case, and the need for the model to 
somehow incorporate the differential impact of the state in different areas – particularly 
marking the urban/rural divide, and perhaps moving away from the uniform 
construction of the state-citizen relationship and toward a more fluid conceptualisation 
of the relationship between ruler and ruled. As Edwards writes, “other notions of 
community have persisted on an equal level with that of the state” (1996: 4), which 
implies that any analysis of the interactions between ruler and ruled need to look 
beyond a state-citizen binary.  
5.2.6 1978-2014 
A great deal has been written about this period in Afghanistan’s history. With Tilly’s 
criteria in mind, this select narrative, as above, will focus on events that significantly 
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changed the state-citizen relationship through the expansion of public politics – looking 
particularly at the integration of trust networks, the nature of the state’s relationship to 
autonomous power centres, and categorical inequalities. 
Daoud’s reign had lasted only five years, during which time he consolidated executive 
power and marginalised all forms of opposition, particularly within Islamist circles. 
Even those with leftist tendencies, not dissimilar to Daoud’s own persuasions, were 
marginalised to the sidelines of the political arena (Ewans, 2002: 180). Only the 
President’s party, Hezb-e Inqilab-e Milli, was permitted to exist. All newspapers were 
banned, and, in calling a typically symbolic loya jirga in 1977, Daoud ratified a new 
constitution (without provision for elections) and was himself ‘elected’ president for a 
further six years (Ewans, 2002: 181).   Partly as a result of his exclusionary politics, 
Daoud was assassinated in 1978, as part of the Saur Revolution. 
This revolution was something of a misnomer, in that it did not comply with 
contemporary definitions of the term (see for example Tilly, 1978; Skocpol, 1979).  
Much in the same way as the ‘Afghan Revolution’ of 1929, this was about elite 
competition for power and involved very few of the population at large.  This was partly 
due the impatience of those who wanted to overturn Daoud – cognisant that the 
collective, communist mobilisation of the working class in Afghanistan would take a 
very long time, members of both Khalq and Parcham branches of the (secretly active) 
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) were convinced that they could skip 
this step and impose a communist regime from the top down (Ewans, 2002: 186). This 
is a critical indicator of the disjunct between state and society that existed and the way 
in which politics was still very much in the hands of an elite, educated minority. The 
toppling of Daoud essentially occurred as a PDPA-orchestrated military coup at the 
hands of a few army generals, at a point at which the party had only an estimated 
11,000 members (Ewans, 2002: 188).   
As an initially joint Khalq-Parcham cabinet increasingly became a Khalq-only set-up, 
this fundamental gap between rulers and ruled continued and expanded as a result of a 
government blinded by ideological principles. As Ewans writes, “the actions of the 
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Khalq leadership showed that they retained few connections with, and almost no 
understanding of, the ‘workers and peasants’ in whose name they were theoretically 
acting” (2002: 192), largely as a result of the void between educated elites in Kabul and 
the masses in the provinces. As the Khalq regime become increasingly brutal in its 
imposition of reforms (in land distribution and the rights of women, for example) that 
would anger Afghans across the country, however, it provoked resistance in the form of 
guerrilla warfare that spread rapidly. This inadvertently fuelled the changing of the 
state-citizen relationship, because the regime had pushed its inhabitants to a point at 
which they were angry enough to get involved in public politics, at first through elite 
level demonstrations in the Kabul but then gradually through armed resistance at all 
levels of society. As Roy explains, these wars of resistance, taking place between 1978-
1980, were not an attempt by local commanders to take over the state – but were 
launched to prevent its expansion into regions that had previously enjoyed relative 
autonomy (1994: 157).    
Deeply concerned by the PDPA Taraki (and later Amin) administration’s loss of control 
within Afghanistan, the USSR invaded in December 1979, installing Babrak Karmal as 
president. Their occupation of Afghanistan would last a decade, during which time the 
Islamist resistance, having developed in strength and capacity while in exile in Pakistan, 
would continue to plague the regime in rural areas. Attempting to subdue the Islamists 
by force involved the carpet bombing of large areas of the countryside, killing 
approximately one million Afghans over the ten-year period. Soviet forces were unable 
to overwhelm the rebels, largely because these were ordinary Afghans once again 
fuelled by the conviction of a religious and nationalist agenda against a common 
foreign enemy. In this sense, their motivations and characteristics were not dissimilar to 
those of the uprisings against the British in 1841, 1880 and 1919. Ordinary Afghans 
were once again involved in the political upheavals that were shaping their country. Roy 
contends that these wars of resistance in particular, during 1978-1988, were to 
fundamentally alter the nature of Afghan society:  
...the war profoundly changed the society. The intermixing and displacement of 
segments of the population, as well as the rise in power of a new elite, changed 
the sociology of the country and led highly insular populations to assume new 
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identities (ethnic, linguistic) beyond their connection to local solidarity groups. 
But rather than a return to the traditional society, it is more apt to speak of a 
transference of the solidarity networks and power of a traditional society into a 
modern and international context (Roy, 1994: 150). 
Here, then, we see the beginnings of an expansion of Tilly’s ‘trust networks’ – while 
still remaining unconnected to the state, these networks were expanding in terms of the 
categories within which ordinary people would place themselves. The new-found ability 
to redefine these groups would later be used to the advantage of ethnic leaders, who 
would capitalise on their own definitions of self and other-ness, to generate support 
blocs for their own personal agendas. 
Thanks to an influx of US and Saudi funding to the Islamist resistance (Barfield, 2010: 
243), provided (along with anti-aircraft stinger missiles and other weaponry) through 
the intermediary of the Pakistani ISI (Rubin, 2002: 100-101; 181-183; 196), and the 
added pressure mounting as the imminent collapse of the USSR became more and more 
apparent, the Soviet forces were compelled to leave in 1989. While a seeming victory 
for Afghanistan and its peoples, however, the removal of a common enemy had 
devastating consequences in the ensuing competition for power. President Najibullah, 
who had been installed to replace Karmal as leader (once again with the acquiescence of 
a compliant loya jirga) in 1987, was able to maintain a semblance of order until 1991, 
when Soviet aid ended following the collapse of the USSR (Barfield, 2010: 248). At 
this point, however, without any foreign aid – the USA having promptly abandoned the 
Afghans following the defeat of the Soviet forces – the Afghan state descended into 
civil war between rival Islamist factions, who were now divided by the power struggles 
between leaders and ethnic fragmentation (Rubin, 2002: 247; Barfield, 2010: 249). A 
brief attempt to share power between groups led to all-out civil war when one particular 
leader, Burhanuddin Rabbani, refused to concede power at the appointed time. The 
violence that was to follow was to destroy the capital, Kabul, and shock Afghans across 
all social strata with the extent of its brutality. 
For the next 10 years, Afghanistan remained a ‘failed state’, although to all intents and 
purposes it had never truly been a state in the first place. Until 1995, no central control 
was exercised over warring factions during the civil war, and while ordinary Afghans 
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had played a role in ousting the Russians, the fighting that now took place was once 
again an elite competition. Replaced by the semblance of order by the Taliban in the 
mid-1990s, the individual leaders of the civil war factions were gradually defeated – but 
a new state was not developed as a result. Instead, a brutal, fundamentalist regime 
inflicted their own version of Sharia law on the Afghan population, but did not possess 
the administrative capacity nor the resources to fulfil the functions of state in any sense. 
Implementing and solidifying the categorical inequalities against women that had been 
promoted by the Mujahideen leaders in the civil war, the Taliban possessed a semblance 
of control in their ideological prescriptions and punishments but in fact were little 
equipped to run a government. This was reflected in the way in which only Pakistan and 
Saudi Arabia recognised the ‘Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’ as a sovereign power.  
*** 
The events of September 11
th
, 2001, were to have a profound effect on Afghanistan, 
prompting as they did a US invasion of the country in retaliation to the Taliban’s refusal 
to comply with demands for the handover of Osama bin Laden (Rubin, 2002; Rashid, 
2008). Following the speedy removal of Talib forces, international plans were put in 
place for the rebuilding of the Afghan state, following a conference in Bonn, Germany, 
in 2001 – to which all political players, with the exception of the Taliban, were invited. 
The so-called Bonn Process would involve the re-creation of the institutions of state 
designed to facilitate the basis for a new democratic government.  
What is particularly striking here, however, is the similarity between this attempt to 
install, in the space of a very short time, a functioning democratic system on the basis of 
western liberal ideology, from the top down without widespread popular demand – and 
the attempt to install a communist society in 1978 without first having had a communist 
revolution of workers and peasants. Both, in essence, were attempts to leap-frog over 
the most fundamental component of each: the inclusion of the Afghan people. Of 
course, in the aftermath of state collapse and the urgent need to fill a power vacuum 
after the US invasion, some form of administration was needed, fast, and given the 
trend indicating that liberal democracy was seen as the only form of government that 
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could prevail in the 21
st
 century, as demonstrated in chapters 1 and 2, it was unlikely 
that any other kind of regime would be promoted by international actors. Nevertheless, 
in a country that had never before elected its leader, nor experienced universal suffrage, 
the system brought in at Bonn was seen by many as the beginning of a new era for 
Afghanistan.  
Figure 12: Afghanistan combined PR and CL score, 1972-2010 (Freedom House, 
2012b) 
 
 
 
Referring back to the Freedom House scores for Afghanistan over this period (Figure 
12), it is possible to determine how, following a long period of minimal rights and 
liberties, effective lasting from Daoud’s coup and later assassination right through to the 
fall of the Taliban, the country was considered to be improving on both counts with the 
beginning of the Bonn Process.  It is possible to argue, however, especially with the 
benefit of hindsight, that in fact the 2001-2014 period has seen fewer changes to Afghan 
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society and the state-citizen relationship than had the decade of resistance to the 
Russians.  
Before elections were organised in 2004 and 2005, two successive Loya Jirgas were 
held in an attempt to ‘legitimise’ the Bonn process through Afghan ‘tradition’ (Dobbins 
et al., 2007: 197). As has been apparent throughout this narrative, however, Loya Jirgas 
had never really served any purpose other than to rubber-stamp decisions already made 
by a ruling power (Coburn and Larson, forthcoming, 2013). This was no different in 
2002 and 2003 (ICG, 2002; 2003). Elections themselves, while drawing a significant 
turnout (almost 80 per cent and 50 per cent for the presidential and parliamentary 
elections respectively) achieved their purpose in identifying a leader and legislature that 
western powers could label legitimate, but in fact were poorly conducted, with 
significant fraud overlooked, to the point at which many Afghans suspected the joint 
international-Afghan organising body (the Joint Electoral Management Body, or JEMB) 
of  playing a role in manipulating the results (Wilder, 2005: 35-38). In the rush to 
establish a functioning executive and central government, and in the overwhelming 
prioritisation of security over justice, the reform of the judiciary was overlooked and 
sidelined, in spite of the way in which, of all the institutions of state, this was the one 
that was likely to have a positive impact on the lives of ordinary Afghans. Afghan 
expectations of what the international community could do for Afghanistan, in terms of 
improving the economy and generating stability, were vastly over-optimistic, and were 
quickly disappointed as the uncoordinated agendas of international actors became 
visible (Suhrke, 2011). As the British had done during Abdur Rahman’s regime, the 
international tendency was to throw money at any problems encountered, pledged at 
successive donor conferences, thus contributing to the entrenchment of the patronage 
networks of regional strongmen and government officials. These factors could help 
explain why, according to the relatively crude measures of Freedom House, in 2008-
2010, scores for both political rights and civil liberties were once again worsening.  
In a manner similar to that of Zahir Shah’s reforms, then, while the space for public 
politics had theoretically increased, in fact the connections between citizen and state 
were no more established than they had been in the reign of the former King. In 2009-
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10, 49.5 per cent of Afghanistan’s GDP (excluding the shadow economy, primarily 
comprised of the narcotics trade) was comprised of foreign aid, which, as Suhrke 
describes, “created extreme dependence, weak local ownership and corruption” 
(Suhrke, 2011: 119). Indeed, the extent of the proportion of aid to licit internal revenue 
in itself precluded the need and urgency for comprehensive tax reforms. Elections in 
2009 and 2010 served to increase the gap between Afghans and the centres of power, 
through widespread fraud and the entrenchment of existing power networks that 
precluded ordinary citizens from substantive participation (Coburn and Larson, 
forthcoming 2013). President Karzai was unwilling (and later unable) to debilitate 
autonomous power centres, preferring instead to appease and include regional warlords; 
to fully integrate trust networks into institutions of state, facilitating a degree of 
autonomy for example in terms of allowing Shia courts to practice their own, separate 
jurisdiction and resisting the assimilation of customary law into the state justice system;  
and to eliminate the categorical inequalities that still significantly hindered women’s 
advancement by signing the discriminatory Shia Personal Status Law, for example, and 
being unwilling to challenge the conservative social norms that restricted women’s role 
in the public sphere. These factors, combined with his inability to combat a growing 
insurgency, led the country to be categorised unilaterally by donors as a fragile state. 
5.3 Summary and conclusions: Returning to Tilly 
The picture of the development of ruler-ruled or state-citizen relationships, then, that 
emerges from this narrative, is not straightforward and does not comply with the 
simplified trajectories put forward by Tilly (2007: Chapter 7). Although during Abdur 
Rahman’s reign, the beginnings of a strong state trajectory were visible through his 
authoritarian rule and imposition of harsh taxation policies, this was to revert back to a 
more lenient approach by his successors who would adopt a laissez faire attitude toward 
the governance of autonomous regions. While some attempts would be made in the 20
th
 
century to enforce social reformation from the top down, particularly by Amanullah 
Khan and later by the PDPA in the late 1970s, the more commonly chosen path by 
successive leaders was that of least resistance – of prioritising stability over and above 
the task of comprehensive statebuilding, especially if revenue could be collected 
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through other means, such as the accumulation of aid funds. According to Barfield, this 
was inevitable due to Afghanistan’s ‘natural state’: “[t]he stable climax state in the 
‘political ecology’ of Afghanistan was characterised by a center (wherever it was) 
dominating distinct regions which had their own political elites” (2010: 162). He 
implies that Afghanistan will always return to this model
38
, in which the relationship 
between the center and regions is characterised by ‘externality and compromise’ (Roy, 
1994: 148), and has throughout history resisted the total imposition of a comprehensive 
statebuilding model. Barfield terms this the ‘American cheese’ approach to 
statebuilding – in its rolling out of a unilateral program for state governance to affect all 
areas equally, as opposed to the ‘Swiss cheese’ model, in which certain ‘holes’ are left 
to their own devices (Barfield, 2010: 67).     
 While this analysis allows for a greater degree of flexibility than does the Tilly 
framework, however, which is fundamentally based on American cheese assumptions, it 
is nonetheless flawed in that it does not take into account the transitions that did occur 
in the political landscape and to the nature of local participation in politics.
39
 Evidently, 
some changes have taken place in the nature of the state-citizen relationships at 
different points in history, even if their effects seem to have been limited. Tilly’s 
emphasis on these historical processes sheds considerable light on the way in which 
democratisation and de-democratisation occur. 
What is also clear from this narrative, however, is the way in which the Afghan state 
does not seem to comply with either the standard conceptualisation of the state as put 
forward in democratisation measures, nor with the definition of a ‘fragile state’ that is 
put forward by international donor agencies. While on the one hand, Afghanistan 
certainly does not match the criteria for Krasner’s four aspects of sovereignty (2009:21) 
or the Weberian notion of a monopoly of violence; on the other hand, the reasons for its 
‘fragility’ are not limited to current insurgencies and a lack of statehood, as current 
donor models for measuring fragility would suggest (DFID, 2005; USAID, 2006). 
Instead, the narrative appears to demonstrate a fundamentally different kind of 
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model. 
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statehood, and a different kind of citizenship. This will be explored and tested in the 
following chapter, which provides a detailed analysis of the nature of the state-citizen 
relationship in Afghanistan through the examination of interviews with Afghan 
respondents at the local level. This will address the question of whether or not it is 
possible to apply Tilly’s framework to the Afghan context without amendment.    
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CHAPTER 6: APPLYING TILLY TO AFGHANISTAN: BREADTH AND 
EQUALITY IN THE DATA 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter examines the primary data collected in order to provide a detailed analysis 
of the nature of the state-citizen relationship in Afghanistan, with reference to the first 
two of Tilly’s themes – breadth and equality. Through the narrative compiled in chapter 
5, it is possible to detect a common theme occurring at different points in Afghanistan’s 
political history: the way in which rulers or elite groups attempted to install new 
systems of government from the top down, with varying degrees of success and 
different reactions from different communities at the local level within Afghanistan. As 
explored in chapter 3, Tilly’s approach to measuring democratisation highlights the 
importance of local politics and the nature of its interaction with the state. In this 
chapter, the researcher explores this emphasis through the examination of primary data 
collected at the local level.  
This examination will begin to address the question of whether or not it is possible to 
apply Tilly’s framework to the Afghan context. First, the chapter outlines a detailed 
framework through which the primary data will be analysed. Second, it provides an 
analysis of the data according to the first two of Tilly’s four processes – breadth and 
equality -  examining how (if at all) these themes are discernible through respondents’ 
descriptions (or lack thereof) of the ways in which their lives are affected by the state.  
6.2 Detailed framework  
The following section outlines the framework through which the researcher will 
examine the primary data collected and use it to examine the state-citizen relationship in 
Afghanistan. It begins with the development of a matrix of analysis criteria, before the 
presentation and discussion of the data set.  
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6.2.1 Matrix of indicators 
Before attempting to assess the data based on Tilly’s four processes of breadth, equality, 
protection and mutually binding consultation, it is necessary to revisit briefly the criteria 
he uses to analyse changes in the state-citizen relationship of a given country.  
Common to most of Tilly’s suggested indicators across the four processes  is their 
actual existence in the real world – for example, the actual number of arbitrarily held 
prisoners increasing or decreasing, or a decline (or increase) in the number of laws 
applying only to one group in society (2007: 66). This is also true of Freedom House 
indictors for political rights and civil liberties, which Tilly draws upon in his analysis – 
and reflects Tilly’s positivist ontological perspective. However, he also alludes to other 
forms of potential measures, for example in his suggestion that one means of 
measurement of change in the state-citizen relationship could be to “analyze 
correspondence and meetings between officials and ordinary citizens” (2007: 60). This 
implies that above and beyond statistical evidence, indicators based on written dialogue 
between state representatives and citizens could also provide insights into the nature of 
their relationship.  
The researcher has decided to take a different approach, however, given the way in 
which official statistics are both difficult to obtain and also often unreliable in the 
Afghan context, as in other fragile contexts also, and given that high levels of illiteracy 
persist and prevent a large part of the population making written correspondence with 
the state. While earlier chapters have to some extent drawn upon the statistical data that 
do exist, for example in the historical narrative in chapter 5, and also in using the 
available Freedom House measures for Afghanistan – the thesis now focuses primarily 
on local perceptions of state functions, representative bodies and interactions with 
citizens. This skews the data towards a local understanding of the role and activities of 
the state, but the researcher argues that this bias is beneficial: it is often overlooked in 
contemporary analyses, and is arguably more appropriate to fragile contexts where 
statistics can be unreliable. This also allows a shift in ontological perspective, also, in 
that – while not dismissing the existence of ‘real’ facts that could influence the state-
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citizen relationship, it is important to consider how that relationship is constructed and 
perceived by citizens themselves.     
Breadth: 
According to Tilly’s definition, breadth primarily concerns political inclusion: the 
extent to which all groups of citizens have access to public politics and have the same 
rights under the state’s jurisdiction (2007:14). As Tilly explains, “at one extreme, every 
household has its own distinctive relation to the state, but only a few households have 
full rights of citizenship; at the other, all adult citizens belong to the same category of 
citizenship” (2007:14).  
In terms of suggested indicators to measure changes in breadth, one example Tilly 
provides is the “[i]ncrease (decrease) in the share of the population having legally 
enforceable rights to communicate complaints about governmental performance to high 
officials” (2007:66). He accepts that this kind of data is not widely available for many 
regimes, however, and thus opts instead to use Freedom House criteria for political 
rights, along with his own judgments of political histories, to compensate, using the 
earlier suggestion as an ideal measure (2007:66). Evidently, this problem applies to the 
Afghan case also – there is no statistical data available that could indicate the extent to 
which citizens have legally enforceable rights to communicate these kinds of 
complaints. While according to the constitution, all citizens share equal status under the 
law (Government of Afghanistan, 2004: Article 22), their de facto ability to make 
complaints about government performance to high officials is a different matter 
altogether, and likely to differ along gendered, ethnic, tribal and patronage lines, among 
others. The key phrase here then, is ‘legally enforceable’.  
Nevertheless, although no ‘hard data’ exist as to the proportion of the population able to 
access high officials to make these kinds of complaints, it is possible to discern from 
qualitative interviews with a sample of respondents from different social backgrounds 
in different parts of the country the extent to which they perceive they have the ability 
to do so. This is a different kind of evidence, but it nonetheless provides indications of 
the way citizens themselves consider their positions vis-à-vis the state. The indicators 
197 
 
used here to measure breadth (and potential changes in breadth, as discussed in chapter 
7), then, will focus on the theme of perceptions of legally-enforceable access to state 
officials across different social groups. These are detailed more specifically in Table 5 
below.       
Equality: 
For Tilly, equality is closely connected to breadth. It ranges from “great inequality 
among and within categories of citizens to extensive equality in both regards” (2007: 
14). Thus, the rights and duties of people in different ethnic groups and genders, for 
example, are either clearly ranked according to those groupings, as in highly unequal 
societies, or undifferentiated according to these categories, at the other end of the 
spectrum (2007: 14).  Tilly considers breadth and equality together to be the critical 
components of citizenship: “instead of a mosaic of variable relations to the state 
depending on particular group memberships, all citizens fall into a limited number of 
categories – at the limit, just one – whose members maintain similar rights and 
obligations in their interactions with the state” (2007:14).  Of particular note here is the 
way in which Tilly considers variability in relationships to the state to be synonymous 
with inequality in these relationships, and thus portrays that variability as a negative 
phenomenon. This demonstrates his conviction of the need for a liberal, uniform 
citizenship for all individuals under state jurisdiction – a theme which will be discussed 
in relationship to the nature of citizenship in Afghanistan throughout the following 
chapters. Also, however, it is possible to differentiate between equality in de jure 
constitutional rights and duties, and de facto equality in terms of the actual lived 
experiences of citizens across different social groups.  
This poses a problem when considering Tilly’s suggested means of measuring equality. 
He posits that one ideal measurement for change in this regard would constitute a 
“[d]ecline (rise) in the number of distinct legal categories defining rights and 
obligations of different population segments vis-à-vis the state” (2007:66). However, 
this does not take into account either the extent to which these categories might exist in 
spite of de jure constitutional frameworks to protect citizen equality, or the extent to 
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which legal categories might exist on paper but in reality have little impact due to the 
lack of their being effectively enforced. In Afghanistan, examples of both cases exist: in 
the first instance, through inequalities experienced by female citizens in terms of their 
access to justice, for example, in spite of women’s constitutionally guaranteed equality 
as citizens – and in the second instance, through the unenforced Shia Personal Status 
Law, which promotes the establishment of separate jurisdiction for Shia citizens, who 
on religious grounds have different approaches to some legal issues to the Sunni 
majority (see Oates, 2009).   Thus, while the theme of equality is of critical significance 
to the examination of the state-citizen relationship in the Afghan case, it is arguably 
more appropriate to use perceptions-based evidence through which to make judgements 
about how equal notions of ‘citizenship’ actually are considered to be from a local 
perspective. I will focus in this area on perceptions of de facto equality between 
social groups, indicators for which will be outlined and justified below in Table 5. 
Protection: 
This theme concerns the extent to which ‘due process’ is extended to all citizens, 
whereby citizens are protected from the arbitrary actions of the state. As Tilly writes, 
“at one extreme, state agents constantly use their power to punish enemies and reward 
their friends; at the other, all citizens enjoy publicly visible due process” (2007:15). 
Critical here is the notion that ‘due process’ be ‘publicly visible’ – this is linked to 
Tilly’s focus on public politics, and the way in which process and procedure are not 
only the same for all citizens but visible, knowable and thus accountable to these 
citizens also.  
In order to measure changes in protection, Tilly suggests the analysis of the “[d]ecrease 
(increase) in the proportion of the population imprisoned without legal sentencing or 
legal recourse” (2007:66). Statistics for this kind of data are notoriously difficult to 
access, as Tilly himself freely admits, particularly due to the way in which, if prisoners 
are denied legal recourse the state is unlikely to publish this kind of information. As a 
retrospective measure, however, this works well, due to the way in which it is much 
easier to find data for this as occurring in previous regimes whose interest in protecting 
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state officials has ended. Looking back over Afghanistan’s 20th century history, it is 
possible to compare for example the large numbers of political prisoners taken during 
Daoud’s Republic (1973-78) and Taraki-Amin government that immediately followed 
(1978-79) (Dupree, 1980: 770-773),  with the relatively few taken without trial under 
the King’s rule (1933-1973)40. While exact numbers may still be unavailable, 
comparisons are possible nonetheless with the data that does exist. Measuring 
protection in current circumstances is more difficult when focusing on illegal 
imprisonment, particularly when distinctions between state and extra-state actors are 
blurred. Thus, again, it is useful to draw on local perspectives to establish how citizens 
themselves consider the ‘due process’ of state jurisdiction. A general theme here for 
consideration will be perceptions of the visibility and accountability of the legal 
process, with indicators specified below in Table 5.    
Mutually binding consultation: 
The fourth of Tilly’s processes concerns the extent to which citizens are able to claim 
state assistance, should they need to: “at one extreme, seekers of state benefits must 
bribe, cajole, threaten, or use third-party influence to get anything at all; at the other, 
state agents have clear, enforceable obligations to deliver benefits by category of 
recipient” (2007: 15).  This, then concerns the social contract between citizens and the 
state, and the extent to which access to services (such as healthcare provisions and 
access to state schools) can be expected by citizens.  
To measure changes in mutually binding consultation, Tilly suggests an analysis of the 
outcomes of citizen complaints regarding their limited access to state services. As he 
explains, this could take the form of an “[i]ncrease (decrease) in the share of all 
citizens’ complaints regarding the denial of legally mandated benefits that result in the 
delivery of those benefits” (2007:66).  To access this kind of information, ideally the 
records of case outcomes from a Citizens’ Complaints Bureau or similar institution 
could be collated and analysed. However, as Tilly concedes, this is an ideal measure, 
data for which is not readily available for many countries, especially those with weaker 
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 Although this depended somewhat on which Prime Minister was in charge at the time.  
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state institutions. Indeed, the likelihood of such an institution existing, or providing 
publically-accessible information of this kind in a fragile context is minimal due to the 
general weakness of institutional capacity and/or suspicion of making information 
public. This being the case, Tilly makes use of Freedom House figures for civil liberties 
and again combines these with his own judgments based on historical narratives. 
It is also possible to extend this measure to look more broadly at the nature of citizen 
complaints. Asking where and to which bodies people actually take their grievances, 
and what kinds of grievances these comprise, can shed light on the way in which the 
social contract between citizen and state is constructed. If for example, people bring 
complaints concerning the closure of a state-run health facility first to a non-state 
council or body, to then be referred up to a larger, state-representing institution, this in 
itself provides information about how people expect problems and complaints to be 
dealt with (through local interlocutors rather than through state procedures directly). 
Furthermore, the perceived outcomes of these complaints as related by local 
respondents can indicate how the state and its role is perceived in the local community. 
In this way, local perspectives on service provision and complaints procedures can 
function as a useful theme for investigation under this category.    
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Table 5: Specific indicators 
 
Tilly’s process Corresponding qualitative 
theme to explore 
Indicators 
 
A. Breadth Perceptions of legally-
enforceable access to state 
officials across different social 
groups. 
1) Respondents from a variety of 
ethnic and social backgrounds 
perceive their access to state 
officials to be unhindered and 
give examples 
Looking for: 
a) similarities across 
different case study 
provinces 
b) similarities across urban 
and rural respondents 
c) similarities across male 
and female responses 
2) Respondents refer to legal 
procedures for recourse should 
their access to officials be 
hindered 
B. Equality Perceptions of de facto 
equality between social groups 
1) Respondents consider their 
own status vis-à-vis the state to 
be equal to that of others, for 
example in terms of access to 
services 
Looking for: 
a) Female respondents 
consider themselves to 
have similar rights and 
duties vis-à-vis the state 
as their male counterparts 
b) Little difference between 
different ethnic responses 
concerning their 
perceived status vis-à-vis 
the state 
2) Respondents consider their 
votes in elections to carry as 
much weight as those of other 
citizens 
C. Protection Perceptions of the visibility 
and accountability of the legal 
process 
1) Respondents refer to common 
procedures through which 
arbitrary state action can be 
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countered and give examples of 
when this has been done 
2) Respondents express 
confidence in the judicial system 
3) Respondents compare current 
legal processes more accountable 
/knowable than in past regimes 
D. Mutually 
binding 
consultation 
Local perspectives on service 
provision and complaints 
procedures 
1) Respondents express 
expectations concerning state-
provided services and indicate 
that these are generally met 
2) Respondents express 
confidence in the continuity of 
the provision of state services 
3) Respondents express 
familiarity with state institutions 
and recount examples of taking 
complaints about service 
provision to them 
(Table 5 cont.) 
Discussion of indicators 
The indicators specified above in Table 5 are purposefully broad in nature, allowing for 
a degree of variation between transcripts collected from respondents in very different 
areas of Afghanistan, which have different kinds of connections to the state. This also 
allows comparison between different regional contexts, and also between urban and 
rural sites within the same case study province. The indicators also require some 
disaggregation of the data, particularly by gender, religious sect, geographical location 
and urban/rural divides. They are all phrased in a positive sense, primarily for 
consistency’s sake – and as such they make the assumption that respondents will talk 
about their relationship to the state in some form or another. This assumption could be 
proven wrong, in which case none of the criteria for the indicators will be met when 
data is analysed.  
Rather than assign a numerical score to these indicators, results will be discussed 
analytically. This avoids any risk of arbitrary judgments being made when the data 
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being drawn upon must be interpreted
41
, to some degree, and thus must be subject to the 
subconscious decisions made by the interpreter. This is in part a factor of the qualitative 
nature of the data but also the result of the way in which the researcher is very much 
aware, as interpreter of the data, of the potential biases she might bring to her own 
interpretations. While she attempts to mitigate this through constant cross-referencing to 
secondary historical and contemporary sources, this is nevertheless a limitation. 
Tilly weights all four categories evenly, given his conviction that all four contribute 
equally to democratisation (2007:15). The researcher attempts to do the same here, 
noting if the data meet the indicators in one category more than in others and exploring 
the reasons for this.  
A final point to mention is the question of change in each of the four categories. This 
will be discussed later in the chapter and in chapter 7 in more detail, but it is worth 
mentioning here that the indicators above (with the exception of C3) do not account for 
change over time, and rather focus on current experiences and perceptions of citizens. 
This is again due to a concern for consistency, in that many of the respondents had 
migrated to Pakistan and Iran during previous regimes, and others were often too young 
to remember former regimes. While the researcher will note examples in which 
respondents do make comparisons with past regimes of their own accord, for the most 
part the indicators focus on present circumstances. Change over time could be measured 
through repeated studies conducted at regular intervals using the same set of indicators. 
The researcher will draw upon secondary data to make some judgments about change 
from previous regimes. In chapter 7, she will explore in detail factors that might cause 
change in the future in each of the four areas, either toward or away from 
democratisation.    
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 Here I refer to the analytical interpretation of data, rather than the literal translation of interview 
transcripts from Dari or Pashtu into English. Nevertheless, the translation of data adds a further layer of 
interpretation that is not insignificant. For a note on translation, see Appendix 3..   
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6.2.2 Data set: tables of interviews and discussion  
Table 6: Nangarhar interviews
42
 
Location Income Men Women Total 
City Elite 2 3 5 
Mid income 5 1 6 
Low income 2 0 2 
Total:  9 4 13 
Suburb Elite 1 1 2 
Mid income 6 2 8 
Low income 3 1 4 
Total:  10 4 14 
Rural Elite 3 1 4 
Mid income 3 4 7 
Low income 4 4 8 
Total:  10 9 19 
Total men and 
women 
 29 17 46 
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 For a full list of interviews for all provinces, see Appendix 4.  
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Table 7: Ghazni interviews 
Location Income Men Women Total 
City Elite 2 2 4 
Mid income 4 2 6 
Low income 2 2 4 
Total:  8 6 14 
Suburb Elite 0 1 1 
Mid income 2 5 7 
Low income 0 2 2 
Total:  2 8 10 
Rural Elite 3 0 3 
Mid income 9 0 9 
Low income 3 1 4 
Total:  15 1 16 
Total men and 
women 
 25 15 40 
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Table 8: Balkh interviews 
Location Income Men Women Total 
City Elite 2 3 5 
Mid income 3 2 5 
Low income 0 2 2 
Total:  5 7 12 
Suburb Elite 6 1 7 
Mid income 6 7 13 
Low income 1 0 1 
Total:  13 8 21 
Rural Elite 2 0 2 
Mid income 1 0 1 
Low income 5 5 10 
Total:  8 5 13 
Total men and 
women 
 26 20 46 
 
Table 9: Kabul interviews 
Location Income Men Women Total 
City Elite 2 2 4 
Mid income 7 2 9 
Low income 0 0 0 
Total:  9 4 13 
Suburb Elite 1 3 4 
Mid income 2 2 4 
Low income 1 0 1 
Total:  4 5 9 
Total men and 
women 
 13 9 22 
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Actual data collected reflects, for the most part, the specifications set forward in chapter 
4.  These include the need for respondents to reflect a broad sample of society in a given 
province, in terms of ethnicity, age, position or role in society and gender, for example. 
A full breakdown of interviews detailing this specific information is given in Appendix 
4. In total, 154 interviews were conducted, meeting the requirement of approximately 
35-45 per province and including an additional 22 interviews conducted in Kabul as a 
means to compare responses from Kabul city with those of elsewhere in the country. 
When referring to the three provinces in which the majority of data were collected, the 
researcher avoids using the term ‘case study province’ because not enough interviews 
per province were conducted to merit a full case study of each, nor were interviews in 
each province conducted in one single geographical location. This was a purposeful 
methodological choice which allowed a broader sample of interviews to be conducted 
across a range of different people groups.  
In the above tables, alongside the indication of the respondents’ sex, the researcher has 
divided respondents into six simple categories, however, in order to demonstrate an 
overall picture of the spread of the sample. These include the location-specific 
categories of ‘city’, ‘suburb/provincial town’ and ‘rural’; and the social position-
specific categories of ‘elite’, ‘mid-income’ and ‘low-income’.  These require further 
explanation, as given below.   
Location-specific categories relate to the place in which the respondent was currently 
residing, if they had been resident in the same place for over five years. Thus, a person 
who had moved from a rural village to the city for work four years previously would be 
categorised as ‘rural’, largely due to the way in which Afghans themselves refer to their 
home as the place in which they and their ancestors grew up. Similarly, a student living 
in the city in order to study but visiting family on a regular basis in a rural area would 
also be classified as ‘rural’. The researcher distinguishes between the three categories 
by identifying those respondents living in or on the outskirts (1-3km) of a provincial 
centre as ‘city’ respondents. A ‘suburb’ is characterised by its distance from the 
provincial centre - 3-5km, and also by the existence of a sub-centre in which shops and 
services can be found locally. In Kabul this works slightly differently due to the 
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sprawling nature of the city – in this instance, Kart-e Se, an urban district to the south-
west, for example, with its own shops and services, is still considered part of the city, 
but Dasht-e Barchi, an area connected to Kart-e Se but 3km further away and more 
contained as a unit separate to the city, is considered a suburb.  ‘Provincial town’ is also 
included in this category, as, for example in Balkh province, interviews were conducted 
in Dehdadi, Hairaton (Kaldar district) and Balkh which are all district centres in their 
own right, with shops and services, and are further than 5km from the provincial centre 
but still do not count as ‘rural’. The ‘rural’ category is reserved for villages and farms 
located more than 5km from the provincial centre and with few immediate shops or 
services available for residents.  It should be noted here that a key limitation of data 
collection was the inability to conduct interviews in very remote areas – the furthest 
rural village in which data was collected was approximately 25 kilometres from the 
nearest district or provincial centre. This was due to security concerns and the need to 
protect the safety of the research team.     
Social position-specific categories relate to the nature of the respondent’s role and 
approximate, relative levels of income or material wealth. These factors are individually 
problematic because a person’s status in local society may be determined by more than 
just material wealth, although the two are no doubt related in some cases, particularly 
where for example a good deal of wealth is needed to ensure one’s social position (for 
example in terms of standing for election for parliament, which requires capital or at 
least access to credit to pay for extensive campaigning). As such, the researcher has 
attempted to combine the two. Conscious of the ambiguity surrounding the term ‘elite’, 
she has used it to incorporate both status and wealth, taking into account the role of the 
respondent in society first, before considering their material possessions. A qaryadar 
(village head), provincial council member or head of a women’s shura (council) are all 
considered elites, as are those in positions of high office (heads of departments) in 
government ministries or their provincial branches. Further to this, other examples of 
respondents categorised as ‘elite’ include the owners of large companies, former 
military commanders, political party leaders and university lecturers.  
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The ‘mid-income’ category is used to refer to respondents who work (or whose spouses 
work) as professionals, and whose household includes at least one regular salary or 
steady source of income. Indicators for a ‘mid-income’ respondent also include whether 
or not the respondent owns their own house or car, has expensive and/or imported 
furnishings in their home, owns a television or computer, and has family members 
living in Europe, North America or Australia.
43
 This provides some indication of wealth 
and stability due to the expense and/or patronage ties needed to obtain a passport and 
documentation for overseas travel, and also the likelihood of remittances being sent 
back to Afghanistan from the family member working overseas. By comparison, 
respondents in the ‘low income’ category are so classified if they have no steady source 
of income, relying for example on subsistence agriculture or sales of vegetables on a 
mobile cart (karachi); if they rent, rather than own their house; have simple furnishings, 
provide only tea and chickpeas for the research team during the interview (as opposed 
to more expensive snacks such as raisins, sweets or almonds); if they are dressed 
simply; or if their household is female-headed (with no male breadwinner due to the 
death of a husband or father).      
Looking at the data as a whole, it is possible to see clearly that there are fewer women 
respondents than men. This was expected before data collection began, due to the way 
in which women in Afghanistan have far less of a role in the public sphere than men. 
While some women in urban areas work in government offices, for NGOs, as nurses for 
women in female-only clinics and as teachers, other roles – including all public 
shopkeeping or selling, taxi-driving, urban maintenance, and banking, for example – are 
almost exclusively for men only. This limits access to women, simply because it is more 
difficult to find women and build their trust to the extent that (female) researchers are 
invited to enter the family home for an interview. As might also be expected, accessing 
women for interviews was more difficult in rural areas. Also related to this is the lack of 
women categorised as ‘elite’ in rural areas – this again was due to the fact that very few 
women work outside the home in highly conservative parts of the country, such as rural 
Ghazni – and even fewer have public roles that would increase their status in the 
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 These are all factors noted by the research team in their observations, compiled for each interview.  
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community. As a result, we were only able to conduct one interview with a ‘rural’ 
woman in this province – a significant limitation of the data. Also notable in Ghazni 
province is the way in which very few ‘suburb’ interviews were conducted with men. 
This is because the male research team divided their time between the interviews in the 
city, and those in the Qarabagh district, about 20km from the provincial centre. The 
female research team were unable to conduct interviews in this district due to security 
concerns.
44
       
As explained above, data for Kabul province was collected for purposes of comparison 
with the other provinces, and was not treated as a separate case for analysis in its own 
right, hence the fewer interviews conducted. Of the 22 interviews that were conducted, 
very few were with ‘low-income’ respondents, partly due to the difficulty in finding 
respondents fitting this category with space and time to talk in the city. While in other 
provincial centres, low-income families are able to rent property in the city, this is 
increasingly difficult for Kabul residents due to the high rental prices, in part affected 
by the high concentration of international agencies renting office space and living 
accommodation in the city. Interviews were not conducted in the rural districts of Kabul 
province due to the way in which Kabul was treated differently to Nangarhar, Ghazni 
and Balkh – data collection was limited to the city and suburban areas as the researcher 
did not anticipate using Kabul as another province for full investigation. This could be 
attempted in further research, but there was not time to add further interviews to this 
project.   
6.3 Data analysis: Breadth in the state-citizen relationship in Afghanistan  
Having presented the available data in table format, and having also outlined the criteria 
through which the state-citizen relationship in Afghanistan will be analysed, this chapter 
will now focus on data analysis, assessing the applicability to the Afghan case of the 
first of Tilly’s four processes: breadth.   
Table 10: Recap of breadth indicators 
                                                          
44
 These affected the male team also but in different ways – women travelling alone with no male relative 
and no reason for travelling to Qarabagh, other than for work, would present a significant target for 
insurgent interrogation, whereas men were more free to travel alone in this manner.  
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Tilly’s process Corresponding qualitative 
theme to explore 
Indicators 
 
A. Breadth Perceptions of legally-
enforceable access to state 
officials across different social 
groups. 
1) Respondents from a variety of 
ethnic and social backgrounds 
perceive their access to state 
officials to be unhindered and 
give examples. 
Looking for: 
a) similarities across 
different case study 
provinces 
b) similarities across urban 
and rural respondents 
c) similarities across male 
and female responses 
2) Respondents refer to legal 
procedures for recourse should 
their access to officials be 
hindered 
 
 
6.3.1 Indicator 1) Respondents from a variety of ethnic and social backgrounds 
perceive their access to state officials to be unhindered and give examples 
Data collected for this indictor covered a broad range of sub-topics concerning 
perceptions of access to state officials. Across all respondents in the three key 
provinces, a clear preference for avoiding contact with state officials altogether was 
noted, and instead a tendency to attempt to solve disputes and issues at the local level. 
Reasons for this included tradition and custom, a widespread concern about issues 
escalating into greater problems, bribes being considered necessary to access state 
officials and obtain assistance, and the way in which even when state officials were 
sought, they were perceived as inaccessible, particularly to those without connections or 
money. In rural Ghazni, the option of soliciting Taliban assistance as opposed to that of 
the state was discussed by respondents also. These issues will be discussed in turn. 
Across the entire data set from the three key provinces, only two examples of positive 
interactions with state officials were given, and possible reasons for this will then be 
explored.  
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6.3.1.1 Preference for avoiding contact with state officials altogether 
In compliance with the research methodology, which justified a qualitative, 
conversation-style interview technique with open-ended rather than leading questions,  
respondents were asked to describe in general how they would go about solving a 
problem or dispute – rather than questioned specifically about their perceived access to 
state officials. Correspondingly, answers were not limited to a description of due 
process involving different branches of state institutions but covered a much broader set 
of arrangements for dispute resolution. Across the board, respondents discussed a 
preference for solving issues at the local level at least initially, before attempting to 
access state officials. The following quotations are representative of responses from all 
three study provinces, across all social levels and both men and women: 
Question: How do you deal with problems and disputes, if you have them? 
Answer: Problems are different in nature, for example if there is a conflict over 
land between two sides, then it is referred to the municipality. But in the case of 
some problems, without informing the government, we try to solve them 
through the tribal leaders, elders, local chiefs and local council. It is much better 
this way, because it shows respect to the elders and their agreement on a single 
decision is an indication of unity among the people (Nang 3 W) 
 
Question: If you have a problem and want to solve it, how do you do this? 
Answer: First, if there is any problem, we refer it to the Malik of the village. If 
he can solve it, then everything is ok. if he cannot, then Maliks from other 
villages are gathered to help solve the problem...  
Question: Can you give some examples? 
Answer: Common problems, such as a fight breaking out between two people, 
are referred to the local elders, but issues of death and injuries are referred to the 
district administration for a solution. If necessary, we take serious issues to the 
court as well. But, first we try to solve any kind of problem without referring it 
to the government. (Nang 21 M) 
 
Question: If you have a problem and want to solve it, to whom you refer it? 
Answer: We try to solve the problem ourselves first. There is a proverb in 
Pashto that says Pushto hagha ghota che pa las khlasige no Khula ta ye sa 
hajat de. It means if the problem is solved at home then it is not necessary to 
share it with others. If it is not solved at home then it is taken to the whitebeards 
(Speen Zharee) of the village, and they are unable to solve it then it is taken to 
the tribal elders (Mashran) and the regional Mashran. Finally if there is no other 
solution it is referred to the government. (Ghaz 7 M) 
 
213 
 
Question: If you have a problem, how do you solve it?  
Answer. If there is a problem, the first thing we do is discuss it with the elders 
of our household. If they cannot solve it themselves, then we refer it to the 
Mullah and the community elders, and then finally parliament members.  
Question: Could you give any examples of when a problem was solved?  
Answer. Yes, it is a good question. To answer it I will tell you a story from my 
own experience. A few years ago my sister-in-law's husband [respondent’s 
brother] was killed. After her husband’s death, the elders, malik and the elders 
of her family gathered together to decide what to do. They decided that she 
should choose herself whether she wanted to continue to live in her husband’s 
house, and if she did not she would be free to return to her father’s house, or 
take another husband. There was no pressure on her. (Ghaz 1 W) 
 
 
Question: If you have a problem, how would you solve it? 
Answer respondent 1: Through the shura. 
Answer respondent 2: This shura was established five years ago. We have 
another shura called the Shora-e-Okhowat Islami (Council of brotherhood) and 
most of the members of the two shuras are the same people. This shura solves 
most of the problems and disputes people face. However, the shura was not able 
to solve a recent dispute about water between the villages.  We asked the MPs of 
Balkh province for help, but they didn’t help us to solve this problem. (Balkh 15 
M) 
 
Question: In this area when people have a problem or dispute with one another, 
how do you find a solution? 
Answer: We have the Shura-e Hambastagi [a local council in which anyone can 
participate to help solve disputes through consultation]. If the shura is unable to 
solve the problem we take it to the Wolswali (district governorship) for a 
solution, and finally if the Woliswal (district governor) is also unable to solve 
the problem or dispute we go to the Wolayat (the city court) in Mazar (Balkh 25 
M). 
 
These quotations demonstrate the extent to which local communities – whether in urban 
or rural areas – across the country have their own mechanisms for dispute resolution 
that rarely include state officials, or see consultation with the state as a last resort. The 
names and types of informal groups and individuals vary between Pashtun and non-
Pashtun areas, and between urban and rural communities. Across all three provinces, 
‘whitebeards’ are community elders to whom local residents are primarily accountable. 
These are informal positions to which older members of the community are selected by 
the community itself.  In Pashtun, rural areas, key members of the local political 
landscape also include a village Malik (religious elder), tribal and/or regional Mashran. 
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In larger communities across all ethnicities, a shura is a regular gathering of elders 
charged with the responsibility of decision-making and problem-solving, and potentially 
representing villagers at the district level. This would be lead by the kalantar or 
qarydar, the head of the community. In urban areas, a wakil-e guzar functions as 
representative of the immediate community, such as the street or block of housing. This 
position is semi-formal and oftentimes wakil-e guzars are registered with the 
municipality and are given stamps of authority through which to approve 
documentation. All of these individuals hold different relationships to state officials 
depending on personal connections, location and levels of influence in the community. 
As reflected in the quotations above, respondents differentiate between different kinds 
of problems and their appropriate methods of resolution. Thus, family quarrels, disputes 
between neighbours and issues relating to local services and resources are often taken to 
local elders or shuras, while state authorities could be called upon to deal with criminal 
cases, for example.
45
 The division of labour allocated to local and state officials is made 
differently by different respondents, however, with those living in more rural areas less 
likely to involve state officials even for criminal cases. At the opposite extreme, 
respondents in Balkh province appeared more likely to include state officials in 
problem-solving – while they still referred to local elders as their first and preferred 
option, they were much more likely to suggest the district and provincial governorships 
as the next stages in the process. This was not to say that they always received 
resolutions to problems from these sources, however, and many had examples of 
disappointing experiences when approaching officials at the district and provincial 
levels, as reflected in the quotation from interview Balkh 17 M cited above. Likely 
reasons for this difference include the way in which respondents in Balkh were largely 
from surburban areas or provincial towns, meaning that their awareness of and 
connection to state authorities was likely to be greater than that of respondents in rural 
Ghazni or Nangarhar, purely due to proximity to administrative centres and availability 
of information through a range of different available media sources, for example. Also, 
the provincial governor, Ustad Atta Noor, has established a network of district 
                                                          
45
 For a comprehensive review of dispute resolution mechanisms in Afghanistan, see Coburn and 
Dempsey, 2010; and Coburn, 2011). 
215 
 
governors of varying ethnicities that are largely loyal to him and who function very 
much within the infrastructure he has created. This has facilitated stronger ties between 
the different people groups living in the various districts of Balkh province and the 
provincial administration at the centre.   
Reasons given by respondents for their preferences to solve disputes outside of state 
institutions were varied. A common response referred to tradition and local customs, 
whereby people chose to approach local leaders first due to the way in which this had 
traditionally been a method of dispute-resolution in the area. This is not to say that all 
local institutions were necessarily well-established and/or trusted, however – as one of 
the respondents from Balkh province mentions above, some shuras have only been 
formed recently, particularly those that were established as part of the National 
Solidarity Programme.
46
  Often, more than one shura can exist in a given area, but it is 
common for members to overlap. This can be a problem when, as reported by a number 
of suburban respondents in Balkh province, members of the shura are considered to 
work for their own interests above and beyond those of community members.  
Nevertheless, ‘tradition’ and ‘custom’ feature regularly in respondents’ explanations as 
to why issues are solved at the local level.  
Another reason cited by many respondents is that of the fear of problems escalating, 
should they involve state officials. One young woman from a suburb of Jalalabad city in 
Nangarhar referred to the way in which consulting government institutions could make 
a family problem worse: 
Question: How do people deal with problems and disputes if they have them? 
Answer: If it is a legal or social problem; for example, conflict over credit or 
between relatives, we try to solve it by consulting with the local council. And if 
it is a criminal issue; such as when someone is injured by another person, or 
theft of property; then it is referred to the district government. 
                                                          
46
 The National Solidarity Programme was established in 2003 as a collaboration between the Ministry of 
Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) and the World Bank. Under the direction of Ashraf 
Ghani, a former Afghan minister and World Bank Official, the programme combined democracy 
promotion with service provision on a national level by requiring villages to form elected councils that 
would put together requests for the use of development funds, choosing between a number of options 
(such as a water pump, generator, irrigation system etc). These funds would then be delivered with the 
help of ‘facilitating partners’ – usually local or international NGOs working in the area. For more, see 
Kakar, 2005.     
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Question: Why do people tend to solve legal and social issues through local 
councils and leaders?  
Answer: If the problem is between two members of a family and they refer the 
problem to the government, the government decides between them on the basis 
of the law, and after that point one of them will be known as a criminal and will 
be punished, exacerbating the issue and widening the gap between the two 
family members and also causing tension within the whole family. Rather than 
face such consequences, people prefer to find solutions to different problems 
through the local council and elders. (Nang 6 W) 
 
In this way, the likelihood of state intervention contributing to the problem rather than 
serving to provide a solution acts as a principal deterrent to contacting district or 
provincial officials with a case. This reflects the way in which for many, the lack of 
access to state officials is not necessarily considered a significant problem for individual 
respondents. 
Related to this is the way in which many respondents saw state officials as predatory 
and corrupt, charging unofficial tariffs for their services which many were unable to 
afford. Although some urban respondents made the same complaint about leaders in 
less formal positions of authority, such as wakil-e guzars and kalantars, for the most 
part bribery was associated unilaterally with institutions of state. Overall, an official 
stamp or seal of approval (possessed by wakil-e guzars and kalantars as well as formally 
appointed state officials) was seen by respondents as a means of extortion:     
 
Question: How do you think problems should be solved within society? 
Answer: I think that if people in a society face a problem, it should be referred 
to the local council or the provincial council, and the provincial council will 
form a commission for the solution to the problem, but it should be mentioned 
that the commission will also cheat people, because all the officials including 
the governor are cheating people. As people apply to the officials for help and 
these officials do not take any action to assist them, people become hopeless and 
even commit suicide. (Nang 7 W) 
 
Question: How do people solve problems in your community, if they face 
them? 
Answer: We try to solve any problems through our council, because there is 
huge corruption in the government network. It is a big headache to refer to the 
government for your difficulties. The government is corrupt and creates 
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additional problems for the applicants, so it is better not to refer to government. 
(Nang 6 M) 
 
Question: What do you think about the way in which decisions are made in the 
community? 
Answer: In my view it is good because most of the whitebeards and elders make 
decisions and prevent problems from occurring. Nowadays there is a lot of 
bribery in the government administration, it is impossible to refer anything to 
them without paying a bribe. (Ghaz 9 M) 
 
Question: How are decision-makers selected in your village? 
Answer: Decision-makers are selected by the people from the village, by the 
tribal elders and the regional elders. And then these people are performing their 
duties. 
Question: What do you think about this? 
Answer: It is good. The problems of the people are solved in an easy and 
helpful way and their problems are resolved. Most the people in our village are 
daily wage earners and they are poor – governmental officials take money from 
them [to solve problems] and they can't afford it (Ghaz 10 M). 
 
Question: Tell me about the system of authority in this area. 
Answer: ...One time I wanted to get an ID card (Tazkirah) for each of my sons. 
In order to do this I needed [the Kalantar’s] stamp and he asked me to pay the 
fee of 500afs (USD 10) for this. I paid this amount but it was useless, because 
the system is corrupt in this area. Here for a small administrative task in the 
government you have pay lot [extra] to get the job done. (Balkh 19 M) 
 
These examples, representative of many more respondents’ accounts across the data set, 
demonstrate the extent to which institutions of state – and the individuals employed 
within them – are considered unaccountable, and provide another reason for the 
preference for avoiding state mediation in dispute resolution altogether. While one 
respondent from Balkh province considered the bribes of government officials a 
deterrent to those considering criminal activity, and thus an indirectly positive 
phenomenon, it was nevertheless for most a disappointing characteristic of state 
institutions, from which greater transparency was expected.    
In cases where state officials are sought to provide authorisation or mediate in disputes, 
they are often perceived to be inaccessible, particularly to those without connections or 
money. This inaccessibility was reported by respondents from all provinces, indicating 
that people from all ethnic groups had similar experiences – although it was more 
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common among low-income respondents, and mid-income respondents without 
personal connections to the individuals working in state institutions: 
Question: What do you think of the Provincial Council? 
Answer: The Provincial Council has been seized by warlords. They do not care 
about public problems. The members have problems among themselves. It is 
their responsibility to serve their people, but instead they are struggling for their 
own salaries and benefits...Last month we faced some problems regarding the 
cleaning of the streams and brooks in our area. I went to the Provincial Council 
with some other members of our local shura to solve the problem. We waited 
until the evening, but no-one came to ask about our problem or to offer 
assistance. Finally, the watchman asked us, “what have you come for?”. We 
explained our problem to him. He asked again, “do you know anyone in the 
Council?” We told him that we did not know anybody there. He looked at us 
jeeringly and said “Go home. Even if you wait here for days, no-one will take 
any notice of you. It is our Council.”  (Nang 5 M) 
 
Question: If the local leader and elders are also unable to help you, then how do 
you solve problems? 
Answer: Then we apply to the district administration to help us solve our 
problems. But, the district government solves only the problems of those people 
who have a connection there or who have money, or both. The problems of 
people who don’t have these are not solved at the district level and are referred 
back to the village’s local council for solutions.” (Nang 13 M) 
 
Question: Tell us about your relationship with the local officials? 
Answer: Unfortunately they do not have good relationships with ordinary 
people and they want to get everything just for themselves, not for the poor 
people. No-one worries about poor people and that is very shameful for us as 
Muslims...If the son of a rich and important person does something unlawful 
then you will see him walking free in the city after one week of committing a 
crime, and there is no rule of law for them. (Balkh 14 M) 
 
In terms of the indicators of breadth identified above, these quotations highlight the way 
in which access to state officials is not perceived to be universal but instead limited to 
the rich and influential in society. Data from men and women, old and young people 
across all three provinces indicates the same finding. Interestingly, fewer examples of 
this complaint occur in the interviews conducted in Ghazni province, but this is possibly 
due to the way in which respondents in Ghazni were less likely to approach state 
officials in general than respondents in Nangarhar or Balkh, due to the more rural 
location of the province, and also had a further alternative to seeking state jurisdiction – 
that of the authorities of the ‘shadow government’ or Taliban in the area.     
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Found across most of the interview transcripts from respondents in rural Ghazni (13 out 
of 16 total interviews in rural areas, all of which were Pashtun villages) was the 
statement that, should local maliks and tribal elders be unable to solve a particular 
problem in the community, members of the Taliban could be drawn upon to intervene:  
 
Question. If you have a problem and want to solve it, how would you do this? 
Answer. In our village there is a tradition that if a person has a problem then 
first of all they try to solve it by themselves, and if they don’t find a solution 
then they refer to the elders for help. 
Question. If they could not solve your problem then to whom would you refer? 
Answer. If the problem is not solved within the household, then we have tribal 
elders to help, and if they also could not solve it then we have respected 
whitebeards in the village. If they also cannot solve the problem then we enlist 
the help of the Taliban who are a political group. We refer to them, and if in 
some villages there is no Taliban then they refer to the government officials 
(Ghaz 12 M). 
 
 Question: Are there political groups or parties active in this area? 
Answer: No, there is no political group here, but there are two governments: 
one is Hamid Karzai’s government and the other one is the Taliban government. 
And no political parties (Ghaz 21 M). 
 
 Question: If you have a problem, how do you go about solving it?  
Answer: If we have problem in our family we first refer to the elder of our 
family, such as a father or elder brother, and they solve the problem. If the 
problem is in the village then the villagers refer to the elders of the village for a 
solution. If they cannot solve it, then we refer to the Taliban and they solve our 
problem in the space of a single day – even if it is a difficult problem they can 
do this (Ghaz 23 M). 
 
In contrast to respondents’ accounts of government officials, statements about the 
Taliban as local interlocutors do not refer to any incidences of bribery or unavailability, 
assigning a comparative moral high ground to the so-called shadow authorities as 
compared to representatives of the state. Indeed, as one rural mid-income male 
respondent described, Taliban authorities were readily available to help and did not put 
a fee on their services: “there are Taliban here and they are always around, so we go to 
them and then they come up with a solution [to a problem] without charging anything” 
(interview Ghaz 21 M). In interviews the Taliban are referred to variously as a ‘political 
group’, some kind of political party or even as ‘the government’ itself. Perhaps 
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contributing to the frequency with which Taliban intervention was mentioned was the 
way in which, even in urban Ghazni, many respondents were hesitant to talk about 
government officials, expressing unwillingness to go into detail about state systems and 
institutions, as if concerned about the ramifications of speaking to the research team 
about the government. By contrast, in general respondents were comfortable giving 
information about shadow authorities. This is itself demonstrates the limits of 
government influence in the area, and the way in which the control of violent force is 
not held by the state in this region. In spite of people’s willingness to talk about the 
Taliban, however, and the seeming availability of Talib officials to intervene in dispute 
resolution, they are nevertheless still considered by respondents to be a last resort in 
problem solving, playing a similar (if more morally accountable) role to that of the state 
in other provinces. Regardless of the accessibility of these actors, the preferred means 
of problem solving and dispute resolution remains within the local community through 
the assistance of family and/or village elders.  
6.3.1.2 Possible reasons for lack of positive examples of interactions with state officials 
given 
The first indicator for breadth was specified as a way to measure access to government 
officials across different social groups, looking in particular at whether people of 
different ethnicities, social backgrounds, ages and residential areas (whether rural or 
urban) considered their access to these officials to be adequate. Instead, it was found 
that few respondents sought access to state officials unless this access was considered 
the only means of solving a given issue, due to fear of the problem escalating and 
creating opportunities for extortion – and that when they did require access this was 
oftentimes unavailable to those without connections or money. 
Factors affecting the data in this regard could include the way in which, given the time 
and opportunity to complain about government services and officials in interviews, 
people are likely to do so. However, as can be seen from the example quotations given 
above, respondents referred in their own right to problems with representatives of state, 
without provocation or leading questions. Care was taken to ensure that respondents 
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were selected according to a broad sample, including those who might be close to the 
state infrastructure and those who likely had little connection with it.  Another factor 
contributing to the abundance of negative stories of access to state officials and bribery 
could be the timing of interviews, which took place in between presidential and 
parliamentary elections in Afghanistan in 2009 and 2010 respectively, and which were 
both marred by widespread fraud and were a talking point for many respondents.   
 
Across the data set, two examples were given about times when state intervention had 
been useful to the solving of a particular issue – one concerning the provision of 
materials for a school, and the other regarding a forced marriage that was overturned: 
Question: Can you give us an example of a recent problem that has been solved 
in your village? 
Answer: Yes, why not. There was a problem regarding the school. On behalf of 
the people, I took the problem to the Provincial Council. The Council paid a 
great deal of attention to the issue and provided books and other learning 
materials for the students. (Nang 10 W [women’s shura leader]). 
 
Question: What kind of problems do you refer to the local elders? 
Answer: There are some problems that even the local elders cannot solve, and 
they consult with the peoples’ shura to find a solution. For example here in our 
village a 14-year old girl was given by her family in marriage to an 80 year-old 
man, as compensation for the murder of his brother (for which their son was 
accused, but found innocent). The girl shared her problem with the elders but the 
80-year old was also an elder of the village, and due to this the people insisted 
she should go ahead with the marriage. The girl was obliged to refer the 
Department of Women’s Affairs [the regional branch of a government line 
ministry] to solve her problem. When she referred to the Department her 
problem was solved. (Ghaz 12 W).  
 
In the second example here, the story given is unusual given the generally negative 
reputation held by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and its perceived inability to solve 
problems such as this one. Indeed, two other accounts were given by women 
respondents relating to the way in which this ministry had either ignored a similar 
situation, or made it worse. Nevertheless, also interesting is the way in which both 
stories of positive interaction with and access to the state come from women 
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respondents. While there is not enough evidence here to suggest a trend, it is possible to 
suggest that access to state officials might be more significant to women than to men, 
due to their lack of access to and influence within alterative, local institutions of 
decision-making and dispute resolution.   
In sum, findings for this indicator highlight and call into question some of the 
assumptions inherent in Tilly’s model – first and foremost, that citizens of a given state 
actually desire access to state officials for assistance, and that the institutions of state 
are seen to provide a neutral facility for administrative affairs and dispute resolution. In 
an environment in which elite capture of these institutions thrives, particularly in rural 
areas, partly due to a lack of regulation and influence of central government over 
regional centres, and to endemic corruption throughout the state infrastructure, this is 
clearly not the case. In some urban areas, a greater degree of desired access to state 
institutions – should they become less corrupt – for communities and individuals was 
noted. Even within urban areas, however,  different ‘categories of citizenship’ (Tilly, 
2007: 14) exist, some being more equal than others in terms of their access to the state, 
and would appear to contribute to a position on the lower end of the spectrum for 
breadth for Afghanistan in 2010.  
6.3.2 Indicator 2) Respondents refer to legal procedures for recourse should their 
access to officials be hindered 
Following on from indicator 1 is the secondary assumption that, should respondents 
refer to the way in which their access to state officials has been hindered, they describe 
means through which they have been able to seek legal recourse for this. This is a 
critical component of Tilly’s criteria under the breadth category – it is fundamental that 
access to state officials is legally enforceable, in order that all citizens are entitled by 
law to the same access to state administration and services. This also links to Tilly’s 
notion of public politics – in situating people’s right to access the state within a legal 
framework, he essentially excludes deals and bargains that could be made between 
individual state officials and members of the public (2007: 12-13).  
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Very clear from the data, however, is that respondents perceived themselves to have 
little or no legal recourse available to them if their access to state officials had been 
hindered.  The following quotations demonstrate this: 
Question: What are the main issues that people in this area face? 
Answer: Our most fundamental problem is that our homes are near to the river, 
and when there is heavy rain, the floods wash our homes away. We have written 
applications and petitions to the government in this regard so many times, but 
still no solution has been found. We even took this problem to the ministry level 
[in Kabul], but unfortunately there has been no outcome. It is a very serious 
problem, because peoples’ lives are at risk (Nang 11 W). 
 
Question: What are the main issues that people in this area face? 
Answer: One of the main problems is the lack of electricity. My father and 
other elders of the area have frequently applied to the province about it, but the 
issue has not been solved yet (Nang 13 W). 
 
Question: To whom do you refer if there is a problem in the area? 
Answer: Previously, we would refer to the village elders, but since hearing a 
recent story, our hearts don’t want to refer to anyone at all. The story is that 
three months ago in Khogyani, there were three sisters who didn’t have a father 
or a brother. One of them was married to her cousin by force by her uncle, and 
he wanted to marry the other two also to his sons. When the two sisters 
understood this, they took their case to the Afghan Independent Human Rights 
Commission – which they were able to find with some difficulty. This office 
kept the girls for some time but then they submitted them back to their uncle. 
They didn’t pay any attention to their situation. Is this justice that they were 
submitted back to their uncle and all the people were informed about their 
situation? The Human Rights authorities didn’t make any good decision. ...Now, 
we won’t share our problems with anyone; we will trust only in Allah (Nang 15 
W). 
 
You know that nowadays people are only thinking about money...The Qaryadar 
in our area was given USD 60,000 from an NGO for providing electricity to 
villages in our district, and the same amount was given for two other districts as 
well. He took the money for himself and so we still don’t have electricity, but 
the others districts do have it...It is a really tough and unbearable situation in our 
area, but there is no entity to receive our complaints. We went to raise this issue 
with governor – with great difficulty after four days I succeeded to meet him, 
but nothing happened as a result. Therefore I can conclude that the Qaryadar and 
the Governor have links to each other (Balkh 18 M).     
 
These stories of a distinct lack of available legal recourse for those unable to access 
state officials reflect a variety of circumstances, from complaints concerning lack of 
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service provision, to the inability of women to access reliable assistance when faced 
with the prospect of forced marriage. None of the respondents above mention any 
attempt to take the matter further or to seek legal support or compensation. This is not 
to say that the judicial system does not function, but in a similar manner to other 
institutions of government, it is perceived with some suspicion and the prospect of 
penalties for those who cannot afford or refuse to bribe officials. Again, this appears to 
be a case of unequal citizenship, in which the richer or better connected party would 
always win a case.  
In many cases, women are more likely to be affected by this lack of legal recourse than 
men, particularly when problems involve so-called ‘family issues’. Here, social norms 
of non-intervention come into play, both in terms of a woman’s reluctance to approach 
non-family members for assistance and in terms of institutions of state considering 
‘family issues’ to be beyond their remit. As the following example demonstrates, this 
can have tragic consequences:  
 
Question: Sister, are there any problems in your area that are still unresolved? 
Answer: Yes. We had a terrible problem that wasn’t solved and had negative 
results. All the people of the area knew about it and were very nervous about it.  
Question: What kind of problem was that? 
Answer: It was a family problem. There was a girl who was newly married, and 
who tried to please her husband but could not succeed, the husband argued a lot 
with her and behaved badly towards her. The bride couldn’t talk about the issue 
to anyone due to shame. So she poured oil on herself and set herself on fire. It 
was a family problem and so neither the Human Rights Commission, nor the 
Women’s Shura, nor the Provincial Council paid any attention to it.” (Nang 10 
W) 
 
This provides an example of one of the most fundamental functions of state – that of 
protecting citizens – often being inaccessible to a significant proportion of women, 
particularly in rural and conservative areas. As such, it indicates that breadth of access 
to state protection remains minimal.    
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6.3.3 Kabul data on breadth indicators 
In contrast to the findings from the three key provinces on indicator 1, data from Kabul 
indicated that respondents were much more likely to solicit assistance in administrative 
matters from state institutions, partly due to the way in which the authority of the state 
as compared to that of any other form of local governance was much stronger. As one 
respondent described, 
Usually people refer to the [urban] district authorities and police for small 
problems and disputes.  But if people have big problems, they demonstrate 
peacefully in the city.  But parliament is the main place in which our interests 
are represented (Kabul 2 M).  
This is not to say that Kabul respondents unilaterally supported the parliament or trusted 
its members – most were critical of the way in which it functioned and the partiality of 
MPs within it. Rather, this refers to the increased level of access to state officials 
enjoyed by Kabul residents. It is not uncommon for people to visit MPs in their Kabul 
homes, for example, as described by the parliamentarians interviewed for this study 
(interviews Kabul 3 W and 4 W). Further, the connection between local level officials 
and the broader institutions of state appears stronger also, as a local malik described: 
As I am the Malik of the area, I am the representative of the people to the 
government, and it is my responsibility to raise the people’s problems – such as 
sanitation, electricity and any other problems – with the government.  From the 
government’s side, I am responsible to approve and sign people’s application 
forms when needed.  For example, when a person wants to get an ID card 
(tazkirah), I can confirm that the applicant is from the area and that he is Afghan 
and so on.  (Kabul 5 M) 
This is similar to the system established in urban Balkh province also, in which stamps 
of governmental authority are allocated to local leaders such as maliks or other leaders 
of urban communities. Thus, in spite of the way in which bribery was still perceived to 
exist within governmental institutions, Kabul respondents seemed to have fewer 
concerns about taking problems to these institutions than their provincial counterparts, 
and generally had greater degrees of access to them even in the case of having few 
personal connections or a lack of financial resources. These factors were still important, 
but were not considered the only means through which to access government services.  
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As compared to the way in which Ghazni respondents referred to their solicitation of 
Talib officials for assistance in dispute resolution, Kabul respondents perceived the 
authority of the government to be increasing over autonomous power centres, such as 
(former jihadi) political parties. As one man described,  
Once the government gets stronger, people will not go to parties, but instead 
they will go to the government to solve their problems.  Even now people go to 
the government rather than to their party, but in the past every party was a 
government in itself.  In the past, parties used to solve disputes and other 
problems in the community in which they were functioning (Kabul M 5). 
Here, the respondent refers to the civil war period (1991-4) in which Kabul was divided 
between warring factions. The perspective that the government was increasing in 
authority over and above these groups was reflected across the data from Kabul, 
although this could have been linked to the timing of the interviews, which took place 
after Karzai had been re-elected.   
Few Kabul respondents indicated that they had had difficulty accessing state officials, 
and thus it is difficult to assess whether or not a legal process for recourse in the event 
of hindered access existed or was known about. Interestingly, however, respondents 
from the suburb of Dasht-e Barchi talked about the way in which people still voted 
according to the qawm or wider family group, in order to ensure access to state officials. 
As one local barber indicated, 
As you know, Afghan people are traditional, so everyone wants to vote for their 
own relatives. For example my cousin is a candidate. Although he is not 
educated and not able to do the job, I will vote for him. Because when he wins 
the election he will have to be accountable to me. I will have access all the time 
to see him (Kabul 12 M). 
Thus, it appears that – especially in areas like Dasht-e Barchi where a strong sense of 
community exists among residents who have emigrated from particular parts of the 
central highlands – an insurance against the potential for systems of accountability to 
fail is to attempt to rely on relatives and close connections in state institutions. In this 
sense, then, there appears to be little difference between the perspectives of provincial 
and Kabuli respondents in terms of the lack of trust in knowable, legal processes for 
recourse should their access to officials be hindered.  
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6.4 Data analysis: Equality in the state-citizen relationship in Afghanistan 
Table 11: Recap of equality indicators  
Tilly’s process Corresponding qualitative 
theme to explore 
Indicators 
 
B. Equality Perceptions of de facto equality 
between social groups 
1) Respondents consider their 
own status vis-à-vis the state 
to be equal to that of others, 
for example in terms of access 
to services 
Looking for: 
a) Female respondents 
consider themselves to 
have similar rights and 
duties vis-à-vis the state 
as their male counterparts 
b) Little difference between 
different ethnic responses 
concerning their 
perceived status vis-à-vis 
the state 
2) Respondents consider their 
votes in elections to carry as 
much weight as those of other 
citizens 
 
6.4.1 Indicator 1) Respondents consider their own status vis-à-vis the state to be equal 
to that of others, for example in terms of access to services 
Data collected for this indicator highlighted a variety of underlying grievances of 
respondents concerning their perceived (in)equality as citizens vis-à-vis the state. 
Across all three provinces, respondents referred to the way in which poorer members of 
society were not provided with the same level of state service as those who were able to 
pay bribes to government officials. Related to this is the way in which having 
connections (such as relatives) within the government was considered critical to 
obtaining services and thus those without these sorts of connections considered 
themselves excluded from benefits that were perceived to be universal ‘rights’ (such as 
access to electricity). Ethnicity did not feature as a divisive issue in interviews with 
respondents in Balkh and Nangarhar, but was prominent in Ghazni transcripts due to the 
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discrepancies between services available in Hazara and Pashtun areas. Finally, women 
in rural areas considered their own status in the public sphere to be minimal in 
comparison to that of their male family members, as a result of cultural norms limiting 
their access to public sources of information and the government’s inability (and 
unwillingness) to enforce constitutional provisions that outline (in theory) their equal 
status as Afghan citizens.  
6.4.1.1 Levels of income affecting equality 
Running throughout interview transcripts from low and mid-income respondents was 
the complaint that the availability and quality of government services (such as 
healthcare, education, access to mechanisms for complaint or recourse, and particularly 
the judicial system) was dependent on a person’s ability to pay bribes to the state 
service provider (or NGO equivalent).  As the following selection of quotations 
demonstrates, this issue was a theme that re-occurred across transcripts from all 
provinces: 
There are two boys from our village. One is Said Nasir and the other is Kamal. 
Kamal is a very poor boy but he is currently at the top of his class at (state) 
school. The teachers told him that if he wants to keep his position at the top of 
the class, he should pay them $300, otherwise, forget about first position. Said 
Nasir was rich, and he was able to get to the top of his class through the power 
of money. All the people in our village know about this. There is no law and 
everyone acts according to his own wish. Those sons of poor men who have 
talent and ability as a gift from Allah but don’t have money, they are pushed 
back. Those who have dollars go forward, because they have dollars. 
Question: What should be done, according to your point of view? 
Answer: First, our people are illiterate, and they are not aware of Islamic law. 
The main issue is that there is no government...The government is asleep and 
doesn’t see anything. (Nang 17 W) 
 
 
 
Question: If the local elders are unable to help you solve the problem, who do 
you refer to then? 
Answer: Then we refer to the district administration, but unfortunately, the 
government has employed there people like the district governor [name], who 
hasn’t even seen the door of school [has not studied at all himself], but keeps 
three pens in his pocket. Such officials think that governmental seats are like 
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money-printing machines. If you give them the amount of money they want, you 
will have no problem, but if you refuse to pay money, then they won’t listen to 
your problem. 
Question: What kind of problems do you refer to? 
Answer: Brother, life is full of problems. I think if you have money and you 
have any kind of problem, it will be easily solved by the government. (Nang 11 
M) 
 
Question: What do you think about the elections?  
Answer: I think our elections are business elections. 
  Question: What do you mean exactly?  
Answer: In Afghanistan if the people have a small problem, it cannot be solved 
without money – we must spend money to achieve that goal. And it is very clear 
to us that without money people’s tasks cannot be undertaken in the 
governmental administration. It is like that in the elections, if someone has 
money than he or she will win the elections, but if they don’t have money then 
for sure they cannot win. (Ghaz 7 W, Failed PC candidate). 
 
 Question: How is the security situation in your village and in your province? 
Answer: The security situation in our area is very good from the Taliban side 
but not from government side and alhamdulallah (thanks to Allah) the Taliban 
has put an end to the activities of all thieves and bad people. But the government 
itself is a complete thief. I needed a new taskirah (identity card) and the price of 
it is normally 300 Afs ($6), but in fact I spent more than 2000 Afs ($40) because 
of having to give bribes to each one of the government officials, and to make 
sure that my card would be processed without having to wait for other people 
who paid more to go first (Ghaz 21 M).  
Question: Tell us about the local authorities in this area 
Answer: High-level people prefer to listen to what the Kalantar says rather than 
what we ordinary people say, and we do not have access to very high-level 
people. In this area the rich people are powerful and they can do anything. If the 
government provides land for the people then they will take it first, and if some 
NGOs bring some assistance for us then they will take it for themselves first. 
No-one pays any attention to the poor people’s lives. (Balkh 19 M) 
 
These quotations are representative of the majority of low-income and mid-income 
respondent interviews, and carry significance beyond that of respondents comparing 
their own financial circumstances with those of other people. More specifically, they 
reflect the way in which the state itself is seen by respondents to be complicit in 
broadening the gap between rich and poor, through accepting bribes for services from 
those who can afford to pay them, or through endorsing the successful candidacy of 
fraudulent competitors in an election. This demonstrates the way in which the state is 
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not seen as a neutral arbiter able and willing to protect the rights of all citizens, but 
instead an institution characterised by individual patron-client relationships that are 
often dependent on the former’s provision of financial resources to the latter.  
A previous study on Afghan perceptions of democracy found that a number of Afghans 
linked the ‘freedom’ associated with (what was usually termed ‘western’) democracy to 
perceptions of a free market economy that favoured the rich and widened the gap 
between rich and poor (Larson, 2009b: 14-18). Suggestions for appropriate means to 
address the problems associated with this widening gap most predominantly included 
additional state regulations, reminiscent of those that had been installed by the PDPA 
government under Soviet influence in the 1980s. This call for increased state 
intervention is particularly interesting given the sceptical views of the state expressed 
by respondents for this research, conducted only a year later – perhaps indicating that in 
spite of negative views of state institutions there is nevertheless a common desire for a 
stronger state with greater capacity to enforce more interventionist policy in some 
sectors. Thus, for many the ideal of what a state should be as an institution to which all 
citizens have access should they choose to seek it, and the prospect of equal treatment 
regardless of their financial circumstances. This also reflects notions of social justice 
within Islamic scholarship and texts, which point to members of the broader Muslim 
community holding equal status under God’s sovereignty (or Tawhid, see El Fadl, 2004: 
9 for further discussion on this concept). As the woman speaking in the first quotation 
above implies, part of the problem is perceived to be the lack of knowledge among 
Afghans about Islamic principles (or an unwillingness to apply these) on the distribution 
of wealth and against bribery. These are considered to constitute a significant source of 
inequality among and between Afghans.  
6.4.1.2 The importance of having connections in government 
A second factor considered by respondents to affect levels of equality between citizens 
was the question of whether or not they had connections – relations or ‘supporters’ – in 
government offices or ministries, for example. A high value was placed on knowing 
someone in these institutions, as a means to avoid bribery and/or long delays in gaining 
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access to services, completing administrative tasks, winning an election or even 
speaking freely against an official, as the following quotations demonstrate:  
 
Question: How is the general living situation here? 
Answer: It is average; neither good nor bad. We have shelter, water and 
electricity. Electricity is sometimes available but sometimes not. Those people 
who work for the government enjoy electricity, but our children die of heat.” 
(Nang 5 W) 
 
Unfortunately the Provincial Council election was also determined by 
discrimination according to language, religion and tribal differences. The people 
participated in the election with a lot of interest but the organisations in charge 
committed fraud. For example the candidates who didn’t have relationships with 
high-ranking people and the IEC did not succeed, and this is how results were 
decided. (Ghaz 6 W)
47
 
 
Respondent 1: There is freedom of speech here but not for all: if you don’t have 
a supporter you cannot express your ideas freely...If you don’t have some kind 
of support you cannot express your ideas or complain about someone in the 
government.  
Respondent 2: To be able to criticize is a very good thing, but [in Afghanistan] 
people [in higher levels of office] don’t accept criticism. The people always feel 
afraid to criticise them. Democracy may not be practical here until there is no 
sense of fear among the people. (Balkh 18 M)
48
 
 
This theme cuts across indicators for breadth and equality, seen by respondents to 
determine their access to state officials, as described in the previous section, and also 
their access to state services, their ability to speak freely in public, and their likelihood 
of getting elected to public office. In this sense, then, having a contact, relative or 
supporter in a position of authority within state institutions marks a considerable 
advantage and separates some citizens from others in terms of the facilities and 
freedoms available to them.  
Again, however, this is likely the case due to the authority associated with official 
stamps held by those in state office, and the weight attached to bureaucratic processes 
particularly in urban areas. This is likely a remnant of Zahir Shah’s government, in 
                                                          
47
 The interviewer’s question is not included here simply because the respondent talked for some time and 
had by this point moved away from the subject of the question asked. 
48
 Ibid. 
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which the state’s control of administrative affairs in urban areas was very much issued 
from the top down; and also of the expanded bureaucratic processes that were 
prominent during the Soviet era.  In spite of its lasting legacy, the authority associated 
with the stamps of public office and the importance of having contacts to those who 
control them is likely to be contingent on these processes continuing to be seen as the 
only way in which to achieve administrative tasks or acquire documentation. 
Nevertheless, at present, even in rural Ghazni, some emphasis was placed by 
respondents on the need to complete these kinds of tasks through government channels, 
in spite of much of the de facto authority (particularly concerning judicial decisions and 
maintaining order) belonging to Taliban groups. As demonstrated in interview 21, cited 
above, a man from a rural area talks both about the way in which the Taliban are a 
government in their own right, but also (begrudgingly) about the way in which he must 
obtain an identity card from the Karzai administration.  
In addition to this, expectations concerning the ideal role of the government in Ghazni 
province centre primarily around maintaining security and providing justice and 
accountability. While some respondents mentioned the way in which health and 
education services were limited in their area, their principal concern in terms of 
government responsibility was that of maintaining the peace and holding criminals 
accountable:   
Question: How is the security situation in your region? 
 
Answer: It is not good. One day at 10:00am a person was killed in the bazaar 
but nothing was asked about him and no one asked why he was killed. In the 
village whoever has a gun can do anything. (Ghaz 11 M) 
 
In the provinces the government is just symbolic. It has not brought peace 
because people are getting shot. (Ghaz 21 M) 
 
In this way, while a number of people considered the government to have a role in the 
province in maintaining security, and implied that a stronger state would be desirable in 
this regard, they appeared not as concerned with its role as a service provider. 
Furthermore, knowing a person in government did not function as so much of an 
advantage in rural Ghazni as in Nangarhar or Balkh due to the risks associated with 
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government work (with NGO and government staff frequent targets of Taliban 
assassinations). It was common for rural Ghazni respondents to state clearly at the 
beginning of an interview that they did not know anyone in government, largely for this 
reason. This was also due to the limited reach of the state and its minimal capacity in 
rural areas, affecting the likely utility of a patron in state office.   As the first respondent 
cited above implies, the possession of arms appears to be a more obvious source of 
inequality than whether or not one has connections in government.  
6.4.1.3 Ethnicity in Ghazni province 
In Nangarhar and Balkh, the issue of ethnicity did not appear to be considered by 
respondents as a source of considerable inequality, as compared to wealth and/or having 
connections in government. This has been reflected in the majority of interviews that 
the researcher has conducted over eight years of conducting qualitative research in 
Afghanistan: while indeed ethnic faultlines exist and are used as tools for political 
mobilisation by tribal leaders and political/religious fundamentalist groups, particularly 
in times of insecurity, there appears to be little animosity at the local level between 
people of different ethnicities. 
This being the case, it is perhaps unsurprising that in the relatively secure provinces of 
Nangarhar and Balkh, respondents did not talk about ethnicity as a source of perceived 
inequality. The two provinces differ in terms of ethnic composition, the former being 
largely Pashtun (and while divided along tribal lines, generally maintaining good 
relationships between tribes with some key exceptions). The latter is highly diverse in 
its representation of different ethnicities, which are generally segregated into different 
districts but have little history of ethnic conflict. Governor Atta has selected 
representatives from all ethnicities to hold different positions of power and generally 
speaking, residents are satisfied with this arrangement in spite of the fact that the 
dominant minority is Tajik. As one (Hazara) respondent explained, 
Overall in the country there is an imbalance of power at the highest levels 
according to ethnicity, especially in terms of the military and government 
positions, but in Balkh the situation is better because every ethnicity has a role 
and is represented. For example, Hazara people currently hold the positions of 
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Deputy [Provincial] Governor, deputy chair of the Provincial Council and the 
governorship of three districts. (Balkh 6 M)  
The respondent here refers to the way in which Karzai’s administration had few Hazara 
cabinet members at the time of interviewing, a source of contention for many given the 
promises made by the President when seeking Hazara support for his election for a 
second term in office in 2009. Still, on a local level and in terms of access to 
government services this perceived discrimination at the highest levels of government 
appears to have little effect in Balkh. More a cause for concern among respondents is 
the inequality promoted by the Governor in terms of his favouring close friends and 
allies in lucrative business deals.     
Another feature of the diverse but segregated model of ethnic composition in Balkh is 
that different communities in ethnically homogeneous districts have their ‘own’ 
representatives in government bodies. One respondent talked about a perceived 
disparity between the services provided by a Turkman MP to his community, and the 
lack of services provided to the respondent’s community by their local representative:  
Question: [in repose to the respondent stating that there were no MPs 
representing him in Balkh] Have you heard of Roz Guldi, the Turkmen MP for 
Balkh? Could you approach him with your problems? 
 
Answer: I was not aware that Ruz Guldi was an MP. I think he represents 
Turkmen people and they are very lucky to have such an MP. If we had an MP 
like Ruz Guldi, no one could misuse our money like Zaman Khan [a local leader 
in the respondent’s area]. 
 
Question: What would prevent you from meeting with Ruz Guldi to discuss 
your problems? 
 
Answer: It would be impossible for us to meet him, because we don’t have his 
phone number and the Turkmen people do have his phone number, so whenever 
they face problems they can call him. He is a good representative for Turkmen 
people but not for all people. (Balkh 18 M) 
 
In this sense, then, the respondent considers his own community at a disadvantage 
through the lack of having a responsive representative in a position of authority, but he 
attributes this to luck more than a strategic policy on the part of the government to 
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marginalise his ethnic group. Indeed, the respondent here is Tajik, the most powerful 
ethnic group in Balkh province, and the MP he refers to represents a small Turkmen 
minority. This demonstrates the way in which issues of exclusion and inequality do not 
follow ethnic lines in Balkh, but are more strongly demarcated according to the 
patronage networks of the Governor and his allies.  
In Ghazni, however, divisions according to ethnicity were more apparent throughout 
transcripts. This is partly due to the way in which the province is divided roughly 
equally between Hazara and Pashtun residents, with a considerable proportion of the 
Hazara population living close to the provincial centre and in rural districts where 
government influence is strongest, and Pashtuns living more predominantly in rural 
areas where there is limited government reach. This has led to an increased and 
disproportionate number of Hazaras gaining positions of public office, probably due to 
the ways in which the areas in which they live have greater levels of security and so 
more opportunities for voting in a safe environment during elections. In 2010, three 
months after this research was conducted, parliamentary elections resulted in all eleven 
allocated seats for Ghazni province being won by Hazara candidates. In the rural areas 
where Hazaras are in the majority, in the north and west of the province bordering the 
Hazarajat and Central Highlands, security is generally better than in majority Pashtun 
districts. Here, however, there has been a longstanding history of conflict between the 
resident Hazaras and nomadic Kuchi population (a Pashtun sub-tribe), whose annual 
migrations pass through the area and frequently cause significant violent clashes over 
land and grazing rights.  Nevertheless, as one Pashtun respondent described, there is a 
significant discrepancy between the facilities available to Hazara and Pashtun residents 
of Ghazni:    
Question: How are the security conditions in your region? 
 
Answer: In general the conditions here are very poor in comparison with other 
provinces, but then it depends on the area. In some areas the security, health and 
education situations are really awful, but in other areas these circumstances are 
not too bad. 
 
Question: Can you specify these places? 
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Answer: Yes, I should tell you in short, that the entire Hazara people’s districts 
are calm and lots of rebuilding work is being done there, but in Pashtun areas the 
conditions are quite the opposite. (Ghaz 2 M) 
 
Here, in comparison to sentiments expressed by Nangarhar and Balkh respondents, the 
inequality in terms of access to service is attributed to a government agenda for 
discrimination, in which Pashtun areas are deprived of services available to Hazara 
residents. Again, this local perception counters what appears to be a Pashtun-dominant 
government on the national level, and also a recent history of the marginalization of the 
Hazara ethnic group. This demonstrates the discrepancy (and distance) between politics 
at the centre and politics as it is perceived and experienced by citizens in provinces.  It 
would be difficult to argue on a national level and in terms of de jure constitutional 
rights that Afghanistan’s current regime was one with a strategic agenda to marginalise 
certain ethnic groups, but this does not equate to all citizens considering themselves 
equal in terms of their access to services and vis-à-vis the state.  
6.4.1.4 The government’s inability (or unwillingness) to enforce equality for women  
Afghanistan is often associated by the international media, UN reports, human rights 
associations and donor governments with the systematic subjugation of women. Indeed, 
many of the provisions included in the Bonn process and in the formation of the new 
constitution of Afghanistan were included as an attempt to redress the systematic 
inequalities enforced by previous regimes (namely, the Taliban and Mujahideen) – 
including a recognition of the equal rights of all citizens, male or female (Article 22), a 
commitment to improving women’s education (Article 44), and a reserved seats system 
for women in the lower house of parliament and allocated seats in the upper house 
(Articles 83 and 84). From the words of the constitution, then, it would be possible to 
assume that the state’s approach toward upholding the equality of men and women 
citizens was a considerable improvement on the active persecution and discrimination 
of women by the Taliban and Mujahideen regimes.   
While this is no doubt true, the existence of constitutional provisions and the general 
absence of state-sanctioned, systematic discrimination does not equate to women 
considering themselves to be equal to men in terms of their rights and duties as citizens. 
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Neither does it correspond with the state’s ability and willingness to enforce 
constitutional provisions to uphold equality. In a context in which, as a result of 
cultural, historical and to some extent religious norms, the demarcation between public 
and private is rarely renegotiated without considerable backlash, there is little incentive 
for the state to intervene in ‘family matters’ that often include domestic violence, 
confinement, lack of access to medical services and breaches of inheritance laws, for 
example. The following quotation from a low-income woman respondent in Ghazni 
demonstrates the extent to which some women perceive their status as citizens to be 
lesser than that of men: 
 
Question: Dear sister, can you tell us about the members of the provincial 
council? 
 
Answer: Dear sister, I don’t know anything about the provincial council, and I 
don’t know anyone who works there. Dear sisters, I am a housewife: I only 
know about housework and children and family members. In the village that we 
live in, the women don’t have the right to fight for their rights, so then what 
would they know about the provincial council? If we need clothes or anything 
we have to ask our menfolk to take us to the bazaar, or if we are sick, they tell us 
that ‘women are only for the home’ and that we don’t have the right to go the 
bazaar, or even to a doctor.... Whatever it is good or bad we have to accept it. 
(Ghaz 14 W). 
 
This quotation comes from a woman living in the suburbs of Ghazni city, and its 
contents were reflected in urban interviews with women also, indicating that these kinds 
of perspectives are not restricted to rural women. Similar findings were also found 
among different respondents in Ghazni in a simultaneous study conducted for AREU on 
Afghan perspectives on democracy (Larson, 2011: 27). The apparent prevalence of this 
kind of data coming from female respondents highlights the way in which women can 
have very limited access to the public sphere – even in terms of their parental home, the 
local bazaar or doctor’s surgery – let alone a workplace, governmental ministry, court 
of law or representative body. The widespread exclusion of women from public politics, 
and from any interaction with the state or state-provided services, suggests the kind of 
categorical inequality that Tilly speaks to, even if it is not officially endorsed by the 
state.  
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While this kind of marginalisation of women appears to be widespread, however, it is 
not static and is affected by several variables. One of these is the level of security in a 
given area, with insecurity providing a justification for men to insist that their wives and 
daughters remain inside the home, particularly when elections occur, for example: 
 
Question: Why didn’t you vote? [in the elections in 2009, after the respondent 
had been talking about voting in 2004 and 2005]  
Answer:  The [security] situation was not suitable and our menfolk didn’t allow 
us to go out to cast our votes. We were also worried about security incidents; 
therefore we didn’t leave home (Nang 17 W). 
 
Question: Did you vote for the provincial council representatives? 
Answer: No I didn’t, because our men were saying that we didn’t have the right 
to leave the house, because the security situation was not good (Ghaz 13 W). 
 
Both of these women had talked about voting in previous elections, and while they also 
talked about being told who to vote for by their male relatives, they were nevertheless 
permitted to take part in the elections. Security has worsened across the country since 
the first round of elections took place in 2004/2005, but it has worsened for all citizens, 
not only for women, and thus it is interesting that this deterioration is considered to 
affect women more (or to provide a narrative to support an increasing conservatism that 
could also be construed in terms of family safety, maintaining an appearance of strict 
conformity to conservative Islamic norms that would satisfy potential Taliban 
informants). In the generally more secure province of Balkh, by comparison, women of 
all income levels and across rural, suburban and urban communities were more 
commonly able to leave the home to vote, although some were still given directions as 
to who to cast votes for: 
Question: Did you participate in the recent election? 
Answer: Yes, we participated in the election. 
Question: How did you decide who to vote for?  
Answer:  Our men decided who we should all vote for, and so we voted for the 
person they selected.  
Question: How did you know how to find that person on the list [ballot]? 
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Answer: The men brought us a picture and showed us, then we voted for that 
person (Balkh 8 W). 
Although there are many (overlapping) variables contributing to this discrepancy 
between provinces, including levels of education, levels of religious conservatism, 
literacy rates and proximity to an urban centre, it appears that there is still some 
correlation between equality and levels of security also.  
This coincides with the way in which women in urban areas – generally more heavily 
guarded by government and international forces – tend to have a greater degree of 
freedom within the public sphere (and by extension, to interact with public politics) than 
do women in more remote areas.  While for many women interviewed in urban areas, 
men were still the primary decision-makers in a household (for example as expressed in 
interview Nang 17 W, as included in Appendix 3) – factors such as their living in close 
proximity to schools, women-only hospitals and polling centres by default allowed them 
greater access to state-provided services and facilities than women living further away 
from district or provincial centres.    
Perhaps the narrative that runs most clearly through the interviews across the data set, 
with men and women respondents, however is the way in which ‘equality’ as defined in 
terms of the rights and duties of individual citizens does not sit comfortably with the 
way in which society in Afghanistan is for the most part based on cohesion amongst a 
given community. Collective decision-making, compromise and keeping the communal 
peace are all given higher priority than individual rights, as indicated in the quotation 
above from women in Balkh (interview 8 W). This is a theme that occurs consistently 
throughout the data, with women’s equality being only one manifestation of many 
(others including the way in which people refer to the communal practice of voting, as 
in, “we voted”, and general use the first person plural over and above the first person 
singular in every day speech). It comprises one of the key problems in applying a model 
of democratisation such as Tilly’s to the Afghan context, where individual citizens do 
not always consider themselves as single, rational actors to be central to the way in 
which their community relates to the central government.  
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6.4.2 Indicator 2) Respondents consider their votes in elections to carry as much weight 
as those of other citizens 
This indicator was included as a way in which to use a concrete example and recent 
occurrence to assess whether respondents considered their status as citizens vis-à-vis the 
state to be equal to that of others. Results were surprising in that no respondents across 
the data set questioned the weight of their vote as compared to, for example, people of 
another ethnic group or gender, and those in rural areas did not consider their vote any 
less valid than urban citizens.
49
 Instead, respondents across all provinces (but most 
notably in Nangarhar and Ghazni) were concerned about the validity of any vote in the 
face of widespread fraud and the buying of votes by powerful individuals. The 
following quotations from a male student in Ghazni and an elite woman respondent 
from urban Nangarhar is representative of these concerns:  
Question: (In response to the respondent referring to injustice in the elections) 
In what way was there injustice in the election? 
Answer: Each candidate had their own representatives at the polling centre and 
they manipulated people into voting for their candidate. I went to a polling 
centre and wanted to vote. There was an election official there who took my 
card and wrote down my vote for a candidate, and then I was sent to another 
person and he also did the same, and then I went to a third person who asked for 
my card I and he was the only one who made a hole in my card [to show the 
vote had been cast]. When I came out I quarrelled with them because they used 
my card three times for one candidate. When I understood the situation I became 
unhappy and tried to talk to an armed guard about it but then I realised that he 
was also a supporter of the same candidate. Every candidate had supporters and 
everyone tried to work for a candidate in order to get money or privileges in 
return (Ghaz 4 M).    
 
Question: Do you think existing parliamentarians will campaign for the next 
elections? 
Answer: They will be candidates, but if there is no fraud in election then the 
present parliament members will not be successful because no-one will vote for 
them due to their disloyalty and cheating. If there is fraud in the election process 
they will succeed again, by the power of their money and their political parties. 
Generally we should tell the people to elect those candidates who love their 
country, love their nation [meaning ethnic group here], know about human 
rights, know Islamic rules and regulations, and who are kind hearted. Still, it 
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 Another study has shown that, by contrast, urban respondents expressed concerns about the way in 
which they considered rural, poor, illiterate voters easy prey for commanders and warlords who would 
seek to manipulate the election by buying votes. In this sense, they appeared to imply that the equalizing 
nature of elections was problematic. (Larson, 2009: 15)  
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would be better if candidates were selected through shuras and by the elders of 
the villages (Nang 2 W).  
 
In the second quotation, it is ambiguous here as to whether the respondent recommends 
a replacing of elections altogether with the decisions of shuras and elders, or whether 
she refers to the selection of candidates for elections by these means (rather than any 
Afghan over the age of 25 being able to put themselves forward). Either way, however, 
it is interesting that she considers the collective decision-making of a local shura a 
better safeguard for the legitimacy of elections (and the choice of candidates therein) 
than the way they currently function.  
One of the principal concerns of the Karzai administration and the international 
organisations involved in supporting elections in the run-up to the polls in 2009 and 
2010 was that the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) would not be able to 
establish polling centres in insecure areas, thus by default disenfranchising a significant 
proportion of the population. This was a particular worry for the Karzai campaign given 
that the majority of the incumbent’s support base inhabited areas of the country in the 
south and east where insecurity was highest. Interviews for this study were conducted in 
between the elections of 2009 and 2010, and thus elections were a key talking point for 
many respondents. The researcher expected that respondents in Ghazni in particular, 
and possibly in some parts of rural Nangarhar, would make complaints about the way in 
which they had not been able to access polling stations and thus felt unfairly under-
represented. As demonstrated by the following quotations from Ghazni, however, while 
respondents did talk about the lack of access to polling centres in rural areas, they did 
not seem overly concerned about the result of not having been able to get to the polls:      
Question: What do you think about parliamentary elections in Afghanistan? 
Answer: I think the parliamentary government should be selected by the people. 
And there should be no fraud in the election. In the first election people went to 
the ballot boxes with a lot of interest because it was first time a president had 
been selected by the people. But in the second election there was a lot of fraud, 
even at the hands of foreigners, and ballot boxes were filled only with the votes 
of election officials. This was especially the case in Ghazni province because 
security was not good in the districts, so the people didn’t vote there, and yet the 
ballot boxes got filled somehow (Ghaz 8 W). 
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Question: What do you think about the first elections, and last year’s elections? 
Answer: The first elections were very good and most of the people went to vote 
with a lot of interest to elect their president, and there was less fraud in the first 
elections. But unfortunately during the second elections we witnessed that there 
was more fraud, the conditions were insecure and most of the people didn’t vote. 
I didn’t even vote myself in the second elections because my family didn’t 
permit me to go to the polling centre (Ghaz 10 W). 
 
Question: Did you vote in the parliamentary elections? 
Answer: We did not vote in the first or the second elections. 
Question: Why you didn’t vote? 
Answer: Because we heard people say that if anyone voted the Taliban would 
cut off their fingers. That is why we didn’t vote (Ghaz 11 W). 
 
Question: Dear sister, tell me a story about the first and second elections? 
Answer: At the time of the first election we had just come back from Iran, and it 
seemed to go well. The security conditions were better than they are now. When 
the second elections took place the security conditions were not good, and also 
the people were not interested because they were saying that the president did 
not perform well so we will not vote. Some people did not go in order to protect 
the security of their families, and some other people were not interested in the 
elections and were saying that whether or not they voted, this president will 
succeed anyway because foreign countries are supporting him (Ghaz 15 W). 
 
Question: How did last year’s provincial council elections take place? 
Answer: Last year's elections passed by but the people took little part in them. 
People did not take part because they were scared of Taliban. The cities were 
closed, most of the shops were closed, the baker’s stalls were closed – I could 
not find bread so I had to have cookies and tea for dinner that night. The security 
was not good, and there were lots of fake cards that filled the boxes. In most 
areas of the province elections did not take place at all because the security was 
bad and people were scared (Ghaz 8 M). 
  
 Question: How did last year’s provincial council election go? 
Answer: Most of the people didn’t take part because they were afraid, and also 
the Taliban announced threats to participants. On the day of the election there 
was a fight between the Taliban and government in which a car was bombed. 
People were very afraid (Ghaz 25 M). 
 
None of these respondents continued to talk about how the lack of access to polling 
centres in insecure areas had made them feel unequally treated or represented – instead, 
the focus was rather on the way in which people had become disinterested in elections 
anyway due to the lack of tangible services provided by those elected to office. This 
was a common theme throughout interviews, reflecting a certain resignation to the way 
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in which elections would be fraudulent, with pre-determined outcomes, and would not 
result in greater service provision to local residents.  
6.4.3 Kabul data on equality indictors 
Data for Kabul on indicator 1 highlighted less underlying grievances perceived between 
people of different social groups than data collected in the three key provinces.  None of 
the 22 respondents from Kabul mentioned bribery as proving a significant hindrance to 
the access to services of poorer people, although this could reflect the way in which 
fewer respondents from the low-income category were interviewed in Kabul province. 
The need to have connections in government institutions in order to access services was 
assumed, as in provincial interviews – and yet did not appear to prove too much of a 
problem given the way in which a number of respondents talked about having these 
connections. Still, the relative importance of knowing someone in government was 
clear, as one candidate for the Kabul provincial council implied when discussed her 
plans if she were successful in her campaign: 
I will do my best to do my job properly. First I will try to have a good 
relationship with the mayor of Kabul, and then through the mayor I will be able 
to find out about the government’s development projects. I will have meetings 
with the mayor at least once a week (Kabul 7 W).  
Evidently, not unlike their provincial counterparts, Kabuli respondents assigned a 
certain value to having good relationships with government officials.  
While ethnic divisions did not feature in terms of most Kabul respondents’ descriptions 
of their access to services, a certain narrative of exclusion was prominent among the 
predominantly Hazara residents of the suburb of Dasht-e Barchi, as one provincial 
council member explained:  
There are many Hazara people are many in Kabul, but we have just one urban 
district, and the other 17 belong to other ethnicities. Hazara people should have 
a few districts. This area is not given any attention, for example the people don’t 
have electricity, the alleys are not concreted, the people don’t have proper 
drinking water and the candidates for elections try to get all these services for 
the people (Kabul 6 W). 
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The way in which urban districts are perceived as ‘belonging’ to different ethnicities 
highlights the extent of the way in which many parts of Kabul are segregated into 
different areas for different ethnic groups, although this is in no way forced by 
governmental authorities. Further, the level of services provided in different parts of the 
city varies greatly, with a lack of electricity and drinking water experienced in several 
areas. Dasht-e Barchi is particularly densely populated, however, and thus the problems 
are likely to be considered by residents more acute in this area. Respondents from other 
parts of the city also expressed concerns that ethnic groups be treated equally by the 
government, but overall did not suggest that systematic discrimination was taking place 
on account of ethnicity. In general there was a sense that an ideal government would 
consider the interests of all groups. As one Pashtun student described, 
There should be a government in Afghanistan that can give all the minorities 
and ethnicities their rights... There should be a comprehensive government 
which provides all citizens their rights (Kabul 7 M). 
Interestingly, while this respondent talks in terms of ‘citizens’ rights’, he also refers to 
these in the collective sense, in terms of the rights of different groups of people in 
society.  It appears that in spite of living in the city, group as opposed to individual 
interests still very much determine the ways in which many people consider their needs 
and expectations from the state.  
As might be expected, women in Kabul expressed a greater degree of freedom and 
equal treatment than did provincial respondents, as the following statement from one 
female Provincial Council candidate indicates: 
After three decades of war and after the Taliban regime it was a surprise for the 
people that women were able to take part in political life for example through 
the Provincial Council and the Wolesi Jirga, and all the people voted for 
them...You know that under the Taliban regime women couldn’t come out and 
work in society, but now we are very happy that women can leave their homes 
and work in the same way as a man. This new equality is a big achievement 
(Kabul 7 W).  
On some issues, such as the need for women to vote and campaign in elections, male 
respondents in Kabul were also very much in favour of equality, even those within 
conservative religious groups. On other issues, such as wearing the hijab and women’s 
245 
 
behaviour in public, a broader spectrum of opinion existed. Nevertheless, the data from 
Kabul appears to indicated that the state is more able and willing to protect women’s 
role in society in Kabul than in other provincial contexts.  
Data collected for indicator 2 demonstrates that in general, Kabul respondents 
considered their votes to count for the same as those of others, and that – like in the 
provinces, if people were worried about their votes not being useful, they were worried 
about all votes being useless as a result of fraud or international interference: 
People are don’t care about the election, because they think someone will be 
elected as president, regardless of votes: that the decision has already been 
made, so their participation in the election will not have any effect...People think 
this election is a show and that someone has already been chosen by the 
foreigners (Kabul 5 M).    
This perspective was not commonly held across the Kabul data collected for this study, 
with most respondents still keen to participate in elections and seeing this as a national 
duty, in contrast to some of the more sceptical perspectives heard across the provinces 
(and in Ghazni in particular). Nevertheless, it speaks to a suspicion of outside or elite 
interference in Afghan politics that was as pervasive in urban as in rural areas. This 
sentiment appeared to increase after the 2010 elections, in which a great deal of fraud 
was reported to have occurred (Coburn and Larson, 2013, forthcoming).   
Section 6.4 has attempted to assess the space Afghanistan might occupy on the 
spectrum between “great inequality among and within categories of citizens to 
extensive inequality in both regards” (Tilly: 2007: 14), by considering respondents’ own 
perceptions of their equality to one another vis-à-vis the state.  In terms of access to 
services, in the three key provinces inequality was perceived to exist along the lines of 
income levels, connections in government, security levels and gender – with ethnicity 
playing a lesser role in Nangarhar and Balkh than in Ghazni. Equality was not widely 
measured in terms of the weight of people’s votes in elections: people were not so much 
concerned about their votes counting the same as other people’s votes, but instead 
considered most votes to be equally insignificant in the face of fraud. Respondents in all 
three provinces also often talked about elections in terms of the benefits that could be 
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gained from any potentially successful candidate.  In Kabul, these grievances were less 
pronounced, with less perceived inequality existed between different social groups. 
Respondents were not generally concerned with their votes counting less due to 
categorical inequalities, but in some cases due to a perceived notion that the outcome of 
the election had already been predetermined.  
6.5 Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter the researcher has outlined the framework used for data analysis and has 
presented the data set. She has analysed the data according to the first two of Tilly’s key 
themes – breadth and equality – and in doing so has found that certain assumptions 
underlie Tilly’s conceptualisation of the state-citizen relationship that make it difficult 
to apply his framework to Afghanistan. These assumptions include the way in which all 
citizens of a given state do in fact desire access to state officials for assistance, and the 
way in which institutions of state (such as courts of justice and line ministries) are seen 
to provide a cohesive neutral facility for administrative affairs and dispute resolution – 
both of which can be questioned in light of the data analysis in this chapter. The ways in 
which collective interests are articulated much more prominently than individual ones 
by respondents also brings to light problems with applying the  liberal notion of 
individual citizenship to the Afghan case.  The data presented in this chapter has also 
however clearly highlighted discrepancies between respondents in urban and rural 
areas, and between men and women respondents, in terms of the desirability of 
individual access and interaction with state officials. Thus while it appears that 
assumptions cannot be made about the uniformity of perceptions of the meaning and 
importance of individual citizenship across Afghanistan, it seems that the prospect of 
(greater) interaction between individual citizens and the state is desirable to some and 
so cannot be dismissed entirely from an analysis of democratisation.  
What is also clear, however, as highlighted by the quotation from interview Kabul M 5 
in section 6.3.3, is that change has occurred, and is perceived likely to continue to occur 
in the relationship between ruler and ruled in Afghanistan – with more people going to 
the government with problems rather than to parties, as this man described. Clear also is 
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the way in which people in Ghazni increasingly solicit the Taliban for assistance instead 
of the state – change perhaps in the opposite direction. These changes, however, would 
likely be missed by existing democratisation measures because they often reflect 
community, and not individual, responses, to changing levels of fragility.   
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CHAPTER 7: APPLYING TILLY TO AFGHANISTAN: PROTECTION AND 
MUTUALLY BINDING CONSULTATION IN THE DATA 
7.1 Introduction 
Continuing the application of Tilly’s four themes to the primary data collected, this 
chapter explores the themes of protection and mutually binding consultation and how 
they relate to the Afghan case. Further to this, it directly considers the question of 
whether Tilly’s state capacity/democracy matrix is applicable to the Afghan case, and 
then asks whether it would also be possible to identify potential causes of change in the 
state-citizen relationship that could allow movement toward or away from 
democratisation to be noted and measured. This final question will link the discussion 
back to Tilly’s three clusters of change: in integrating trust networks, in eliminating 
categorical inequalities and in eradicating autonomous power centres – asking what 
would need to be noted in these three areas, if anything,  to indicate change.  
7.2 Data analysis: Protection in the state-citizen relationship in Afghanistan 
Of all the four themes, protection indicators were those that least corresponded with the 
accounts of respondents. This could be linked to the way in which there is little 
precedent in Afghanistan for protection of citizens against the arbitrary actions of the 
state, and as such little expectation of this being provided. It is also related to the way 
which, as observed in the breadth indicators, people tend to avoid the state apparatus if 
possible, dealing with judicial issues within the local community. Finally, it concerns 
once again the lack of formal procedures in place through which citizens can, as 
individuals, make complaints or hold the state accountable. 
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Table 12: Recap of protection indicators 
C. Protection Perceptions of the visibility and 
accountability of the legal 
process 
1) Respondents refer to common 
procedures through which 
arbitrary state action can be 
countered and give examples of 
when this has been done 
2) Respondents express 
confidence in the judicial system 
3) Respondents compare current 
legal processes more 
accountable /knowable than in 
past regimes 
 
7.2.1 Indicator 1) Respondents refer to common procedures through which arbitrary 
state action can be countered and give examples of when this has been done 
Again due to the methodological stipulations described in chapter 4, respondents were 
not asked directly what procedures they would follow if the state were to take arbitrary 
action against them. This could have provoked suspicion as to the reasons for asking, 
and as such might have had an impact on the answers given. Instead, more general 
questions about respondents’ opinions of the different branches of state were asked, and 
their response analysed for stories about arbitrary state action. A number of respondents 
in Nangarhar talked about occasions in which the state (or representatives thereof) had 
taken what they considered to be arbitrary action against either themselves or someone 
they had heard about. The following quotations provide some examples of this: 
Question: What do you think about the members of parliament from your 
province? 
Answer: Candidates who were successful in the parliamentary elections at first 
pretended to be servants of the nation, to gain votes, but as soon as they won 
their seats they began struggling for their own ends. For example, Hazrat Ali, 
who is a former commander, and now an MP, seized the Gambehre desert area 
which is about 12 kilometres to the north of Jalalabad city. He distributed this 
land among his brothers and built homes there, and all residents have been 
bothered by them. The people of the district demonstrated against him to try to 
force him to leave the district, but Hazrat Ali and Commander Gul Karim came 
along with their Mujahideen and opened fire on the people. And yet I am sure 
Hazrat Ali will succeed once again in the upcoming election (Nang 1 M).   
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There is no democracy in Afghanistan, because government officials themselves 
don’t care about the law. They seize public land and there is no one to stop 
them. (Nang 6 M) 
 
Question: If the local elders cannot solve your problem, to whom do you refer 
next? 
Answer: After them we go to the police station.  
Question: What happens there? 
Answer: If you know someone there, your problem will be solved, otherwise 
you will be jailed in a toilet (Nang 20 M). 
 
I remember a story about the elections for the Nangarhar Provincial Council. 
There were many candidates and the results of the elections were delayed for 
quite a long time. This is itself a question of governance. I would look at any 
candidate and their lips were dry and they were going out of their minds, but 
they couldn’t do anything about it. (Nang 28 M) 
 
Interestingly, these kinds of stories did not occur in the Balkh or Ghazni data. In the 
case of Ghazni, this could be due to the way in which the reach and influence of state 
actors is relatively limited. In Balkh, the researcher expected there to be more stories of 
how officials – and particularly those connected to the governor – had taken predatory 
action. The lack of these stories could indicate a generally more accountable system in 
Balkh than elsewhere, possibly due to the way in which district governors are often 
selected by Ustad Atta to be of the same ethnic group as the majority of district 
residents, and thus perhaps slightly more accountable or beholden to them. It could also 
indicate however a fault with the data collection and the way in which questions were 
asked (by different research team members) in Balkh as compared to Nangarhar.  
Nevertheless, these examples from Nangarhar appear to suggest that when arbitrary 
state action does occur in the province – at the hands of MPs, government officials more 
generally, the police or the Independent Electoral Commission (widely perceived to be 
working for the government in spite of its formally independent status), there is very 
little that citizens can do to protest or complain about it, let alone standard procedures to 
follow through which they could claim compensation.  
This is partly the result of the way in which the state in itself is not a unified entity in 
Afghanistan, and that the actions of individuals who in one role represent the state are 
not held to account by state bodies or an independent judiciary. In the case of land 
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seizure by a member of parliament reported above, the otherwise assumed line of 
demarcation between state and non-state actors becomes blurred, with the individual in 
question drawing on both his military authority as a former commander and the political 
authority he claims as an elected member of parliament. Thus, this does not really 
provide an example of arbitrary state action, but instead arbitrary action committed by 
an individual linked to the state system in some way. In terms of combating this kind of 
action, this example also implies that the personalities involved, and the patronage 
networks they command, are more likely to determine the outcome of a given situation 
than any official procedures that might be put in place. The state’s inability or 
unwillingness to reprimand individuals acting in this manner in a systematic way 
implicitly condones a system in which these individuals may function according to their 
own rules, without concern for whether or how their actions reflect the image of the 
state as it is seen by citizens. This runs contrary to the principles outlined in Tilly’s 
model of protection, and also highlights the ways in which the Afghan case is difficult 
to apply to the state-citizen model more generally because of the ambiguity surrounding 
what the state actually is, and what affiliation to it means in real terms.  
The disunity between different arms of state is clear in the following example of a 
stand-off between the provincial council and governor in Ghazni, as one urban woman 
respondent described:    
Recently a decision made by the provincial council was rejected by the governor 
of Ghazni. As a result, problems were created between the provincial council 
members the governor, which led to the provincial council being closed down 
for a year. Some of the council members went to Kabul city to complain, after 
which a delegation was sent from Kabul to solve the problem. In the end the 
council started working again. (Ghaz 6 W). 
Again notable in this case is the lack of formal procedure for dispute resolution between 
different arms of the state, with the result being that an ad-hoc delegation was formed 
and sent from Kabul to try to resolve the issue. Although trying to combat arbitrary state 
action (in this case on the part of the governor closing down the provincial shura) by 
referring to (other) state officials in Kabul seems counterintuitive, it is not as illogical as 
it sounds when considering the way in which state officials have no binding 
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accountability towards one another on the basis of their being state officials, but rather 
instead on the basis of personal connections and relationships.  In a sense then it is 
possible that citizens could find recourse for arbitrary state action even from within the 
state itself, but this would be dependent on their connections and their ability to pay for 
such a service rather than on a set of standard procedures. This, then, veers away from 
Tilly’s definition of public politics, and more toward a complex web of interactions 
between individuals and state representatives.   
7.2.2 Indicator 2) Respondents express confidence in the judicial system 
This indicator overlaps with the first finding under the breadth category – in that for 
many, the prospect of interacting with the state judiciary was considered a last resort, 
depending on the incident in question.  Most statements made by respondents about the 
courts and local policing recounted associations of bribery and extortion rather than 
confidence in its impartiality, as the following representative example demonstrates:  
Question: How is the security situation in the province? 
Answer: At the present the security situation is better than in other provinces in 
our country. But there is no justice in the government organizations. 
Question: Can you tell us more about justice in the government organizations? 
Answer: If you have a criminal or land ownership problem that you take to 
court, it is very difficult to solve it without giving bribes to the judge (Nang 4 
M). 
 
Evidently, the way in which most respondents across all three provinces refer to the 
existence of a state judicial system and include it as a way in which to solve problems, 
even as a last resort, demonstrates some level of commonality and standardisation in the 
system in terms of its availability across the country. Part of the problem, however, is 
that the state judiciary forms only one of a number of possible avenues for seeking 
justice, with Sharia and customary law providing alternatives. Different combinations of 
these forms of justice, often under the term ‘informal justice system’ have been 
discussed at length elsewhere, (Coburn and Dempsey, 2010; Suhrke and Borchgrevink, 
2009), and was reflected in this study through the lengthy discussions held with 
respondents over their preferences for solving disputes on a local level before 
approaching the state system for assistance.  
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Most obvious across the transcripts was a general concern about the lack of state 
enforcement of the rule of law and justice system, as described somewhat bitterly by the 
following respondent from Balkh province: 
I am sure that [MPs] are aware about all the problems that we have in the 
country but they do not worry about poor people... We will be witnesses of a 
time when family members kill each other for money, and if the current situation 
continues we will see that MPs are killed by poor people and farmers because 
there is no rule of law and justice (Balkh 14 M). 
Again, then, this implies that in spite of concerns about the quality of the judicial 
system, a stronger state structure was considered desirable by this respondent – a mid-
income Pashtun shoemaker living in the provincial town of Balkh. This is perhaps 
unsurprising given the respondent’s ethnicity, and the fact that the powerful governor of 
the province (an ethnic Tajik) was widely seen by respondents as partial toward the 
support of close friends and business associates from within his own branch of the 
Tajik-dominated Jamiyat-e Islami party. Indeed, the governor’s control over the organs 
of state in Balkh province appear to leave little room for the development of a 
transparent and knowable legal process, as the following respondents – both opponents 
and supporters of the governor – testify: 
We are not satisfied with our governor...As Woliswal [district governor] of [X] 
district I have not received any share for my district of the reconstruction, 
infrastructure and business projects planned in the province. I have only 
received small development projects, which are not enough to meet the needs of 
this district [which is] located far from Mazar city... The Governor does not like 
the people of our district because of the conflict between the Jumbesh and 
Jamyat parties. The Governor is from the Jamiat Party and he doesn’t like our 
district because its people are connected to the Junbesh Party, led by [Abdul 
Rashid] Dostum... 
Question:  Do the MPs help you in acquiring projects for the district? 
Answer: The MPs of Balkh province are friends of the Governor. Out of 19 
representatives in the provincial council, 12 were selected by the governor. Mr. 
Atta does not care about the rules of government and no one can stand against 
him.  (Balkh 7 M District Governor) 
 
Although I don’t have a good relationship with the Governor, if there is any 
problem, I call him. I have a good relationship with the Woliswal [district 
governor]. The Governor doesn’t care about the government, he does what he 
wants. It is a big problem that a commander [such as the governor or another 
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former military strongman] can do what he wants but an MP cannot. For 
example, I have received calls telling me that the police has arrested someone, 
and when I have called the police to ask about this, they tell me that they found 
him with hashish, and that he is guilty. But a commander can get him released 
easily, by giving 80,000 Afs [$1600] to the Woliswal. For an area commander 
anything is easy to do...  
Question: Is the role of an MP different to that of local government?  
Answer: A person called me and told me that an innocent person had been put 
in prison. I called the commander to tell him that the man was not guilty, and 
that he was a poor man who was just selling melons for a living, but the 
commander said that he was guilty. After some time, I saw the melon-seller and 
I asked him what had happened, and he told me that a commander had released 
him. The government is put into effect by war commanders, and only an MP 
who is also a war commander can achieve anything. (Balkh 20 W MP)  
 
Question: How were you appointed to this position? 
Answer: I was associated with Atta and I had work experience under the Najib 
government. So, Atta appointed me to this position in this district. All the 
district governors are appointed by him in this province and he appoints people 
on the basis of his political and social knowledge of the area, and on the ability 
of individuals (Balkh 3 M District Governor).  
 
I think it would be good if the district governor and district security commanders 
were appointed by election. For example, the security commander of this district 
is Atta’s man and he will be in this position as long as Atta remains governor of 
Balkh province, even though people are not happy with the commander. Atta is 
a very powerful governor. He has used lots of governmental lands to build tall 
buildings in Mazar city.  He appoints all the key positions such as district 
governors, security commanders and other positions (Balkh 13 M, shopkeeper). 
 
As the story from the female MP from Balkh about the release of prisoners implies, the 
judicial system in the province appears to be beholden to the whims of powerful 
individuals, such as commanders and the provincial governor, rather than to a set of 
transparent rules that are knowable to citizens.  Trying to judge whether or not people 
have confidence in the system thus seems a misplaced or inappropriate question, in a 
context where court decisions could be either influenced by these individuals or 
overturned by them at a later date. 
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7.2.3 Indicator 3) Respondents compare current legal processes more 
accountable/knowable than in past regimes 
In comparison to the way in which respondents viewed the current judicial system and 
the enforcement of rule of law more generally, some talked at length about the 
characteristics of previous regimes. As could be expected, their perspectives varied 
greatly depending on a number of factors – which regime they were making comparison 
with, their perspective of the current security situation in their own province, and their 
own political affiliations. While some do not specify which regimes they are referring 
to, differ in opinion as to whether they consider the present or former regimes to be 
more effective, and do not all speak to legal processes specifically, the following 
quotations help to give a sense of what respondents value in a state system:   
Life under the former regime was better than the current one. The reason was 
that the government then had an effect and an influence on people; the laws of 
the government were clear and were enforced on everyone, whether they were a 
Khan or a poor person. For example, a soldier would come with a stick, not a 
gun, and would be able to take a criminal to the government. This was due to 
having a formal and disciplined government. Now there is a government that 
doesn’t have sovereignty over its regulations and is unfamiliar with regularity 
and discipline (Nang 17 M) 
 
.  It was only Najib and his government who worked very well. During Najib’s 
government people were very happy because there was no corruption, no party 
issues, and no poverty. Since he himself was a very good person, his 
government was also very good. But now everyone is looting everyone else for 
their own pocket. I am a truck driver, and now I have to pay bribes at every 
security checkpoint between Mazar and Kabul (Balkh 17 M). 
 
Some work has been done by the current government in different sectors, 
especially regarding security. For example, during the rule of Mujahideen we 
were told that everyone was responsible for his own security, but we feel a little 
more secure now. Schools are open, and roads, hospitals and irrigation canals 
are being constructed. But bribery still exists... During the kingdom of Zahir 
Shah, there was a good democracy in Afghanistan. People would call him 
Zahire kal which means “bald Zahir” without any fear. They could protest 
freely. For the first time, political parties were established during his kingdom. 
But when Daoud Khan became the president, there was only his party that was 
active, and other parties were not permitted to interfere in government affairs. It 
was the same during the government of Peoples’ Democratic Party. It is not the 
principle of democracy to apply sanctions on political parties. Now, Karzai has 
given full freedom to parties and anyone who has at least 600 supporters can get 
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official permission from the Ministry of Justice to establish his own political 
party (Nang 6 M) 
 
For governance, the system of Zahir Shah was very good. I don’t remember it, 
but my mother says that it was a time of peace and stability. There were no 
suicide attacks or bomb blasts. My father’s job was in Kabul, he would come 
home late without any fears or concerns (Nang 8 W). 
 
Evident from these statements is the way in which a knowable, dependable set of rules 
and regulations enforced by the state is considered ideal: a state which has popular 
sovereignty (to the extent that criminals can be reprimanded without excessive force), 
can control corruption and can provide security for citizens. As the third quotation 
implies, however, the extent of state control should be tempered with an acceptance of 
democratic competition, in which political parties are permitted to exist and to exert 
influence on government. These statements all comply with Tilly’s model for increased 
democratisation, in that the state needs to have capacity enough to exert a monopoly of 
violence and yet respond to citizen demands for civil liberties and political rights (2007: 
16). However, they all come from urban respondents whose connections to the state 
have already been established and systematised. In this way, they are similar to the 
perspectives from Kabul discussed below. By comparison, responses given in rural 
Ghazni were much more concerned with the provision of basic security and service 
provision, and did not generally see a role for the state beyond this. What is interesting 
then from this comparison of urban and rural responses, is the way in which there 
appears to be a marked difference between the former, in which context a number of 
respondents appear to desire greater connection and interaction with state institutions, 
provided that they become more transparent/less corrupt – and the latter, in which there 
is a distinct sense of respondents valuing a certain distance from these institutions, for 
example as shown through the overwhelming data on preferences for local-level dispute 
resolution in rural areas (as documented in chapter 6).     
7.2.4 Kabul data on protection indictors 
Data collected for Kabul on indicator 1 for protection was quite different from 
provincial data in terms of the examples of arbitrary state action given by respondents. 
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Rather than focus on cases where actors related to the state (such as powerful ex-
warlord parliamentarians) had used their positions to facilitate land grabbing, for 
example, they instead talked about the way in which there were few procedures in place 
to hold the government to account, should they be deemed to have too much control. A 
number of respondents complained about the lack of a formal opposition that could 
monitor governmental activities. Others, including the following two male shopkeepers 
from the centre of the city (interviewed separately), gave examples of how they 
considered governmental powers to be unchecked: 
Sometimes you don’t know who the most powerful people playing key roles in 
Kabul are.  For example, many powerful people tried to force [Dadfar] Spanta 
the Minster of Foreign Affairs to resign from his position – and a majority in 
parliament backed the demand for his resignation, but no-one could make him 
resign. Only Karzai supported Spanta and no-one could oppose his decision. 
(Kabul 1 M)  
You may remember that parliament tried very hard to replace Spanta, the 
Foreign Minister, but no-one could do anything about it. This means that the 
government is the most powerful entity in Kabul (Kabul 2 M). 
In this case, the first respondent talks about the power of the President, rather than the 
government more generally (although often ‘government supporter’ and ‘Karzai 
supporter’ are used interchangeably by respondents, as in the second quotation) – again 
because ‘the government’, like the state more generally in Afghanistan, is not a unified 
entity. Afghanistan’s presidential system allocates significant powers to the President 
and, while these are countered to some degree by parliamentary votes (a two-thirds 
majority can overturn a decree) there are a number of examples, such as the one given 
above, in which Karzai has overridden the outcome of these votes. Respondents 
concede that there is little that can be done in this case, and no procedures that could be 
followed to counter the arbitrary action of the President.   
For indicator 2, concerning people’s confidence in the judicial system, Kabul 
respondents were almost as skeptical as their provincial counterparts, particularly when 
describing the way in which powerful individuals were not held accountable for their 
actions. As one man working for an NGO explained, 
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There are gangs who are committing crimes and kidnapping people.  But when 
they are caught by the police and security forces, they are able to get out of jail.  
But it is difficult to know how they get out and who is supporting them...Gangs 
and the mafia can come in different shapes and forms.  They have occupied 
different positions in the government and they have been involved in torturing, 
killing and looting the people in the past, but they are still in power and 
influential...  They misuse their government positions and commit corruption 
(Kabul 4 M). 
Further to this, a number of respondents also expressed a lack of confidence in the 
independence of institutions such as the Supreme Court and Independent Electoral 
Commission. These two bodies in particular were widely considered to be 
untrustworthy, serving the interests of the government or of powerful individuals.   
Finally, in terms of Kabul respondents’ comparisons of legal processes across different 
regimes, perspectives of current processes were generally positive. In spite of criticising 
the lack of independence in the judiciary and the way in which powerful individuals 
were able to manipulate the system, nevertheless there had been improvements made: 
I remember during Dr. Najib’s government, [1987-1992] several groups of 
people were tortured and disturbed by the government. But now all the former 
pro-Russian parties, like Khalq and Parcham, are in the parliament.  It is the 
achievement of democracy that all these different types of people have come 
together in the parliament. (Kabul M 2).  
In the past people were oppressed and people had no choice to elect a person or 
criticize the government...Now our life has improved and we have a better life 
than in the past.  Now we can work and travel to all the provinces, but in the past 
there was no such opportunity for us (Kabul M 5). 
 
While these respondents do not speak specifically to the transparency of legal 
processes, they indicate a greater level of poltical and social freedom than was 
experienced in the past. Thus, while these Kabul respondents shared the scepticism of 
other urban respondents across the country concerning the achievements of the Karzai 
administration, and while their expectations concerning what the government should 
provide were equally high, there was nevertheless a greater sense of relative change, 
and also a stronger appreciation of some political gains that had been made (in terms of 
greater plurality, for example) rather than a focus only on rule of law and service 
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provision. Indeed, they appeared to be reflecting on how the social contract between 
ruler and ruled had been shufting. Like many other urban respondents, a call for a 
stronger state structure with greater levels of intervention was common. In this sense, 
then, it is possible to detect more of a sense of the desire for liberal statehood in Kabul 
(and to some extent in other urban areas) than elsewhere in the country.     
To summarise findings on protection, then, it is possible to conclude first that no real 
systems that are knowable and public are perceived to exist for the protection of citizens 
against arbitrary state action, and that instead this protection is sought from powerful 
individuals with whom citizens might have connections or relationships. These 
individuals could also play a role within the state, a factor blurring the boundaries 
between ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ actors – in itself a dichotomy that assumes some kind of 
bond between state actors on account of their being connected to state structures. This 
assumption evidently does not stand in Afghanistan, and provides a problem for the 
application of Tilly’s model.  Even in Kabul, respondents considered powerful 
individuals to be above the law, and to be able to manipulate processes for their own 
ends. Second, that respondents’ confidence in the judicial system is lacking, both in the 
key provinces and in Kabul, again due to the often arbitrary intervention of powerful 
individuals. Finally, that in comparison to previous regimes urban respondents in the 
provinces largely consider the current state system to be lacking in its ability to exercise 
sovereignty, combat corruption and provide security and services, but that this differs 
from rural perspectives whose expectations of (and aspirations for) the role of the state 
are more limited. In Kabul, respondents appear to share the same high expectations of 
the state as their provincial urban counterparts, but also consider the relative political 
gains that have been made since previous regimes were in power. 
7.3 Data analysis: Mutually binding consultation in the state-citizen relationship in 
Afghanistan  
This theme concerns the extent to which citizens are able to claim state assistance, and 
hold the government to account to ensure provision of this. Again, as a reminder of 
Tilly’s own definition, “at one extreme, seekers of state benefits must bribe, cajole, 
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threaten, or use third-party influence to get anything at all; at the other, state agents 
have clear, enforceable obligations to deliver benefits by category of recipient” (2007: 
15).  The following three indicators are discussed in turn to assess expectations of 
citizens in terms of the contract they consider themselves to hold (or not to hold) with 
the state in this regard. 
 
Table 13: Recap of mutually-binding consultation indicators 
D. Mutually 
binding 
consultation 
Local perspectives on service 
provision and complaints 
procedures 
1) Respondents express 
expectations concerning state-
provided services and indicate 
that these are generally met and 
likely to continue 
2) Respondents express 
familiarity with state institutions 
and recount examples of taking 
complaints about service 
provision to them 
 
7.3.1 Indicator 1) Respondents express expectations concerning state-provided services, 
and indicate that these are generally met and are likely to continue 
This indicator overlaps with the discussion above on breadth and the access to services 
that people consider themselves to have towards one another. Here, the subject is 
viewed from a slightly different angle, however, focusing on the social contract that 
people perceive themselves to have with the state. As these representative statements 
demonstrate, most respondents felt that levels of government service provision did not 
meet their expectations, and had little hope that this situation would improve:   
Question: If you have a problem, how do you go about trying to solve it? 
Answer: No one solves our problems. Sometimes we meet with our district 
governor but he doesn’t help us. For example, we don’t have water pipelines and 
we are drinking water from a canal which is not safe, and we told our district 
governor about this but he didn’t help us. A private organisation came and told 
that us that they would make water pipelines for us, and they took our money 
and we bought pipelines, but we haven’t seen any water yet (Balkh 12 W). 
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Our [provincial] council hasn’t done anything yet. Electricity cables and wires 
have been laid from Daronta to Jalalabad, but there is no electricity in Surkhrod 
and we have very hot weather here. What should we do with the council or the 
governor, Sherzai? (Nang 26 M) 
 
The situation in society is not good... For example there is a school in our area 
that doesn’t have any chairs and the students are studying in the yard. And the 
hospital in our area can’t make decisions about giving medicines or beds to the 
patients – whether you are poor or wealthy you have to buy your medicines 
yourself... there is no education, and there is a high cost of living in the 
province. There is no decision made by the government about how to solve this, 
and everyone just does whatever they want (Ghaz 8 W). 
 
The government and parliament haven’t done anything positive in the past five 
years. If you come to our village, you will see people’s lives. We don’t have 
drinking water, a clinic, a school or electricity. We have a small muddy pool 
from which people of the village and animals such as dogs and livestock are 
drinking. The water in the pool is not clean but we have to drink it because we 
don’t have a well or a spring. When someone gets sick, we don’t have cars to 
take our patients to the centre of the district and it is has happened a lot that 
critically ill patients died on the way. Most of our children get sick with diarrhea 
because of the water... There is no government, it is just a government by name 
(Balkh 16 M). 
 
The data here is skewed toward a negative perspective, largely due to the way in which 
in interviewing people at length about their views on the government the research team 
members were giving them a chance to voice their frustrations. Nevertheless, these 
statements were not responses to direct questions about whether or not the government 
met their needs in terms of service provision, but were rather impromptu examples 
given as part of the conversation as a whole. While one respondent mentioned the way 
in which the state had provided land for her father, who was wounded during the war 
years (Nang 13 W), and some respondents talked generally about services being more 
readily available than in previous regimes (see above), the majority of accounts detailed 
a negative perception of the government’s commitment to providing for its citizens.  
This can be compared with extremely high expectations of the role of the Karzai 
government in the aftermath of the war years. These were fuelled by promises were 
made by officials running for office (particularly in the presidential and parliamentary 
elections in 2005) and by international actors involved in reconstruction concerning 
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levels of service provision for citizens that have not materialised.  Further, expectations 
of what the state should provide for citizens were in many cases reminiscent of the 
systems that had been put in place in urban areas during the Soviet era, which 
emphasised an expanded bureaucracy and state provision of food coupons for civil 
servants, a systematised curriculum, a number of state-owned industrial factories 
providing jobs, healthcare and other services.  Given this precedent, it is unsurprising 
that many urban respondents in particular were disappointed by the lack of similar 
provisions available to citizens under the Karzai administration.  
One factor notable in its absence is the lack of connection made by citizens between 
service provision and taxation. When analysing the data for perspectives on a social 
contract between citizens and state, for mutually-binding consultation, the researcher 
was expecting that – particularly in urban areas, with more respondents holding salaried 
positions (and thus paying income tax of at least ten per cent on their earnings if more 
than 12,500 Afs [$250] per month) more people would link the lack of services 
available to their tax contributions and would complain that the money they paid to the 
government was not being spent on public goods (Afghan Income Tax Law, 
2009).While many of the complaints about lack of services come from rural areas, a 
number also come from urban areas also. However, across the entire data set, no 
mention of taxation was made by any respondent, in relation to government service or 
any other subject, demonstrating the lack of consistent historical precedent of taxation 
in the country and also a distinct emphasis on the rights as opposed to the duties of 
citizens. Respondents spoke very much in the language of entitlement from government 
as opposed to that of a two-way relationship.   
7.3.2 Indicator 2) Respondents express familiarity with state institutions and recount 
examples of taking complaints about service provision to them 
The final indicator here refers to the way in which, should citizens not be provided with 
expected services, they were familiar with procedures for addressing this. Again 
overlapping with previous discussions on complaints processes, this highlighted similar 
findings: people were willing and able to take complaints to a representative of local 
government, such as a district governor or member of the provincial council, but none 
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of the examples given had ended in services actually being provided. In most cases, the 
officials concerned had not been able to address the problem, as the following 
respondent from Balkh province explained: 
You might have heard people talk about the way that the [Amu] river is eroding 
the soil on the Afghan side.  Lots of people have lost their land and their homes. 
Thousands of jiribs of land have been destroyed by this river, which is the 
formal border between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. The government has not 
done any work to stop the water and save the land and the homes of the people. 
There is one MP and one PC member from this area, but they cannot do 
anything. People have raised the issue to them but they cannot do anything.  The 
government should work on this problem, but there is no government and the 
people there are only working for themselves (Balkh 17 M).  
 
As this statement (and others used throughout this chapter) imply, it is to individuals 
and their offices – and not institutions – that people address their problems and 
concerns. This theme has appeared throughout the data analysis, and reflects the way in 
which while institutions of state exist and hold significant authority in terms of formal 
procedures (such as the need to acquire government stamps and the correct paperwork), 
it is the individuals within those institutions who determine whether or not a complaint 
is processed or a problem addressed. Local communities themselves do not approach 
institutions directly but instead would lobby a locally-known contact within 
government, such as a provincial council member, to draw on their own contacts in 
government offices to achieve a certain task. Even with these contacts, however, there is 
no guarantee that a problem will be solved or a service provided: as can be seen in the 
example above, in spite of the locally-popular MP being consulted on the issue of 
erosion, no solution has yet been found to the problem.  This again then relates to and 
contrasts with Tilly’s concept of public politics, where processes are systematic and 
knowable within the public sphere rather than dealt with on a one-to-one basis. 
However, it is unclear in Tilly’s definition of public politics whether entire communities 
addressing powerful individuals with complaints about service provision constitutes 
public politics, or whether – due to the lack of institutional procedure – this kind of 
public action still falls outside of the category. Perhaps falling somewhere in between 
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the two, this provides another example of the way in which the Afghan case does not 
quite fit with the parameters that Tilly sets out.  
7.3.3 Kabul data on mutually binding consultation indictors 
Kabul respondents talked at some length about the lack of governmental services 
provided by the Karzai administration, indicating that, like provincial respondents, their 
expectations had not been met. Also again as with the provincial data, responses tended 
to reflect expectations concerning individual officials’ provision of services for their 
local area, rather than institutionalised governmental projects.  One student living in a 
suburb described her expectation of the outcome of the 2010 parliamentary election, for 
example, in terms of service provision: 
The winning candidate from this area should bring electricity to our area, he 
should work for good security, and he should consider what our people need 
(Kabul 5 W).  
This was emphasised also by the accounts of Provincial Council and Wolesi Jirga 
members interviewed, who talked about the services they themselves had provided for 
their constituents: 
I supported a juice-making project in this area. I also constructed three small 
power stations and I gravelled 5 kilometres of alleyways. I also built 500 water 
pumps and I helped the people by providing them with buses (PC member, 
Kabul 6 W). 
While the mayor of Kabul is officially responsible for providing these kinds of services, 
these are not regularly delivered, and rarely to suburbs that lie beyond the city centre. 
One Kabul respondent also expressed disappointment with the services that had been 
delivered on a macro scale, and their lack of perceived sustainability: 
Unfortunately, so far no important changes have been made to address people’s 
needs. For example, no attention has been paid to our agricultural sector and we 
are still importing everything we need into the country. In the past 7 years it 
would have been possible to build two big dams to generate electricity and use 
the water for agriculture, but nothing happened in this regard.  Electricity is 
bought from Tajikistan and they can stop the supply whenever they want. There 
is no guarantee that we will have sustainable electricity in Afghanistan (Kabul 2 
M). 
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Whether through relying on individuals or considering governmental development 
projects, then, Kabul respondents had little more faith in the ability of the government 
to provide services sustainably than provincial respondents. Further, there was still no 
connection made at all by respondents between service provision and taxation, 
indicating again a disjunct between perceptions of the role of the state and duties of 
citizens. While a person’s duty to vote was discussed much more frequently in Kabul 
than elsewhere, the lack of association made between a person’s paid taxes and the 
corresponding expectation of services, even in the city where more respondents were 
earning enough each month to pay taxes, was indicative of a broader trend in which 
there is little imperative to hold the government to account for missing or unreliable 
services.   
Kabul data addressing indicator 2 showed, as might be expected, a greater familiarity 
with institutions of state than the provincial data. A number of respondents talked about 
parliamentarians representing their interests, and parliament itself providing a useful 
forum for the expression of public concerns. As a local malik explained,  
Our interests are mainly in security and economic issues.  We first want security 
so that we can improve our lives.  When there is no security, there won’t be any 
investment, jobs or economic improvement.  These interests are represented by 
the MPs in parliament.  It is the parliamentarians who are raising the people’s 
problems to the government in parliament (Kabul 5 M). 
While this respondent speaks to broader issues of security and economic growth, others 
talked about taking smaller problems to the urban district authorities, and few referred 
to local informal councils as preferential sources of assistance.
50
 Respondents did not 
give specific details about the procedures they would follow to relate complaints to 
these bodies, but responses across the Kabul data were similar in terms of their 
familiarity with the district authorities. Not only do Kabul residents have more direct 
contact with state institutions at the local level, they are also much more likely to own 
televisions, through which parliamentary sessions are often broadcast. As such, their 
connection to and interaction with these institutions is much greater than their rural 
counterparts. When this data was collected, however, parliamentary elections in 2010 
                                                          
50
 With the exception of two suburban respondents.  
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had not yet occurred, and since these problematic elections the new parliament has 
experienced a series of internal disputes ending in deadlock (Coburn and Larson, 2013, 
forthcoming).  Whether or not these events have affected people’s perception of the 
parliament’s ability to raise their interests is not shown in the data. 
Under the theme of mutually-binding consultation, then, it is possible to summarise that 
citizen expectations of state service provision are not generally met in the provinces or 
in Kabul, and that oftentimes people talk more about individuals providing services than 
the state as an institution instigating development projects. It is also clear that a 
mutually-binding relationship between citizen and state is not talked about in terms of 
rights and duties, but primarily in terms of rights and entitlements only. While in Kabul 
it was often considered a respondent’s duty to vote, taxes were not discussed as a means 
through which to hold government to account. Again when needing to complain about 
the lack of services provided, respondents in the provinces studied generally refer to 
individuals with personal connections in government institutions rather than rely on any 
institutionalised procedures that might exist. In Kabul, however, complaints are more 
often referred to urban district authorities, with broader interests expected to be 
represented in parliament. Thus, significant differences do appear to exist between 
provincial and Kabuli respondents, in terms of their relationship with state institutions – 
but this relationship is still not consistent with the mutually-binding stipulations of 
Tilly’s fourth theme.     
7.4 Is it possible to locate Afghanistan within Tilly’s state capacity/democracy 
framework?  
Before attempting to answer this question, it would be helpful to summarise briefly the 
findings from all four of Tilly’s themes. First, when applying breadth indicators to the 
data, it became clear on the one hand that accessing state officials for assistance 
(interpreted in a broad sense) was not seen by all respondents as a desirable or useful 
facility. This was particularly the case among rural respondents. Reasons for this 
included the preference for locally autonomous decision-making, and the predatory 
light in which state officials were often perceived, with institutions of state not 
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considered to provide a neutral mediation tool for administrative affairs and dispute 
resolution. On the other hand, among respondents who saw access to state officials as 
potentially desirable, largely in urban areas – there was  a general sense that this was 
only available to certain groups of society – those with money, or those with personal 
connections to officials. This then created what were perceived as different ‘categories 
of citizenship’ (Tilly, 2007: 14), some with more access to the state than others. This 
was experienced by respondents to a lesser degree in Kabul than elsewhere.  
Second, when applying equality indicators to the data, it became evident that 
respondents perceived inequality – for example in terms of access to services – to exist 
and be dependent on levels of income, personal connections or relations in government, 
security levels and gender. While divisions along these lines could be found in an 
analysis of citizen perceptions in almost any state, in terms of people with more 
money/connections to find accessing services easier than those without, in this case the 
researcher is concerned with people having any access at all to the most basic of 
services, such as water provision, healthcare, or the procurement of a national identity 
card, access to all of which also seem to be dependent in provincial Afghanistan on 
whether or not someone has money or connections. Contrary to popular generalisations 
about Afghan society, few inequalities were perceived to exist along ethnic lines, 
particularly in Nangarhar, Balkh and Kabul (possibly with the exception of a lingering 
narrative of exclusion among Hazaras in Kabul) – but were a significant factor in the 
responses of people from Ghazni. In general, people considered their votes in elections 
to hold equal weight as those of people from other social groups, meaning that all votes 
were largely assigned little value due to widespread fraud. In Kabul a sense that the 
outcome of elections was already pre-determined by foreign powers was notable in 
some transcripts, but in general there was a willingness and perceived necessity to vote 
regardless of fraud or outside interference. 
Third, protection indicators demonstrated the distinct lack of knowable, publically 
accountable systems existing to protect citizens against arbitrary state action. This is 
partly a result of the powers assigned to the executive in Afghanistan’s constitution, and 
the lack of checks and balances that exist to counter this. Instead of making cases 
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through transparent systems, protection is sought from powerful individuals, such as 
local commanders, MPs or religious elites with whom citizens have relationships, and 
who can at any one time play roles within and outside of state structures. Paradoxically, 
this reliance on powerful individuals further exacerbates people’s lack of confidence in 
the judicial system, which is seen to bend to the whim of any influential interlocutor. 
This mistrust of institutions was also expressed by Kabul respondents, but to a lesser 
degree – with people demonstrating a greater sense of familiarity with state institutions 
and a propensity to approach state authorities with problems and disputes.  
Finally, when applying indicators for the mutually-binding consultation theme, it was 
apparent that respondents’ expectations concerning state service provision had not been 
met, although these expectations differed according to urban/rural perspectives and also 
between provinces. Across the data set, however, it was clear that citizens themselves 
do not refer to what might be labelled a ‘mutually-binding relationship’ featuring both 
rights and duties, but instead only with a sense of entitlement to services. While Kabul 
respondents talked about a duty to vote, none at all referred to taxation as a means to 
hold the government to account on service provision – a surprising finding given the 
percentage of Kabul residents that pay income tax as compared to other parts of the 
country. The definition of citizenship in Afghanistan, then, needs to be considered in 
more depth in terms of its compatibility (or lack thereof) with Tilly’s assumptions about 
the term.   
These findings point to a series of further questions about the applicability of Tilly’s 
model to the Afghan case. They imply that it is not possible to locate Afghanistan on 
the state capacity/democracy matrix – not because the data are not available in such an 
insecure environment, not because Afghanistan as a ‘fragile state’ is by default 
undemocratic, or because there is no state/citizen relationship at all, but rather because 
Tilly makes fundamental assumptions about this relationship that simply do not hold as 
general rules in the context. Evident from the data collected is that changes do occur in 
the nature of interactions between ruler and ruled: there are expectations among the 
Afghan people about what the central government should provide and negotiations do 
take place accordingly – but often informally between communities and central 
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authorities. It is also clear that stark differences exist, for example, between 
perspectives in Kabul and those in other provinces – and further differences between 
urban and rural viewpoints within those provinces. These assumptions can be divided 
into four broad categories: notions of the individuality of citizenship; the notions of the 
constancy of citizenship across urban and rural areas; notions about the constancy of 
citizenship over time, and notions about the cohesiveness of the state structure. These 
will now be discussed in turn. 
7.4.1 Assumptions of the individuality of citizenship 
Clear throughout Tilly’s work, and indeed through most western scholarship on 
democracy and democratisation, is the assumption that the foundation of (liberal) 
democracy lies in the relationship between the individual citizen and the state. This is 
often discussed in terms of constitutional liberalism – which encompasses property 
rights, freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and freedom of religion, among 
other provisions for individual citizens. As explored in chapter 1, this is very much 
focused on the way in which an individual interacts with the state, and the safeguards 
that are put in place to protect any given individual citizen from the threat of arbitrary 
state action. 
As discussed in chapter 1, constitutional liberalism of this kind has become the 
backbone of western liberal democracy over time – largely due to the events of the 
twentieth century in the United States and Europe, which brought about monumental 
shifts in society. The suffragette movement, the two World Wars, increasing 
urbanization and the rise to popularity of the behaviouralist school of thought all 
contributed to the ways in which the (rational) individual and nuclear family unit 
replaced the community-centred social fabric of the 19
th 
century and earlier. Even 
before these events, the democratic systems that developed in these countries were 
influenced considerably by factors specific to their own historical trajectories – such as 
the war of independence, development of the constitution and the civil war in the 
United States; the Treaty of Westphalia, Reformation and French Revolution in Europe. 
In this sense, as Tilly would argue, the role played by these historical trajectories is 
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inseparable from the development of a democratic politics in a given state and/or 
region.  
Critical in the Afghan case is the way in which the relationship between ruler and ruled 
did not change dramatically during the twentieth century. As examined in chapter 5, 
Abdur Rahman Khan had made significant alterations to the way in which Afghans 
interacted with their king during his reign, including the impositions of conscription and 
taxes on areas previously autonomous from central control, but this had come to an end 
with the death of the ‘Iron Amir’, whose sons, by and large, had preferred to appease 
subjects in order to avoid resistance. This tendency continued into the twentieth century, 
exacerbated by the reliance of successive monarchs on outside sources of revenue, such 
as politically-aligned aid during the Cold War. Without a systematic campaign on the 
behalf of the state to regulate all parts of the country in the same way, a number of rural 
areas retained a great deal of the autonomy they had held for many years, maintaining 
their cohesiveness as community units and avoiding regular (potentially combative) 
interactions with the state, coming into contact with the centre only through tribal 
leaders who would periodically renegotiate their autonomy from the central government 
as and when necessary. Following Edwards, the state never managed to make a ‘myth’ 
of itself in the public imaginary (1996: 4).   
In this sense, then, it is unsurprising that the evolution of the state-citizen relationship 
did not occur in a similar fashion to the way it had done in western democracies. 
Instead, communities remained intact and autonomous for the most part, and although 
not immune from the transformative effects of civil warfare, did not develop a closer 
relationship with the central government under any of its 20
th
 century leaders. For this 
reason, as demonstrated throughout the data, appealing to state institutions for 
assistance in local governance issues, such as dispute resolution or land conflict, 
remains a last resort for many communities in rural Ghazni, for example. Furthermore, 
talking to people in these areas about their interactions with the state almost invariably 
involved a response articulated in the collective sense – ‘we voted’ or ‘we took our 
concerns to the district governor’. There is little sense of the way in which an individual 
might alone seek to interact with the state to solve a problem or voice a concern.          
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This then makes the application of Tilly’s framework difficult, because in these rural 
areas there are few mechanisms through which an individual, without the assistance of 
her community, could access state assistance. Transparent processes do not exist, for the 
most part. This has a particularly isolating effect on women; whose access to the state is 
more restricted than men’s, and whose livelihoods are dependent to an even greater 
degree on support from the wider family and community.  
Whereas this would be categorised in Tilly’s model as an inherent weakness of the 
system, however, compromising democratisation through its apparent contradiction of 
the principles of breadth and equality, it is not always seen in this manner by women 
themselves, some of whom find security and support through the collective organisation 
of the community. State intervention, in for example a case of domestic violence, could 
be seen as highly negative and detrimental to family honour as opposed to the seeking 
of assistance from community elders. This is particularly the case given that state 
officials are often considered predatory and are not trusted by the communities they are 
intended to serve. The most obvious drawback of this approach however is that there 
are no formal standards to which local communities must comply in their treatment of 
women, the end result being that many communities – who would also rarely intervene 
in a case of domestic violence, unless very extreme – would not provide support to 
women in what might be considered in western terms an ‘equal’ or ‘fair’ manner. 
Without state-enforced punishments for the maltreatment of women, there is very little 
incentive to insist on new rules that would protect them inside the home. However, what 
is clear from the data is that women’s sense of their own needs for justice and fair 
treatment overlap with a concern for community cohesion, the maintenance of their 
local support networks and the need to maintain family honour. These kinds of concerns 
are lost within Tilly’s model, which would seek to focus only on a citizen’s individual 
needs. 
This issue serves as an example that links to all three of Tilly’s three clusters of change. 
In terms of integrating trust networks into public politics, it emphasises how 
communities (one form of trust network) can be insulated from public politics and can 
function very much apart from institutions and systems of state. To this extent, then, 
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according to Tilly’s model – the more connected these networks become to state 
systems – for example in the way in which urban districts often have maliks in charge 
of state stamps of approval – the greater the change toward democratisation. This also 
connects with his stance on the need to eradicate autonomous power centres – or areas 
that exist and function outside of state jurisdiction. But as is clear from the data, these 
changes have been in place in some urban areas for many years, but have not occurred 
in rural communities. Furthermore, Tilly’s assumption presumes that the convergence 
of state and trust network serves in the overall interest of the population of individual 
citizens, when women (for example) can often see their interests defined in terms of 
collective family or community concerns that would be negatively affected by closer 
coordination with what is often seen as a predatory state. While over time, the argument 
runs, this would then provoke conflict and compromise, this would only be the case if a 
regime lasted long enough to inflict similar policies on the same communities 
consistently – an unlikely scenario, perhaps, in a fragile state.    
The example also speaks to the need in Tilly’s model for a reduction in categorical 
inequalities if democratisation is to occur. Women are certainly treated in some parts of 
Afghanistan as second-class citizens, and as such often have less access to state services 
and to justice than men. However, this is not a result of state policy against women, but 
rather state inability and/or unwillingness to intervene in ‘family’ and/or community 
affairs. Arguably, as has been seen throughout Afghanistan’s history, the more the state 
attempts to intervene in these issues, the greater the likelihood of conservative backlash 
and the worsening of the situation for women. Thus, this is more a case of changing 
norms and values over time than about the forceful intervention of the state.   Again, the 
difference between urban and rural perspectives on this issue is often stark and thus 
does not lend itself to country-wide generalisation.  
7.4.2 Assumptions of the constancy of citizenship across the urban/rural divide 
Related to the question of individual citizenship is the kind of citizenship that is 
experienced by or available to citizens in a given state. In its suggestion that the more 
constant the nature of citizenship across different social groups, the more democratic a 
country necessarily becomes, Tilly’s model by extension suggests that in states where 
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citizenship can be differentiated across these groups, democratisation is lacking. This 
requirement for constancy in citizenship comes with a concern for equality and breadth 
of access to state services, in an attempt to ensure that countries in which categorical 
inequalities occur, for example on the grounds of race, ethnicity or gender, are 
sufficiently penalised for this in terms of their progression along the democratisation 
continuum.  
While this serves a necessary purpose, however, it also rests on the assumption that 
uniform citizenship – again based on a relationship between the individual and the state 
– is a pre-requisite for democratisation, when, as evident from the data analysed in this 
study, people living in different parts of a given country can have different kinds of 
democratic relationships with the central government.  
Voting in elections provides a useful example. Whereas respondents in urban areas and 
in Kabul in particular generally appeared to have more contact with state institutions, a 
greater understanding of how these institutions and processes within them functioned, 
and higher expectations as to what they should provide for citizens, than their rural 
counterparts – many rural respondents still talked about the necessity of voting in 
elections and talked about how they would vote in forthcoming polls. This tendency to 
talk about participating in elections decreased with security levels, but not all rural areas 
are necessarily insecure. Respondents in rural Nangarhar and Balkh in particular talked 
about the importance of voting, albeit often as a community – collectively choosing a 
candidate in the village council meetings, for example – indicating that in spite of 
widespread fraud and a suspicion of central government, there are occasions in which 
residents of rural areas actively seek interaction with the state and participation in 
democratic processes. For this reason, in spite of the differences between urban and 
rural citizens of Afghanistan, in terms of access to services and the extent of their 
interaction with the state, there are still grounds to argue that democratisation – 
especially in terms of increased interaction and negotiation – occurs, albeit in different 
ways, across the urban/rural divide. In other words, differential citizenship can co-exist 
with democratisation, and does not necessarily indicate the existence of categorical 
inequalities.   
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7.4.3 Assumptions of the constancy of citizenship over time 
Implied in the section above is the way in which there may be certain times at which the 
relationship between citizen/communities and the central state are more interactive than 
others – meaning, that this relationship is not constant over time. Returning to Olivier 
Roy’s observation of the negotiated relationship between communities and the centre in 
Afghanistan as being one of ‘externality and compromise’ (Roy, 1994: 148), and 
drawing on the data gathered, it is possible to see how the relationship between citizen 
and state can vary over time. Evidently, this is central to Tilly’s theory, hence his taking 
an historical approach to the analysis of democratisation – and critical to his thesis is the 
way in which this variation rarely moves according to an upwards linear trajectory 
toward greater democratisation. Nevertheless, his assumption of movement taking place 
over time rests on the possibility of generalising across an entire population at any given 
moment in time, when it is plausible that different groups in society could move toward 
and away from greater interaction with the state simultaneously.  
As an example, former military commanders might at once retain local strongholds on 
power and influence but also hold positions of public office. This is the case in many 
provinces in Afghanistan, where former warlords are currently members of parliament. 
Given that formal disarmament was not completely successful when it was undertaken 
in the early years during the Bonn Process, many still control armed groups that can 
solidify their influence in a given area. These, then, are presumably examples of Tilly’s 
autonomous power centres. However, these individuals are not wholly determined to 
remain entirely autonomous from the state, given the benefits they can generate from 
holding a position of public office. These include access to patronage networks that the 
downwards provision of public services can provide. Thus, they do not fully comply 
with Tilly’s definition of autonomous power centres, maintaining as they do a certain 
interaction with the state which is at any given time negotiated and re-defined. A former 
parliamentarian and warlord in Paktia province, Pacha Khan Zadran, for example, 
threatened to gather armed forces and storm the capital if he was not re-instated as a 
winning candidate in elections in 2010, after having been disqualified for fraud – and 
yet after talks with the President did not carry out these threats (Coburn and Larson, 
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2013, forthcoming, chapter 7).   In a different kind of negotiation, the governor of Balkh 
province, Atta Mohammad Noor, refused to align himself with Karzai’s re-election 
campaign in the presidential poll of 2009, supporting the opposition candidate, 
Abdullah Abdullah, instead. When Karzai attempted to replace him, Atta was simply 
able to send his replacement back to Kabul in a taxi given the extent of his local power 
and influence in the area. Nevertheless, Atta still maintains a negotiated – if distanced – 
relationship with central government, upon which he is reliant for some resources, and 
for political support against his long-time rival, Abdul Rashid Dostum. These examples, 
alongside those mentioned by respondents in cases of land-grabbing by MPs and other 
‘state officials’, demonstrate the blurred boundary between ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ actors 
that exists, and that does not sit comfortably with western attempts to ‘statebuild’ or to 
measure democratisation. These actors can emphasise their connection to the state as 
and when it behoves their political and economic interests to do so, meaning that there 
is very little in the way of transparent, knowable due process that could bind them to a 
particular code of conduct, for example.     
7.4.4 Assumptions of the cohesiveness of the state structure 
 
The fourth assumption made by Tilly is very much related to the issue of constancy of 
state-citizen relations over time, and concerns the nature of the state as a coherent 
institution within which members play defined, internally-coordinated roles and hold a 
specific agenda. This speaks to different theoretical conceptions of the state, as 
discussed in chapter 1, such as those of the structuralist school which holds that a state 
system has a clearly defined, non-neutral agenda of its own, as opposed to the pluralist 
view which contends that the state is made up of individuals pursuing their own 
interests through state structures. In either argument, however, there is a fundamental 
assumption that some form of incentives to maintain a cohesive state structure exist for 
the officials employed within it. Even if no stated or perceived agenda is held, it is 
nevertheless in the interests of individual officials to function as part of a coherent set of 
institutions. 
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This is not always the case, however, in Afghanistan. Within line ministries, there is 
often a sense of institutional memory through the continued employment of staff who 
had worked in the same position under former regimes, which generates a sense of 
hierarchy and process (albeit cumbersome and bureaucratic). This is counteracted, 
however, by the reforms introduced since the international intervention in 2001, which 
have included Priority Reform and Restructuring (PRR) as part of conditions imposed 
through the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in order to access aid 
funds. These have seen new staff brought in and an attempt to introduce meritocratic 
hiring procedures, such as the holding of examinations and interviews for staff to 
reapply for their jobs. This has been less than successful due to the patronage networks 
that exist in ministries, with officials overriding examination results for example in 
order to ensure the hiring of relatives and friends. Still, what has also occurred has been 
the formation of ‘parallel institutional cultures’ (Kandiyoti, 2007; Larson, 2008: 54) 
where different sets of rules (and salary scales) exist for different staff members.  
Even within line ministries, then, there is little sense of a cohesive civil service – but 
this lack of coherence is even more apparent between ministries, due to the way in 
which hiring usually occurs on the basis of a new minister’s family connections. 
Whenever a minister is replaced, there is often a significant staff turnover also. As one 
woman MP for Kabul explained, “I think it would be better if the government did not 
introduce new ministers as frequently as they do – all of them come to office and fill 
their pockets with state funds, and they select all their family members to work as 
employees in the ministry” (Kabul 3 W). Coordination between different line ministries 
is rarely systematised and often dependent on the personalities involved in a given 
project.  
Parliamentarians in a given province also have little incentive to work together as a 
legislative body for the purposes of enhancing the local perspective of the state. In spite 
of their mandate to represent the official constituency of their province, as all 
parliamentarians are de facto elected from highly localised areas, such as a district or 
even village, the extent to which they represent the province as a whole is highly 
limited. This can take on an ethnic dimension also, given the way in which in many 
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parts of the country, different ethnic groups or qawms live in specific, homogenous 
geographical areas. As respondents in Balkh and Ghazni discussed, there was very little 
overlap between the areas of the province that different MPs served. Not elected on a 
party platform but as individuals, there is very little that holds individual officials 
together as a unified group of state representatives. This is perhaps most apparent in the 
lower house of parliament, where, in 1972 an observer remarked on the way in which 
“[t]he Wolesi Jirgah, in effect, houses 216 distinct parties: one for each member” 
(Weinbaum, 1972: 61).  
This causes a problem when attempting to use Tilly’s framework to measure 
democratisation – not because individual MPs are not necessarily committed to 
providing services to their constituents, but because the ‘state’ that citizens are assumed 
to have a relationship with is not a coherent entity in its own right, either in reality or in 
the public imaginary. Rather, it is a mechanism through which individuals can seek to 
further their own individual interests through the connection it provides to the central 
locus of decision making, itself exacerbated by the presidential system that has 
concentrated power at the centre. This then brings into question the assumption that 
trust networks can be ‘integrated’ – integrated into what, when the state does not exist 
as a cohesive institutional body? Further, it blurs boundaries once again between so-
called autonomous power centres and the state, when it is unclear what exactly these 
power centres are supposedly autonomous from.  
7.5  Is it possible to identify causes of change in these areas?   
Having looked at whether or not it is possible to locate Afghanistan on Tilly’s state 
capacity/democracy matrix, and having proposed that it is not, it is now relevant to ask 
whether it would be possible to map changes in democratisation according to Tilly’s 
model. The conclusions above render this second question somewhat problematic, 
however – the four key assumptions on which Tilly’s conceptualisation of 
democratisation and its relationship to state capacity rest can be challenged significantly 
when applied to a fragile context such as Afghanistan. In a similar manner, problems 
occur when trying to map shifts in the state-citizen relationship. These will be discussed 
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in turn below in relationship to Tilly’s four themes of breadth, equality, protection and 
mutually-binding consultation, and discussion of change further expanded in chapter 8. 
7.5.1 Changes in breadth 
In order to map changes in breadth, Tilly suggests a focus on the “[i]ncrease (decrease) 
in the share of the population having legally enforceable rights to communicate 
complaints about governmental performance to high officials’ (2007: 66). As discussed 
at length above (chapter 6), simply assessing the number of people with these 
enforceable rights is difficult in a context in which the difference between de jure 
‘rights’ and de facto ability to pursue these is significant. For this reason, this study 
looked instead at the breadth of perceptions of access to high officials for the purposes 
of communicating complaints, but again this did not provide an insight into the number 
or proportion of people considering themselves to have this access due to the way in 
which rural responses were very different from urban ones, often considering access to 
state officials to be unnecessary or a last resort. Plotting change according to this 
measure, then, is difficult – even if more formal measures were put in place by the state 
to ensure that a greater number of citizens were able to complain to state officials, the 
(voluntarily) limited interaction that rural respondents had with state structures would 
mean that they would be very unlikely to call upon the judicial system to assist them in 
a case of this sort, should they find their access to government officials denied. Simply 
assessing a change to the formal mechanisms in place would not then provide a useful 
proxy indicator for any actual change toward greater or lesser democratisation.  
7.5.2 Changes in equality 
Returning to Tilly’s suggested indicator of change in equality – a “[d]ecline (rise) in the 
number of distinct legal categories defining rights and obligations of different 
population segments vis-à-vis the state” (2007: 66) – it is possible to see how movement 
in this area might be difficult to trace meaningfully in that Afghan context. The 
existence of more rather than less legal categories of citizens indicates for Tilly an 
implication of de-democratisation, and yet as the data analyses in chapters 6 and 7 
show, the formal existence or absence of formal categories may not necessarily coincide 
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with the extent to which people perceive themselves to be in different categories in 
terms of their relationship with the state. The Afghan constitution makes it quite clear 
that men and women hold equal rights before the law and a citizenship that is equally 
valid, and yet there are still many instances in which women consider themselves to be 
‘second-class’ citizens, or at a distinct disadvantage as compared to men when needing 
to access state services. This is due to the fact that the constitution is only one of a 
number of different sources of legitimate rule-systems, with Sharia providing perhaps 
the most powerful in many areas, and customary law also holding a significant degree 
of value among citizens (Coburn and Dempsey, 2010; Coburn, 2011). The interplay 
between these different systems allows for a certain fluidity in interpretation of all three, 
but most notably of the interpretations of the constitution, being the most recently 
introduced.   
This also ties in to the discussion about the constancy or uniformity of citizenship for 
individuals that Tilly assumes a necessary tenet of democracy, when in Afghanistan for 
example equality is often measured in terms of equal representation of groups or 
communities rather than individuals. 
To measure change in equality, then, in the Afghan context, is to move beyond the mere 
existence of legal categories and look at the way in which relationships between 
different segments of the society interact with the central government on a regular basis. 
A new set of questions needs to be developed to encapsulate this. Basic initial queries 
could include: Are these segments represented in the central and local branches of  of 
government, for example, if so, how? What does representation constitute, and has it 
changed over time? What are the factors that would allow people to consider 
themselves equal to other Afghans? Taking these questions forward, a detailed 
examination of indicators that might assess changing levels of perceived equality 
(alongside Tilly’s other three themes) is given in chapter 8.        
7.5.3 Changes in protection 
As a means to measure change in levels of protection for citizens against arbitrary state 
action, Tilly suggests as an example focusing on the “[d]ecrease (increase) in the 
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proportion of the population imprisoned without legal sentencing or legal recourse” 
(2007: 66). Due to the difficulty in gaining these kinds of figures in Afghanistan for the 
current regime, when analysing protection levels in the data the researcher has looked 
instead at perceptions of the visibility and accountability of the legal process as a 
broader theme instead. Measuring change in these perceptions, as is the case with all 
four themes, is difficult, partly because it would need to rely on respondents’ 
retrospective comparisons of previous regimes. Controlling for ethnicity, region, and 
urban/rural differences, however, it may be possible to build a comprehensive picture of 
the extent to which the current regime has instituted an improvement or decline in the 
transparency of legal processes as compared to its predecessors. Combining this data 
with any available statistics on past regimes would serve to strengthen this approach. It 
may also be possible to measure change in perceived levels of protection as it has 
occurred within the current regime, if at all, although these changes are likely to be less 
dramatic (in terms of the time it takes for legislation to pass through parliament, become 
enforced country-wide and have an impact on the lives of ‘ordinary’ citizens. 
Nevertheless, combining these perspectives with any incidences of changed legislation 
could be another means of strengthening this form of comparison.  
7.5.4 Changes in mutually-binding consultation 
In order to measure change in Tilly’s final theme, mutually-binding consultation, he 
suggests mapping the “[i]ncrease (decrease) in the share of all citizens’ complaints 
regarding denial of legally mandated benefits that result in the delivery of those 
benefits” (2007:66). Again as a result of lack of data in this field, and the need to focus 
on perspectives rather than ‘hard data’, the researcher analysed local perspectives on 
service provision and complaints procedures more generally. Measuring change in these 
perspectives again would be problematic due to the differences in service availability 
across urban and rural areas, and across different parts of the country. Further, and 
perhaps more importantly, procedures for complaints appear to be available in highly 
institutionalised state bureaucracies and not so much in those existing in fragile states, 
which often require significant post-war rebuilding and re-structuring. Very few 
procedures for citizen complaints exist in Afghanistan, meaning that when complaints 
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are made they are made through local interlocutors to a regional patron, or in person to 
a member of parliament though visiting their private residences in Kabul. This renders 
the question of measuring how and to what extent these processes have changed 
somewhat difficult to answer due to the fluidity of complaints practices and the lack of 
formal structure available. This does not mean necessarily that people are unable to 
complain – but simply that they do so in a manner that does not comply with Tilly’s 
form of measurement.     
7.6 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has analysed the data set as regards to the themes of protection and 
mutually-binding consultation, attempting to apply Tilly’s framework to the qualitative 
data collected. Several problems were encountered, as in the first two themes of breadth 
and equality discussed in chapter 6. Across all four themes, assumptions underlying 
Tilly’s model became clear, concerning specifically the individuality of citizenship, the 
constancy of citizenship across urban/rural populations, the constancy of citizenship 
over time and the cohesiveness of the state structure. These assumptions simply do not 
hold in the fragile context of Afghanistan, as the data shows. This being the case, it is 
possible to assert that it is not possible to locate Afghanistan on Tilly’s state 
capacity/democracy matrix, as the model currently exists. However, change nonetheless 
occurs in the ruler/ruled relationship, as the data has also shown. While measuring 
change in each of Tilly’s four areas remains difficult, it may not be impossible if a new 
set of questions and indicators could be developed. This task is attempted in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 8: ADAPTING TILLY TO FIT A FRAGILE CONTEXT: 
INTRODUCING ‘COMPREHENSIVE DEMOCRATIC INDICTORS’ 
8.1 Introduction  
Tilly’s model makes several key assumptions about the nature of the state and its 
relationship to citizens that are difficult to apply to Afghanistan, and potentially to other 
fragile contexts. At the same time, however, these contexts cannot be discounted from 
attempts to measure democratisation, due to some aspects of Tilly’s model applying to 
some parts of the population at certain times, and to changes that do occur in the 
relationship between ruler and ruled. It is thus necessary to ask whether or not 
amendments could be made to the model to render it more appropriate to these cases. 
This chapter explores whether such amendments might be possible. First, it summarises 
the problems found with Tilly’s model so far. Following this, it focuses on the state-
citizen (or SC) relationship and asks whether the concept of a ‘centre-community’ (CC) 
relationship might serve as a more appropriate construct for the analysis of 
democratisation in fragile states. The application of this alternative however proves in 
itself problematic due to the nature of the differences between urban and rural 
populations in Afghanistan. This is discussed before the possibility of combing both 
state-citizen (SC) and centre-community (CC) constructs in the same model is 
considered. Finally, the chapter discusses the way in which this new approach might 
affect the theory, measurement and practice of democratisation in fragile states. 
8.2 Summary so far  
This thesis has attempted to apply Tilly’s model for measuring levels of democratisation 
to the Afghan case. Before the researcher attempted to do so, however, she made certain 
amendments to the model – such as shifting the focus of Tilly’s suggested indicators of 
democratisation from one of ‘hard data’ to one of respondent perspectives, applying an 
interpretivist approach to data analysis instead of a positivist one. She argued that this 
change in methodological approach does not alter the principles on which Tilly’s model 
rests, but is a change fundamental to the application of the model to fragile contexts in 
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which ‘hard data’ is difficult to attain and questionable in reliability. Evidently, this 
makes the ‘measurement’ of democratisation more difficult because perceptions shift 
depending on the context in which interviews are conducted. However, it does not 
preclude analysis of Tilly’s four themes of breadth, equality, protection and mutually 
binding consultation.   
When applying the data collected to the model in chapters 6 and 7, the researcher found 
that there were also several key problems concerning the underlying principles on 
which it rests. These problems – more fundamental than the kinds of indicators used for 
measurement – related not to the way in which Afghanistan was simply an unsuitable 
case for analysis, because some aspects of Tilly’s model (such as the levels of 
interaction between individual citizens and state institutions) clearly applied usefully to 
the exploration of how democratisation levels were changing in some (largely urban) 
parts of the country. Rather, the problems related to the way in which assumptions were 
made about the all-encompassing nature of citizenship in the country, and the lack of 
space for variability in the kinds of relationships held between different citizens and 
different aspects of the state system – a variability that was not necessarily negative or 
‘undemocratic’.  
The first of these assumptions concerns a presumed individuality of citizenship as 
present or desirable across the entirety of a given state, which does not hold in the 
Afghan case in many places where decisions are made and interests pursued 
collectively, either as part of a family, wider family or larger community group. This 
means that greater value is often placed by respondents on a state official’s ability to 
meet community needs, for example, rather than those of individual citizens. The 
second assumption concerns the presumed constancy of citizenship across the 
urban/rural divide – the notion that all communities across all parts of the state hold or 
should be able to hold a similar relationship and form of interaction with the state 
system. This is problematic in Afghanistan where, historically, rural and urban 
communities have interacted with the state in very different ways.  The third assumption 
concerns the constancy of citizenship over time, in its presumption that at any given 
moment, a citizen is likely to consider their relationship to the state in the same way. 
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This is not always the case in Afghanistan where a person can simultaneously run for 
(and attain) political office and comply with the official demands of such a position, but 
also maintain resource supplies of their own should they consider their personal 
influence to be under threat of state cooption. The final assumption concerns the 
cohesiveness of the state structure, in presuming that all representatives of the state 
apparatus present a unified body of official administration, when in fact for many in 
Afghanistan a position within the state structure provides simply a means of furthering 
personal gains and patronage networks rather than the signing up to a cohesive political 
or administrative agenda.   
These assumptions render problematic the application of Tilly’s model to Afghanistan, 
and thus the question remains – would it be possible to alter the model further, to the 
point at which it becomes more appropriate for application to these cases, so that 
changes in the ruler-ruled relationship might be measured even if they do not match up 
with standard definitions of democraticness? Or would this change, necessarily to 
fundamental principles of Tilly’s approach, render the model so different from its 
original form that it could no longer be considered part of the same process of analysis? 
This will be discussed further in the following sections.  
8.3 State/citizen: centre/community?  
Discussed above are some of the problems with the emphasis that Tilly (along with 
other recent scholars) has put on the state/citizen relationship. While Tilly himself does 
not come from the liberal school explicitly, this focus nevertheless plays into liberal 
ideas about the nature of democracy and how it should affect the relationship between 
individuals in a given country and the state apparatus. It focuses on the individual, on 
the authority and cohesiveness of the state, on protection from arbitrary state action, and 
on political rights and civil liberties. While these are no doubt desirable characteristics 
of a political system, they do not take into account the variability described above in 
terms of the fluidity of relationships between state and citizenry in Afghanistan. There 
are problems with the applicability of liberal notions of both the ‘state’ and the ‘citizen’. 
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Whether it would be possible to replace these terms, then, seems a valid route of 
enquiry. This would not purely be a semantic change, but a move toward a construct 
that could provide a more appropriate framework through which to view the 
relationship between rulers and ruled in Afghanistan.  
Clear from the analysis of the data collected for this study have been the ways in which 
the community has taken precedence over individual interests for many within Afghan 
society. Looking back once again to the historical analysis of Olivier Roy, and his 
description of a typical relationship of ‘externality and compromise’ between rulers and 
ruled, he is referring to the ways in which communities – under the stewardship of 
elders and leaders acting as interlocutors – maintained a negotiated relationship with the 
ruling powers that was fluid and subject to change at different points (Roy, 1994: 148). 
Barfield discusses this relationship in some depth also, referring to the ways in which 
leaders would often seek to avoid violent uprising through compromising with 
communities differentially (i.e., with different communities and different ways, 
depending on their location, potential threat to central rule, and historical  relationship 
with the King) over issues of taxation and conscription, for example (2010:198).    
The term ‘community’ appears to work well as a potential alternative to a focus on the 
‘citizen’. First, it moves focus away from the individual, and allows for a sense of 
collective identity that is much more prevalent in Afghanistan than that of individual 
interests and needs. Second, it can be used to refer to a number of different kinds of 
people group – whether a tribe, qawm, village, ethnic group or district – all of which are 
communities within which citizens can be included at any one point in time, depending 
on how they choose to define themselves at a given moment. Also, it allows for regional 
differentiation – whereas for example tribes are more commonly found among Pashtun 
groups in the south, ethnic groups and qawms provide a more common means of 
collective mobilisation in the north and west of the country. The term ‘community’ 
could be applied differentially and not fixed to a certain group – but at the same time 
still denote a kind of relationship with the ruling powers that could be compared across 
the country.  
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The attempt to apply Tilly’s model to the Afghan case has also demonstrated problems 
with the way in which ‘the state’ is portrayed. As mentioned above, Tilly makes 
assumptions about the cohesiveness of the state structure. While he allows for 
differences in state capacity, and measures the effect of changing levels of state capacity 
on democratisation processes – he considers even states with low capacity to be unified 
entities of some sort, with some agency, surviving at this point in time more than ever in 
history as a result of the protection provided by international institutions (2007:164). 
Further, it is implied that the reach of the state is (or should be) uniform across different 
parts of a given country; that the ‘state’ is perceived in the same way by citizens across 
urban and rural populations.  
As a potential alternative, the term ‘centre’ appears more appropriate to describe the 
ruling powers that govern Afghanistan. This is for several reasons. First, that ‘centre’ 
implies a nucleus of political activity, surrounding which concentric circles of state 
influence might emanate but which decrease with distance – the further away from the 
centre a given region, the weaker the influence of central state structures (although in 
urban areas regional state institutions may generate their own circles of influence). As 
demonstrated by the data analysed in chapters 6 and 7, Kabul represents an entirely 
different political entity to any other part of Afghanistan, facilitating a different kind of 
connection with state structures for its population that do other urban areas. Second, the 
term ‘centre’ allows for the possibility of satellite centres of authority to exist on the 
periphery of state influence – which are connected to the state but also maintain a 
certain degree of autonomy in that they exist as urban areas in regions where state 
influence is weak. Third, ‘centre’ does not imply a necessarily cohesive political or 
administrative agenda, held by any member of the state administration, but instead 
denotes a space from which patronage networks and top-down decision-making 
emanate. The difference here is that other sites of political authority – for example, 
governorships in provinces – can maintain their allegiance to the state structure when it 
comes to claiming resources, but at the same time are not committed to maintaining that 
allegiance when it comes to promoting state policy, for example. The use of the 
alternative term ‘centre’ would not preclude the existence of the state administration, 
but would recognise the way in which its reach was not as universal as the term ‘state’ 
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has come to suggest. It would account for the manner in which provincial governorships 
are at once connected to and distanced from the state administration.  
There has been considerable use of the term ‘centre/periphery’ in the literature on 
statebuilding, used to describe the relationships between central governments and 
border regions in fragile contexts, which are often weak and unstructured (Perkman and 
Sum, 2002; Cramer and Goodhand, 2002; Maroya, 2003; Goodhand, 2009). In 
particular, the political economy of border regions has come under scrutiny and analysts 
have pointed to the way in which these areas often govern themselves and are able to 
extract rents from lucrative cross-border trade deals without having to rely on central 
state authority (Goodhand, 2009). This conceptualisation is certainly appropriate to the 
Afghan case, where for example in Nangarhar province the control of the border 
economy is very much in the hands of Governor Sherzai. However, the centre-periphery 
model is also too limited to describe the relationship that Sherzai continues to maintain 
with the state, which is very much negotiated and not as static as the term suggests: he 
is at once part of the centre and the periphery.  
The problems with this term are perhaps evident in the example of electoral fraud, 
which was in actuality and perceived by Afghans and international observers to be 
widespread in the 2009 and 2010 elections (NDI, 2011; Coburn and Larson, 2013, 
forthcoming). When responding to the allegations of fraud, election officials were quick 
to assign incidences of irregularities to peripheral areas, assigning district and provincial 
election officers to undergo investigation (Filkins, 2009).This may well have been the 
case – indeed, according to maps produced by the National Democratic Institute, the 
most numerically significant incidences of fraud did indeed occur in some of the most 
remote areas in the south and east of Afghanistan (NDI, 2010). However, fraud did not 
only occur in these areas, and was (as demonstrated in NDI’s maps, and according to 
several accounts of researchers working for the AREU at the time) prevalent across 
Kabul province also, in terms of vote numbers being changed at local polling stations 
and then changed again before initial results were published by the IEC headquarters in 
Kabul (Coburn and Larson, 2013, forthcoming). This indicates that while centre-
periphery dynamics are an important means of analysing the relationship between the 
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state and remote areas within the country, they cannot encompass the way in which 
‘periphery’-type behaviour occurs in spaces that are not ‘peripheral’ at all. In this sense, 
centre/community seems to provide a more appropriate framework through which to 
assess the relationship between rulers and the ruled in Afghanistan, because 
communities exist both at the centre and at the periphery and their behaviour in relation 
to the state is not determined necessarily by geographical location.    
If, then, this new construct of centre-community could be used to replace that of the 
state-citizen, it is necessary to ask whether it would still be applicable to measures and 
conceptualisations of democratisation. The danger is that while this may be an entirely 
more appropriate term to describe the relationship between ruler and ruled in fragile 
contexts, it describes only what exists, and not any form of democratic political rule. In 
this sense, it would function as a descriptive tool only and not as a means of making 
normative judgements as to the ‘value’ or merit of the political system.  Could the 
centre-community construct be used as a basis for the measurement of democratisation? 
If so, how? What characteristics of this relationship would need to be evident before a 
regime could be classified as a democracy? What space, if any, would exist within such 
a framework for the guarantee of individual freedoms? How and to whom would 
communities be held accountable? Essentially: do Tilly’s indicators still apply? 
To answer these questions, it is necessary to return briefly to definitions of democracy, 
as used and justified in the opening chapters of this thesis. If democracy is to be defined 
as: a political system in which individuals or groups of individuals within a given state, 
institution or political community have the right and ability to determine the ways in 
which they and their collective resources are governed and to whom decision-making 
power is assigned – as was suggested in chapter 1, then it is arguable that a centre-
community framework would be compatible with democracy. In this definition, 
individuals are included but they comprise a political community of sorts – whether as 
part of a state, or as part of a more localised collective body.  The definition here refers 
primarily to the allocation of resources and decision-making powers, rather than to the 
liberal concepts of individual property rights and freedom of speech – and in doing so 
follows Adam Przeworski’s observation that, in a minimalist definition such as this one, 
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it can be assumed that liberal characteristics of governance could be included here 
should people choose rulers for whom these would be a priority (Przeworski, 1999).  
This definition of democracy emphasises public agency, and the opportunity to 
participate in decisions concerning how and through what means their resources are 
distributed – neither of which are necessarily excluded by a focus on the centre-
community instead of the state-citizen.  
In terms of Tilly’s framework, the four themes of breadth, equality, protection and 
mutually-binding consultation are also still applicable, if in a modified sense. Breadth 
and equality would refer to the way in which communities of all ethnic backgrounds, 
religions and classes could interact with processes of decision-making at the centre in 
the same manner – ensuring that no group was systematically excluded from these 
central decision-making processes, particularly in terms of resource allocation.  
Afghanistan might be considered relatively progressive when considering ethnic 
divisions, here, in that most ethnic groups do have access to central decision-making 
under the Karzai administration (and certainly as compared to the Taliban regime, 
which excluded Hazara and Shia groups) – but would ‘score’ negatively in terms of its 
unwillingness or inability to combat the systematic marginalisation of women in 
society, perhaps. Protection would refer to the way in which communities were able to 
take collective action against the central authorities should they consider their 
livelihoods or resources under threat as a result of arbitrary state activity. This could 
still involve a focus on knowable legal process and would not need to detract in any 
significant way from Tilly’s own stipulations for measurement, but could include the 
option for processes to be community-driven as well as available to individuals. 
Mutually-binding consultation would apply to the way in which communities could 
expect central authorities to provide services in return for taxation and the performance 
of other civic duties, perhaps – but could also stipulate fixed processes through which 
communities could hold central authorities to account should they not deliver mutually-
agreed services. In this sense, any new framework based on a centre-community 
construct would not bend to fit the fluid manner in which communities bargain 
differentially with the centre, depending on past histories of preferential treatment or the 
extent of the threat they could pose to central authorities, and thus would impose some 
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level of uniformity in terms of the agreed relationship or social contract between 
communities and the state administration.  However, it would move away from the 
assumption of this uniformity, and allow space for different kinds of communities to 
make a case against the centre.  
8.4 The problematic urban elite 
In replacing a focus on the state-citizen with that of the centre-community, however, a 
critical problem occurs, relating to the way in which Kabul respondents and some of the 
urban respondents in Nangarhar and Balkh talked about their expectations of the state. 
In these responses, differentiating from those in rural areas, it was clear that greater, 
more transparent interaction with the state was desired and not only through collective 
representation, but for individuals also. Greater accountability for services was 
expressed as a potentially positive change. Respondents in Kabul and in urban areas in 
the provinces were also more likely to describe a desire for greater state control over so-
called ‘autonomous power centres’ – influential party and ex-Jihadi leaders, for 
example, and to enforce the rule of law. In short, these responses appeared to uphold 
Tilly’s assumptions about the necessity for a focus on the state-citizen relationship 
when considering change toward democratisation.  
This could be partly a result of the way in which ‘the state’ is a very much more 
prevalent aspect of daily life in the city of Kabul than it is elsewhere in the country. 
Line ministries tend to employ a considerable staff base, in spite of poor levels of pay, 
and this results in the proportion of Kabul residents who know someone working in a 
government ministry significantly high. Many residents of Kabul have access to 
television and radio stations, through which parliamentary sessions, presidential 
speeches and state messages are broadcast on a regular basis. Knowledge of 
governmental affairs is widespread as a result. While state representatives may still not 
act as a cohesive whole, they, as ‘the government’, are nevertheless the subject of 
considerable scrutiny among residents.  
Evidently, there were some aspects of Kabul respondents’ responses that did not differ 
greatly from their provincial counterparts – such as the lack of emphasis on taxation, 
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and the propensity for some urban communities to function very much as communities, 
rather than groups of individual families, particularly in the suburbs. By and large, 
however, Kabul respondents were likely to express perspectives on their relationship to 
state institutions that coincided more accurately with Tilly’s state-citizen emphasis than 
with the centre-community model suggested above.  This is not to suggest that urban 
responses were in some way ‘better’ or ‘more democratic’ than rural ones, but simply 
implies that urban communities may have come to expect and perhaps rely on more 
regular interaction with central authorities. Likewise, it does not signify that rural 
communities are any ‘less democratic’ than their urban counterparts. However, it should 
be stated also that further research would be needed to substantiate this finding, given 
that Kabul in particular was not considered as a case study in this research in its own 
right but simply used as a means of comparison with three other provinces in which 
more detailed research was carried out.      
This being the case, it is problematic to simply discard the state-citizen construct when 
it appears to provide a framework adequate to describe the aspirations of some urban 
citizens, if not their rural counterparts, for their relationship to central authorities. 
Although residents of Kabul city make up only approximately one tenth of the country’s 
population, (Central Statistics Organisation, 2012a), this is still significant. In some 
parts of the capital, communities remain as cohesive, if not more so, as they do in rural 
areas – and yet in other parts, individual families function very much more 
autonomously from their broader collective identity groups. The term ‘community’, 
then, does not always apply. Comprising part of the centre themselves, they are not as 
separate and/or autonomous from power structures in the capital as people in rural 
areas. In sum, the variation that exists throughout the country in terms of its citizens’ 
relationship with central authorities – the fact that makes it difficult to apply Tilly’s 
model – is also the problem preventing a complete application of the centre-community 
model. 
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8.5 Possibility of combining both: The CDI approach  
As a result of this complexity, then, it necessary to ask whether a model combining both 
approaches would be feasible, or theoretically sound. Would it be possible to promote a 
model for the conceptualisation, measurement and even practice of democratisation in 
fragile states that included alternatives: a means to focus on the state/citizen but also on 
the centre/community in areas where the latter would prove more appropriate? This 
would evidently make for a more complicated analysis, but would avoid the over-
simplification of presuming all relationships between ruler and ruled do and should take 
the format of a liberal democratic framework. It would still hold to principles of 
participation and accountability, but would combine these with the acknowledgement of 
the realities of community mobilisation in many non-western contexts. The critical 
motivation again refers to the central hypothesis that fragile contexts cannot be 
excluded from democratisation measures simply because they are fragile. Measuring 
democratisation should still be conceived of in terms of the changing relationship 
between ruler and ruled in these contexts, but a more nuanced approach is necessary to 
capture these changes. The following chart demonstrates the comparative advantages of 
applying the centre-community framework to fragile contexts, emphasising also where 
and when a state-citizen approach still may remain valid and useful. 
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Table 14: Comparative advantages of the centre-community framework 
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(Table 14 cont.) 
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Table 14 demonstrates ways in which using the community/centre model might help to 
capture changes in the dynamics between ruler and ruled in fragile contexts – in 
suggesting that this relationship may change but that changes that do occur may be 
missed through standard conceptualisations of the state-citizen relationship. For 
example, under mutually-binding consultation, one of the indicators used in this study 
was that respondents would express familiarity with institutions of state and recount 
examples of taking complaints to them. However, in rural areas in fragile states it is 
unlikely that individuals themselves go through the processes of taking complaints to 
the state, due to the resources required to make the often significant journeys to these 
institutions which are often located in a district or provincial centre. Instead, it would be 
much more common for community leaders to act as interlocutors for the community as 
a whole. This does not preclude the potential for changes to take place in the 
relationship between community and state, however – visits to state institutions may 
become more frequent, for example, as more is invested by the central government in 
rural development; or interactions may become more fraught over time given the lack of 
delivery of expected services. Either way, these changes are likely to be missed with a 
focus purely on the relationship between individual citizens and the state. At the same 
time, there are still occasions when a state-citizen approach might yet be more 
appropriate in fragile contexts, particularly in urban areas where, continuing with this 
example, respondents living in close proximity to state institutions may interact with 
them on a regular basis and become more familiar with processes of filing complaints 
about services individually.  
8.5.1 Operationalising the Comprehensive Democratisation Indicators (CDI) approach 
Clearly, there are some advantages in combining these two approaches in a single 
model. Overall, this model could allow a more comprehensive analysis of 
democratisation in fragile states, and thus for the time being will be referred to as the 
Comprehensive Democratisation Indicators (CDI) approach. Critically, however, it is 
necessary to consider how this model might be put into use by analysts or practitioners 
of democratisation, and what it could be used for.  
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First, following Tilly, before attempting to assess any kind of democratisation change in 
a given community or area, researchers would need to develop a detailed historical 
narrative of the area in terms of its relationship to central authorities and in terms of the 
nature of public politics therein over time. Within this, several questions would need to 
be asked about the subjects and location of enquiry in order to determine whether to use 
primarily centre-community indicators,,  primarily state-citizen indicators or a thorough 
combination of both. Answers to these questions could be determined through an 
analysis of proximity to the centre (whether to a capital city or provincial centre, as in 
either case, institutions of central government exist) and the historical relationship of 
communities in the area to institutions of state.  Furthermore, questions could be asked 
of respondents about the ways in which they identified themselves, combined with 
existing secondary information on the types of communities living in the area (tribes, 
qawms, single ethnic groups, or a mixture of different people groups living together in 
an urban setting). Some locations may be too complex to fit into one of the two 
approaches. In the Dasht-e Barchi area of western Kabul, for example (classed as a 
suburb for the purposes of this research), the population is largely from the Hazara 
ethnicity but within this, residents tend to live in blocs of streets grouped according to 
their places of origin. Most have migrated to the city from different parts of the central 
highlands, and so some streets are comprised entirely of residents originating from 
Behsud district in Wardak province, some from central Bamiyan province, and some 
from Jaghori district in Ghazni province.  These communities remain strongly cohesive 
in spite of their urban setting, and thus in this case, a completely mixed approach 
combining both centre-community and state-citizen would be most appropriate.  
Given that the suggested approach remains perceptions-based – although does not 
preclude comparison with ‘hard data’ such as that suggested by Tilly, or Freedom 
House measures, should these happen to be available in the context in question – 
research would need to take place over a series of intervals, possibly each year for five 
years, in the same communities, for example, in order to note change. This evidently 
brings with it limitations in terms of practicality and access, one of the key problems 
with this approach (see section 8.6 below for a further discussion on the limitations of 
CDI). Nevertheless, the following table outlines some tentative suggestions for potential 
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indicators that could be used for a combined state/citizen and centre/community 
methodology.  
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Table 15: Suggestions for operationalising the joint model 
Theme Tilly- change S/C indicators Change? C/C indicators Change? 
Breadth “[i]ncrease 
(decrease) in the 
share of the 
population 
having legally 
enforceable 
rights to 
communicate 
complaints about 
governmental 
performance to 
high officials” 
(2007: 66). 
1) Respondents from a variety 
of ethnic and social 
backgrounds perceive their 
access to state officials to be 
unhindered and give 
examples 
 
Looking for: 
a) similarities across 
different case 
study provinces 
b) similarities across 
urban and rural 
respondents 
c) similarities across 
male and female 
responses 
Increase/decrease 
in the number of 
respondents 
across different 
social groups who 
expressly desire 
access to state 
institutions and 
officials who 
perceive this 
access to be 
unhindered  
Respondents 
from a variety 
of ethnic/social 
groups perceive 
their community 
to have access 
to central 
services and 
government 
officials 
Increase/decrease 
in the number of 
respondents 
across different 
social groups who 
consider their 
communities to 
have access to 
central services 
and government 
officials, and give 
examples of this 
as a regular 
occurrence 
2) Respondents refer to legal 
procedures for recourse 
should their access to officials 
be hindered 
Increase/decrease 
in the number of 
respondents 
expressing 
knowledge about 
legal procedures 
for complaint 
Respondents 
discuss how 
they would 
notify central 
authorities 
should they 
have problems 
accessing 
officials 
Increase/decrease 
in the number of 
community 
leaders expressing 
interactions with 
the centre as a 
means to lodge a 
complaint 
Equality “[d]ecline (rise) 
in the number of 
distinct legal 
categories 
defining rights 
and obligations 
of different 
population 
segments vis-à-
vis the state” 
(2007: 66) 
1)Respondents consider their 
own status vis-à-vis the state 
to be equal to that of others, 
for example in terms of 
access to services 
Looking for: 
a) Female 
respondents 
consider 
themselves to have 
similar rights and 
duties vis-à-vis the 
state as their male 
counterparts 
b) Little difference 
between different 
ethnic responses 
concerning their 
perceived status 
vis-à-vis the state 
Increase/decrease 
in the number of 
complaints made 
by respondents 
about different 
social groups 
perceived as 
being treated 
differentially in 
terms of state 
service provision 
Respondents 
consider their 
community’s 
status vis-à-vis 
central 
authorities to be 
equal to that of 
others, for 
example in 
terms of access 
to services.  
Increase/decrease 
in the number of 
complaints made 
by respondents 
about different 
social groups 
perceived as 
being treated 
differentially in 
terms of state (or 
central) service 
provision 
2)Respondents consider their 
votes in elections to carry as 
much weight as those of other 
citizens 
Increase/decrease 
in respondents’ 
stated confidence 
in the impartiality 
of the electoral 
system 
Respondents 
consider their 
community 
votes to be valid 
and to 
potentially 
impact future 
connections 
with the centre 
Increase/decrease 
in the number of 
respondents 
referring to the 
process of 
national elections 
as a community 
event 
Protection “[d]ecrease 
(increase) in the 
proportion of the 
population 
imprisoned 
without legal 
sentencing or 
legal recourse” 
1) Respondents refer to 
common procedures through 
which arbitrary state action 
can be countered and give 
examples of when this has 
been done 
Increase/decrease 
in number of 
respondents 
demonstrating 
knowledge of 
procedures for 
countering state 
action 
Respondents 
refer to 
community 
resistance 
against arbitrary 
state action 
Increase/decrease 
in the number of 
incidences of 
peaceful 
community 
resistance to the 
state that have had 
results. 
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(2007: 66) 2) Respondents express 
confidence in the judicial 
system 
Increase/decrease 
in levels of 
confidence in the 
judicial system eg 
through examples 
of positive 
interactions with 
district courts 
Respondents 
express 
familiarity with 
the judicial 
system 
Increase/decrease 
in the number of 
respondents 
referring to any 
interaction of 
their community 
with central 
judicial system 
3) Respondents consider 
current legal processes more 
accountable /knowable than 
in past regimes 
Increase/decrease 
in positive 
comparisons of 
legal processes in 
past regimes with 
present ones  
Respondents 
consider current 
legal processes 
more 
accountable 
/knowable than 
in past regimes 
Increase/decrease 
in the number of 
community 
leaders expressing 
awareness of 
current legal 
processes  and 
comparing them 
favourably to 
those of past 
regimes 
Mutually 
binding 
consultation 
“[i]ncrease 
(decrease) in the 
share of all 
citizens’ 
complaints 
regarding denial 
of legally 
mandated 
benefits that 
result in the 
delivery of those 
benefits” 
(2007:66). 
1) Respondents express 
expectations concerning state-
provided services and indicate 
that these are generally met 
and likely to continue 
Increase/decrease 
in positive 
examples given 
concerning 
respondents’ 
experiences of 
state service 
provision 
Respondents 
express 
expectations 
concerning 
centrally-
provided 
services and 
confidence in 
their 
sustainability 
Increase/decrease 
in respondents 
attributing 
development 
projects to central 
(as opposed to 
individual-patron) 
sources 
2) Respondents express 
familiarity with state 
institutions and recount 
examples of taking 
complaints about service 
provision to them 
Greater/lesser 
proportion of 
respondents give 
examples of 
taking complaints 
to state 
institutions and 
refer to a process 
for doing so  
Community 
leaders recount 
examples of 
taking 
complaints 
about service 
provision to 
central 
institutions, 
rather than to 
individuals 
Increase/decrease 
in the number of 
incidences 
reported by 
respondents of 
community 
leaders taking 
complaints to 
central institutions  
(Table 15 cont.) 
 
Indicators and potential determinants of change specified in the centre/community 
column in this table attempt to address some of the problems with measuring change in 
democratisation in fragile states according to the state/citizen model, as outlined at the 
end of chapter 6. These relate largely but not exclusively to rural areas. In some cases, 
only slight alterations have been made in the wording between state/citizen and 
centre/community indicators. As will be explained below, however, even this seemingly 
insignificant change can expand analytical capacity significantly. In two cases, marked 
in red, indicators are the same across both categories – implying that they would apply 
equally in either case.  
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8.5.2 Suggested indicators for changes in breadth 
 S/C change in breadth 1: Increase/decrease in the number of respondents across 
different social groups who expressly desire access to state institutions and 
officials who perceive this access to be unhindered 
 S/C change in breadth 2: Increase/decrease in the number of respondents 
expressing knowledge about legal procedures for complaint 
 
When looking at potential means to measure change in breadth in chapter 7, one of the 
key problems that emerged was the way in which rural respondents did not expressly 
desire access to state officials, hence the difficulty in assessing whether or not this 
access had been hindered for certain groups. Thus, a slight change was required in terms 
of the way in which the state/citizen indicator of change was worded – specifying its 
relevance only to respondents “who expressly desire access to state institutions and 
officials” – and new indicators of change included under the centre/community column: 
 C/C change in breadth 1: Increase/decrease in the number of respondents across 
different social groups who consider their communities to have access to central 
services and government officials, and give examples of this as a regular 
occurrence 
 C/C change in breadth 2:  Increase/decrease in the number of community leaders 
expressing interactions with the centre as a means to lodge a complaint 
These allow greater flexibility of measurement when assessing rural (and possibly some 
semi-urban) communities, as they focus on communities rather than individuals and on 
the agency of community leaders in their roles of interaction with the centre on behalf 
of local populations. Through these measures, it could be possible to gauge increasing 
or decreasing levels of interaction between communities and the centre, and also the 
nature of these interactions when dealing with complaints.  
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8.5.3 Suggested indicators for changes in equality 
 S/C change in equality 1: Increase/decrease in the number of complaints made 
by respondents about different social groups perceived as being treated 
differentially in terms of state service provision 
 S/C change in equality 2: Increase/decrease in respondents’ stated confidence in 
the impartiality of the electoral system 
When considering the potential to measure change in equality according to state/citizen 
indicators in chapter 7, one of the problems encountered was the way in which the 
formal existence or absence of categories of citizens, for example as written in a state 
constitution, may not necessarily coincide with the extent to which people perceive 
themselves to be categorised by the state. Furthermore, these indicators in their original 
form tended to assume individual grievances as opposed to collective ones, whereas in 
Afghanistan for example equality is often measured in terms of the equal representation 
of groups or communities rather than that of individuals. As such, the researcher has 
amended the S/C indicators to cover a broader spectrum of individual and collective 
identities, which now refer to the impartiality of the electoral system as a whole rather 
than whether an individual considers their vote to hold the same weight as others. To 
capture the dynamics of rural communities’ sense of equal treatment by the state, the 
researcher has also suggested further indicators for the centre/community approach to 
measuring change. The first is the same as for the S/C approach, given that it focuses on 
social groups and can be applied to the community context. The second, however, 
differs slightly: 
 C/C change in equality 1: Increase/decrease in the number of complaints made 
by respondents about different social groups perceived as being treated 
differentially in terms of state (or central) service provision 
 C/C change in equality 2: Increase/decrease in the number of respondents 
referring to the process of national elections as a community event 
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This second indicator looks at the way in which respondents in rural (or semi-urban) 
communities perceive elections on a national level and the extent to which they 
consider their own community’s involvement in those elections to be worthwhile. This 
has the potential to indicate changing levels of community interaction with state 
processes and as such provide an important means of documenting the dynamics of 
democratic change in rural areas.   
8.5.4 Suggested indicators for changes in protection 
 S/C change in protection 1: Increase/decrease in number of respondents 
demonstrating knowledge of procedures for countering state action 
 S/C change in protection 2: Increase/decrease in levels of confidence in the 
judicial system e.g. through examples of positive interactions with district courts 
 S/C change in protection 3: Increase/decrease in positive comparisons of legal 
processes in past regimes with present ones 
When considering how to measure change in levels of protection in chapter 7, according 
to the state/citizen approach, the researcher found some potential for useful comparisons 
of protection from arbitrary state action between different regimes (indicator 3). 
Problems with the first two indicators however, when applied to respondents in rural 
communities, included their focus on the individual knowledge of legal procedures 
when community leaders were more likely to have information about processes for 
interacting with state. Further, the assumption that community members had any 
interactions at all with the state judicial system was found to be flawed. This being the 
case, she has included the following suggestions as indicators of change in protection 
under the centre/community approach:  
 C/C change in protection 1: Increase/decrease in the number of incidences of 
peaceful community resistance to the state that have had results 
 C/C change in protection 2: Increase/decrease in the number of respondents 
referring to any interaction of their community with central judicial system 
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 C/C change in protection 3: Increase/decrease in the number of community 
leaders expressing awareness of current legal processes  and comparing them 
favourably to those of past regimes 
These supplementary indicators move focus away from the individual knowledge of 
legal processes and instead focus on the ways in which communities have resisted 
arbitrary state action through their own means. They also move away from the 
assumption that respondents will necessarily have had some experience of interacting 
with the judicial system, and instead note whether or not they have done so. They retain 
emphasis on comparisons with previous regimes, seeing as this proved a useful 
indicator under the state/citizen approach – although again move focus to the 
knowledge of community leaders of these processes rather than assume the familiarity 
with state processes of individual community members.  
8.5.5 Suggested indicators for changes in mutually-binding consultation 
 S/C change in mutually binding consultation 1: Increase/decrease in positive 
examples given concerning respondents’ experiences of state service provision 
 S/C change in mutually binding consultation 2: Greater/lesser proportion of 
respondents give examples of taking complaints to state institutions and refer to 
a process for doing so 
Assessing measures of change in mutually binding consultation according to the S/C 
approach, the researcher again found problems in assuming respondents’ knowledge 
and experience of formal processes in rural areas, where more often than not complaints 
were taken by community leaders to influential individuals rather than to state 
institutions. This did not equate to respondents not being able or willing to complain 
about poor or inconsistent services, but rather indicated that they did so in a way that 
was not compatible with Tilly’s form of measurement. This being the case, the 
following suggestions were put forward as supplementary indicators under the 
centre/community approach:    
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 C/C change in mutually binding consultation 1: Increase/decrease in respondents 
attributing development projects to central (as opposed to individual-patron) 
sources 
 C/C change in mutually binding consultation 2: Increase/decrease in the number 
of incidences reported by respondents of community leaders taking complaints 
to central institutions 
These alternative measures offer a means to capture the way in which communities 
might relate to central institutions providing services, and to changes in their attribution 
of those services to central institutions as opposed to powerful individuals. They also 
focus once again on the agency of community leaders in communicating complaints to 
the centre, as opposed to individuals themselves addressing concerns to state officials in 
person.  
In sum, these measures when combined with indicators of change for the state/citizen 
model offer a more holistic approach – the CDI approach – to the measurement of 
democratic change that could potentially capture the dynamics of this change as it 
occurs (differentially) in different areas of a given state. 
8.6 What would this actually do (if anything) for the analysis of democratisation in 
fragile states? What would it not do?  
This section now looks back at the problems highlighted with current means to 
conceptualise, measure and practice democratisation in fragile contexts as discussed in 
chapters 1 and 2, and argues that a combined approach using indicators from both the 
state/citizen and centre/community models would address some of these problems, 
providing a more appropriate framework for analysis in these contexts.  Gaps that this 
model could fill in terms of the theory, measurement and practice of democratisation are 
discussed sequentially, alongside limitations and potential problems with the CDI 
approach.  
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8.6.1 Theory  
The discussion of current trends in the literature on the theory of democratisation 
(chapter 1) focused specifically on existing means to conceptualise the relationship 
between democracy and the state. Throughout this discussion, three key observations 
were made about gaps in the current literature. These will be revisited in turn, with 
suggestions as to how the combined approach suggested above might help to fill these 
gaps. 
The first observation made was that the literature on transitions from autocracy to 
democracy (and vice-versa) is insufficient to explain the complexities of political 
transition and also the nature of democratisation, especially as it occurs in fragile 
contexts. This, along with much of the literature on measuring democratisation, assumes 
a clear dividing line between regime types, or a threshold over which a regime becomes 
democratic. Further, as Geddes points out, this literature imposes western democratic 
norms and values onto authoritarian regimes and their leaders whose rationale and 
methods for staying in power may differ significantly from a programme of meeting the 
needs of the electorate (1999: 125). This could apply to other kinds of contexts also, 
including those that are not technically labelled ‘autocratic’ but perhaps are already in 
the process of democratic transition. Another problem with much of the literature on 
transitions and democratisation more generally is its focus on elite behaviour as a mean 
to explain transition and democratic consolidation (Diamond, 1999), and yet this also is 
insufficient to explain the ‘grass roots’ mobilisation and interaction with central powers 
of government  central to many transitions. It also excludes the agency of international 
actors who may assign conditions to democratic progression in return for aid 
allocations. Finally, much of the literature also takes an ahistorical approach and talks in 
terms of conditions or pre-requisites that must be in place before democratisation can 
either begin or take hold – without considering the way in which these conditions were 
not often present as democracies emerged in western Europe, for example. Yet again, 
these conditions often exclude fragile contexts from analysis. These conceptualisations 
of transition are thus too narrow for application to fragile contexts. 
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Having said this, broader conceptualisations that do situate democratic transitions 
within historical contexts specific to the state in question are also problematic in that 
they focus very specifically on the state-citizen relationship (Grugel, 2002: 31; Tilly, 
2007). As discussed in chapter 1, however, so-called fragile states do not fit into 
Weberian or Westphalian models of statehood – hence the ‘fragile’ label – and thus 
again, are excluded from analyses of democratisation, because these essentially focus 
on the building of a democratic state (Grugel, 2002: 68). These approaches make a 
strong connection between state capacity and democratisation, following the logic that 
the stronger the state, the easier the transition to democracy simply due to the extent of 
the state’s interaction with its citizens.  
Throughout this thesis, the researcher has not attempted to argue that contemporary 
conceptions of the state and their relationship to democratisation are not important – nor 
that the ultimate goal in democratisation should not be the building of a democratic 
state. What she has argued, however, is that it may not be possible to apply these 
conceptions and goals to the measurement of democratisation (at the very least in its 
early stages) in fragile contexts, where states did not form in the same manner as they 
did in western Europe. The tendency for analysts would be to exclude fragile states 
from analysis of democratisation entirely, simply because their statehood does not 
comply with Weberian/Westphalian norms. And yet, clear from the data gathered for 
this study is that democratisation – in terms of changes toward a more interactive 
relationship between centre and community – may occur in other spaces, outside of the 
state-citizen relationship but still within the bounds of linking people to the places and 
means through which their collective resources are governed.   
This being the case, it is possible to see how a centre-community-based approach might 
shed more light into the ways in which fragile states democratise and de-democratise. It 
allows for greater flexibility, not necessarily relying on the existence of transparent 
procedures and an emphasis on individual citizenship, but instead focusing on ‘a 
political landscape of best fit’ – assessing how communities relate to central 
government and whether or not there are changes within this relationship that can be 
measured over time. It allows for the conceptualisation of a different pace of change, 
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perhaps, in different parts of a given country, that is not necessarily directly 
proportional to the increase of state capacity. This would be combined with an analysis 
of state capacity, ensuring that the importance of this to democratisation was not 
overlooked – but would allow for change to be noted outside of this somewhat limiting 
framework. As such, the CDI model could contribute significantly to the understanding 
and conceptualisation of democratisation in fragile contexts.  
A second area of theory explored through the literature review for this thesis was that 
relating to state sovereignty and states in the international system. From this review it 
was possible to gauge that state sovereignty is a contested concept that is often 
simultaneously assumed and contradicted, when states are both considered theoretically 
sovereign entities but nevertheless subject to potential international intervention when 
seen to behave in a manner contrary to international principles such as the universal 
declaration of human rights.  Within this, ‘negative sovereignty’ is a powerful concept 
to explain these contradictions in weak or fragile states. It is the contention of this study 
that this idea can also help to explain these states’ inability to foster liberal relationships 
between state and citizen. In the case of Afghanistan, as discussed in chapter 5, a history 
of international intervention in state affairs and of reliance on international funding as 
an alternative to widespread taxation policies and domestic industry, alongside 
significant periods of conflict toward the end of the twentieth century, has hindered the 
development of a systematic relationship between state and citizen, meaning that rather 
more fluid relationships between the centre and different communities across the 
country have flourished instead. This framework for assessing relationships, in 
conjunction with the negative sovereignty concept, holds greater explanatory capacity 
when assessing democratisation trajectories than does a more straightforward 
assumption of state sovereignty, which lies at the heart of most approaches to 
democratisation and also to the study of the behaviour of states in the international 
system within conventional IR approaches.   
Finally, the term ‘fragile states’ is in itself problematic, because it serves only as a 
means to categorise states that do not fit the ‘standard’ model of what a state should be 
in Weberian or Westphalian terms – thus, it remains a term to describe what these 
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regimes are not, rather than what they actually are. Other, similar terms include ‘quasi-
states’ (Jackson, 1987; 1996), ‘non-states’, ‘weak states’ and even ‘failed states’. 
Defining them in these terms automatically calls into question the application of state-
centric theories about the way in which countries democratise. While these concepts are 
relevant in that they bring to light the differences between fragile contexts and state 
systems in developed countries, for example, the acknowledgement of non-compliance 
with the ‘standard’ state model has not led to the creation of a new framework through 
which to conceptualise political transitions in these countries.  
Evidently there remain issues with conceptualising democracy in a manner that moves 
away from (or at least dilutes focus on) the ability of individual citizens to hold the state 
to account. There is an inherent risk of CDI being used to romanticise the role of 
community representatives who may not always act in the interests of those they 
supposedly represent, and may have developed impunity from public scrutiny through 
coercion or threatened violence. However, if the CDI method was used in a manner that 
combined both SC and CC indicators, it would be possible to detect if and where 
communities and their leaders were in fact failing individual citizens who wanted 
greater representation as individuals. In theory, then, this approach would not minimise 
or overlook the necessity of democratic accountability; rather, it would allow for this 
accountability to be found in different sets of relationships including that of the state-
citizen, rather than that of the state-citizen alone.    
While the CDI approach developed through this thesis – a combined analysis of centre-
community and state-citizen relationships – does not claim to provide a simple 
alternative to the concept of fragile states, or to the application of a state-citizen 
assessment of democratisation within them, it nevertheless sheds light on the failings of 
these concepts and the ways in which they mask fundamental details about the nature of 
fragile contexts that inform discussions about how they might democratise. The 
researcher does not advocate the rejection of the term ‘fragile state’ altogether – 
although ‘fragile context’ may be more appropriate – but instead argues that its implicit 
focus on the ways in which countries lack conventional characteristics of statehood is 
simply inadequate, on its own, to contribute usefully to the analysis of democratisation 
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in these countries. A supplementary approach is needed, and this can be provided by the 
CDI framework. This allows an exploration into the nature of the relationship between 
ruler and ruled that does not need to be confined by the limiting parameters of the state-
citizen construct, and the ways in which fragile contexts do not meet standard 
definitions. It allows the simultaneous analysis of what this relationship is, and what it 
is not – rather than a singular focus on the latter. In this way, then, the approach 
contributes helpfully to the available theoretical conceptualisations of how 
democratisation might occur in these contexts. 
8.6.2 Measurement 
Related to the way in which the CDI approach could contribute to the existing 
theoretical conceptualisations of democratisation in fragile states is the way in which it 
can allow a more holistic approach to measuring levels of democratisation.  
As discussed in chapter 2,  existing models for measuring democratisation vary in terms 
of their chosen focus, with the Polity model and Freedom House assigning scores to 
certain qualitative attributes of states and in particular looking at institutions and 
political rights and civil liberties (essentially, a focus on the state-citizen relationship). 
Vanhanen, by contrast, assesses electoral data alone – taking a quantitative approach to 
measurement that uses voter turnout figures in combination with the percentage of votes 
gained by each political party. Both of these approaches, however, assign judgements as 
to the threshold after which a country becomes ‘a democracy’, or ‘free’. These 
thresholds appear to be somewhat arbitrarily determined and also are very much based 
on the assumption that state and non-state institutions, such as electoral politics and 
political parties, function in a similar manner to the ways in which they function in 
western democracies. Regimes in which these institutions might function differently are 
thus either not analysed due to a lack of data, or categorised simply as ‘not free’ or 
‘non-democracies’.  Tilly’s model for measuring democratisation surpasses those put 
forward by Polity, Freedom House and Vanhanen in its consideration of an historical 
and political narrative, and in its process-oriented approach using variables rather than a 
‘yes/no checklist’. However, it still very much relies on conventional concepts of the 
state and state capacity which are problematic when applied to fragile contexts. 
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The researcher argues that the CDI approach could provide an alternative means of 
measurement that allows greater flexibility and inclusivity. It comprises qualitative 
indictors with which to measure change in the relationship between ruler and ruled that 
do not necessarily rely, again, on the limited construct of the state-citizen relationship 
but instead allow a broader conceptualisation of this relationship.  Much more research 
needs to be undertaken in order to verify the validity of these indictors, as at the current 
time they provide only a suggestion for how best to measure change, and are only based 
on data from three provinces within one case study country (Afghanistan). It remains to 
be seen whether they could be applied more generally across a range of different fragile 
contexts. Nevertheless, they demonstrate that it is possible to allow for greater diversity 
in the types of regimes that could be included in the comparative analysis of 
democratisation.   
Further, this approach indicates that it is possible to combine an attempt to measure 
changes in the state-citizen relationship with a simultaneous attempt to measure changes 
in the more broad relationship between ruler and ruled. It shows that at any one time, 
fragile contexts may contain within them parts of society, often in urban areas, in which 
progression (or regression) along the democratisation continuum is notable and 
measurable in terms of state-citizen relationships – but at the same time contain areas – 
largely those less connected to the state infrastructure – which require a less limited 
form of analysis and measurement. Combining the two allows for a significantly more 
holistic approach to measuring democratisation and one which is able to capture more 
accurately the differential nature of change in the relationship between ruler and ruled 
in different parts of a given regime. As such, this approach can contribute a new form of 
measurement to the existing approaches. 
As indicated above, however, one of the key limitations of CDI is the relatively long-
term nature of the qualitative observations required. Communities would need to be 
studied over a number of years, with a significant amount of qualitative data collected 
within these communities on an annual basis, perhaps, to measure change. The 
practicalities of operationalising this approach in fragile contexts are thus questionable, 
although not impossible particularly for independent research organisations with a 
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history of working in a given context, for example. Another problem with CDI in terms 
of its capacity to measure democratisation in a given state is the potential difficulty in 
comparing results across case study communities. Part of the model’s strength is its 
ability to capture the differential nature of different communities’ relationship to central 
authorities, and yet this is also a weakness in that without insisting on absolutely 
uniformity across communities, comparing the rate of change between them could pose 
a problem. This, and the extent to which it poses a barrier to useful comparison, could 
be explored in further research and testing of the CDI model.    
8.6.3 Practice  
As explored in chapter 2, the practice of internationally-promoted democratisation has 
become integral to the exercise of statebuilding in post-conflict and fragile states. 
Experiences in countries as diverse as Iraq and East Timor, however, have demonstrated 
the difficulties in attempting to encourage democratisation ‘from the outside’ – an 
approach which can stand in direct contradiction to the principles of state sovereignty 
and also to the notion of democratisation comprising more than simply an altered 
motivation among political elites. Some critics of international statebuilding call for less 
focus on democratisation and more on promoting security in post-conflict states 
(Etzioni, 2007); others call for  a focus on ‘institutionalisation before liberalisation’, 
suggesting that it is the infrastructure of state that needs strengthening before a liberal 
agenda can be imposed or encouraged (Paris, 2004); and a further group of academics 
suggest that a better approach would be to ensure that democratic institutions are 
accompanied by democratic politics (Bastian and Luckham, 2003). 
Tilly implies that a top-down approach to democratisation – i.e., one that is imposed 
from above – does not take into account the essence of what democratisation actually is, 
in that it fails to recognise the importance of changes within interactions between the 
citizen and the state. This is not to say that he condemns the entire exercise of 
internationally-promoted democratisation, but that he considers its current emphasis on 
the building of formal institutions misguided. Indeed, according to Tilly, 
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If this book’s arguments are correct, those of us who hope to see democracy’s 
benefits spread across the undemocratic world will not waste our time focusing 
on preaching democratic virtues, designing constitutions, forming non-
governmental organizations, and identifying pockets of democratic sentiment 
within undemocratic regimes. We will, in contrast, spend a great deal of effort 
promoting the integration of trust networks into public politics, helping to shield 
public politics from categorical inequality, and working against the autonomy of 
coercive power centers...The democratizing experiences of South Africa, Spain 
and some post-socialist regimes show that such changes always pass through 
struggle but remain susceptible to external influence (2007:205). 
While ‘preaching democratic virtues’, creating constitutions, forming NGOs and 
identifying where within a regime democratic sentiment may form part of the 
international project to democratise, for Tilly these should contribute to the larger goals 
of integrating trust networks, eradicating categorical inequality and consolidating state 
power over autonomous centres, and should not be undertaken for their own sake (2007: 
205). This emphasises his concern with building the capacity of the state in order to 
allow processes of democratisation – namely, through the principles of breadth, 
equality, protection and mutually-binding consultation – to take place. Clearly, 
however, he sees a role for international actors within this project, to the extent that, 
after speaking directly to would-be international democracy promoters he states that 
“[h]opeful democrats need not sit on their hands, waiting” (2007: 205). Yet he is careful 
to maintain emphasis on the way in which democratisation must be an holistic change 
involving the active participation of citizens themselves.  
Clear from Tilly’s concluding statements, however, are the ways in which he assumes 
that building state capacity is essential to any form of democratisation. In this sense, my 
own conclusions about the ways in which democratisation can occur in other spaces 
than that of the state-citizen relationship differ significantly from Tilly’s perspective. 
They suggest that the state-citizen construct is not the only potential lens through which 
to view changes in the relationship between ruler and ruled in fragile contexts, 
particularly where institutions of state have not been formalised or ‘rolled out’ to a point 
at which they are accessible to all inhabitants of a given country. How, then, might this 
contribute to the practice of internationally-promoted democratisation?  
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Arguably, this approach is not merely a case of “identifying pockets of democratic 
sentiment within undemocratic regimes” (Tilly, 2007: 205) but rather about measuring 
changes in the relationship between ruler and ruled in fragile contexts that would 
otherwise be missed by an analysis of the state-citizen relationship alone. This 
could potentially inform the practices of democratisation as imposed from ‘outside’ by 
highlighting the ways in which change occurs differentially in different areas of a given 
state, and through different media. For example, rather than rolling out a civic education 
programme that insists on promoting the need for individuals to vote independently of 
one another, amendments could be made that take into account the possibility of (and 
rationale behind) bloc voting in rural communities. While it would be necessary to 
ensure that awareness about the possibilities of voting as an individual was raised, 
voters would not be lectured through campaigns preaching the necessity of this 
approach.   
An historical component could be included in all programming, to ensure that the nature 
of a particular community’s relationship with the central government over time was 
documented and taken into account before democratisation programming began. The 
importance of conducting the historical analysis here, however, before programming 
began, cannot be underestimated. In Afghanistan there have been a number assumptions 
made by international actors – such as the assumed legitimacy attached to Loya Jirgas 
in spite of hand-picked attendees and pre-determined outcomes – that have alienated the 
Afghan public from democratic processes (Coburn and Larson, 2013, forthcoming). 
Provided that a comprehensive historical analysis formed the bedrock of any 
democratisation programming, however, the contribution of the CDI approach would be 
to provide an alternative means of helping to strengthen the relationship between ruler 
and ruled – possibly one which may at some point become one that could be defined 
categorically in terms of state and citizen – but which would cater more appropriately to 
the political context of the fragile state in question. 
This relates to a final important characteristic of the CDI approach that could help 
improve current forms of democracy promotion in practice: the flexibility and 
reflexivity of the model.  First, the combination of CC and SC indicators used in an 
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assessment can be varied according to the context in question, allowing for more or less 
of one than the other based on early inital analyses as to which would be more 
appropriate. This could then be altered over time, however, to mirror changes in the 
ruler-ruled relationship as levels of fragility and state capacity change, for example. In 
an iterative process, repeated annual studies in a given community could inform 
democracy and governance programming designed to strengthen the state-citizen 
relationship, ensuring optimum applicability of these programmes to the particular 
community in question. 
Limitations of the approach in its usage in the practice of democracy promotion could 
include lack of time and resources on the part of international democracy promotion 
agencies, particularly when these actors are often constrained by the narrow parameters 
imposed by donors. In partnership with national civil society organisations, however, 
whose expertise and understanding of local political histories would be highly valuable 
in a CDI approach, some of these limitations could be overcome. Relationships of trust 
could be built within given communities over time and could facilitate annual analyses 
of change in their relationship to central authorities. This could help to promote national 
ownership of democratisation monitoring and practice – a key demand of fragile state 
governments as articulated by the G7+, discussed further in chapter 9.   
Perhaps more importantly, however, using CDI in practice might be limited by the need 
for democracy promoters to strike a balance between helping to empower community 
representatives, on the one hand, and ensuring that the needs of individuals were 
adequately addressed, on the other. Again, this returns to the question of ensuring that 
accountability mechanisms were in place to ensure that community leaders were in fact 
beholden to the interests of their community members, and that individual interests 
could be expressed, should they differ from those of the community as a whole. As 
mentioned above, however, the combination of CC and SC indicators, used in research 
undertaken on an annual basis, could help monitor discrepancies between the views of 
leaders and members in terms of the extent to which representation occurs. This could 
then feed in to democracy programming – for example, by shifting emphasis on to the 
creation of a youth council if young people felt that their voices were not being heard in 
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shura meetings. Findings from CDI studies may uncover issues that are not easily or 
tidily addressed by existing donor democracy programmes, but then, this is entirely the 
point: a new approach is needed. 
8.7 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has explored possible amendments to Tilly’s model for conceptualising 
and measuring democratisation, which would serve to allow more accurate application 
to the context of fragile states. Further to summarising the problems with the application 
of Tilly’s model as found throughout chapters 6 and 7, it has suggested the replacing of 
a sole focus on the state-citizen relationship with a combined CDI approach that would 
broaden analysis beyond the limits of this construct, including a potentially 
complementary focus on centre-community relationships. This still focuses on the 
interaction between ruler and ruled but moves away from the limitations that the liberal 
notions of ‘state’ and ‘citizen’ impose on the analysis of how democratisation occurs. 
Alongside providing a prototype model, combining both approaches, this chapter has 
also assessed the ways in which these amendments might affect and assist the theory, 
measurement and practice of democratisation in fragile states. It suggests that there are 
several ways in which gaps in the literature might be filled by this new approach, in 
particular by continuing to adopt an holistic view of democratisation as a process of 
greater interaction between ruler and ruled, but by moving beyond the narrow focus of 
scholars in this field who concentrate solely on the state-citizen relationship as the locus 
for this change. While still in the early stages of development and requiring much 
further study to test the indicators suggested, and to apply them to cases beyond that of 
Afghanistan, there is nevertheless potential for the CDI to contribute significantly to 
contemporary scholarship on democratisation in fragile states and also to the way in 
which internationally-promoted democratisation is currently practiced in these contexts.  
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS 
This final chapter of the thesis summarises the way in which this work has developed 
throughout the research process, from initial inception to data collection, analysis and 
the formation of the CDI approach. It documents the lessons learnt throughout this 
process, and reiterates the contribution that the research makes to existing theory, 
measurement and practice of democratisation in fragile states.  It then states explicitly 
how the research findings address the three central hypotheses made at the beginning of 
the thesis, and points to ways in which they were unable to respond to issues that these 
hypotheses raised. It puts forward 10 principles for the improvement of the practice of 
democratisation in fragile states, aimed specifically at international donors, practitioner 
agencies and G7+ governments. It points to the potential for broader application of the 
10 principles beyond the Afghan context, and finally makes suggestions for ways in 
which research in this field could be extended.   
9.1 Summarising the journey: lessons learnt and contribution of the thesis  
Inspiration for this study began in 2006 with the answer to a casual question about the 
previous year’s parliamentary elections, given by a good friend in Mazar-i Sharif, Balkh 
province over an evening meal. “Why would we vote? There are no candidates we can 
trust, and we never see them after they get elected. We have no connection to the 
government”. Laden with the normative assumptions of a western visitor to 
Afghanistan, the question, which had assumed the friend had voted, as an individual, 
was entirely misplaced and demonstrated a marked ignorance about the significance of 
elections and their likely impact in the country.  
Even at that point, with a central state apparatus newly established with international 
backing, it was possible to detect a sense of detachment, distrust and disinterest in 
elected parliamentarians among a number of Afghans that the researcher spoke to across 
the country, unless a member of their family or immediate community had been 
successful in the polls. In the wake of presidential elections in which almost 80 per cent 
of registered voters had come to participate, this was interesting and perhaps betrayed 
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much more of the real story behind people’s sense of connection to the central 
government. Further research in a range of governance- and democracy-related issues 
for AREU would increase this suspicion over time and inspired the reseacrher to 
investigate further and in a more structured manner the relationship between ruler and 
ruled in the country.   
A thorough survey of the literature on democratisation and the state revealed a number 
of issues. First, that there appeared to be no deviation at all in academic discussions on 
the theory, measurement and practice of democratisation away from the centrality of the 
relationship between the state and the individual citizen. Indeed, this focus was 
becoming more prevalent in most recent scholarship, moving away from the elite-led 
transitions approaches of the 1980s. Democratisation is almost always discussed in 
relationship to the nation state, and the way in which it can be held accountable by 
individuals or groups within it. This being the case, it was also clear that there were 
reasons for this uniform theoretical underpinning to the study of democratisation, first, 
that the development of the nation-state and of democratic political systems occurred 
alongside one another in western Europe, and second, that in spite of the work of a few 
scholars focused more intently on the importance of democracy at the international or 
‘cosmopolitan’ level, states remain the most prevalent loci of the study of international 
comparative politics. However, scholarship on the nature of the state pointed to a 
number of liberal assumptions commonly held within the democratisation literature 
about what a state is (or should be) and what it does, and what citizens are (or should 
be) and what they do. These included an assumed individuality of citizenship, an 
assumed uniformity of citizenship across space (particularly the urban/rural divide) and 
time, and an assumed cohesive central authority. Here was the problem when trying to 
apply democratisation measures to fragile contexts: the states and citizens in question 
simply didn’t fit these assumptions. There appeared to be only one response to this 
mismatch across existing theory, measurement and practice of democratisation: that 
fragile states needed to be ‘fixed’ to fit these assumptions more closely, to democratise. 
More often than not, these contexts are disregarded as categorically ‘undemocratising’, 
because they do not comply with standard liberal notions of statehood and citizenship.   
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This realisation of a certain uniformity across the literature led to a number of 
questions. First, was this really the case? Given that many fragile states had developed 
in very different circumstances to those in which European democracies emerged, was 
it even realistic to suppose that they could be ‘fixed’ to be made more western, or more 
liberal? At this point, the researcher began to question whether the normative constructs 
of ‘state’ and ‘citizen’ were in fact applicable to fragile states. Undoubtedly, 
democratisation was a question of the changing relationship between ruler and ruled, 
but was it necessarily a question of the changing relationship between state and citizen? 
One of the key lessons learnt throughout this research has been the realisation of the 
difference between these two phenomena. Further, that if this difference was significant, 
key changes in the relationship between ruler and ruled that might indicate change 
toward or away from democratisation, could be missed by attempts to chart them 
according to a state-citizen approach.     
In order to investigate this further, the researcher decided to focus on the Afghan case, 
building on several years of experience working in the country, and developed a 
methodology based on Charles Tilly’s approach situating historical analysis at the 
forefront. In the comprehensive study of historical connections between ruler and ruled 
in Afghanistan, she learnt that there was a considerable precedent set for a constantly 
negotiated, but distant relationship between the central Kabul administration and 
communities across the country, and that the understanding of this was vital to any 
study of democratisation processes in Afghanistan. Further to this, she developed a set 
of indicators, again based on Tilly’s own model but substituting ‘hard’ data – not 
readily available in Afghanistan – for qualitative narratives.  
This is important for application to other fragile states also, again in which hard or 
quantitative data is difficult to find, unreliable or non-existent.  In developing the 
methodology for this research the researcher found that if ‘measurement’ can be broadly 
interpreted as the systematic assessment of a given phenomenon, and qualitative values 
assigned to a framework for analysis, then the measurement of democratic change 
becomes more feasible in fragile contexts. This is because perceptions of change can 
signify greater meaning in terms of the differences felt by ordinary citizens than can the 
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tracking of the establishment of formal institutions which in themselves do not 
constitute substantive movement toward democratisation, for example. Critical here, 
however, is the emphasis on a systematic approach: one limited study on perceptions of 
change such as that presented by this thesis cannot in itself measure democratisation, 
but repeated in the same geographical areas over a number of years, would be able to 
provide significant insight into the nature of the changing relationship between 
communities and central authorities, or between citizens and the state. This is not to say 
that changes would necessarily occur in a unidirectional trajectory, but as conceived by 
Tilly, may fluctuate back and forth on a continuum toward and away from greater 
democratisation. 
With access to an Afghan research team and logistical support to visit three provinces in 
which to conduct fieldwork, provided by the AREU, the researcher was able to conduct 
154 interviews, across which several trends became apparent in data analysis. First, that 
it was difficult to apply a number of Tilly’s criteria for measuring change in the state-
citizen relationship. For example, Tilly’s suggested measure for breadth is an 
“[i]ncrease (decrease) in the share of the population having legally enforceable rights to 
communicate complaints about governmental performance to high officials” (2007:66). 
In theory, there is no constitutional or other provision preventing any Afghan from 
communicating a complaint to a high official. Yet, even if it were possible to determine 
the meaning of ‘legally enforceable’, when legal processes are not widely familiar to the 
population at large, due to the limited reach of state institutions – few of the respondents 
interviewed in rural areas expressed any desire to approach high officials themselves 
with problems of any kind. Indeed, among the majority of interviews from respondents 
in rural and semi-rural contexts a sincere distrust of state officials existed, due to the 
perceived predatory nature of these officials and the likelihood of being forced to pay a 
bribe. This being the case, it is difficult to see how the application of this indicator 
could result in the generation of data that could imply a move toward greater or lesser 
breadth in the state-citizen relationship: people tend to deal with their complaints about 
governmental performance in other ways, for example through sending a community 
leader to complain to an official on behalf of the community as a whole. 
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One alternative to the state-citizen construct that has emerged from this research is the 
notion of centre-community interaction. This does not move away from the central tenet 
that democratisation comprises changes within the relationship between ruler and ruled, 
but it deviates from the narrow focus on liberal notions of statehood and citizenship. In 
doing so, it allocates greater flexibility for application to contexts where the state does 
not conform to Weberian or Westphalian notions of authority, boundedness and 
sovereignty, and where citizens do not necessarily consider themselves as individual 
agents whose interests are defined purely on the basis of their being individuals.  For 
example, in the Afghan case interactions between citizens and the central government 
tend to take place, most particularly in rural areas, at the community level, where local 
interlocutors such as elders or maliks represent community interests, Elections take 
place as a collective local exercise in which communities decide, collectively, in 
advance which candidate they consider to present the best prospects for future 
interactions with the central government, and vote in a bloc accordingly. This is a 
particularly strategic tactic given the nature of the electoral system in Afghanistan, 
which determines that in some constituencies only a few thousand votes are needed to 
secure a parliamentary seat. 
Also important with this alternative construct is its lack of emphasis on the state per se 
and its focus instead on ‘the centre’. This term does not exclude state institutions, but it 
acknowledges that central decision making may occur outside of them, or in the spaces 
between state officials and other influential actors. It allows for the way in which ‘the 
state’ may not be a unified entity with a combined political or administrative agenda, 
and that some state officials command other sources of authority and legitimacy also 
which may not coincide with their role within the state. Having promoted the centre-
community construct as an alternative means of conceptualising the relationship 
between ruler and ruled, the researcher realised through the data analysis process 
however that there are areas within Afghanistan – in Kabul and in some provincial 
urban centres, such as Mazar-i Sharif (Balkh) and Jalalabad (Nangarhar) – in which 
liberal notions of the state-citizen relationship do appear more relevant and also in some 
way part of the aspirations of respondents concerning their desired interaction with the 
state.  This suggests that, contrary to liberal notions of citizenship, uniform measures of 
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what the state-citizen relationship should look like do not adequately capture the 
differential nature of this relationship as it occurs across different parts of a given state. 
This is not necessarily to say that ‘equality’ between citizens is necessarily lacking, but 
rather that different groups in society interact with the central authorities in different 
ways. This being the case, the researcher found that it would be possible to suggest that 
state-citizen approaches could be usefully applied to some, urban areas within fragile 
states, where interaction with state institutions is strongest, alongside a centre-
community analysis. She then developed the idea of a combined centre-
community/state-citizen model for analysis into the Comprehensive Democratisation 
Indicators or CDI approach, putting together a prototype model to guide future research 
in democratising fragile states.  
This, then, comprises the main contribution of the research: a means through which to 
conceptualise, measure and practice democratisation in fragile contexts without the 
exclusive focus on the state-citizen relationship that is dominant in existing approaches. 
Developed from the analysis of a substantial sample of not-ordinarily-accessible 
primary data, and addressing a clear knowledge gap, CDI challenges the validity of the 
liberal state-citizen construct when applied unquestioningly to fragile states and in 
doing so pushes the subject forward. It provides the basis for an holistic analysis of 
democratisation, through which to capture change in the relationship between ruler and 
ruled that might otherwise go undocumented in assessments of democratisation in these 
contexts. This research also points to an alternative approach to the practice of building 
state capacity, advocating a move away from the imposition of western liberal norms 
and instead focusing more broadly on encouraging greater interaction between centre 
and community.     
9.2 How the findings address the hypotheses  
In chapter 2, the researcher outlined three central hypotheses:  
1) The state-citizen relationship is only central to theoretical concepts of 
democratisation to the extent that no alternative currently exists. Democracy 
theorists commonly assume a strengthening relationship between the state and 
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its individual citizens as a necessary characteristic of movement toward 
democratisation – but this precludes application to fragile contexts. An 
alternative means of conceptualizing democratisation is needed, because there 
may be aspects of democratisation that are taking place in these contexts that 
remain outside the limitations of the state-citizen relationship. 
 
This contention makes the bold claim that notions of the state-citizen relationship are 
only necessary to conceptualisation of democratisation because no alternative to this 
approach exists. Having attempted to apply an alternative model – that of the centre-
community – to the Afghan case, however, I have found that even in a fragile context 
there are spaces in which a state-centric model of democratisation (that is to say, one 
which focuses on the state-citizen relationship) can be applied, namely in urban areas 
where perceptions of statehood and citizenship comply more accurately with liberal 
notions. Also, to claim that the only reason for the state’s centrality within the 
democratisation literature is due to lack of alternative approaches is perhaps unfounded 
given the extent of scholarly research that has been undertaken in this field.  
Furthermore, while democratisation scholars have presumed a strengthening 
relationship between the citizen and state to be critical to democratisation, this does not 
preclude application to all areas within fragile states and can be usefully employed to 
measure change in urban areas, where interaction with state structures is strongest. 
What this thesis proves inaccurate, however, is the notion that the state-citizen 
relationship must be uniform across all parts of a given regime for democratisation to 
occur. If this is a non-negotiable component of democratisation theories, then they 
cannot be applied to the Afghan case and possibly not to other example of fragile 
contexts either, with any other result than one of negative conclusions about the 
likelihood of democratisation taking place. 
Finally, it is clear that an alternative conceptualisation of the way democratisation 
occurs in fragile states is indeed necessary, as can be concluded following the 
researcher’s attempt to apply Tilly’s framework to the data gathered in Afghanistan for 
this study. This is because the limitations of a state-citizen construct as determined by 
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liberal democratic theory cannot be imposed on to areas within a state that have a 
characteristically different relationship with central government structures than this 
formulaic relationship presumes. As stated above, a combination of both state-citizen 
and centre-community models provides the most holistic approach and one which is 
most likely to capture the nuances of democratic change across different areas of a 
fragile context.  
2) It is possible to measure levels of democratisation and how they change within 
fragile contexts. In order to do so, however, an historical and political narrative 
is imperative to understand the nature of the relationship between rulers and 
ruled over time, so as to establish how that relationship has changed, and how 
resource management has been affected as a result. Analyses based only around 
narrow interpretations of liberal democracy, such as elections, party 
performance or civil society activism, will mean little in contexts in which these 
institutions are unfamiliar to much of the population.    
The research conducted for this study has shown hypothesis 2 to be true. Measures of 
democratisation that do not include a detailed historical and political analysis specific to 
the context in question cannot grasp the nature of the way in which, in fragile contexts, 
the relationship between ruler and ruled has changed over time. An understanding of 
these changes is fundamental to the assessment of the ways in which that relationship 
functions in different ways in different parts of a given country at present, and is 
instrumental to the determination of whether a state-citizen or a centre-community 
model – or mixture of both – might be best appropriate to measure democratisation.  
3) The state-citizen relationship is only central to the practice of internationally-
promoted democratisation in fragile states to the extent that international actors 
such as the UN are unable to move away from a one-size-fits all blueprint of 
democratisation that prioritises the building of state capacity.  
Whereas in regards to hypothesis 1, the claim that a lack of alternatives in the theory of 
democratisation was the only reason for state-centrality was deemed inaccurate, in this 
case, the claim that a lack of alternative approaches is the only reason for a 
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homogeneous approach to international efforts to promoting democratisation holds to be 
true. As became apparent through the literature review in chapter 2 and the compilation 
of the historical narrative in chapter 5, this is because promoting state capacity has been 
central to the practice of democratic statebuilding since the intervention began in 2001. 
Discourses of democratisation in Afghanistan have been donor-led, and have been 
based on the assumption that a liberal democratic state is both appropriate and 
necessary to combat fragility. In this way, fragile states are defined and categorised 
according to the ways in which they fall short of western notions of statehood, rather 
than by characteristics that are specific to individual country contexts or to fragile states 
more generally. This is evident in the way in which elections are promoted as part and 
parcel of statebuilding efforts and yet are largely seen as a technical exercise, without 
regard for the way in which they impact local political landscapes (Coburn and Larson, 
forthcoming, 2013). The data from this study clearly demonstrates a sense of 
detachment from the so-called democratic processes of elections that are nevertheless 
considered by international actors to carry heavy weight when it comes to assessing 
levels of democratisation. There is no space within current international approaches to 
democratisation for an alternative vision of statehood or citizenship, that might in fact 
facilitate programmes that are able to better encourage a more interactive relationship 
between citizens, communities and central authorities.   
9.3 A role for international actors?  
Given that it is possible to make strong criticisms of international approaches to 
democratisation in Afghanistan, and given that most of the evidence collected in this 
thesis (both historical and empirical) suggests that democratisation must occur as a 
process of changing relationships between central authorities and their own populations, 
it is possible to question whether there is a role for international actors at all in 
promoting democratisation in the aftermath of conflict.  
Still, Tilly’s contention that “[h]opeful democrats need not sit on their hands, waiting” 
(2007: 205) refers to the way in which he does see a role for international actors in 
promoting democratisation, provided that this role concentrates primarily on the 
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encouragement of further integration of trust networks, the dissolution of categorical 
inequalities and the eradication of autonomous power centres. In comparison to these 
three areas of focus, he considered technical exercises such as the building of civil 
society organisations, and “preaching democratic virtues” (2007: 205) to have limited 
impact. 
Based on findings from this research, the researcher would also concur that there may 
be a role for international actors in assisting to promote democratisation, but with the 
caveat that this role must first be detached from liberal notions of what the state and 
what citizenship should be.  
On the subject of elections, clear throughout the transcripts of interviews conducted for 
this study was a mistrust of the electoral process. This was not to say that respondents 
were not keen to vote – in many cases, across both rural and urban communities and 
spanning income categories respondents expressed a keen interest in participating in 
elections in spite of perceived problems with the polling process. However, many also 
referred to the way in which elections had contributed to existing conflicts in local 
communities, or had exacerbated tensions between local strongmen. In this sense, as has 
been documented elsewhere, the insistence on holding elections as part of liberal 
statebuilding initiatives can contribute to instability rather than promote democratisation 
(Coburn and Larson, forthcoming, 2013).    
However, if international approaches could be separated from a liberal statebuilding 
model, and could replace top-down prescriptions for western-style democracy with a 
focus on encouraging greater interaction between centre and community, for example, 
they might helpfully contribute to democratisation processes. The National Solidarity 
Program provides one example of a hybrid model of development assistance that 
increased interaction between centre and community by way of intermediary 
‘facilitating partners’ (often locally-based NGOs). Although there were a number of 
problems with this programme, not least the unreliable and lengthy process for 
accessing government funds for development projects in the program’s later years – it 
was nevertheless based on a principle of encouraging communities to interact with 
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central authorities. International actors’ insistence on village councils being formally 
elected rather than simply chosen by consensus through community meetings appears to 
have been irrelevant to the overall success of the programme, when members of these 
new councils were oftentimes simply members of existing local shuras.  ‘Success’ was 
largely determinant on the personalities represented in the CDCs, the speed with which 
projects were delivered and the quality/sustainability of the deliverables, rather than the 
method through which CDC members were selected. Nevertheless, this serves as an 
example of the ways in which international intervention can prove helpful and non-
prescriptive but at the same time encourage an increasingly interactive relationship 
between communities and the centre.   
Also critical to the way in which NSP worked in Afghanistan was the input of a 
prominent Afghan statesman (and former World Bank official) in the design of the 
programme. Contributing a deep understanding of local political landscapes, Ashraf 
Ghani was able to combine his knowledge of the country with an understanding of what 
international donors would be likely to fund. To this end, it is critical that if 
international actors are to play a part in assisting democratisation processes, they do so 
under the guidance of fragile state governments themselves. The recent emergence of 
the G7+ and its New Deal for Engagement (G7+, 2011) demonstrates a call for greater 
international accountability to G7+ governments in assistance programming, and greater 
ownership over the kind of programming that is developed. This is perhaps nowhere 
more critical than in helping to encourage democratic processes. This research speaks 
directly to G7+ governments, in that it supports their convictions of the need to define 
democratisation processes on their own terms. However, it also clearly demonstrates 
that these terms need to come from dialogue and consultation at the local level, and not 
merely be dictated by elites in government.  
While this thesis does not claim to provide specific technical suggestions as to how 
different international and national actors might contribute more helpfully to the 
consolidation of democratisation in fragile states, based on the findings of this study it 
can suggest certain guiding principles for engagement in democratisation processes that 
de-emphasise the need for liberal statebuilding and instead focus on more fundamental 
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spaces for change that do not assume compliance (or potential compliance) on liberal 
models of statehood or citizenship. 
9.4 Recommendations: 10 Principles for Improving Practice 
Critical to the overall contribution of this research is its potential to inform and improve 
the practice of democratisation in fragile contexts. Throughout, the researcher has not 
argued against democracy promotion in fragile states, but instead she has looked at how 
democratisation might occur under the certain set of circumstances existing in these 
states. This section addresses international bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors; the 17 
G7+ group governments of self-declared fragile states; international democracy 
promotion agencies such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI), International 
Republican Institute (IRI) and International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES); 
and Afghan democracy promotion agencies (and their equivalent agencies in other 
states) such as the Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan (FEFA) and 
Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA). It suggests 10 principles for improving the practice 
of democracy promotion in fragile contexts based on the findings of this study, without 
losing sight of strong democratic practices that can solidify the connection between 
citizens, communities and governments.   
1) Question the validity of internationally-promoted democratisation in the given 
moment 
Rather than assume that programmes of post-conflict democratisation will by definition 
work towards statebuilding goals, before planning and implementing these programmes 
international policy-makers and practitioners should consider carefully the 
appropriateness and potential consequences of promoting democracy in fragile states. 
The underlying principle of ‘do no harm’ should be upheld at all costs.    
2) If deemed appropriate in the context, any international democratisation assistance 
that is provided should not be ideologically driven  
All too often over the decade of intervention in Afghanistan, the language of democracy 
promotion has been used (albeit unintentionally in most cases) by international actors 
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with a fervour that has been interpreted by many Afghans as a disregard for their own 
culture and customs and an imposition of alien values. Yet, it is possible to be strongly 
committed to the cause of promoting democratisation without giving the impression that 
a blank slate and a complete commitment to liberal western agendas are necessary 
conditions. This principle calls for an attitude of humility to permeate international 
approaches, in which stronger state-citizen or centre-community relations may be 
encouraged to develop ‘from the inside’. This does not presume that fragile states are in 
some way ‘not ready’ for liberal democracy, nor that a liberal democratic model is not 
appropriate for all parts of a given state. Rather, this approach seeks to divert attention 
to more fundamental principles of change which might have a much greater effect on 
the quality of citizens’ lives – for example in terms of better access to and greater 
accountability over service provision – than the insistence on the holding of liberal 
democratic elections simply because these are valuable institutions from a western 
perspective.  
3) Move beyond a narrow interpretation of liberal democracy  
Related to 2), this principle calls for international actors to widen current interpretations 
of what democracy assistance might look like beyond the support for elections and 
insistence on one-person-one-vote methods of assessing popular support for candidates. 
Again, drawing on the findings of this thesis, and the basis of the CDI model, it 
suggests a broader, more creative approach to the practice of democratisation that starts 
with the simple goal of helping to better connect communities and individuals to central 
government authorities. This principle also calls for G7+ governments to begin a series 
of public dialogues as to what people consider the most important facets of democratic 
development in their home countries, and to contribute this information to discussions 
with donors about the kind of assistance required. The data in this study demonstrates 
that democratisation cannot be imposed from the top-down, whether the ‘top’ in 
question signifies international donors or G7+ governments.       
4) Allow time for reflection and reassessment 
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Due to limitations of time and financial resources, many donors and democracy 
promotion agencies struggle to follow up on one-off events – such as civic education 
seminars or political party training sessions – organised to assist local actors in 
democratisation efforts. Clear from the historical analysis conducted in this study, 
however, is the way in which democratisation does not occur through the provision of 
quick-fix approaches or top-down impositions.  In contrast to this, CDI advocates 
continual communication with communities and the recipients of democracy assistance, 
and an iterative process of feedback and change, in order that any alteration in 
responses, attitudes and actions at the community or indeed state-level as fragility levels 
shift might be documented and incorporated into democracy programming.    
5) Always ground practice in detailed historical analysis  
Before any kind of democracy assistance is provided, a detailed historical analysis 
should be undertaken, in coordination with the community receiving assistance, to 
acknowledge and document ways in which that community has interacted with state 
officials and administrative bodies in recent years. This is critical to understanding how 
communities are likely to respond to democratisation assistance differentially, and to 
ensure that assistance is tailored to specific needs and requests. For example, a 
community may feel isolated from their provincial representatives because they come 
from distant parts of the province and have never visited, or may be from a different 
ethnic background. This could prevent or limit participation in schemes designed to 
generate support for provincial council activities, for instance – whereas a more 
constructive use of resources would be to persuade representatives to visit the 
community in person.       
6) Situate all intervention within local political landscapes, mapping consequences 
Viewing democracy assistance as a technical, rather than political, exercise has been a 
requirement of some donors during the Afghan intervention as a means to avoid 
unnecessary involvement in Afghan affairs, and yet this attitude obscures the highly 
political nature of this assistance and of the ways in which it is received by local 
communities. All intervention must be situated within the local political landscape, 
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ensuring that the agendas and motivations of all actors involved are considered before 
assistance programmes are implemented. This is particularly important in Afghanistan, 
where influence and status are often generated by patronage connections and thus the 
inclusion or exclusion of certain influential figures within a local community could 
determine the overall impact of an assistance programme.   
7) Allow space for differentiation between and within communities 
This thesis has demonstrated that there is considerable differentiation between the ways 
in which different communities across Afghanistan relate to and interact with central 
authorities – and yet many democracy promotion programmes are based on liberal 
assumptions of uniformity of citizenship across space and time. To this end, 
programmes are often ‘rolled out’ or ‘scaled up’ in cookie-cutter fashion, without space 
to adapt to different political landscapes and different kinds of relationships to the state, 
and generate very mixed results as a consequence (as for example with the NSP 
programme in Afghanistan, in spite of its ‘success’ in some areas). While some degree 
of uniformity is necessary to ensure that all recipients of assistance have access to the 
same opportunities and resources, differences between communities should be factored 
in to programme planning and expectations for outcomes adjusted accordingly.       
8) Develop relationships of trust with communities 
This principle should underpin all development assistance but is particularly important 
when it comes to democracy and governance programming. Whether the implementers 
of democracy programmes are international or national, it is critical that their assistance 
is perceived by local communities as a means to achieve better connections to resource 
flows and political opportunity, not as an imposition of alien western values that can be 
associated with the term ‘democracy’. Working with communities on a medium to long-
term basis and developing relationships of trust is critical to ensuring that democracy 
assistance is received as assistance and not imposition.   
9) Prioritise substantive local capacity building 
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While commonly cited as a goal within development programmes, local capacity 
building appears to have become something of a buzzword that is used to check boxes 
and attain funds rather than a means to ensure the sustainability of successful 
programme outcomes. Given the nature of democratisation as a continual political 
process that must be forged internally, rather than imposed from outside, substantive 
capacity building of local civil society organisations and democracy promotion agencies 
is paramount.     
10) Commit to a consistency of position and commit for the long term 
Related to developing relationships of trust with local recipient communities, but 
moving to the macro level, is the need for donors themselves to commit to a consistent 
position regarding their stance on democracy assistance. In Afghanistan much lip 
service has been paid by donors to democratic aims and objectives, but this has been 
undermined by military strategy and the conflicting interests of different international 
donors. In accordance with the Paris Declaration, donors need to re-commit to 
principles of mutual accountability if their stance on democratisation assistance is to be 
received as credible by recipient country populations.   Further, the nature of 
democratisation as a lengthy historical and political process demands that any attempts 
to support it must be designed in the long durée: commitments of 20 years or more must 
be considered by international would-be democracy promoters. Evidently, this is an 
impractical suggestion, given that many democracy-promoting agencies are funded by 
government aid agencies, whose budgets are determined politically by home 
governments. Perhaps, then, this is a radical call for these agencies to re-consider where 
all or part of their funding is sourced, in order that more sustainable, and possibly more 
‘successful’, programmes, might be developed.     
9.5 Broader application of the 10 principles  
This research has focused exclusively on the case of Afghanistan, and while this has 
allowed a detailed focus on the historical and political relationships between ruler and 
ruled in one context, it is necessary to ask now whether the lessons learnt, the CDI 
approach and the principles discussed above could apply to other fragile contexts. This 
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would not be a question of ‘carbon-copying’ an approach to democratisation from one 
country to the next, but applying the underlying principles to democracy promotion 
efforts.    
Would it be possible, then, to extend applicability to fragile states more generally? In 
order to answer this question it is first necessary to return briefly to the discussion in 
chapter 2 concerning key characteristics of (so-called) fragile states. In that discussion, 
and further in the justification of choice of case study in chapter 3, the researcher argued 
that Afghanistan is a prime example of a fragile state as defined by international actors 
such as the OECD, USAID and DFID, due to a lack of political legitimacy across the 
country, an inability or unwillingness to provide services to citizens, and an inability to 
maintain a monopoly of violent force. While this thesis has questioned these 
characteristics, alongside the concept of ‘fragile states’ more generally, it is possible to 
use them to group together a number of states recently self-classified as fragile under 
the G7+ group (including countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central 
African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Solomon 
Islands, South Sudan, Timor Leste and Togo). The researcher argues that in theory, the 
CDI approach and the 10 principles discussed above could be applied to democracy 
promotion across the G7+ and specifically in conflict-affected fragile states.  
First, the validity of an historical approach to assessing the relationship between ruler 
and ruled has been highlighted through this thesis, and, as shown by Charles Tilly, this 
approach can be applied to any context regardless of levels of fragility. This would 
contribute significantly to better democracy promotion in practice, as it would the 
understanding of how this relationship has changed over time in any one of the 
countries mentioned above. Most specifically in conflict-affcted states, it would 
highlight how, in particular during times of civil unrest, the relationship between ruler 
and ruled has shifted. From this analysis conclusions could be drawn about the nature of 
the connection between the centre and communities of citizens in different parts of a 
given fragile state, and democracy programmes designed with some flexibility to 
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accommodate differences in this connection. This speaks to the applicability of 
principles 4, 5 and 6.  
Second, that as a combined approach, CDI offers scope for variation that could 
incorporate the differences between states. It allows for liberal constructs of the state-
citizen relationship to be applied alongside a centre-community focus, proportionately 
to the context in question.   It could be, for example, that the reach of the state and level 
of interaction it maintains with citizens (either as individuals or communities) across the 
board is stronger in Sierra Leone than in Papua New Guinea, where more variation in 
this relationship might exist, and thus a combination weighted more heavily toward the 
state/citizen model be used for the former. Either way, the flexibility of this approach is 
one of its key strengths. CDI would potentially allow comparisons to be made across 
starkly different contexts, through its insistence on a central focus on the relationship 
between ruler and ruled and because of its consistent emphasis on interactions between 
central and local forms of governance – but also because of its ability to conceive of 
these relationships and interactions in different ways. No longer confined to the liberal 
notions of the state and the citizen, it offers the potential to measure changes that exist 
in spaces between and beyond these limiting concepts. This speaks to principles 2, 3 
and 6 specifically. 
Finally, principles 1, 2, 7, 8, 9 and 10 all address the underlying need to ensure that the 
message communicated by democracy promotion programmes is one that is considered 
acceptable and credible by recipients of assistance, whether at the local or national 
level. Although in Afghanistan in particular there have been problems with the 
interpretation of the term ‘democracy’ and its association with western liberal values, 
this is not limited to the Afghan context. As the emergence of the New Deal for 
Engagement demonstrates, a number of fragile state governments have complaints 
about how assistance is provided in ways that “underestimate the importance of 
harmonizing with the national and local context” (G7+, 2011: 1). As such, developing 
an approach to democratisation assistance that does not impose assumptions of liberal 
statehood and citizenship, but accommodates a more flexible framework through which 
to work, corresponds directly and accountably with the stated interests of G7+ 
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governments over the long term. This indicates that CDI and the principles discussed 
above could be applied more broadly across fragile states, building on the lessons learnt 
from the Afghan case.          
9.6 Suggestions for further research 
The conclusions that the researcher has developed as a result of this study have a 
number of implications for further research. Although limited time and resources have 
prevented a thorough testing and broader application of the CDI prototype in this thesis, 
there is certainly room for expansion and further analysis.  Alongside the further 
exploration and refinement of the CDI framework, and testing in other conflict-affected 
fragile state contexts, a number of other, related issues that have emerged during this 
study would merit greater attention.  
First, more detailed work needs to be undertaken on how exactly mechanisms of 
accountability are or could be incorporated into a centre-community approach to 
democratisation that assumes individual interests to be secondary to those of the 
community as a whole. How, in these circumstances, are the needs of individuals 
ensured? This thesis touches on ways in which individuals can hold their community 
leaders to account in Afghanistan, but also highlights cases in which this does not occur. 
Further research could shed light on specific mechanisms (such as rotating leadership 
perhaps) that could be encouraged at the community level to ensure that systems exist 
for occasions when individual and community interests do not coincide.      
Second, having undertaken this research with a primary focus on the perspectives of 
Afghan communities and individuals, it would be helpful to explore the viewpoints of 
democracy promotion and governance agencies, to ascertain whether a CDI approach 
would provide a feasible alternative to current practice. Focusing on agency 
representatives’ perspectives on the ‘success’ and ‘failure’ of past projects could 
indicate how success and failure are determined by these actors, and in turn provide 
insight into whether this coincides with the viewpoints of programme recipients. This 
further research could then shed light on ways in which the practical application of CDI 
might impact international democratisation programming. Detailed examination of how 
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agencies such as NDI or IFES might change their current practice and what these 
changes might cost, in terms of time and resources, would help test the validity of this 
approach. Going beyond the application of principles, this would focus rather on 
detailed programming and policy.    
Third, further research into the ways in which democratisation might be measured in 
Islamic (and not necessarily fragile or conflict-affected) states could provide a useful 
comparison with the work conducted here on Afghanistan. The prevalence of Islamic 
community values in these countries may for example, render CDI a useful alternative 
to the liberal state-citizen model, although the stark differences between Islamic states 
such as Iran and Bangladesh, for example, and the ways in which they formed as states, 
might prevent useful comparison.      
Finally, as the military intervention in Afghanistan comes to a close and a new 
government is elected in 2014, it will be important to monitor how the relationships 
between central government and Afghan communities and individuals changes. Existing 
democracy promotion programmes may evolve and change as donor funding wanes, 
and the extent and reach of governance and broader development programmes will 
depend on how levels of security shift. Comparing the research conducted in this thesis 
with perspectives of Afghans and international agencies in the coming years could bring 
to light important differences that are indicative of critical shifts in the state-citizen 
relationship and their connection to fragility and conflict.   
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APPENDIX 1: FURTHER LITERATURE ON INSTITUTIONS, HISTORICAL 
INSTITUTIONALISM AND INTERPRETIVIST VIEWS OF SOCIAL 
EXPLANATION 
 
One of the underlying questions of this research runs as follows: is it in fact possible to 
measure levels of democratisation in a given context, and in such a way that allows like 
for like comparisons with other contexts? This is a relevant subject of enquiry for two 
reasons. First, as mentioned briefly above, democracy and levels of democraticness are 
generally judged according to normative standards, in spite of the efforts of a number of 
theorists and institutions to define empirical, universal standards of measurement.  
There exist no universally accepted standards, with theorists differing according to 
approaches based on events, procedures, substantive outcomes, liberal constitutionalism 
and other features of some democratic polities. Second, given the way in which 
democracies differ significantly according to context, with socio-political and historical 
factors often defining the specific characteristics of one democracy as compared to 
another, it is questionable whether the democratic institutions across any two 
democracies can be compared and levels of democraticness measured according to the 
same criteria.  
This problem will be explored here, with reference to three theoretical approaches to 
social explanation: a rational choice  institutionalist perspective, which often focuses on 
comparable institutions and argues that useful, like for like comparisons can be made 
across differing contexts; an historical institutionalist perspective, which takes a similar 
stance on institutions but grounds them in historical and political context, often 
comparing smaller groups of cases rather than adopting a universalist approach; and an 
interpretivist stance, which contends that all institutions are a product of the social 
meanings assigned to them by the self-interpreting agents acting within them, and are 
thus specific to a very particular context. According to this viewpoint, social norms and 
expectations are ideographic, to the extent that they are singular to a given community 
or individual influenced by that community. Key proponents of RCI include Douglass 
North (1990; 1993), Mancur Olson (1965) and Shepsle; (2006); prominent Historical 
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Institutionalist theorists include Thelen (1999; 2010); Orren and Skowronek (1999); 
Sanders (2006); and Steinmo (2008)  – and those promoting an interpretive stance 
include  Peter Winch (1958), Charles Taylor (1985), Alasdair MacIntyre and D.R. Bell 
(1967) and Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes (2003). Finding flaws with all three 
approaches, the discussion concludes with a detailed examination of whether a useful 
compromise can be made spanning the strengths of HI and interpretivist stances and 
comprising a more appropriate theoretical framework through which to address these 
issues in the Afghan context.  
What are institutions? 
The term ‘institution’ has been used and critiqued by scholars frequently and also 
demands clarification in this context. The word is used in this thesis broadly to denote a 
set of rules or norms that determine and regulate social behaviour, a definition drawing 
primarily from the institutionalist perspective put forward by Douglass North: 
 
Institutions are the rules of the game of a society or more formally are the 
humanly-devised constraints that structure human interaction.  They are 
composed of formal rules (statute law, common law, regulations), informal 
constraints (conventions, norms of behavior, and self imposed codes of 
conduct), and the enforcement characteristics of both (North, 1993: 5) 
 
North makes the distinction between institutions as sets of rules, from organisations as 
the actors or individuals following those rules. Organisations, according to North,  
are the players: groups of individuals bound by a common purpose to achieve 
objectives.  They include political bodies (political parties, the senate, a city 
council, a regulatory agency); economic bodies (firms, trade unions, family 
farms, cooperatives); social bodies (churches, clubs, athletic associations); and 
educational bodies (schools, colleges, vocational training centers). (North, 1993: 
5)   
 
Elections, then, are institutions – sets of formal rules determining interaction between 
voters and candidates in order that new leaders might be selected. Parliaments, line 
ministries, the family, or the shura are all examples of organisations within which 
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institutions exist to determine and regulate the interactions ‘players’ (or actors, or 
agents) within them. This definition draws on the language of institutionalism and game 
theory, in which social interactions (or transactions) are considered to take place 
according to a complex set of rules or institutions. According to North, “[i]nstitutions 
are formed to reduce uncertainty in human exchange” North, 1993: 2) and act as 
constraints on human behaviour. This can be compared with the perspective of others 
within the rational choice institutionalist or ‘new institutionalist’ school, such as 
Calvert, who instead describes institutions as a means of maintaining equilibrium 
(Calvert, cited in Shepsle, 2006: 26) Whereas a number of authors in the statebuilding 
and post-conflict literature use the term to denote a more specifically defined category – 
the administrative organs of state, or government institutions (see Roland Paris, 2004: 
187), this thesis considers their focus too narrow. Elections in themselves must be 
considered one of the many institutions constituting the democratisation process as a 
whole.  
Institutionalist views: Rational Choice  
Institutionalist approaches, in their most basic definition, contend that the occurrence of 
social events can be explained most effectively through the existence, persistence and 
relevance of institutions, structures or motivations which determine the decisions and 
actions of human agents as groups or individuals in a given context, and which can be 
empirically measured. For North, institutions are constraints (North, 1990).  Stephen 
Krasner describes an institutional approach in structural terms, stating that “[a]n 
institutionalist perspective regards enduring institutional structures as the building 
blocks of social and political life” (Krasner, 2009: 90). For some theorists, a focus on 
institutions can be used as a method of predicting future occurrences (Weber and Van 
Bouwel, 2002: 259-275, Little, 1991: ch. 3). A further key component of institutional 
approaches is the way in which institutions are considered to reduce the transaction 
costs of human interaction.  
Rational Choice Theory has contributed a great deal to the way in which the field of 
social explanation has expanded and evolved since the 1950s, when it was first 
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introduced. According to Kenneth Shepsle, “[c]anonical rational choice theory has been 
a staple in political science for decades” and “has become an engine of social scientific 
research” in spite of the way in which many developments have been made to improve 
levels of analytic sophistication since the original versions of RCT emerged (Shepsle, 
2006: 23-24). Having developed alongside the behaviourist movement, its central 
premise is that individuals, or agents, in any given context will choose rationally 
between the choices they perceive to be open to them. As Little explains, within RCT, 
“[a]gents act rationally insofar as they choose their actions from the range of available 
options that best suit their ends, given their beliefs about available options and their 
probable consequences” (Little, 1991: 45). This in turn facilitates a model which can be 
scaled up or aggregated – large scale social movements becoming the combined effect 
of individual agents acting rationally. Furthermore, it allows a universal mechanism for 
comparison: agents act rationally in any given context, and thus their actions can be 
explained comparatively across contexts also.  
This, then, provides a stark example of a school of thought which considers it not only 
possible but imperative to identify universalist principles that allow parallels to be 
drawn between social and political events occurring in what would appear to be vastly 
different contextual settings. It is precisely here, however, that early versions of RCT 
are limited in scope, as they presume all agents to be utility-maximising individuals 
whose concept of rationality and subsequent rational decision-making is knowable and 
predictable as a universal truth, and not defined or influenced by the specificities of 
individual cultures, contexts or institutional settings. As Little concedes, “Rational 
Choice analysis is often guilty of schematism regarding agency and structure” (Little, 
1991: 151).  
Another problem lies with the concept of accumulation, which has been contested in the 
study of collective action. In a seminal work, Mancur Olson clearly demonstrated the 
way in which individuals might not choose a seemingly ‘rational’ course of action to 
achieve a given outcome when embedded within a group setting, given the cost of the 
action and the perception of a shared outcome which might result from other members 
of the group bearing the cost, whether or not an individual decides to act (Olson, 1965).    
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Termed the ‘free-rider’ effect, this theoretical revelation has contributed significantly to 
the considerable academic interest in collective action (for example Tilly, 1978; 2003; 
Skocpol, 1979). More relevant for the purposes of this study, however, is the way in 
which institutions have been theorized using an RCT framework, comprising another 
body of literature often referred to as the New Institutionalism or Rational Choice 
Institutionalism (RCI).   
RCI is one example of the way in which RCT has evolved to encompass more 
sophisticated tools with which to analyse the contexts within which social and political 
phenomena take place. Shepsle, one of RCI’s principal proponents, describes a focus on 
institutions as a means to provide a contextual script according to which social and 
political action occurs in indicating the ways in which RCI has developed from an RCT 
base: 
We…have more nuanced views about the contexts in which political activity 
unfolds, the way these contexts channel behaviour, and the way behaviour, in 
turn, maintains or alters contexts. These contexts are inhabited by political 
actors and organizations to be sure, but it is the institutions that arise and persist 
there that provide scripts for political processes (Shepsle, 2006: 23-24). 
 
This focus provides a framework for cross-cultural comparisons but also allows for the 
ways in which institutions influence and are influenced by the contexts in which they 
emerge. North assigns institutions a general, broad definition of “humanly devised 
constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990: 3), implying a set of rules 
within a game that agents choose to adhere to.  North then makes the distinction 
between institutions and organisations, which are the bodies or groups of actors or 
agents within which institutions exist to regulate the interactions. For others within the 
RCI school, institutions are rather a means of maintaining equilibrium, and a way in 
which to lower the costs of social interaction (Calvert, as cited in Shepsle, 2006: 26). If 
all actors adhere to a set of principles or rules, social balance is maintained and is 
threatened only by those individuals who adhere to different principles or rules 
(Shepsle, 2006: 26). 
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In his outline of RCI perspectives, Shepsle makes his own distinctions between two 
different types of institutions – those which are structured, and those which are 
unstructured. Those institutions listed in the former category comprise what might be 
termed formal entities – such as courts, Congress, central banks, political parties, 
armies. The latter group by contrast include norms, collective action cooperative 
arrangements – those sets of practices which do not necessarily translate into formal 
rules and are “more amorphous” (Shepsle 2006: 27). Whereas unstructured institutions 
can be ill-defined, informal and, while maintaining varying degrees of institutional 
tenacity, difficult to classify or categorize, structured institutions by definition carry 
characteristics amenable to comparison. As Shepsle explains, while not excluding the 
likelihood of variation between different versions of structured institutions, “there are 
also powerful central tendencies...[which] is what induces us to group them together 
and to think it sensible to compare them” (Shepsle, 2006: 27).  
 
Applying this approach to the central concern of this thesis, in the search for social 
explanations of democratisation and why it occurs differently in fragile states, it is 
possible to identify potentially useful concepts. It could be argued, for example, that the 
process of democratisation ideally comprises the creation, establishment and 
development of both structured and unstructured institutions – the former including 
legislative bodies, a functioning judiciary, independent electoral bodies, for example, 
and the latter, certain aspects of civil society – demonstrative collective action, 
relationships of trust between MPs and individuals or communities, or between citizens 
and the state. Of these two forms of institutions, it would seem that while unstructured 
institutions present something of a conundrum in terms of measurement and 
comparison, depending on how they are defined – structured institutions such as 
legislative bodies and elections provide a more solid base for comparison across 
different contexts. 
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Even these comparisons, however, can be problematised. From an RCI perspective, 
institutions or sets of rules are a means to overcome costly differences in levels of 
information between actors – to level the playing field, perhaps, and enable a consistent 
and effective game to take place in which the rules are known to all parties.  
This makes the assumption, however, that there is sufficient incentive for all parties to 
play by the rules – or sufficient disincentive not to. It rests on the premise that all parties 
are aware of and accept the benefits that playing by the rules will generate. Evidently, 
this is the case for example, in elections taking place in established western 
democracies, for example – but not necessarily so in democracies emerging in post-
conflict or continuing conflict societies. The assumption often made by theorists is that 
elections level the political playing field through the simple mechanism of subjecting all 
candidates to the public vote, thus institutionalizing a healthy, intended uncertainty with 
the outcomes unknowable (Przeworski, 1988: 63). In the immediate aftermath of civil 
conflict, however – there is no guarantee that losers in an elections will accept their loss 
according to these new, democratic rules of the game – or that candidates in general are 
prepared to take the risk of playing fairly when so much is at stake, and when there is 
too much to lose. Although often dubbed a ‘post-conflict’ context, a country undergoing 
post-war reconstruction or democratisation processes can be one in which war systems 
remain intact, in the form of complex webs of incentive structures that can keep low-
level conflict continuing for many years after the official ‘end’ of a war. These 
contribute to the ways in which actors who stood to gain significantly from their 
positions of advantage during conflict have often little motivation to de-arm and submit 
to the public vote. 
 Another example can be given in the way in which political actors in unstable 
environments may choose to keep information about themselves and their political 
affiliations ambiguous, in order that they might secure greater advantage within the 
political game by affiliating themselves with different sides depending on which 
appears to be strongest at a given moment. This is precisely the case in the lower house 
of the Afghan parliament, in which very few MPs choose to declare political affiliations 
outright in order that they can reserve the opportunity to change these should the need 
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arise. This ‘political ambiguity’ prevents the playing of an efficient game because the 
incentives to play by the rules and declare political positions do not exist (Larson, 2010: 
1). As such, it would appear that institutions differ across social, political, historical and 
cultural contexts, because rules are interpreted and assigned meaning differentially. 
Indeed, one of the most fundamental critiques of the RCI perspective is its inability to 
conceptualise unstable or transitional politics. As Bates et al. note, “[t]he greatest 
achievement of rational choice theory has been to provide tools for studying political 
outcomes in stable institutional settings. Political transitions seem to defy rational forms 
of analysis” (1998: 604-5, cited in Thelen, 1999: 381). This forms a critical stumbling 
block for the potential application RCI approaches to the Afghan context and to the 
empirical cases of other fragile environments also. 
Historical Institutionalism 
Historical Institutionalism developed at a time when theories of the state and the state’s 
role vis-à-vis society were re-entering the debate in the social science literature in the 
1960s and 70s after a period of widespread unpopularity (Sanders, 2006: 42). This 
strand of institutionalism does not differ from RCI perspectives in its definition of 
institutions, with HI scholars largely holding to North’s (1990) definition of institutions 
as “humanly devised constraints” (Sanders, 2006: 42). Beyond this, however, there is no 
formal agreement as to the extent of the differences between the two, with some 
scholars insisting on a clear divergence (Sanders, 2006) and others highlighting more 
subtle analyses of overlaps and points of distinction (Thelen, 1999). Key contrasts are 
outlined here, followed by a discussion of the potential relevance of HI theory to this 
thesis. 
 
RCI and HI approaches traditionally differ from one another in that, for HI, history and 
power within a given context matter: historical and political factors and cultural norms 
inform why individuals feel they should (or should not) comply with certain 
institutions, and in doing so shape institutions themselves. Kathleen Thelen describes 
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what have come to signify the most commonly cited differences between historical and 
rational approaches, outlining “historical institutionalism’s characteristic focus on 
specific contextual conditions” compared with “rational choice’s characteristic search 
for generalizable features of political behavior rooted in the incentive structures that 
individuals face”. (Thelen, 1999: 370).  While RCI offers a micro-analysis of the 
behaviour of individuals, HI considers this behaviour within the broader, macro-
perspective of historical (and often structural) patterns. The central premise of historical 
institutionalism holds institutions as important tools in the theory and practice of social 
explanation, but insists that they are not constructed or experienced within a vacuum: 
they are the product of given historical structures and processes.  This allows a clear 
theoretical divergence from the prospect of universal generalizations, and instead 
facilitates the comparison of small groups of cases, for example in a regional context or 
across states in which a particular political or social phenomenon has occurred (Thelen, 
1999: 373).  
One example of a social phenomenon which has been subject to considerable scrutiny 
by historical instituionalists and structuralists in particular, among others, is that of 
revolution. Theda Skocpol makes the case that social revolutions in France, Russia and 
China may be explained through the structural explanation of the behaviour of states, 
resulting in the reshuffling of class politics (Skocpol, 1979; Dunn, 1982: 301).  In doing 
so, Skocpol considers the agency of individuals as having minimal explanatory power 
in determining the reasons for and circumstances under which revolutions take place. In 
general, the extent to which structuralist or historical institutionalist theorists include or 
reject the role of the individual varies. As Dunn highlights, Charles Tilly has a different 
approach to revolutions, describing the collective will of demonstrators (or ‘insurgents’) 
as ‘purposive movement’ (Dunn, 1982:302) and thus assigning a considerable degree of 
agency to the insurgents themselves (rather than relying purely on the character of the 
state at any given time) in his explanation of revolutions. As discussed throughout the 
thesis, this also plays a key role in his model for assessing levels of democratisation, 
where a state-citizen relationship is central as opposed to a focus primarily on the 
actions of government elites (Tilly, 2007: 12).  Still, clear from this example is the way 
in which in general, an HI perspective facilitates a comparison across a small group of 
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contexts which are firmly situated within historical processes, considered critical to the 
explanation of the occurrence of social phenomena – in contrast to the tendency toward 
identifying universal trends, as found in RCI approaches (Thelen, 1999: 373). In this 
sense, an HI perspective could be usefully applied to the central concerns of this thesis, 
in that the sphere of analysis – fragile states – would provide an appropriate locus for 
the comparative study of the emergence and differential experience of democratisation 
processes that could be linked strongly to the historical and political contexts of the 
different states studied. It is clear that the historical trajectories, for example, of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, throughout the 20
th
 century are vastly different and thus could 
provide significant explanatory power in terms of measuring the difference outcomes of 
democratisation ‘from outside’. 
In contrast to RCI, HI analysis does not only focus on the regularities and patterns 
within institutions but also in their change and evolution over time. While this is 
ostensibly conducive to the study of the way in which democratisation takes place, and 
thus an asset to its utility as a theoretical framework for this thesis, it presents a problem 
also in that it can facilitate parallels being made between HI analysis and the notion of 
path dependency. Path dependency encapsulates a deterministic view of historical 
processes, in that small events occurring at a given point in time trigger a series of 
increasingly greater consequences which occur teleologically and explain an historical 
path from event A to event B. This can be linked to modernization theory in terms of 
the way countries develop and change on a macro level, moving sequentially from one 
stage of development to another in a seemingly irreversible process (Rostow, 1960).  
Evidently, this kind of deterministic prescription is problematic, particularly when 
linked to the way in which countries democratise. As Tilly points out, processes of 
democratisation can just as easily involve ‘de-democratisation’ as they can the 
progression towards a more democratic state of being (Tilly, 2007: 14).  
Both Tilly and Thelen avoid deterministic accounts of historical processes, however, 
and have more nuanced perspectives on the ways in which institutions develop over 
time, which are not prescriptive. Thelen talks about institutions as “the product of 
concrete temporal processes” (1999: 371), referring to the way in which historical 
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processes are analysed in retrospect to explain how and why social phenomena (such as 
the development of institutions, or the occurrence of revolution) take place. One event 
taking place historically – a ‘critical juncture’ - might trigger a series of further events 
that follow as a result of that particular first event, the “crucial founding moment of 
institutional foundation” (Thelen, 1999: 387). As critical junctures vary across 
countries, they stimulate different paths of development. But at any given time, 
institutions shape and are shaped by the very specific political and social contexts of 
which they are a part, and from which they cannot be extracted (1999:384). In this 
sense, path dependency for Thelen is about both institutional stability and evolution, 
and as such “involves elements of both continuity and (structured) change.” (1999: 
384).   Change occurs but is limited by past events and processes, as “institutions 
continue to evolve in response to changing environmental conditions and ongoing 
political maneuvering but in ways that are constrained by past trajectories.” (1999: 387). 
Within institutions, HI theorists warn against the RCI approach of assuming the 
interests of groups of actors to be solely and disconnectedly utility-maximising, and 
instead to look at how groups were initially formed and how the construction and 
articulation of their interests developed as a result of this. (1999: 395). Viewing group 
interest as socially constructed thus overlaps (uncoincidentally) with Marxist and/or 
structuralist perspectives, and often draws on the character of the state in doing so 
(Skocpol, 1979; Tilly, 1985).  
While allowing a nuanced analysis of the construction, articulation and performance of 
group interests, however, in its focus on historical analysis HI appears to assume that a 
‘starting point’ can be identified. When talking about the ways in which groups formed 
‘in the first place’, it is necessary to identifying when that ‘first place’ in fact was, and 
to draw distinguishing lines based on the – perhaps normative – identification and 
justification of critical junctures. When looking at the case for democratisation in 
Afghanistan, does one begin with a) the international intervention in 2001; b) the 
reasons for which the intervention came to pass, looking back to the anarchy of civil 
war in the 1990s and Taliban impositions of brutal order and rudimentary forms of 
‘justice’ in response to this; c) the series of historical reactions toward modernizing 
monarchs beginning perhaps with the rule of Amanullah Shah in the 1920s; d), even 
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further back, to the centralizing efforts of the fearsome 19
th
 century reign of 
Abdurrahman Khan, the Iron Amir; or e) to the first Pashtun Ruler Ahmad Shah 
Durrani in the mid-18
th
 century? Looking outside of Afghanistan, it would also be 
necessary to link the international effort to promote democratisation to broader global 
trends in this regard and to patterns of statebuilding that had emerged through post-
conflict interventions in Kosovo, East Timor and Iraq at the very least, if not a much 
wider range of historical cases. While Thelen freely states that institutional development 
is the result of changes that can occur across and affect many different processes 
simultaneously in different ways (1999: 383), there is nevertheless still a need to define 
and justify a point from which one’s focus of analysis begins – a point which will 
almost inevitably remain contestable. 
A further issue is the way in which institutional change and political development more 
generally, for an historical institutionalist, must always be a structured process 
involving states and classes. While the ability to analyse institutional change at all is an 
improvement on the limitations of RCI approaches requiring stability, this is still a 
problem when applied to periods of rapid or enforced transition. Some HI scholars have 
problematised the notion of institutional change it that it happens on different 
institutional timelines simultaneously, and change in one affects the structures in 
another (Orren and Skowronek, 1994: 321). This acknowledgement of the complexity 
of institutional change however still does not account for the often rapid and 
unpredictable nature of change in fragile states. A context of increasing instability in 
Afghanistan throughout the last 10 years has heightened the unpredictability with which 
events occur, which might counter the efforts of HI theorists to estimate the nature of 
the paths along which institutional change might take place in future.  In these ways, 
while HI provides a more appropriate framework for application to the study of 
democratisation than that offered by RCI approaches, primarily in its solid grounding in 
historical and political processes, it is nevertheless hindered by its reliance on a 
normatively determined start-point, by its inability to explain rapid institutional change 
and also in its insistence on the structured nature of change through the formulation of 
macro-level group (and state) interests. The latter two hindrances pose particular 
problems to the application of HI frameworks to a post-conflict or fragile state in which 
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institutional change is often enforced from the outside (and thus is not a state-versus-
class issue), in which the instability of the context may preclude predictable processes 
of change, and where the existence of a cohesive state may itself be called into question.  
Given that both rational choice and historical institutionalism – in their very 
conceptions of institutional formation and change at the micro and macro levels 
respectively – pose problems for application in post-conflict environments, it is 
necessary to ask whether a focus on more contextually and culturally specific analysis 
might provide more insight into the explanation of democratisation processes. 
Discarding the notion of structures or institutions that can be compared, like for like, 
across contexts, an interpretative perspective provides a stark contrast to the different 
institutionalisms discussed above. 
Interpretivist views of institutional comparison 
Interpretivist theorists, such as Peter Winch (1958), Charles Taylor (1985) and Mark 
Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes (2003), have a starkly different ontological perspective on 
the analysis of social phenomeona.  Accounts of causal relationships, whether realist or 
nomological, are considered inapplicable to the study of human society (Winch, 1958 
[2008]: 67-8)
51
. 
Relatedly, interpretivists also have a different perspective on institutions and their 
construction than their institutionalist counterparts. They contend that institutions 
cannot make the same sense to individuals across cultural and social boundaries because 
their interpretation of the rules of the game will depend on what makes sense to them at 
a given point in time. As such, truths held by individuals can only be understood 
through the study of their own interpretations of their actions within a certain context – 
there is no universally experienced truth (for example in the meaning of an institution or 
set of rules) that can be empirically measured. As Charles Taylor explains, “[w]e make 
sense of action when there is a coherence between the actions of the agent and the 
meaning of his situation for him” (Taylor, 1985: 24). The key is thus to understand how 
                                                          
51
 The complete dismissal of causal relationships in social science is however refuted by Alasdair 
MacIntyre and D.R. Bell (1967:102-105). 
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human action and interaction is meaningful but only from the perspective of self-
interpreting human agents (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: 18, Taylor, 1985: 26). 
This is particularly helpful in the study of particular social contexts as units of enquiry 
in their own right. As Little describes, interpretation is focused primarily on 
understanding, as opposed to explanation, as “an approach that emphasizes…the 
importance of the particulars of different cultures and holds that the central goal of 
social enquiry is the interpretation of meaningful human practices” (Little, 1991: 68). In 
applying an interpretivist stance to the research questions explored in this thesis, then, 
would involve the search to understand why and how democratisation takes place 
differentially in one context as opposed to another through the study of what aspects of 
democratisation might mean to those involved in this process in a given society, rather 
than the attempt to identity root causes of democratisation that could be similar across a 
number of different contexts.  
This approach would allow the detailed consideration of the specificities of the Afghan 
context, the uniqueness of which could be well-argued based on historical, geo-political, 
socio-economic and religious grounds, and which would benefit significantly from the 
‘thick’ descriptions common to interpretative accounts.  Clifford Geertz’s influential 
account of a Balinese cock fight demonstrates clearly the weight and descriptive 
capacities of interpretative stances and their ability to situate analysis within a complex 
and changing environment (Geertz, 1979: 181-223). Unlike RCI, limited to the analysis 
of stable institutions, interpretation would thus well facilitate the understanding of a 
post-conflict context or fragile state. It would also allow for variety within Afghanistan 
and for a nuanced analysis to be made of the ways in which democratisation takes place 
in different sectors of society. In its central premise that no society can be ‘explained’ 
by a set of analytical tools (Little, 1991: 80), the approach would also posit that no two 
societies would assign meaning to democratic practices or processes in the same way. 
By extension, it would not be possible to measure democratisation in different contexts 
according to one set of criteria or benchmarks.     
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Another strength of the interpretivist approach is its focus on humans as social beings, 
embedded within and constructing social practices to which they assign meaning based 
on a collective understanding. Humans are “social beings who cannot be understood 
apart from our social context” (Trigg, 2001: 66). While interpretivists state this to be the 
case regardless of how apparently collective or individually-oriented a given society, it 
is nevertheless possible to see clearly how any attempt to understand Afghanistan must 
be rooted within efforts to understand social norms and practices given the strength and 
tenacity of the collective lifestyle in the country. Efforts to introduce a policy of ‘one 
man, one vote’ in elections post-2001 provide a key example of the ways in which 
apparently ‘universal’ democratic principles conflict with existing social norms and 
practices in Afghanistan: while on polling days, Afghans have queued to vote in lines as 
individuals, decisions taken on who to vote for were often communal affairs in which 
an entire village may have decided in advance of the election which candidate would 
secure the best connection to central patronage and prosperity for the community 
(Coburn and Larson, 2009).       
Indeed, in contrast to the RCI attempt to construct the individual as a sole unit for 
analysis, or the HI insistence on the role of macro-level structures and interest groups, 
“[a]n interpretive approach moves back and forth between aggregate concepts and the 
beliefs of particular individuals” (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003: 2), shifting between the 
individual and the society of which it is a part in an hermeneutic spiral. Charles Taylor 
expands on this point in his statement that   “[w]hat the ontology of mainstream social 
science lacks is the notion of meaning as not simply for an individual subject; of a 
subject who can be a ‘we’ as well as an ‘I’ (Taylor, 1985: 40). The existence of socially 
shared meanings or facts contributes great explanatory power to the interpretive 
approach, as it demonstrates the interconnectedness between individuals and the 
environments through which meaning is developed and assigned to various social 
phenomena and behaviour. One example of this kind of analysis as applied to Afghan 
society would be in the action of a dinner guest finishing the entire portion of food he is 
given  during a meal – interpreted by his hosts as a clear statement that his hunger has 
not yet been satiated and he would like a further portion.  Quite a different meaning, 
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then, to that ascribed to an empty plate by the researcher’s own family – where this 
would symbolize a satisfied appetite and the end of a meal.  
 
Having discussed the strengths of this approach, there are problems also with the 
interpretivist stance. To reject outright the notion of universal institutions is significant 
in itself in that it denies any kind of political comparison across cultures – precluding 
the prospect of any generalization at all. As Little asserts, “If each social phenomenon is 
sui generis – that it, if each society works according to forces that are unique to it – then 
generalizations are impossible in social science” (Little, 1991: 155).  The researcher 
contends that there are some institutions that can transcend cultural boundaries – and 
that to assume otherwise is highly problematic in the context of increasing 
globalisation. While ‘international human rights’ for example are notoriously vague and 
controversial, there are nevertheless some that would generate shared meaning in more 
than one culture or community. While ‘democracy’ is a value-laden term that is 
certainly interpreted differently across different contexts, and democratic practices, such 
as the holding of elections, ascribed different meaning from one community within 
Afghanistan to the next – the experience of participating in an election is nonetheless 
comparable, if not identical, across the provincial border. There may be similarities in 
the assigned meaning of institutions or rules between villages, districts, provinces, 
nations or within entire regions – and the interpretivist approach does not specify the 
extent to which ‘community’ can be expanded.  
Another principal problem with the approach is that it assigns a level of authoritative 
objectivity to the observer, who presumably also is subject to his own interpretations 
which are culturally conditioned. The idea that a researcher’s own interpretation of the 
meaning of an agent’s actions is somehow more plausible than that of the agent 
themselves is also problematic (MacIntyre and Bell, 1967: 95-97). Additionally, there is 
no means of empirically testing an observer’s interpretation of an action, other than 
through the (interpreted) meanings assigned to action by the actors themselves.  
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RCI, HI and Interpretative: A compromise? 
There are problems with RCI, HI and interpretivist approaches, none of which present a 
perfect theoretical approach for the analysis of democratisation.  Elements of all three, 
however, would facilitate an in-depth understanding of social norms and practices in 
Afghanistan and a causal analysis which could be compared across contexts.  Rational 
choice offers a micro-level analysis that focuses on individual choice and agency – 
arguably fundamental to liberal constructions of democracy as promoted by 
international actors, and a means to thus explain the motivations and perhaps outcomes 
of international engagement in state-building practices. An historical institutionalist 
perspective would then situate this within broader historical and political processes, 
examine the role of the state and different interest groups in determining a 
democratisation trajectory. An interpretative stance would ultimately ground any 
tendency to make universal statements in the deep understanding of the Afghan context.  
A theoretical model combining these highly variant and often opposing stances would 
appear to be, if it existed, incoherent and contradictory – partly due to the ways in 
which some of the key proponents of all three insist that their own method is the only 
means through which human society can be usefully examined. There have been 
attempts, however, to build such a combined framework, most notably in the form of 
the recent Analytic Narratives (AN) literature (Bates et al., 1998, 2000; Levi, 2003). 
Proponents of this approach dismiss the dichotomy between ideographic and 
nomothetical stances (Levi, 2003: 1), in favour of a type of social enquiry that combines 
both interpretive and institutionalist perspectives. Essentially, theirs is an attempt to 
apply rational choice theory to a deep understanding of a specific cultural context. As 
Levi explains, “our version of analytic narrative is clearly informed by theory, 
specifically rational choice theory, and by the conjoined methodologies of historical 
analysis and in-depth case studies” (Levi, 2003:4). While some scholars have dismissed 
analytic narratives as unoriginal and lacking in its contribution of a ‘new’ methodology 
to social scientific enquiry (Dessler, 2000), this is nonetheless a significant attempt to 
address the inadequacies of rational choice accounts by situating them specifically and 
carefully within given contemporary and historical contexts (Thelen, 1999: 375-6). For 
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the purposes of this study, an AN framework remains overly concerned with game 
theory and its application to historical contexts so that it appears to be, as rational 
choice critics more generally have noted, an attempt to bend events and contexts to fit 
the theory (Green and Shapiro, 1994).  Nevertheless, its emergence and defense by 
prominent scholars indicates the need for a combined approach and the limitations of 
RCI, HI and interpretive perspectives as individual methods of enquiry. 
This exploration of different approaches to the basic ontological question of whether 
social structures exist as objects to be examined, or whether they are constituted purely 
by means of their interpretation and assigned meaning in specific social contexts, has 
proven fruitful in its shedding light on the strengths and limitations of each perspective. 
Alongside the HI school, the researcher concurs that institutions may be compared 
across limited groups of contexts, allowing for the possibility, at least, for meaning to 
be shared across different cultural and political environments. This is not to say that 
shared meaning necessarily exists, however, and the researcher would also argue that if 
it does, it does not exist a) in a vacuum, unaffected by current political dynamics in a 
given context; or b) for an indeterminate length of time, irrespective of historical 
changes. This contributes to the way in which democratisation – as implemented by 
external actors according to a one-size-fits-all blueprint for political change – is 
invariably problematic.   
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APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEW GUIDE
52
 
 
Introductions and local context 
 
Introduction to the research team and to the study. Explanation of terms of consent – 
explain how data will be used and how all names (if given) will be removed from 
transcripts. Ensure respondent is fully aware of these issues and happy to continue with 
the interview before beginning the conversation.  Thank the respondent for their time 
before beginning.  
 
 Please introduce yourself (probe: what is your occupation, role in the 
village/area?) 
 
 How long have you lived in this area? Could you tell us a bit about your family 
background? 
 
Authority and decision-making 
 
 Tell us about who holds authority in your area – who makes decisions in the 
community? How do they do this? How are these decision-makers selected? 
(Probe: what do you think about this way of selecting them?) 
 
 If you have a problem to solve, who do you go to first? If that person cannot 
solve it, what happens then? What kinds of problems do you take to which 
people? 
 
Quality of life 
 
 What do you think about living in this area? (Probe: what are the benefits and 
drawbacks? What kinds of services are available? What do you think about 
these?) 
 
 What is the security situation like here? 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
52
 This was used as a rough guide for the researchers rather than a questionnaire, with the main purpose to 
prompt conversation around a few key topics. This being the case, the questions here do not always 
correspond precisely with the ones asked in actual interview transcripts.  Probes are given as a means to 
prompt further conversation, should initial answers be short. The guide was translated into Dari and 
Pashtu for Afghan researchers to use (although some were more comfortable using the English guide). 
All translations of questions were checked and cross-checked by two translators for each language.    
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Government representatives and elections 
 
 What do you think about the Wolesi Jirga members for your province? (probe: 
who are they? Do any of them come from your area? What do they do? What 
should they do/what is their role, in your opinion?)  
 
 What do you think about the parliament in general? Did you vote in the first 
parliamentary elections? Are you planning to vote again? (Probe: If yes, how 
will you decide who to vote for? Do you think the current members will be 
candidates again? Why/why not?) 
 
 What do you think about elections in Afghanistan in general? (Probe: can you 
tell us some stories from the first elections and last year’s elections? Have there 
been any changes?) 
 
 Tell us about the provincial council. What do you think about it? (Probe: do you 
know any PC members? What do they do (what is their role)? Can you tell us 
about how the provincial council elections went last year? Were there any 
candidates from your district? What happened?  
 
International actors 
 
 Is the international community working in your province? (Probe: Who are 
they? What do they do? What are your opinions about their work?) 
 
Possibly finish interview with questions regarding other people who might be available 
for interview in the area (following the guide in the sampling design), and request an 
introduction. 
 
Thank you for your time. 
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APPENDIX 3: NOTE ON TRANSLATION AND SAMPLE INTERVIEW 
TRANSCRIPTS  
 
 
Note on translation 
 
Throughout the data collection, interviews were conducted in the first language of the 
respondent wherever possible. Detailed handwritten notes were taken by one of the two 
researchers conducting each interview, with the other facilitating discussion (and with 
this role alternating between them for alternate interviews). These were then typed up as 
English transcripts by the researchers, with translation checked by other members of the 
research team. The author of the study (so called in this instance to differentiate her 
from the Afghan researchers involved in data collection) was able to verify the quality 
of English translation in the interviews conducted in Dari that she attended herself, as 
she was able to understand approximately 80 per cent of the answers given and check 
her own notes against the transcripts produced.  
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Sample interview transcripts
53
 
 
 
NANG 17 W (Nangarhar women’s interview no. 17: rural/mid-income/Tajik) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observations:  
 
We had made an arrangement the day before to meet the respondent at this time, and 
we left to get to her house at about 7.30am on Wednesday. We waited on the main road 
for a taxi for a while. After finding a taxi, we started the journey toward Surkhrod 
district. We passed the [government-run] Public Health Hospital, the police 
headquarters and Jenderma Bridge and there were carts selling cucumbers and other 
shops. We also passed a mixed high school of boys and girls in Surkhrod district and 
there were some other primary schools we saw in the Charbagh-e Safa and other areas. 
We saw a number of people reaping wheat and some of them were selling fresh fruits 
like apricots, mangos, cucumbers and some others. The area was green all around and 
the weather was good, because it was morning and a very nice breeze was blowing, but 
by the time our interview had finished, the weather had become very hot. We were 
wearing veils, therefore we were feeling very hot. When we approached to the home of 
the respondent, her other neighbours were there too. All the women were happy to meet 
us and paid their respects us and brought us cold yogurt. They had a cow. It was a big 
family and they had a big house. There was a garden in front of the house. The house 
had five rooms, a kitchen, a bathroom, an oven and also a big barn outside. The room 
where we were sitting had four red toshaks [floor cushions] and six red balesht [wall 
pillows]. There were red curtains and the respondent’s clothes were blue. Her native 
language was Dari, but she could speak Pashto correctly and clearly. The respondent 
had a nice voice, neither loud nor too soft. During the interview, the respondent 
                                                          
53
 In these documents, font in italic script represents the interviewer’s thoughts and observations. Text in 
square paratheses denotes the author’s clarifications. Village names have been removed to protect the 
anonymity of respondents. 
Interview type: Individual Interview  
Interview No. 017 
Date: 02 June 2010 
Time: 08:00am – 10.00am 
Province: Nangarhar 
Location: AA village, Surkhrod district 
Respondent name, title and job: XX, housewife 
Respondent ethnicity/tribe: Tajik 
Respondent age: 35 years 
Respondent language: Dari  
Facilitator name: Dewa Mohsin 
Note-taker: Rahat Gul Sadat 
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brought us some cucumbers. She was listening to our questions carefully and answering 
our questions properly, but she didn’t have information about some of the issues.  
 
 
Introduction: 
 
The facilitator gave an introduction to ourselves, our organization and to the research 
and explained the reasons why we wanted to have an interview with her. She talked 
about AREU and OSDR being research organizations without any political agenda. She 
also explained that we would not use any names in any reports and would not write 
down her name if she did not want to give it to us.  
  
(The respondent then asked why, if your organization is non-political, are you going to 
ask us about politics? We explained that we were interested in collecting her opinion 
about some political issues. Before starting the interview, she asked to read the 
interview questions, which we gave to her). Some of the neighbours stayed in the room 
for the interview, and although XX was the main respondent, they contributed at times 
also (as noted below). 
  
Question: OK dear sister, please introduce yourself? 
Answer: My name is XX and my father’s name is YY. I have nine sisters and the 
villagers call my mother “Mother of ten daughters”.  
Question: What is your occupation or role? 
Answer: I don’t have any official job, because I haven’t studied at school and my father 
doesn’t have any official job, but he does different kinds of [agricultural] labouring. 
Now as it is the time for gathering crops he reaps wheat with people and when reaping 
is finished, then he does other work in the field.  
Question: What activities do you do around your home/village? 
Answer: My job is to bake bread at home, milk the cow, and sew clothes. I also train 
girls and women to cut and stitch clothes, and when the sewing machine is broken 
down, I fix it by myself.  
Question: Dear sister, tell us about your relationships with the neighbors and villagers?  
Answer: All of my neighbours are happy and when they buy new clothes, they bring 
them to me for sewing or when their sewing machine is broken down, I fix it. I don’t 
know about anything else.  
Question: When you sew clothes or fix sewing machines, are you paid or it is free of 
charge? 
Answer: No, this is our village, there is no money. We don’t leave our homes, because 
we are not allowed. So when people want to sew their clothes or fix their sewing 
machines, they come to me.  
Question: Sister, how long have you been living in this village? 
Answer: We have been living in this village for a long time, because it is the homeland 
of my grandfathers; they have lived and died in this village and have been buried here, 
because it is our homeland.  
Question: Sister, can you give us any information about your family? 
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Answer: We are not a wealthy family and we live in this village. My mother also lives 
in this village, my parents are also from this village and our other relatives also live 
here. We are a religious and Muslim family and our relatives come to our home and we 
go to their homes.  
Question: Tell us about who has authority here in the village. 
Answer: The biggest power is the power of Allah (SWA), and no other power can 
match it. Otherwise, anyone who has money can make themselves powerful. Powerful 
people commit cruelties on poor people, because they can. There will never be power 
and authority for poor people in Afghanistan.  
Question: Dear sister, tell us about who makes decisions in your community? 
Answer: Decision-making in our village is our men’s work. In our family, the decisions 
are made by my parents, because they are elders.  
Question: What kinds of decisions are made? 
Answer: Decisions are made about important issues. 
Answer of XX’s neighbour: Sister, the decisions of poor people are all made for 
money. For example the reason that people are killing other people, destroying schools 
and destroying buildings is just because they are paid. These are people who are not 
aware of the way of Allah (SWA) and The Prophet (SWA), but under the holy name of 
Islam they commit inhuman activities and don’t know the difference between friends 
and enemies. Due to ignorance, they destroy their homes, their country and kill their 
brothers. They even risk their own life for money and kill themselves so that people 
may say that they were martyred in the name of Allah (SWA).  
(According to my point of view, the respondent didn’t have much education, but she was 
still against ignorant and illiterate people and was dissatisfied by their activities).  
Question: Sister, what are your opinions on this? 
Answer (XX): I hate the Taliban and insurgents because they do many wrong things 
and don’t work for Islam in its real sense. They use and benefit from the name of Islam 
for their personal interests.  
Question: Sister, if you have a problem, how do you solve it? 
Answer: In my opinion, there are lots of problems that people are facing, especially in 
the current situation. Our life is full of problems and the 30-year war faced people with 
many difficulties. Therefore, people are facing lots of problems. For example, the 
problems of homelessness, lack of electricity, economic problems, ignorance, family 
problems, legal issues and problems of injustice in families, as well as the problems of 
insecurity.  
Question: What kinds of problems are family problems, in your opinion? 
Answer: For instance, it is the custom in our village that a girl is engaged to someone 
by force, or for money, or exchanging a sister for the crime of her brother. These and 
other cruelties towards women are family problems. And also there are some ethnic 
problems, when there are conflicts between two ethnicities.  
(According to our point of view, some families in the village don’t know about the rights 
of the women and women are faced with many problems in their husbands’ families) 
Question: If you have any security problems, so how do you solve them? 
Answer: Sister, security problems and ethnic problems are all related to men; we 
women cannot do anything regards this, but our men know better about these matters.  
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(According to our point of view, women do know about which kind of problems to take 
to whom, but unfortunately they are not given any chance or opportunity and authority. 
There are some women that are wise, but they still don’t have any authority to convey 
their problems in a public place). 
Question: Sister, how is the security situation in your village; what is your opinion in 
this regard? 
Answer: Sister, currently, security is good, but sometimes there is gunfire on the police 
check points during the night, and people living in the homes which are close to the 
check point are really bothered by this and sometimes they are injured.  
Question: Sister, what about security in the province as a whole?  
Answer: Sister, we are housewives and we don’t have radio or television and cannot 
lie. Also we don’t know about anything.  
Question: Sister, how is your life passing in this village? 
Answer: It is sometimes good and sometimes bad. Sometimes sad and sometimes 
happy; sometimes it is hot and sometimes cold. Sister, the life of humans passes like 
wind; no one knows how it is passing. 
Question: Sister, is there any candidate from your district or province and do you know 
him/her? 
Answer: No sister. No one has entered to parliament (she means there is no candidate 
from their district). If there are any candidates from the district or province, I don’t 
know them, but our men may know about them.  
Question: Dear sister, did you participate in the first elections and cast your vote? 
Answer: Yes, the women of our village went to the home of Mowlana Abdur Rahman 
[a local religious figure] and there we cast our votes. Other people were voting for 
Karzai and they also told us to vote for him, so we cast our votes in his box. And for 
provincial council, we voted for Muhtarama.  
Question: Sister, if the elections are conducted again, will your cast vote? 
Answer: We will never vote for anyone again. 
Question: Why will you not cast a vote? 
Answer: Because anyone who gets to a higher position works for himself and his 
personal interests; no one works for poor people and the country. Therefore, may Allah 
(SWA) not spoil my intention, I will not leave my home to vote for anyone. This is my 
final decision and intention.  
Question: Was there any difference between the two elections [meaning, between 
2004/5 and 2009]? 
Answer: I should say that the first elections that were held at home of Mowlana Sahib 
in our village. They started in the morning and went on until 4 o’clock in the afternoon, 
and they passed really well.  
Question: Sister, according to your point of view, will the former MPs be candidates 
again in the coming elections or do you think there will be some new candidates?  
Answer: Dear sister, there is a proverb that says “Easy come easy go.” But while Allah 
(SWA) has given them these positions freely, they will never leave their seats. 
Question: Will the people vote for them again, according to your point of view? 
Answer: Hey dear sister, personal relationships and money are enough for them; they 
don’t need the votes of the people. There will be new some new candidates too, but if 
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you don’t pay bribes you will never succeed in getting a seat. Bribery and betrayal is 
normal in Afghanistan.  
Question: Sister, according to your point of view what was the difference between the 
first elections, and the elections of last year? 
Answer: The first elections were a little better. 
Question: How were they better? 
Answer: There was not much war at that time. The American forces in the country 
were limited, but now they have captured all of Afghanistan and security is also not 
good, people are killed by the foreigners. There is no enquiry into their deaths. But, if 
any one of them [Americans] is killed, then they kill guilty and innocent people in 
response. There is no law or court for them, the law and the courts are only for the poor 
people. And the fact is that I did not leave home in those second elections and I didn’t 
vote for anyone.  
Question: Why didn’t you vote? 
Answer:  The [security] situation was not suitable and our menfolk didn’t allow us to 
go out to cast our votes. We were also worried about security incidents; therefore we 
didn’t leave home.  
Question: Sister, are there any shuras [councils] in your province? 
Answer: I don’t know anything else, but when there is an important issue, the elders of 
the nation gather together with the maliks. But I don’t know anything else. 
Question: Sister, what do you think about the provincial council? 
Answer: I don’t know about it (the respondent didn’t understand even the name of the 
provincial council and didn’t have any information in this regard. She also didn’t know 
whether there were any candidates from their area or not).  
Question: Are there any university students in your village? 
Answer: Yes, there are two boys from our village. One is Said Nasir and the other is 
Kamal. Kamal is holding first position and he is very poor boy. The lecturers told him 
that if he wants to keep his position, he should pay them $300, otherwise, forget about 
first position. And the other boy that was rich, held the first position by the power of 
dollars and this has happened in our village that all people know about it and these 
misfortunes are going on in our village, because there is no law and everyone acts 
according to his wish. Especially, that who doesn’t have money, car and that student 
who is son of a poor man, but doesn’t have money and recommendation, but Allah 
(SWA) has gifted him talent and ability, but still he is pushed back. Those who have 
dollars go forward, because they have dollars.  
Question: What should be done, according to your point of view? 
Answer: First, our people are illiterate, and they are not aware of Islamic law. The main 
issue is that there is no government. I also said before that there is no law, and the 
robber is not known. The government is asleep and doesn’t see anything. The lecturers 
take bribes and it is also said to students at schools that if anyone wants to hold first, 
second, third or fourth position, they should pay $200 and submit it to the administrator.  
Facilitator: Sister, thank you so much for answering our questions and letting us take 
your valuable time. Thanks once again and God willing, we will meet again.  
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GHAZ 21 M (Ghazni men’s interview no. 21: rural/mid income/Pashtun) 
 
             
Interview type: Individual interview 
Date: 19-05-2010 
Time: 12:05pm till 1:35pm 
Province: Ghazni 
Place: BB village, Qarabagh district 
Interview no: 21 
Respondent name, title 
and job: 
XX 
Student 
Respondent ethnicity Pashtun  
Respondent age 21 
Facilitator: Mohammad Akbar 
Note-taker: Najibullah 
 
Observations: 
 
As per our plan, first we went to the village and then to the respondent’s house and we 
knocked the door and he opened the door and greeted us. We went through to the main 
room, where there was a window and one door, and 4 toshaks also with white baleshtA. 
The walls were coloured brown. For some time he was busy doing other things in the 
house, but after a while he was ready and he brought a glass of tea for us. There was a 
plastic carpet on the ground. While drinking the tea we started the interview.   
 
      
Introduction:  
 
My colleague introduced the research and how the respondent could trust us not to 
write down his name. He talked about who we were and the organization we work for. 
After this introduction we started the questions. 
 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Question: Please introduce yourself? 
Answer: I am XX, son of YY, resident of the BB area. 
Question: What is your occupation? 
Answer: I am a student at the Shahid-e Abdul Salam school in Qara Bagh district, 
Ghazni province, and also I work around the home. 
Question: How long have you lived here? 
Answer: We have lived here since my birth. 
Question: Can you tell us a bit about your family background? 
Answer: Previously our family was proud to be considered the malikan [leaders] of the 
village, and referred to themselves as this. 
Question: Why do they not do so now? 
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Answer:  Because previously, the malikan had a lot of respect but nowadays no-one 
cares about them. 
Question: How are decisions made in your community? 
Answer: In our society decisions are made by the elders of the village and white-
bearded people. 
Question: How do they make decisions? 
Answer: These elders and white-bearded people of the village get together and make 
decisions about various things and then they put these into practice. 
Question: Who selects these decision makers?  
Answer: These decision makers are the malikan and they are selected by normal village 
people. 
Question: What do you think about this way of selecting the decision makers? 
Answer: This is a good way to elect a person and it solves a number of problems for 
everyone. 
Question: Are there any shuras? 
Answer: No, there is no shura, because there are not that many people in the village.   
Question: If you have a problem, to whom would you go first to solve your problem? 
Answer: It depends upon the kinds of problems that people have. If it is within a 
family, they discuss it with the father or elder brother, and if it is a village problem, they 
go to the village leaders, and if it is a tribal problem such as murder or enmity, they go 
to the tribal leaders to solve the problem. 
Question: If these people cannot solve your problem, then to whom would you take it?  
Answer: We are in the villages and there are Taliban here and they are always around, 
so we go to them and then they come up with a solution [to a problem] without charging 
anything. 
Question: How is reconstruction progressing here? 
Answer: It is done by government, and I also think some organizations are involved. 
Question: Which kinds of organizations are these? 
Answer: Construction is being carried out by the government mainly. 
Question: Where exactly has reconstruction been taking place? 
Answer: It has been only in the cities and not in villages or remote provinces. 
Question: What do you think about the situation in the area? 
Answer: The situation in the area is very unstable; it gets worse everyday through 
fights and people are dying for no reason. 
Question: How is your life going here? 
Answer: Our life is like being in a jail, because from both sides people are opposing us. 
We are especially very tired of the government. 
Question: How is the security situation in your village and in your province? 
Answer: The security situation in our area is very good from the Taliban side but not 
from government side and alhamdulallah [thanks to Allah] the Taliban has put an end 
to the activities of all thieves and bad people. But the government itself is a complete 
thief. I needed a new taskirah [identity card] and the price of it is normally 300 Afs 
[$6], but in fact I spent more than 2000 Afs [$40] because of having to give bribes to 
each one of the government officials, and to make sure that my card would be processed 
without having to wait for other people who paid more to go first. In the provinces the 
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government is just symbolic, they have not brought peace because people are getting 
shot.  
Question: What do you think about the parliament members in your province? 
Answer: From my point of view parliament is good, but the people who elected 
themselves to parliament are not useful people and they are not working for our people. 
Question: Did anyone get elected from your area in the parliamentary elections? 
Answer: No, from our area nobody won in the elections. 
Question: Generally in Afghanistan what do you think about parliament? 
Answer: Generally in Afghanistan parliament should do good work and each candidate 
should not forget his responsibilities and if he can’t do his work then he should leave his 
position and should resign. 
Question: Have you voted before? 
Answer: Yes I voted in the first round of elections but I didn’t vote in last year’s 
elections. 
Question: Why not? 
Answer: Because of problems, security was not good and also in advance we received 
the news that we should not vote. In the first election we didn’t know much about 
elections and we didn’t know what voting was, and if anyone wanted us to vote for 
someone and showed us a picture, we would just vote for that person. And I myself 
voted for President Hamid Karzai. 
Question: Will you vote in the coming elections? 
Answer: Yes, if there is security, and if there is Shariee [religious justice system]. And 
if the election is trustworthy then we will vote. 
Question: How you will make a decision about who to vote for? 
Answer: First we should ask about each candidate and we should know who they are 
and what they do. And then we will vote for a person who is very loyal to Allah. 
Question: Do you think these parliament members will be candidates themselves 
again? 
Answer: Yes, if the situation is good they will stand again for election. 
Question: Are there political groups active in this area? 
Answer: No, there is no political group here, but there are two governments: one is 
Hamid Karzai’s government and the other one is the Taliban government. And no 
political parties.  
 
Many thanks for giving us your valuable time for this interview.   
 
End 
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APPENDIX 4: INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED 
 
 
  
NANGARHAR 
Women 
No. Role/profession Ethnicity Elite/mid/low  City/suburb/rural Age 
1 Teacher Pashtun Elite  City 35 
2 Shopkeeper Pashtun Elite  City 30 
3 Teacher Pashtun Mid Suburb 38 
4 PC member Pashtun Elite  City 45 
5 NGO + unsuccessful PC candidate Pashtun Mid Suburb 48 
6 Student (university) Pashtun Elite Suburb 25 
7 Carpet weaver Arab Mid City 44 
8 Student (school) Pashtun Low Suburb 20 
9 Local council representative Tajik Mid Rural 52 
10 NSP Shura member  Pashaee  Low Rural 25 
11 Housewife Pashtun Low Rural 51 
12 NSP Shura member  Pashtun Low Rural 30 
13 Beauty parlor owner Pashtun Mid Rural 25 
14 Housewife Pashtun  Low Rural 30 
15 Housewife Pashtun Mid Rural 40 
16 Teacher Tajik Elite Rural 38 
17 Housewife Tajik Mid Rural 35 
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NANGARHAR 
Men 
No. Role/profession Ethnicity Elite/mid/low  City/suburb/rural Age 
1 Teacher Pashtun Mid City 63 
2 Tailor (former police chief) Pashtun Mid City 56 
3 Member of PC Pashtun Elite City 40 
4 Sewing machine mechanic Pashtun Low City 60 
5 Chief of local shura Pashtun Elite City 65-67 
6 Teacher Pashtun Mid City 55 
7 School student Pashtun Low City 22 
8 Driver Pashtun Mid City 35 
9 Computer repairman Pashtun Mid City 43 
10 Unemployed, local council head Pashtun Elite Suburb 51 
11 Teacher Pashtun Mid Suburb 48 
12 Farmer Pashtun Low Suburb 55 
13 Unemployed, former gov worker Pashtun Mid Suburb 57 
14 Student (high school) Pashtun Mid Suburb  21 
15 Unemployed, villager Pashtun Mid Suburb 60 
16 Shopkeeper Pashtun Low Suburb 57 
17 Student (university) Pashtun Mid Rural 25 
18 Villager and  former malik Pashtun Mid Suburb 35 
19 Elder of village/former gov worker Pashtun Mid Suburb 58 
20 Unemployed/former driver  Pashtun Low Suburb 59 
21 Government officer  Pashtun Elite Rural 58 
22 Labourer Pashtun Low Rural 53 
23 Malik Pashtun Elite Rural 35-40 
24 Owner of cart market stall  Pashaee Low Rural 38 
25 Head of NSP shura Pashtun Elite Rural 53 
26 Farmer Pashtun Low Rural 49 
27 Mirab (manages water of the village) Pashtun Mid Rural 53 
28 Candidate for parliament  Pashtun Mid Rural 40 
29 Unemployed Pashtun Low Rural 51 
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GHAZNI 
Women 
No. Role/profession Ethnicity Elite/mid/low City/suburb/rural Age 
1 Teacher Tajik Mid Suburb 34 
2 Teacher Tajik Mid Suburb 37 
3 Student  Pashtun Low City 19 
4 Student  Tajik Mid City 18 
5 PC member Tajik Elite City 37 
6 Student  Pashtun Low Rural 20 
7 Law dept. manager, DOWA Pashtun Elite City ? 
8 Beautician Pashtun Elite Suburb 33 
9 Housewife Pashtun Mid Suburb 28 
10 Tailoring trainer Tajik Mid Suburb ? 
11 Housewife Tajik Low Suburb 45 
12 Housewife Tajik Mid Suburb  ? 
13 Housewife Tajik Low City ? 
14 Housewife Tajik Low Suburb 35 
15 Carpet weaver Tajik Mid City ? 
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GHAZNI 
Men 
No. Role/Profession Ethnicity Elite/mid/low  City/suburb/rural Age 
1 Student Pashtun Mid Rural 27 
2 Teacher (university) Pashtun Elite City 32 
3 Teacher (high school) Pashtun Mid Rural  39 
4 Student Pashtun Mid City ? 
5 Driver Pashtun Mid City 33 
6 Farmer Pashtun Low Rural 47 
7 Shopkeeper Pashtun Mid City 45 
8 Village elder/PC candidate Pashtun Elite City 48 
9 Village elder/landowner Pashtun Elite Rural 45 
10 Shopkeeper Pashtun Mid Suburb 46 
11 Driver Pashtun Mid Rural 34 
12 Nurse Pashtun Mid Suburb 38 
13 Shop worker Pashtun Mid Rural 28 
14 Vaccinator Pashtun Mid Rural 30 
15 Driver Pashtun Low  City 34 
16 Unemployed Pashtun Mid Rural 23 
17 Barber Tajik Mid City 38 
18 Rickshaw driver Pashtun Low City 32 
19 Student Pashtun Mid Rural 23 
20 Day labourer Pashtun Low Rural 33 
21 Student (university) Pashtun Mid Rural 21 
22 Student (high school) Pashtun Mid Rural 19 
23 Farmer Pashtun Low Rural  45 
24 Day labourer Pashtun Elite Rural 36 
25 Shopkeeper Pashtun Elite Rural 42 
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BALKH 
Women 
No. Role/profession Ethnicity Elite/mid/low City/suburb/rural Age 
1 Teachers (high school, 5) Tajik Mid Suburb/prov town 25-50 
2 
Students/teachers (high 
school, 16) 
Tajik Mid Suburb/prov town 16-50 
3 Street seller Arab Low Rural 40 
4 Students (high school, 8) Mixed Mid Suburb/prov town 20-22 
5 Housewives (4) Pashtun Low Rural 20-35 
6 Fortune teller 
Tajik/Tajikistan 
origin 
Low Rural  40 
7 Housewife Turkmen Low Rural ? 
8 Gardener  
Tajik/Tajikistan 
origin 
Low Rural 40 
9 Housewife ? Low City ? 
10 Teacher (high school) Tajik  Mid Suburb/prov town 30 
11 Teacher (high school) Uzbek Mid Suburb/prov town 35 
12 Teacher (high school) Tajik Mid Suburb/prov town ? 
13 Head of women's shura Tajik Elite Suburb/prov town 45 
14 Beautician and 2 clients Tajik Mid Suburb/prov town ? 
15 Radio station presenter Tajik Elite City 34 
16 Teachers (high school, 6) Tajik Mid City 30-50 
17 Students (high school, 7) Tajik Mid City 16-19 
18 Teachers (high school, 6) Mixed Low City 30-50 
19 Parliamentarian Pashtun Elite City 35 
20 Parliamentarian Pashtun Elite City 45 
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BALKH 
Men 
No. Role/profession Ethnicity Elite/mid/low City/suburb/rural Age 
1 Head of Balkh PC Tajik Elite City 50 
2 District governor Tajik Elite Suburb/prov town 45 
3 District governor Pashtun Elite Suburb  47 
4 Qaryadars Mixed Elite Rural 45-65 
5 District governor Pashtun Elite Suburb/prov town 52 
6 PC member (deputy head) Hazara Elite City 48 
7 District governor Tajik Elite Suburb/prov town 56 
8 
Teacher and failed WJ 
candidate 
Tajik Mid City 40 
9 Student (university) Tajik Mid City 19 
10 Shopkeeper  ? Mid Suburb/prov town 50+ 
11 Farmer ? Low Rural 50+ 
12 Farmers (2) ? Low Rural ? 
13 Shopkeeper (groceries) Hazara Mid Suburb/prov town 30+ 
14 Shoemaker  Pashtun Mid Suburb/prov town 40 
15 Shura members (4) 
Pashtun, Tajik. 
Hazara 
Elite Rural 40+ 
16 Villagers Pashtun Low Rural 40+ 
17 Villagers 
Tajik. Uzbek 
and Turkmen 
Low Suburb/prov town 35-45 
18 Villager  ? Mid Suburb/prov town 40+ 
19 Villager Tajik Mid City 20 
20 Watermelon seller  Tajik Low Rural 33 
21 Shura member  Tajik Elite Suburb/prov town 50 
22 
2 Students, mullah, shura 
member 
? Mid Rural Mixed 
23 
Member of youth shura 
and English teacher 
Tajik Mid Suburb/prov town 25 
24 Villagers 
Tajik and 
Uzbek 
Low Rural Mixed 
25 Doctor Pashtun Mid Suburb 40+ 
26 PC member for Balkh Turkmen Elite Suburb/prov town  50 
 
  
371 
 
Kabul 
Women 
No. Role/Profession Ethnicity Elite/mid/low City/suburb/rural Age 
1 Religious teacher Hazara Mid City 30 
2 New parliamentary candidate Ismaili Mid City 25 
3 MP  for Kabul Pashtun Elite City 50 
4 MP  for Kabul Hazara Elite City 40 
5 Elections observer Tajik Mid Suburb 16 
6 PC member + candidate Hazara Elite Suburb 45 
7 PC candidate Bayat Mid Suburb ? 
8 PC candidate Hazara Elite Suburb 32 
9 PC member + candidate Hazara Elite Suburb 40 
 
 
Kabul   
Men 
No. Role/Profession Ethnicity Elite/mid/low City/suburb/rural Age 
1 
Fruit shop owner and 
teacher 
Tajik Mid City 50 
2 Shopkeeper Tajik Mid City 40 
3 Religious teacher Hazara Mid City 43 
4 NGO worker Bayat Mid City 30 
5 Fruit seller ? Low City 50 
6 Mullahs (3) Mixed Mid Suburb 
38-
50 
7 Market trader Pashtun Mid City 30 
8 Students Pashtun Mid City 25 
9 
New parliamentary 
candidate 
Pashtun Mid City 45 
10 MP for Kabul Hazara Elite Suburb 45 
11 
New parliamentary 
candidate 
Pashtun Elite City 60 
12 Barber Hazara Mid Suburb 30 
13 Tea shop worker Hazara Low Suburb 
40-
50 
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APPENDIX 5: MAPS OF THREE PROVINCES 
Nangarhar province
54
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
54
 All maps available from the Afghanistan Information Management Service (AIMS) online at: 
http://www.aims.org.af/services/sectoral/agriculture/landcover/Nangarhar.pdf [Accessed 20 July 2013]. 
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Nangarhar districts (Surkh Rod and Behsud) 
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Ghazni province
55
 
 
 
 
                                                          
55
Available at:  http://www.aims.org.af/services/sectoral/agriculture/landcover/Ghazni.pdf 
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Ghazni district (Qarabagh) 
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Balkh province
56
 
 
 
 
                                                          
56
Available at: http://www.aims.org.af/services/sectoral/agriculture/landcover/Balkh.pdf 
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Balkh districts (Balkh, Dedadi [Dihdadi], Kaldar) 
378 
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